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fuerunt. Empirici, formicæ more, congerunt tantum, &
utuntur: Rationales, aranearum more, telas ex se conﬁci-
unt: Apis vero ratio media est, quæ materiam ex ﬂoribus
horti & agri elicit; sed tamen eam propria facultate vertit
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est; quod nec Mentis viribus tantum aut præcipue nititur,
neque ex Historia Naturali & Mechanicis Experimentis
præbitam materiam, in Memoria integram, sed in Intel-
lectu mutatam & subactam, reponit. Itaque ex harum fac-
ultatum (Experimentalis scilicet, & Rationalis) arctiore
& sanctiore foedere (quod adhuc factum non est) bene
sperandum est.Thosewhohavehandledscienceshaveeitherbeenmenofexperiment
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gathers its material from the ﬂowers of the garden and ﬁeld, but
transforms and digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this
is the true business of philosophy; for it neither relies solely or
chieﬂy on the powers of the mind, nor does it take the matter which
it gathers from natural history and mechanical experiments and
lay up in the memory whole, as it ﬁnds it, but lays it up in the
understanding altered and digested. Therefore, from a closer and
purer league between these two faculties, the experimental and the
rational (such as has never yet been made), much may be hoped.
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Samenvatting 268Basic terms and notation
Below one ﬁnds a list of common terms and notation used throughout this thesis.
The symbol I refers to the section in which more information can be found on the
diﬀerent items.
General
N The set of positive integers {1,2,...}.
N0 The set of nonnegative integers {0,1,2,...}.
R The set of real numbers (−∞,∞).
C Thesetofcomplexnumbers,i.e.,allnumbersoftheforma+bi,where
a,b ∈ R and i =
√
−1.
Re The real part of a complex number. E.g., if z = a + bi, then Re[z] = a.
e Euler’s number, i.e., e is the unique real number such that the value
of the derivative of f(x) = ex at x = 0 is exactly 1.
log The natural logarithm, i.e., the logarithm to the base e.
logb The logarithm to the base b, where b > 0,b , 1.
Game theory (I 2.1)
Γ The set of all ﬁnite strategic games.
ϕp A point-valued solution concept.
ϕs A set-valued solution concept.B    xv
Probability and measure theory (I 2.2)
Ω Sample space.
F σ-algebra.




→ Convergence almost surely.
d
→ Convergence in distribution.
p
→ Convergence in probability.
1F Indicator function of the event F.
Weak set inclusion is denoted by ⊆, strict set inclusion by ⊂. The number of
elements in a ﬁnite set S is denoted by |S|. For k ∈ N, the k-fold cartesian product
×k
i=1S of a set S is denoted by Sk. Let U be a subset of a set S. The complement of U
(relative to S) is denoted by Uc. We take “countable” to mean “countably inﬁnite”.
In Chapter 5, we derive some asymptotic results. We use the following stan-
dard notation. Suppose f and g are two functions of a real variable x. We say that
f(x) = O(g(x)) as x → ∞ if |f(x)| ≤ M|g(x)| for all large x and some constant M.
Similarly, f(x) = o(g(x)) as x → ∞, if for all ε > 0, there exists nε ∈ R such that
|f(x)| < ε|g(x)| for all x > nε. Finally, f(x) ∼ g(x) as x → ∞ if limx→∞ f(x)/g(x) = 1.
Similar deﬁnitions hold as x ↓ 0 and for real sequences (f(n))n∈N, (g(n))n∈N.1 Networks, learning and games
Summary
This thesis is concerned with two distinct topics, (i) game theory and
networksand(ii)learningingames.Here,weprovideabriefintroduction
tothesetwotopicsanddiscussthequestionsthatweaddressinthisthesis.
We conclude this chapter with an outline of the thesis.
1.1 Networks and games
In the ﬁrst part of this thesis, we focus on networks and strategic interactions.
Networks play a central role in economics for two reasons. Firstly, at least since
theseminalworkofColemanetal.(1966)onthediﬀusionoftechnologiesandGra-
novetter (1974) and Rees (1966) on job contact networks, it is widely recognized
that networks give access to various resources, such as information, knowledge
and capital. This is corroborated by a large number of subsequent empirical stud-
ies; see e.g. Conley and Udry (2005), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Powell
et al. (1996) on the diﬀusion of new technologies, and De Weerdt (2002) and
Fafchamps and Lund (2003) on informal insurance networks in developing coun-
tries. Secondly, several empirical studies have pointed out that agents’ behavior
is primarily shaped by the behavior of those with whom he has a direct relation-
ship, rather than on the behavior of the population at large. Indeed, Goolsbee
and Klenow (2002) and Tucker (2006) ﬁnd that an individual’s decision to adopt
a particular communication technology is primarily inﬂuenced by the adoption
decisionsofthosewithwhomheinteractsdirectly,ratherthanbytheoveralladop-
tion level in the population. Glaeser et al. (1996) and Topa (2001) provide similar
evidence in the context of crime and unemployment, respectively.
These empirical studies have stimulated a rich theoretical literature in game
theory on strategic network formation and strategic interactions on networks,
starting with the seminal contributions of Myerson (1977), Jackson and Wolinsky1 N,    2
(1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000). This literature has produced a wealth of insights
on what networks are formed by self-interested, rational agents, and what the
implications are for eﬃciency and inequality (see Jackson, 2005, for a survey).
An important branch of the literature studies the interplay of strategic network
formation and strategic interactions on networks (see Goyal, 2007, for a survey).
Until recently, the game-theoretic literature on networks has focused almost
exclusively on settings where agents have full information on the network struc-
ture. The assumption of complete information is particularly problematic in a
network context. Since players on a network only interact with a small subset of
players, it is hard to believe that they would have complete information about
all other players and their relations, in particular since many social and economic
networks are very large and complex (Vega-Redondo, 2007), and evolve rapidly
overtime(e.g.Powelletal.,2005).1 Inasense,networksareawaytomodellimited
communication possibilities and limited interactions, which is hard to reconcile
with the assumption of complete information.
Moreover, the combinatorial constraints imposed by the network structure
makes that equilibria in network games with complete information are generally
hard to characterize, already in the simplest games. In addition, there is often a
large number of equilibria. In such complex settings, it is hard to conceive that
actual players will manage to play according to an equilibrium. To account for
this, one could assume that players have incomplete information on the network,
or,equivalently,thattheysimplydonotuseallinformationtheyhave.2 Thetaskof
ﬁnding an equilibrium (for game-theorists and, more importantly, for players) is
then much simpliﬁed because under incomplete information, players do not have
to choose their strategies taking into account the full network structure, reasoning
howopponents’networkpositionwillinﬂuencetheirbehavior,butinsteadchoose
their strategies on the basis of some probability measure over networks which is
the same for each player given their local information. In eﬀect, the assumption
of incomplete information allows one to average out the discrete features of the
1 Someempiricalstudiesinsociologyandsocialpsychologyhavestudiedindividuals’information
about their network. For instance, Friedkin (1983) ﬁnds that the “observational horizon” of
individuals is limited in communication networks in organizations: individuals only know their
local environment in the network. Krackhardt and Hanson (1993) report that informal networks
in organizations are mostly unobservable to senior executives. Also, Powell et al. (1996, p.120)
observe that in R&D collaborations in biotechnology, “beneath most formal ties [. . . ] lies a sea of
informal relations”.
2 An alternative approach to account for the complexity involved in network games is to assume
that players use simple heuristics or rules of thumb to guide their behavior. See Vega-Redondo
(2007) for a discussion of this approach.1.1 N   3
network which make the equilibria in network games hard to solve for, so that the
equilibrium predictions thus obtained may provide a more realistic description of
actual play.
For these reasons, attention has increasingly turned to models which allow
for incomplete information or some randomness, both in contexts of network
formation and of strategic interactions on a ﬁxed network. In the ﬁrst part of this
thesis, we focus on the latter class of models.3 In this introduction, we brieﬂy
discuss the literature, and we highlight some open questions that are related to
the work in this thesis.
The literature on network games studies settings in which players are located
on a network. Each player is associated with a node or vertex in the network, with
the edges or links representing the relations between them. Players play a ﬁxed
game with their neighbors in the network. They need to take the same action in
each of their interactions. Hence, while interactions are bilateral, the interactions
are linked through the fact that players need to take the same action in each of
the bilateral games they play. In many contexts, this is a natural assumption. For
instance, suppose that a player needs to decide which operating system to buy. He
may want to coordinate his choice with the choices of his neighbors to facilitate
the exchange of ﬁles, but it would be too costly and impractical to buy a diﬀerent
operating system for each of his bilateral interactions. Furthermore, it is assumed
that players have incomplete information on the network structure. They have a
common prior, and in addition, they have some private information on their local
environment. The literature to date has focused on the case that a player’s private
informationisthenumberofconnectionshehasinthenetwork,i.e.,hisdegree(e.g.
Galeotti et al., 2006; Galeotti and Vega-Redondo, 2005; Jackson and Yariv, 2007;
L´ opez-Pintado, 2006; Sundararajan, 2005).
Here, we discuss two central issues in the study of network games under
incomplete information, aiming to show how the chapters in this thesis relate to
them. Firstly, an important issue is how the combination of strategic interactions,
incomplete information and networks can provide new insights. The second issue
we address is how players’ beliefs should be modeled in settings where players
interact strategically on a network under incomplete information on the network
structure. We discuss these issues in turn.
3 Papers in the ﬁrst class include Cabrales et al. (2007), Jackson and Rogers (2007), Marsili, Vega-
Redondo, and Slanina (2004), and McBride (2006). Also see Vega-Redondo (2007) for a survey.1 N,    4
The interplay of networks, incomplete information and strategic interactions
Theﬁrstquestionweaddressishowthecombinationofstrategicinteractions,
incomplete information and networks can provide new insights in economic set-
tings. The last few years have witnessed the development of two largely com-
plementary literatures that model interactions on networks. The ﬁrst literature is
concerned with strategic interactions on networks where players have full infor-
mation on the network structure (see Goyal, 2007; Jackson, 2008, and references
therein). Complementary to this literature, an extensive literature has developed
thatfocusesonstochasticprocessesonnetworks(e.g.Durrett,2006).Inthemodels
studied in the latter literature, agents interact non-strategically with their neigh-
bors. A primary example is the study of the spread of epidemics, where agents
become infected by their neighbors, and infect their neighbors with some proba-
bility.
Boththeseliteratures,theliteratureonnetworkgameswithcompleteinforma-
tion and the literature on stochastic processes on networks, address the question
how agents interact on a network, and in particular, how the interactions change
when the network structure is varied. However, the two literatures each take a
diﬀerent perspective. The ﬁrst literature emphasizes strategic decision-making by
rational players with full information, while the latter is concerned with non-
strategic decision-making in situations where agents are not informed of the full
network structure.
Onlyrecently,attentionhasturnedtomodelsinwhichstrategicagentsinteract
on a network under incomplete information, thus combining the complementary
perspectives of the two literatures discussed above. The early works in this ﬁeld
merelybuildontheaforementionedliteratureonstochasticprocessesonnetworks,
adapting the models to the speciﬁcs of the social and economic phenomena of
interest(seeVega-Redondo,2007,Ch.4foradiscussion),andintroducingstrategic
decision making. Two basic approaches have been adopted. The ﬁrst approach
studies the (long-run) behavior of myopic adjustment processes (e.g. Jackson and
Yariv,2007;L´ opez-Pintado,2006),thusremainingcloseinmethodologicaltermsto
the literature on stochastic processes. The second approach takes an equilibrium
perspective, analyzing the (symmetric) Bayesian equilibria (Jackson and Yariv,
2007; Sundararajan, 2005). In terms of results, the two approaches are similar
for certain classes of games, however, as the rest points of the stochastic process
correspond to the Bayesian equilibria Bayesian equilibria of the game (Jackson
and Yariv, 2007).
Thesetwoapproachesalreadypresentanimportantsteptofurthertheunder-1.1 N   5
standing of strategic interactions on networks. Many important classes of games
lenditselftosuchanapproach,suchascoordinationgamesandgameswithstrate-
gic complementarities (Vega-Redondo, 2007), and the strategic models provide
important new insights that could not be obtained from the original non-strategic
models. A primary example of a question that can only be studied within strategic
models is how behavior reacts to changes in incentives. For instance, Jackson and
Yariv (2007) study how adoption patterns vary with the returns to adopting and
adoption costs. Also, the strategic approach allows for an assessment of welfare
in network settings (e.g. Sundararajan, 2005).
However, to some extent, the game-theoretic models merely rationalize the
behavior of the original stochastic models. While this makes it possible to do
welfare analyses and to study how behavior depends on incentives, there are
some limitations to this approach. Firstly, this approach is restricted to games in
which payoﬀs only depend on the number of neighbors taking a certain action.
However, in many settings, a player’s payoﬀs depend on which neighbor takes
a given action, even if we restrict attention to games that are anonymous in the
sense that the identity of a player per se does not matter, only his structural
characteristics. Consider for instance a setting in which ﬁrms compete on multiple
markets. Each ﬁrm competes on a subset of possible markets. This gives rise to
a network with a group structure (see Chapter 5): each market forms a group,
and ﬁrms are connected in the network if and only if they compete in at least one
market. In such a setting, the eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s proﬁt will be greater if a competitor
on a large number of markets invests in a general cost-reducing technology than
when a ﬁrm with which it only competes on a single market makes such an
investment.
Secondly, this approach fails to capture the richness in strategic behavior
that stems from the interaction between network formation and network play
that has been studied in the game-theoretic literature on network games (Goyal,
2007; Jackson, 2008). For instance, in both static and evolutionary settings, it has
been shown that cooperation in a (ﬁnitely repeated) prisoner’s dilemma crucially
depends on the possibility of players to ostracize players that defect (e.g. Hauert
et al., 2007; Hirshleifer and Rasmusen, 1989; Ule, 2008).
To overcome these limitations, a further integration of the game-theoretic ap-
proach and the stochastic approach seems to be needed. While much of the work
to date has tried to bridge the gap between the literatures by adding strategic deci-
sion making to models from the literature on stochastic network processes, a few
papers have taken this approach one step further by abstracting from particular1 N,    6
applications and extending the approach to a broader class of games. This is the
approach taken by for instance Galeotti et al. (2006), who study games with strate-
gic complements and substitutes in a network setting. Players do not know the
network structure, but they are informed of the number of connections they have.
Galeotti et al. study how the degree of players determine their choices and how
this aﬀects payoﬀs, showing that predictions change when the degree distribution
and the correlation among players’ degrees are varied.
As in the literature on stochastic processes on networks, random network
models play a central role in this approach. A random network model gives for
each network in a given set the probability that this network is realized (see Sec-
tion 2.3 for a precise deﬁnition). The two approaches diﬀer in an important respect
intheuseofthesemodels,however.Intheliteratureonstochasticprocessesonnet-
works,randomnetworkmodelsareusedtoyield(withhighprobability)networks
that are representative of real networks in terms of their macroscopic properties.
For instance, the random network model we discuss in Section 2.3.2 gives with
high probability a network whose empirical degree distribution matches closely a
given degree distribution (in the limit of a large number of vertices). In the litera-
ture on network games, by contrast, random network models are purely a model
for players’ beliefs. To the extent that players believe that the network on which
they are located has certain macroscopic properties, it is of course important to
use random network models that have on average these properties, but it is not
necessary that the random network model produces a network with these proper-
ties with high probability. In fact, as we discuss below, it is not even clear whether
we need to use belief models that give a probability distribution over networks,
rather than over players’ local environment in the network. This means that we
can abstract from speciﬁc random network models and focus on realistic models
of players’ beliefs.
Such an abstract setting allows us to investigate the rich interplay between
incompleteinformation,strategicreasoningandlocalinteractions.Sinceempirical
evidence on individuals’ beliefs on their network, or on their information about
their social environment is scarce,4 it is important to investigate the sensitivity of
game-theoretic predictions to informational assumptions and to assumptions on
players’ beliefs.
In Chapter 3, we study the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions to as-
4 Evidencesuggeststhatagentsusesimpleheuristicstoformbeliefs(JanicikandLarrick,2005),and
that their perception of the network is biased (e.g. Kumbasar et al., 1994), even in an environment
with strong incentives (Johnson and Orbach, 2002).1.1 N   7
sumptions on players’ beliefs in Bayesian network games. This class of games
is studied extensively in the literature (Galeotti et al., 2006; Jackson and Yariv,
2007; Sundararajan, 2005). In this class of games, players interact with their direct
neighbors and are informed of their degree. Chapter 3 studies which features of
players’ prior beliefs are important from a game-theoretic perspective in this class
of games. That is, we ask under what conditions a “small” change in players’
beliefs can give rise to a large diﬀerence in outcomes. To answer this question, we
have to specify what we mean by similar outcomes, i.e., when two priors are close
in a strategic sense. We say that two priors are close in a strategic sense if for any
game in which players hold one of these priors, for any symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium in that game, there is a symmetric approximate equilibrium in the
associated game with the other prior such that ex ante expected payoﬀs are close
under both equilibria. If that is the case, players can obtain approximately the
same ex ante expected payoﬀs under both priors.
We show that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and only if the
degree distribution and the correlation among neighbors’ degrees is similar under
the two priors. This is an important result, for two reasons. Firstly, this result
implies that in order to explore the full range of strategic outcomes in this class
of network games, it is suﬃcient to vary the degree distribution and the degree
correlation. Hence, on the one hand, varying the type distribution, as has been the
focus of much of the literature so far (e.g Jackson and Yariv, 2007; Sundararajan,
2005), is often not enough. On the other hand, this result limits the set of priors
that one needs to consider: priors need only be varied on two dimensions. A
second important implication is that we can interpret such network game as a
set of overlapping “local games”, and that we do not need to concern ourselves
with the nonlocal features of players’ beliefs. That is, while players’ beliefs are
represented by a probability measure on a set of networks, we show that it is only
the induced degree distribution and the induced degree correlation that matters
for game-theoretic outcomes.
Chapter 4 takes this approach one step further by allowing for uncertainty
overthenetworksize.Thisisanaturalassumptioninthecurrentcontext.Ifaplayer
onlyinteractswithasmallsubsetofplayersandhasincompleteinformationonthe
network structure, it is natural to assume that he does not know the exact size of
thenetwork.Interestingly,weobtainqualitativelydiﬀerentresultswhennetworks
can be of any ﬁnite size. When players are uncertain about the network size, two
priors are strategically close if and only if (i) they assign similar prior probabilities
to all events involving a player and his neighbors, (ii) with high probability, a
player believes, given his type, that his neighbors’ conditional beliefs are similar1 N,    8
under the two priors, and that his neighbors believe, given their type, that. . . the
conditional beliefs of their neighbors are similar, for any number of iterations.
Condition (i) is similar to the condition for strategic closeness in Bayesian
networkgamesderivedinChapter3.Condition(ii)isnew.Thereasonwhyweneed
an additional condition for strategic closeness in network games with uncertainty
over the network size is that when a network can be of any ﬁnite size, the type
set is countably inﬁnite (recall that a player’s type is his degree in these games).
In that case, events that have small prior probability may considerably aﬀect
outcomes through players’ conditional beliefs: even if an event has small prior
probability, this event may inﬂuence a player’s actions when he thinks (given his
private information) that it is likely that his neighbor think it is likely that their
neighbors think it is likely. . . that the small probability event is true. When the
type set is ﬁnite, as in the class of Bayesian network games studied in Chapter 3,
closeness in terms of prior probabilities assigned to local events implies closeness
in terms of players’ conditional beliefs (cf. Proposition 4.5.15). This shows that it
is important to be careful in specifying the model. While it seems innocuous to
allow for uncertainty over the network size, the results in Chapter 4 shows that it
can have important ramiﬁcations.
Interestingly, condition (ii) can also be formulated in terms of correlations
among types. An alternative formulation of condition (ii) is that the set of types
for which conditional beliefs are similar has to have high probability, and has to be
suﬃciently cohesive in the sense that with high conditional probability, a type in
that set interacts only with types in that set that, with high conditional probability,
only interact with types in that set, and so on. This formulation of condition (ii) is
reminiscent of the results obtained by Morris (2000) on contagion on networks. In
the setting of Morris, players on a ﬁxed network play a coordination game with
their neighbors, with their payoﬀs depending on the fraction of their neighbors
takingacertainaction.Heﬁndsthat,startingfromaﬁnitesetofplayersX,behavior
does not spread contagiously by myopic best-reply dynamics on a network with
a countably inﬁnite number of players if and only if the network of players not
belonging to X contains a large group of players Y that is suﬃciently cohesive, in
the sense that players from Y interact mostly with other players from Y, who in
turn interact primarily with other players from Y, and so on.
Condition (ii) is a direct stochastic analogue of this result of Morris (2000).
Rather than a ﬁxed network of players, we consider a random network of players,
which induces a ﬁxed interaction structure on the players’ types, and the situation
we consider is the following. Suppose that there is a set of types with small prior1.1 N   9
probability for whom conditional beliefs are very diﬀerent under two priors (so
that they may follow diﬀerent strategies under the two priors). We ask under what
conditions these types do not “infect” a large (in terms of ex ante probability) set
oftypesthroughplayers’higherorderbeliefs.Thisisthecasepreciselywhenthere
is a group of types with high prior probability that is suﬃciently cohesive.
That is, we map a random network of players to a ﬁxed interaction structure
of types. This mapping allows us to apply the formal equivalence between games
on a ﬁxed network with complete information and Bayesian games established by
Morris (1997, 2000), which in turn enables us to use ideas from literature on higher
orderbeliefs.Thisprovidesanexampleoftherichnessofresultsthatcanbegained
from more fully integrating the strategic approach with the stochastic approach.
Moreover, the work presented in Chapter 4 opens the door to the application of
ideas and concepts from the literature on higher order beliefs to answer questions
that are important in network settings, such as the sensitivity of predictions to
assumptions on players’ information.
Beliefs and random network models
The second question we address in this introduction is how players’ beliefs
in network games should be modeled. So far, the literature, including the work in
this thesis, has primarily used random network models to model players’ beliefs,
focusing on local features of these models, such as the degree distribution induced
bythemodel.Here,weaskwhetherthesetypesofmodelsarethemostappropriate
representation of players’ beliefs, and how they might be improved. We thereby
focus on two issues. Firstly, we ask whether we need models that specify players’
beliefs over the full network. Secondly, we discuss whether we need to account
for features of networks that are not purely local, such as community structure.
To start with the ﬁrst issue, the random network models employed in much
of the literature on network games present a “global” model of players’ beliefs,
in the sense that they provide a probability measure on a set of networks. Hence,
when we use these models to represent players’ beliefs, we assume that players
have some assessment of how likely it is that each network is realized. However, it
is not clear that these global models of beliefs present an adequate representation
of the beliefs of human subjects or, more generally, economic agents. Random
network models, especially when they involve some interdependencies among
the characteristics of players (vertices) in the network, may be quite complicated.
It may be more reasonable to assume that players only entertain local beliefs, i.e.,
beliefs about the characteristics of their neighbors. An important characteristic of1 N,    10
network games is that players play games with their direct neighbors, who in turn
interactwiththeirneighbors,etcetera.TheworkinChapter3and4indicatesthatit
is not so much the global structure of the network that matters for game-theoretic
predictions, rather, it is the induced interactions between player types that play
a role, as in standard Bayesian games. This insight may provide a way to move
away from global belief models to more realistic models of players’ beliefs.
While it may be more realistic to assume that players do not have beliefs over
thefullnetworkstructure,theremaybenetworkpropertiesthatarenotpurelylocal
that are important for game-theoretic applications. The second issue we address
here is therefore whether “meso-level” features of networks, i.e., features that are
neither purely local nor global, should be accounted for. In the games studied in
the literature so far, a player’s payoﬀs only depend on his own action and type
andtheactionsandtypesofhisneighbors.Thatis,higher-levelnetworkstructures
such as the partition of the network into communities (densely linked groups) do
not play a role. In Chapter 3 and 4, we show that only players’ beliefs over the
distribution of degrees and the correlation between the degrees of neighbors aﬀect
game-theoreticpredictions.However,empiricalevidenceindicatesthatalsomeso-
level features of the network aﬀect actions and outcomes. For instance, Coleman
(1990) argues that networks which exhibit greater network closure, i.e., that are
highly interconnected, generate high trust. Several empirical studies support this
claim(e.g.Allcottetal.,2007),indicatingthatthecommunitystructureofnetworks
plays an important role.
An important next step would therefore be to widen the scope to other classes
of games, where players’ payoﬀs may depend on other features of the network. In
network games with incomplete information on the network structure in which
closure or community structure plays an important role, other features of priors
than the degree distribution and the degree correlation are likely to be important
for game-theoretic predictions, which may yield new insights. Chapter 5 proposes
arandomnetworkmodelwithacommunitystructurewhichcanbeusedtomodel
beliefs in such game-theoretic models, as it allows one to gradually vary features
of the model such as the degree distribution and community structure.
1.2 Learning in games
Up to recently, work in noncooperative game theory has focused almost exclu-
sively on equilibria in games, in particular on Nash equilibria and reﬁnements of1.2 L   11
the Nash equilibrium concept (see Section 2.1 for formal deﬁnitions and discus-
sion). When one views game theory as a positive science, i.e., when one takes the
stance that the principal aim of game theory is to provide an accurate description
of the behavior of players in strategic situations, an important question is when
and why we can expect players to behave according to some equilibrium. Tra-
ditionally, the explanation is that equilibrium behavior results from analysis and
introspectionofplayersinsituationsinwhichtherulesofthegame,therationality
of the players, and the utility functions of players are common knowledge (e.g.
Myerson, 1991; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). However, this approach suﬀers




the long-run outcome of an adaptive process in which boundedly rational players
learn that some strategies perform better than others. The literature on learning
and adaptive play in games (see e.g. Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Samuelson,
1997;Weibull,1995,andreferencestherein)proposesvariousadaptiveprocessesto
describe players’ behavior, and analyzes the long-run behavior of these processes.
In the second part of this thesis, we investigate several issues in the theory of
learning in games. Here, we discuss how the chapters of this thesis ﬁt in with the
literature on learning in games.
Beforewebeginourdiscussion,itisimportanttoremarkthatlearningmodels
are not models that explain how players learn to play according to an equilibrium.
Thiswouldpresume,ﬁrstly,thatplayersalwayslearntoplayaccordingtoanequi-
librium, and, secondly, that learning models always converge to an equilibrium.
Both of these presumptions are false. Firstly, a number of experimental studies
report that subjects do not learn to play according to a Nash equilibrium of the
game (e.g. Erev and Roth, 1998; Ochs, 1995). Secondly, learning models need not
converge, or need not converge to an equilibrium. In fact, Hart and Mas-Colell
(2003) show that there exists no uncoupled learning dynamic, i.e., a learning dy-
namic in which the changes in a player’s strategy does not depend on the payoﬀ
functions of other players, that guarantees Nash convergence.6
5 An important conceptual problem arises for instance when there are multiple equilibria: if we
cannot explain how players come to expect the same equilibrium, their play need not correspond
to any equilibrium of the game. A major empirical problem with the traditional explanation of
equilibrium behavior is that play in the early rounds of many experiments does not resemble
equilibriumplay,whichisnotinlinewiththeideathatequilibriumbehaviorresultsfromanalysis
and introspection. See Fudenberg and Levine (1998) for a discussion of these and other problems
with the traditional explanation of Nash equilibrium play.1 N,    12
Rather than explaining how players learn to play according to an equilib-
rium, learning theory contributes to our understanding of play in games in four
distinct ways. Firstly, learning theory may oﬀer an accurate description of how
experimental subjects learn to play according to an equilibrium when they are
initially very far from equilibrium (e.g. Cooper et al., 1997). Secondly, when exper-
imental play converges, but not to a Nash equilibrium of the game, then learning
models may give an accurate account of how subjects choose their actions, and
thus shed some light on why the equilibrium prediction fails (e.g. Erev and Roth,
1998). Thirdly, learning theory can help resolve equilibrium selection problems
(Samuelson, 1997). Finally, learning models can suggest useful ways to evaluate
and modify traditional equilibrium concepts. In some cases, learning models con-
verge to a reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium, such as risk-dominant equilibria (e.g.
Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1998); in other cases, predictions are much weaker
than Nash equilibrium, for instance in extensive form games.
The point of departure of learning models is that players may not always
be perfectly rational: players choose their strategies in a trial-and-error learning
process, ﬁnding that some strategies perform better than others. At the same time,
players may be somewhat sophisticated. Learning models diﬀer in the degree of
sophistication they attribute to players, aiming to strike a balance between the
realization that players are not fully rational yet not completely unsophisticated.7
In Chapter 6, we present a model that tries to strike such a balance. In the
model we propose there, players choose best replies to beliefs that are supported
by observed play of their opponents in the recent past, thus requiring some so-
phistication on the part of players. At the same time, players are “forgetful” (cf.
Hurkens, 1995; Young, 1998): they only recall a ﬁxed number of past periods. In
addition, players are subject to a so-called “recency bias”: if there are multiple
6 Convergence and stability properties of learning models generally depend on the properties of
thegame,sothatalearningmodelmayconvergetoanequilibriuminoneclassofgamesbutnotin
another.Forinstance,thereinforcementlearningmodelofRothandErev(1995)doesnotconverge
in games with a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium. Stochastic ﬁctitious play (e.g. Fudenberg
and Levine, 1998, Ch. 4) converges in this class of games, but not to the Nash equilibrium.
7 For instance, reinforcement learning models (Roth and Erev, 1995) only posit that strategies that
have been successful in the past, will be used more often than strategies that have proved less
successful. To learn according to a reinforcement learning model, players only need to know the
actions they chose in the past and the associated payoﬀs. In particular, they need not know or
understandthestructureofthegame.Bycontrast,inbelief-basedmodels(FudenbergandLevine,
1998), players form beliefs over their opponents’ behavior on the basis of their past play. To learn
according to this class of models, players need to be rational, form beliefs over others’ play and
calculate expected payoﬀs. For this, they need to be informed of the game, their opponents’ past
actions and their own history of play.1.2 L   13
best-replies to a given belief, players choose the most recent one.
We show that play converges to a minimal prep set of the game. Minimal
prep sets (Voorneveld, 2004) are a set-valued solution concept for strategic games
(see Section 2.1.2 for a precise deﬁnition). Also in the deﬁnition of this solution
concept there is a balance between relaxing the assumption of full rationality
and assuming some sophistication. The solution concept combines a standard
rationality condition, stating that the set of recommended strategies to each player
mustcontainatleastonebestreplytowhateverbeliefhemayhavethatisconsistent
with the recommendations to the other players, with players’ aim at simplicity,
which encourages them to maintain a set of strategies that is as small as possible.
The work presented in Chapter 6 thus provides an instance of the fourth potential
contribution of learning theory listed above, by providing a dynamic motivation
for minimal prep sets.
A recurrent theme in the theory of learning in games is that diﬀerent learning
processes make diﬀerent predictions (for a given class of games). It is hard to
understand in general terms why some learning models converge to one solution
concept, and other learning models to another. To further our understanding, it
is important to understand the nature of diﬀerent solution concepts. In Chapter 7
we therefore provide an axiomatic characterization of minimal prep sets and the
closely related minimal curb sets (Basu and Weibull, 1991). Minimal curb sets are
a set-valued solution concept for strategic games that requires the set of recom-
mendations to players to contain not just some (as in minimal prep sets), but all
best responses against beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the remaining
players (see Section 2.1.2 for a precise deﬁnition).
We show that for the most part, minimal curb sets and minimal prep sets
satisfy the same desirable properties; in their respective axiomatizations, the only
distinguishing property concerns the treatment of one-player games. This follows
directly from the deﬁnitions: the concept of a minimal prep set requires players
to hold some best reply to any belief they may have that is consistent with the
recommendations to other players, while the concept of minimal curb sets re-
quires them to hold all best responses. The interesting issue is that while the two
solution concepts sometimes give rise to very diﬀerent solutions (see Tercieux and
Voorneveld (2005) for some appealing examples), all diﬀerences between the two
solution concepts are captured by the way they deal with one-player games.
In Chapter 8 and 9, we turn to the study of learning in a class of congestion
games, the class of minority games. In a minority game, players need to choose1 N,    14
between two actions; the players who have chosen the action that is selected
by the smallest number of players receive the highest payoﬀ. In Chapter 8, we
characterize the limiting behavior of several well-known learning models for this
class of games. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that predictions are not equivocal. While
this may be partly due to the fact that the games in the class we study have
a continuum of equilibria (cf. Duﬀy and Hopkins, 2005), it is nevertheless an
interesting result, as some important related games share this property. A primary
example is the class of market entry games (Selten and G¨ uth, 1982) when the
market capacity is integer (Duﬀy and Hopkins, 2005).8 These games have been
studied extensively experimentally, with puzzling results (see Ochs, 1999, for
a survey). While aggregate play is largely consistent with equilibrium play, a
“magic” ﬁnding, in the words of Kahneman (1988), with the number of entrants
close to capacity, individual play generally does not resemble Nash play.
The work reported in Chapter 8 may help shed some light on this. While the
set of equilibria of the class of market entry games with integer capacity (Duﬀy
and Hopkins, 2005) is very similar to the class of equilibria in minority games, the
two classes of games diﬀer in one important respect: the symmetry of the minority
game makes it harder for players to play repeated-game strategies in experiments.
In experiments on the (asymmetric) market entry games, players can try to build a
reputationforentering(seeDuﬀyandHopkins,2005,foradiscussion).Thereisno
scope for such strategies in minority games. By comparing experimental ﬁndings
in minority games and market entry games, one could gain further insight in
the question why players do not learn to play according to an equilibrium in the
market entry game. By characterizing the long-run behavior of diﬀerent learning
processes in the minority game, Chapter 8 provides a useful benchmark to assess
players’ behavior in experiments, and thus aids in our understanding of why
players do not learn to play according to an equilibrium in certain games, in line
with the second potential contribution of learning theory listed above.
In Chapter 9, we examine an alternative learning model that may provide a
realistic model for players’ behavior in congestion games. Experimental ﬁndings
on such games seem hard to explain using standard learning models, such as the
ones discussed in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 therefore discusses an alternative learning
model. In this model, players condition their behavior on a limited history of
past outcomes, using so-called response modes that prescribe which action to take
given the history of recent outcomes. Players decide which response mode to use
8 In a market entry game, players need to decide whether to enter a market or not. Payoﬀs to
entering generally fall in the number of entrants, while not entering gives a payoﬀ independent
of the actions of other players.1.3 O    15
on the basis of the past performance of diﬀerent response modes. We show that
such a learning model may provide a good description of experimental play in
suchgames,inlinewiththesecondpotentialcontributionoflearningtheorylisted
above.
1.3 Outline of this thesis
Weconcludethisintroductionwithabriefoutlineofthisthesis.Chapter2provides
the necessary theoretical background. It introduces the three main mathematical
ﬁelds on which the chapters in this thesis build: game theory, probability and
measuretheory,andthetheoryofrandomnetworks.Eachofthefollowingchapters
is meant to be self-contained, although it is assumed that the reader is familiar
with the concepts and results presented in Chapter 2. Whenever necessary, the
reader is referred to the deﬁnitions and results of Chapter 2.
Part I of this thesis concentrates on networks and game theory. Chapter 3
studies a setting in which players are located on a network and have incomplete
information on the network structure. In these Bayesian network games, players’
beliefs are represented by a (common) prior over a set of networks. Each player is
informed of the number of neighbors he has in the network, i.e., a player’s type
is his degree. The chapter studies the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions to
the speciﬁcation of players’ beliefs in such a setting. We show that a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for two priors to be close in a strategic sense is that they be
similar in terms of the prior probabilities assigned to “local” events, i.e., events
involving the types of a player and his neighbors.
In Chapter 4, we study a similar question as in Chapter 3. In contrast with
Chapter 3, we now allow for uncertainty over the network size. We show that
in this case, small probability events can have an important eﬀect on outcomes
through players’ conditional beliefs: a player may think it is likely (given his type)
that his neighbors think it is likely that. . . the small probability event is true. In
addition to requiring that two priors be similar in terms of the prior probabilities
assigned to local events for them to be close in a strategic sense, we also need that
with high probability, a player has a type such that his conditional beliefs are close
and that he believes (given his type) that with high probability, his neighbors’
conditional beliefs are close, and that they believe (given their type), that their
neighbors’ conditional beliefs are close, etcetera.1 N,    16
The ﬁnal chapter of Part I, Chapter 5, proposes a random network model with
a group structure that can be used to model players’ beliefs in network games. We
characterize the degree distribution and the clustering of the model, showing that
we can obtain a random network with any clustering and any degree distribution.
Such a model allows for the simultaneous investigation of the eﬀect of players’
beliefs on the degree distribution on the clustering on game-theoretic outcomes.
Moreover, the model is set up in such a way that it could be the result from a
strategic process of network formation.
Part II of this thesis is concerned with learning in games. Chapter 6 studies
a best-reply learning process in which there is some inertia in players’ behavior.
More precisely, we study a best-reply learning process in which players form
beliefs over others’ actions on the basis of recent past play. In addition, we assume
that players players have a recency bias in the sense that they always choose the
most recent best reply to a given belief whenever there is more than one best reply.
We show that play converges to minimal prep sets, a set-valued solution concept
thatcombinesastandardrationalitycondition,statingthatthesetofrecommended
strategies to each player must contain at least one best reply to whatever belief he
may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players, with
players’ aim at simplicity, which encourages them to maintain a set of strategies
thatisassmallaspossible.Wethusprovideadynamicmotivationforthissolution
concept.
In Chapter 7, we give an axiomatic characterization of minimal prep sets and
the related solution concept of minimal curb sets. We show that both solution
concepts satisfy the axiom of consistency: given that a set of players commits
to playing according to a certain solution, the remaining players in the reduced
gameshouldhavenoincentivetodeviatefromit.Whilethisseemstobeaminimal
requirement for solution concepts, it can be shown that reﬁnements of the Nash
equilibrium are not consistent (when one requires utility maximizing behavior
in one-player games and nonemptiness). Hence, minimal prep sets and minimal
curb sets are attractive concepts in this respect.
We then turn to learning in a speciﬁc class of congestion games. In Chapter 8,
we study the limiting behavior of several well-known learning processes in this
class of games, and we show that diﬀerent learning models yield diﬀerent predic-
tions. This is an important ﬁnding, since experimental results on such games are
puzzling in the sense that whereas play quickly converges to equilibrium play on
the aggregate level, individual behavior does not conform to a Nash equilibrium.
That diﬀerent learning models give diﬀerent predictions in this class of games1.3 O    17
means that we have little guidance from learning theory to explain these experi-
mental ﬁndings. In Chapter 9, we therefore discuss an alternative learning model
for this class of games, and relate it to other learning models in game theory. The
model we discuss assumes that each player is endowed with a random set of so-
called response modes that specify a player’s response to a given history of play.
Each player chooses the response mode from his endowment that has performed
well in the past. We argue that this is a behaviorally plausible model for such
games, as it allows players to coordinate to diﬀerentiate in a natural way. More-
over, it can explain the experimental ﬁndings discussed above, since the model
predicts aggregate equilibrium play, while individuals do not play according to a
Nash equilibrium.2 Preliminaries
Summary
In this chapter, we brieﬂy introduce the three main mathematical ﬁelds
from which we draw in this thesis: game theory, probability and measure
theory, and the theory of random networks. In addition, we list some
basic results from these ﬁelds. Section 2.1 provides a brief introduction
to game theory. Section 2.2 gives an overview of the concepts and results
we use from probability and measure theory. Finally, Section 2.3 gives an
introduction to the ﬁeld of random networks.
2.1 Game theory
In this section, we introduce some basic game-theoretical notions. We do not
intend to cover the whole ﬁeld; rather, we focus on the concepts and deﬁnitions
that are important for the work in this thesis. In particular, we restrict attention
to noncooperative game theory, i.e., we assume that players cannot make binding
agreements. Furthermore, we focus on one-shot strategic games and Bayesian
games. Good textbook treatments of game theory include Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991), Myerson (1991), and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
This section is organized as follows. In Section 2.1.1, we introduce the class
of strategic games. We discuss several solution concepts for this class of games in
Section 2.1.2. In Section 2.1.3, we discuss the class of Bayesian games.
2.1.1 Strategic games
A (ﬁnite strategic) game is a tuple G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni, where
• N is a nonempty, ﬁnite set of players;
• for each player i ∈ N, Ai is a nonempty, ﬁnite set of pure strategies or actions;
• for each player i ∈ N, ui is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function from the
set of strategy proﬁles ×i∈N Ai to R, which speciﬁes for each strategy proﬁle






Figure 2.1. The payoﬀ matrix of the game of Example 2.1.1
Let n := |N|. We denote the set of all ﬁnite strategic games by Γ.
When the number of players is equal to two, a game can be conveniently
represented by means of its payoﬀ matrix, which gives the payoﬀs to each player
for each choice of action proﬁles. Example 2.1.1 presents a simple game and its
payoﬀ matrix.
Example 2.1.1. Bill and Steve need to decide which operating system to buy. They
can choose between two options, Pear and Pane. Both have their preferences
over the two systems, but in addition, each cares about the other’s choice, as
they would like to exchange ﬁles with each other. More speciﬁcally, if they buy
a diﬀerent operating system, they each receive a payoﬀ of 0. If they both buy the
Pane system, Bill gets a payoﬀ of 10, and Steve gets a payoﬀ of 5, while if they
both buy the Pear system, Bill gets a payoﬀ of 5, and Steve gets a payoﬀ of 10. The
payoﬀ matrix of this game is given in Figure 2.1. /
We write A = ×i∈N Ai. Let i ∈ N. We use the standard notation A−i to denote
the set of strategy proﬁles ×j∈N\{i} Aj of the opponents of i, with typical element
a−i = (aj)j∈N\{i}. Let S ⊆ N. Then, AS = ×j∈SAj denotes the set of strategy proﬁles of
players in S, with typical element aS. With slight abuse of notation, we sometimes
representastrategy proﬁlea = (aj)j∈N ∈ Aby(ai,a−i)or (aS,aN\S)to stress theaction
choice of player i or players in S.
Playersareallowedtousemixedstrategies.Aplayerwhousesamixedstrategy,
randomizes over (a subset of) his actions. Let Qi be a nonempty subset of Ai. The
set of mixed strategies of player i ∈ N with support in Qi is denoted by ∆(Qi), i.e.,
∆(Qi) :=
n
αi : Qi → [0,1]






The set of all mixed strategies of player i ∈ N is thus ∆(Ai). Given a mixed strategy
proﬁle α = (αj)j∈N ∈ ×j∈N∆(Aj), we use α−i to denote (αj)j∈N\{i}.2 P 20
We can extend payoﬀs to mixed strategies. The payoﬀs to player i ∈ N of a







That is, the payoﬀ of a mixed strategy proﬁle α is simply the expected payoﬀ
associated with the lottery α. Similarly, the payoﬀs to player i of action ai ∈ Ai








Given a mixed strategy proﬁle α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Aj), an action ai ∈ Ai is a (pure) best
response or (pure) best reply of i to proﬁle α−i if the payoﬀ of ai given that other
players play according to α−i is at least as high as the payoﬀ of any other action
bi ∈ Ai. The set of pure best replies of player i against proﬁle α−i is denoted by:
BRi(α−i) = {ai ∈ Ai | ∀bi ∈ Ai : ui(ai,α−i) ≥ ui(bi,α−i)}.
Each player forms beliefs over the strategies of his opponents. We take beliefs to
be proﬁles of mixed strategies, i.e., correlation in beliefs is not allowed. We can
thereforeidentifythesetofpurebestresponsesagainstthebelief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Aj)
of player i with the set BRi(α−i) of pure best responses against the mixed strategy
proﬁle α−i.
2.1.2 Solution concepts for strategic games
In Part II of this thesis, we study diﬀerent solution concepts. A solution concept
for strategic games provides for each (ﬁnite strategic) game a prediction of play.
In this thesis, we consider both point-valued and set-valued solution concepts for
strategicgames. Apoint-valuedsolution concept assignsto eachgame acollection
of strategy proﬁles. Formally:
Deﬁnition 2.1.2. A point-valued solution concept ϕp on Γ is a correspondence that
assigns to each game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ a collection ϕp(G) of mixed strategy
proﬁles,i.e.,eachelementofϕp(G)(ifthereisone)isamixedstrategyproﬁleα ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai).
We call elements α ∈ ϕp(G) solutions of G.
By contrast, set-valued solution concepts assign to each game a collection of prod-
uct sets of (pure) strategies:2.1 G  21
Deﬁnition 2.1.3. A set-valued solution concept ϕs on Γ is a correspondence that
assigns to each game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ a collection ϕs(G) of product sets in A,
i.e., each element of ϕs(G) (if there is one) is a set Q = ×i∈NQi with Qi ⊆ Ai for each i ∈ N.
We call elements Q ∈ ϕs(G) solutions of G.
We discuss these classes of solution concepts in turn. Point-valued solution con-
cepts are the standard class of solution concepts studied in noncooperative game
theory. The most commonly studied solution concept is the Nash equilibrium
concept.
Deﬁnition 2.1.4. A pure strategy proﬁle a ∈ A is a pure Nash equilibrium of a game
G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni if no player can beneﬁt from a unilateral deviation:
∀i ∈ N,∀bi ∈ Ai : ui(a) ≥ ui(bi,a−i).
A pure Nash equilibrium is strict if the above inequality is strict whenever bi , ai.
Similarly,amixedstrategyproﬁleα ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai)isamixedstrategyNashequilibrium,
or simply a Nash equilibrium, if
∀i ∈ N,∀bi ∈ Ai : ui(α) ≥ ui(bi,α−i).
Using Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem (Ok, 2007), it is straightforward to show ex-
istence of Nash equilibria (possibly in mixed strategies) for ﬁnite strategic games.
Various reﬁnements of the Nash equilibrium concept, in addition to strict equilib-
ria, are discussed in Van Damme (1991).
We now turn to set-valued solution concepts. Set-valued solution concepts
form a natural class of solution concepts for a number of reasons. Firstly, in many
contexts, people live by rules and principles that restrict behavior but do not de-
termine it uniquely. Hence, it may be more natural to think of people choosing
freely among a subset of possible actions rather than choosing a ﬁxed distribu-
tion over this set of actions, as in a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Secondly,
many learning processes settle down in sets, rather than converging to strategy
proﬁles (e.g. Hurkens, 1995; Tercieux, 2006; Young, 1998, and Chapter 6 of this the-
sis). Thirdly, set-valued solutions are the natural outcome of a process of iterated
elimination of “bad” actions. For instance, the set of rationalizable strategies of a
game is the set of strategies that survive the iterated removal of strategies that are
never a best response. Finally, as discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis, set-valued
solution concepts satisfy the desirable property of consistency (Peleg et al., 1996;
Peleg and Tijs, 1996), while recommending strategy proﬁles to players can lead2 P 22
to consistency problems (Norde et al. (1996); see Voorneveld et al. (2005) for a
discussion). Set-valued solution concepts include the set of rationalizable strate-
gies (Bernheim, 1984), persistent retracts (Kalai and Samet, 1984), minimal curb
sets (Basu and Weibull, 1991), and minimal prep sets (Voorneveld, 2004). Here,
we focus on minimal curb sets and minimal prep sets, as these concepts play an
important role in Chapter 6 and 7 of this thesis.
Basu and Weibull (1991) deﬁne the concepts of curb sets and minimal curb
sets, where “curb” is mnemonic for “closed under rational behavior”.
Deﬁnition 2.1.5. A curb set of a game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ is a nonempty
product set Q = ×i∈NQi ⊆ A such that for each i ∈ N and each belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Qj)
of player i, the set Qi contains all best replies of player i against his belief:
∀i ∈ N,∀α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Qj) : BRi(α−i) ⊆ Qi.
A curb set Q is minimal if no curb set is a proper subset of Q.
Theset-valuedsolutionconceptthatassignstoeachgameitscollectionofminimal
curbsetsisdenotedbymin-curb.Hence,foreachgameG = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ:
min-curb(G) = {Q ⊆ A | Q is a minimal curb set of G}.
Similarly,
curb(G) = {Q ⊆ A | Q is a curb set of G}.
Voorneveld (2004) introduces the concept of prep sets and minimal prep sets,
where “prep” is shorthand for “preparation”.
Deﬁnition 2.1.6. A prep set of a game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ is a nonempty
product set Q = ×i∈NQi ⊆ A such that for each i ∈ N and each belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Qj)
of player i, the set Qi contains at least one best reply of player i against his belief:
∀i ∈ N,∀α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Qj) : BRi(α−i) ∩ Qi , ∅.
A prep set Q is minimal if no prep set is a proper subset of Q.
Theset-valuedsolutionconceptthatassignstoeachgameitscollectionofminimal
prepsetsisdenotedbymin-prep.Hence,foreachgameG = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ:
min-prep(G) = {Q ⊆ A | Q is a minimal prep set of G}.2.1 G  23
A
Figure 2.2. Each ﬁnite strategic game has a minimal curb set (minimal
prep set).
Similarly,
prep(G) = {Q ⊆ A | Q is a prep set of G}.
Establishingexistenceofminimalcurbsetsandminimalprepsetsinﬁnitestrategic
gamesissimple.Theentirepure-strategyspaceAisacurbset(prepset).Hencethe
collection of curb sets (prep sets) is nonempty, ﬁnite (since A is ﬁnite) and partially
ordered by set inclusion (see Figure 2.2 for an illustration of this argument). This
proves:
Proposition 2.1.7. Each game G ∈ Γ has at least one minimal curb set and at least one
minimal prep set, i.e.,
min-curb(G) , ∅, min-prep(G) , ∅.
See Basu and Weibull (1991, Prop. 1) and Voorneveld (2004, Thm. 3.2) for general
existence results for minimal curb sets and minimal prep sets, respectively.
Example 2.1.8 illustrates the diﬀerences between the diﬀerent solution con-
cepts discussed here.
Example 2.1.8. In the two-player game G in Figure 2.3, min-curb(G) = {{T,B} ×
{L,R}},min-prep(G) = {{T}×{L}},andthesetofNashequilibriaconsistsofallmixed
strategy proﬁles (αT + (1 − α)B,L) with α ∈ [1/2,1]. The pure Nash equilibrium
(T,L) can be obtained by iterated elimination of weakly dominated actions; in this
example, this is exactly the outcome predicted by the game’s unique minimal prep




Figure 2.3. Diﬀerences between min-curb, min-prep, and Nash equilib-
ria.
2.1.3 Bayesian games
In many cases, players are uncertain about the characteristics of some or all of
the other players. For instance, they may be uncertain about the payoﬀs other
players receive from their actions. Such a situation is modeled concisely by means
of Bayesian games.
More precisely, let n ∈ N, and let N be a set of n players. Each player i ∈ N
is endowed with some nonempty, ﬁnite set of actions Ai. Uncertainty is modeled
by introducing a set of possible states of nature Ω, each of which is a description of
all relevant characteristics of the players in N. Throughout this thesis, we assume
that the set of states of nature is ﬁnite. Players have a (common) prior µ over the
set of states of nature, i.e., a probability measure that for each state of nature gives
the probability that players assign to the state before they have any information
on the state.1 In any given play of the game, some state ω ∈ Ω is realized. Players’
information about the state of nature is modeled by a proﬁle of signal functions
(τi)i∈N. For each i ∈ N, τi is a function on Ω that gives for each state ω ∈ Ω the
signal τi(ω) that player i observes when the state of nature is ω. For i ∈ N, denote
the set of all possible signals for player i by Ti. By ﬁniteness of Ω, the set Ti is ﬁnite.
We refer to τi(ω) as the type of player i in state ω, and to Ti as the type set of i. After
players have learned their signals, they update their beliefs according to Bayes’
rule. More speciﬁcally, when the common prior is µ, the posterior or conditional












i (ti) ⊆ Ω has positive probability under µ. Players’ payoﬀs depend on
their action and the actions of other players as well as on the state. More precisely,
for each i ∈ N, the payoﬀs to player i are given by a von Neumann-Morgenstern
1 For a formal deﬁnition of probability measures, see Section 2.2.1.2.1 G  25
utility function ui : ×j∈NAj × Ω → R, with for each a ∈ ×j∈NAj and ω ∈ Ω, ui(a,ω)
the payoﬀs to action proﬁle a when the state is ω.
In Bayesian games, players condition their actions on their type, i.e., their
information on the state. For i ∈ N, a (mixed) strategy σi of i is a function from Ti to
∆(Ai), with the probability that action ai ∈ Ai is played under strategy σi by player
i given that his type is ti ∈ Ti being denoted by σi(ai | ti). Let Σi be the set of all
strategies of player i. A strategy proﬁle is a function σ = (σi)i∈N ∈ ×i∈NΣi, with for
each i ∈ N, σi a strategy of player i. As before, payoﬀs can be extended to mixed
strategies.
Let ti ∈ Ti be such that µ(τ−1
i (ti)) > 0. Then, the interim expected payoﬀs to a
player i ∈ N of type ti of action ai ∈ Ai under prior µ when other players follow



















Deﬁnition 2.1.9. A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle σ = (σj)j∈N ∈
×j∈NΣj such that for each i ∈ N, for each ti ∈ T such that µ(τ−1
i (ti)) > 0, for each ai ∈ Ai
such that σi(ai | ti) > 0,
ϕi(ai,σ−i;ti,µ) ≥ ϕi(bi,σ−i;ti,µ)
for all bi ∈ Ai.
ExistenceofaBayesian-NashequilibriumfollowsdirectlyfromexistenceofaNash
equilibrium in ﬁnite strategic games (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 215).
Deﬁnition2.1.9requiresthateachplayerassignspositiveprobabilitytoactions
that maximize his interim expected payoﬀs for each type he may end up having,
given the strategies of other players. One could also consider a player’s ex ante
expected payoﬀs of a strategy proﬁle, i.e., the expected payoﬀ to a player before he
learns his type. Formally, the ex ante expected payoﬀs to a player i ∈ N of a strategy

















Proposition 2.1.10. A strategy proﬁle σ = (σi,σ−i) ∈ ×j∈NΣj is a Bayesian-Nash equi-





2.2 Probability and measure theory
Inthissection,wecoversomebasicconceptsandresultsinprobabilityandmeasure
theory, as well as some more specialized concepts and results that we use in this
thesis. A good introduction to probability theory is provided by Grimmett and
Stirzaker (1992); see e.g. Billingsley (1995) or Dudley (2002) for a more advanced
treatment of probability and measure theory.
2.2.1 Basic concepts and deﬁnitions
The concept of measure generalizes notions such as length, area and volume.
Informally, a measure on a set is an assignment of “sizes” to some subsets of the
set that is somehow consistent, in a way to be made precise below. Depending
on the application, the size of a subset may for instance be interpreted as area or
length, or as the probability that the outcome of an experiment lies in that subset.
More speciﬁcally, measure theory is used to deﬁne integration over general sets.
A probability measure is an example of a measure; probability theory builds
on measure theory to study random phenomena. In this thesis, we mainly use
concepts and results from probability theory, though we sometimes need the more
general theory of measure. Here, we therefore introduce both ﬁelds, with the
emphasis on probability theory.
Given a set, we would like to assign a measure to (some of) the subsets of the
set. Forreasons beyond thescope of thistext,2 it isnot possible toassign a measure
to all subsets of a set in a reasonable way when the set is uncountably inﬁnite.
Hence, we need to work within subclasses of the class of all subsets of a set. We
now deﬁne the classes of the appropriate kinds, the algebras and σ-algebras in a
set.
2 See Billingsley (1995, pp. 45–46) for a particularly clear formulation of the argument.2.2 P    27
Deﬁnition 2.2.1. Given a set S, an algebra in S is a collection F of subsets of S such
that:
(i) ∅ ∈ F;
(ii) if E1,E2 ∈ F, then E1 ∪ E2 ∈ F;
(iii) if E ∈ F, then Ec ∈ F.
Deﬁnition 2.2.2. Given a set S, a σ-algebra in S is a collection F of subsets of S such
that:
(i) ∅ ∈ F;
(ii) if E1,E2,... ∈ F, then
S
`∈N E` ∈ F;
(iii) if E ∈ F, then Ec ∈ F.
That is, while algebras are closed under ﬁnite unions (and thus, by (iii) and De-
Morgan laws, under ﬁnite intersections) and under complements, σ-algebras are
additionally closed under countable unions (and thus under countable intersec-
tions).Hence,theclassofσ-algebrasofagivensetisasubsetoftheclassofalgebras
of that set. As we shall see, measures can be deﬁned on algebras, but often we
are interested in measures that are deﬁned on σ-algebras. Simple examples of
σ-algebras include the following.
Example 2.2.3. The smallest σ-algebra associated with a set S is the collection
{∅,S}. /
Example 2.2.4. Let E be a subset of a set S. Then, the collection {∅,E,Ec,S} is a
σ-algebra in S. /
Example 2.2.5. The power set of a set S, i.e., the set of all subsets of S is obviously
a σ-algebra. This is the largest σ-algebra in S. /
In Example 2.2.4, we explicitly deﬁned a σ-algebra in a set given some subset of
this set. More generally, we can generate a σ-algebra in a set starting from some
collection of subsets of this set:
Deﬁnition 2.2.6. GivenacollectionC ofsubsetsofasetS,theσ-algebraσ(C)generated
by C is deﬁned to be the smallest σ-algebra in S such that C ⊆ σ(C).
The collection σ(C) is well deﬁned for any collection of subsets C, as the intersec-
tion of any nonempty collection of σ-algebras in S is also a σ-algebra in S.2 P 28
Example 2.2.7. If C is a σ-algebra in some set S, then obviously σ(C) = C. If
C ⊆ C 0, then σ(C) ⊆ σ(C 0). If C ⊆ C 0 ⊆ σ(C), then σ(C 0) = σ(C). /
A particularly important σ-algebra is the Borel σ-algebra.
Deﬁnition 2.2.8. Let I be the collection of all half open intervals (a,b] in R, where
a,b ∈ R,a < b. Then, B := σ(I) is the Borel σ-algebra. The elements of B are called
Borel sets.
The Borel σ-algebra thus forms a σ-algebra in R. More generally, we can deﬁne
such σ-algebras in Rk:
Deﬁnition 2.2.9. Let k ∈ N. The σ-algebra Bk of k-dimensional Borel sets is the σ-
algebra in Rk generated by the set of all bounded rectangles in Rk, i.e., by the set of all sets
of the form
n
x = (x1,...,xk) ∈ Rk    a` < x` ≤ b`,` = 1,...,k
o
,
where a`,b` ∈ R,a` < b` for ` = 1,...,k.
Deﬁnition 2.2.10. Let Ω be a set. If F is a σ-algebra in Ω, the pair (Ω,F) is a measur-
able space. The elements of F are (F-)measurable sets or events.
Deﬁnition 2.2.11. A function µ on an algebra F in a set Ω is a measure on F if it
satisﬁes the following conditions:
(i) µ(E) ∈ [0,∞] for all E ∈ F;
(ii) µ(∅) = 0;
(iii) If E1,E2,... are elements of F such that E` ∩Ek = ∅ for all ` , k and
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If µ(Ω) = 1, then µ is a probability measure.
Condition(iii)isreferredtoascountableadditivity.Itiseasytoseethatthiscondition
implies ﬁnite additivity, which is deﬁned in the obvious way.
An important example of a measure is the Lebesgue measure on R, which is
the standard way of assigning a length to an interval. Formally, for a,b ∈ R,a < b,
let
λ((a,b]) := b − a.2.2 P    29
Then, λ can be extended to the Borel σ-algebra B (Billingsley, 1995, p. 168), and it
is called the Lebesgue measure on R.
Remark 2.2.12. While,asnotedabove,wecannotassignameasureinareasonable
way to all subsets of a set when the set is uncountable, Deﬁnition 2.2.6 allows us
to ﬁnd σ-algebras that contain all subsets of interest. For the important case of the
set of real numbers R, the Borel σ-algebra B contains all relevant intervals, and
for Rk, k ∈ N, we can use the σ-algebra Bk of k-dimensional Borel sets. /
Deﬁnition 2.2.13. Let Ω be a set. If F is a σ-algebra in Ω and µ is a measure on F, the
triple (Ω,F,µ) is a measure space. If µ is a probability measure, then we refer to the
triple as a probability model or a probability space.
Throughout this thesis, we mostly focus on probability measures, which we usu-
ally denote by P. A probability space (Ω,F,P) is a description of an experiment
or trial. The set Ω lists all possible outcomes of the experiment, and is referred
to as the sample space. The probability measure gives for each event E ∈ F the
probability that E occurs. Hence, all questions and statements associated with an
experiment can be formulated in terms of a probability space and vice versa.
Example 2.2.14. Inthecaseofrandomnetworkmodels(seeSection2.3),theexper-
iment is a random construction procedure. The random construction procedure
determinestheprobabilitieswithwhichallpossiblenetworks(theoutcomesofthe
experiment) occur. For instance, given a (ﬁnite) set of vertices and some p ∈ [0,1],
we can construct a random network by drawing an edge between two distinct
vertices with probability p, independent of other edges. This deﬁnes a probability
measure over a set of networks. We discuss this random network model in more
detail in Example 2.3.1. /
Some more terminology will be useful. Let (Ω,F,µ) be a measure space. An event
E ∈ F thathasmeasure1underµissaidtohold(µ-)almosteverywhere,abbreviated
(µ-)a.e. If µ is a probability measure, then we say that E holds (µ-)almost surely,
abbreviated (µ-)a.s. An event that has probability 0 under µ is called a (µ-)null
event. Hence, the complement of an almost sure event is a null event.
Aprobabilityspace(Ω,F,P)iscompleteifA ⊆ B,B ∈ F andP(B) = 0together
imply that A ∈ F and therefore (by countable additivity) that P(A) = 0. Consider
a probability space (Ω,F,P) that is not complete. It is possible to enlarge the
σ-algebra and extend the measure to obtain a probability space that is complete.
More speciﬁcally, let F0 be the collection of all subsets of P-null events in F, and2 P 30
let H := σ(F ∪ F0) be the smallest σ-algebra that contains the sets in F and F0.
It can be shown that the domain of P can be extended in a straightforward way
from F to H (see Billingsley, 1995, p. 45, for details). Denote the extension of
P to H by P0. Then, the probability space (Ω,H ,P0) is complete; it is called the
completion of (Ω,F,P).
Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, and let E1,E2 ∈ F. If P(E1) > 0, the
conditional probability of E2 given E1 is















for any ﬁnite subset J of the index set I. Equivalently, we say that the events {E`}`∈I
are independent. Note that if two events E1,E2 are independent (and P(E1) > 0),
then P(E2 | E1) = P(E2). That is, the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event E1
does not give any information about the likelihood of the event E2.
2.2.2 Random variables
Often, we are not so much interested in the experiment itself, but rather in the
consequences associated with its random outcome. Random variables and more
generally measurable functions provide a means to describe these. Formally, let
(Ω1,F1) and (Ω2,F2) be two measurable spaces. A function X : Ω1 → Ω2 is called
an F1/F2-measurable function if:
{X−1(E) | E ∈ F2} ∈ F1.
In words, the inverse image of every F2-measurable set is F1-measurable.
When X is a real function, i.e., Ω2 ⊆ R, we take F2 to be the Borel σ-algebra
restricted to Ω2, and we refer to X as a random variable. In that case,
∀x ∈ Ω2 : {ω ∈ Ω1 | X(ω) ≤ x} ∈ F1.
When X maps Ω1 into a subset of Rk, k ∈ N, F2 is taken to be the σ-algebra of
k-dimensional Borel sets restricted to the subset, and we refer to X as a random2.2 P    31
vector. In that case, X is of the form
X = (X1,...,Xk)
for some real-valued functions X1,...,Xk. It can be shown (Billingsley, 1995, p.
183) that X is a F1/Bk-measurable function if and only if
∀(x1,...,xk) ∈ Ω2 :
n
ω ∈ Ω1
   X1(ω) ≤ x1,...,Xk(ω) ≤ xk
o
∈ F1.
Afunction f : R` → Rk,where`,k ∈ N,isaBorelfunctionifitisB`/Bk-measurable.
Functions of random variables can be random variables. Let X be a random
variable deﬁned on some sample space Ω, and let g : R → R be a function on R.
Deﬁne g(X) by:
∀ω ∈ Ω : g(X)(ω) := g(X(ω)).
Hence, g(X) maps Ω into R. It is easy to verify that if
∀B ∈ B : g−1(B) ∈ B, (2.1)
then g(X) is a random variable. Condition (2.1) is satisﬁed if g is e.g. suﬃciently
smooth or regular by being continuous or monotonic.
Example 2.2.15. A particularly useful class of random variables is formed by the
indicator functions of events. Loosely speaking, an indicator function is a function
deﬁned on a set that indicates membership of an element in a subset of that set.
Formally, let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, and let E ∈ F be an event. Then, the
indicator function of E is the function 1E : Ω → {0,1} deﬁned by:
∀ω ∈ Ω : 1E(ω) :=
(
1 if ω ∈ E,
0 otherwise.
Hence, 1E is a random variable taking the values 1 and 0 with probabilities P(E)
and P(Ec), respectively. /
We can use random variables to generate σ-algebras:
Deﬁnition 2.2.16. Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, and let X be a random variable








deﬁnition can naturally be extended to σ-algebras generated by random vectors.
When the measurable space (Ω1,F1) is endowed with a probability measure
P, the probability that a random variable on this measurable space takes a certain
value, or, more generally, that the image of a measurable function lies in a certain
set, can of course be inferred from the combination of the original probability
space (Ω1,F1,P) and the measurable function. However, it is often convenient to
deﬁne a probability measure directly for the measurable function. Let (Ω1,F1,P)
be a probability space and let (Ω2,F2) be a measurable space. Let X be a F1/F2-
measurable function. The law of X is the probability measure PX on F2 deﬁned
by:





When X is a random variable, its (cumulative) distribution function is the function
FX : R → [0,1] deﬁned by:
∀x ∈ R : FX(x) := P

{ω ∈ Ω1 | X(ω) ≤ x}

.
When X = (X1,...,Xk) is a random vector, the distribution function of X is deﬁned
by:
∀x = (x1,...,xk) ∈ Rk : FX(x) := P

{ω ∈ Ω1 | X1(ω) ≤ x1,...,Xk(ω) ≤ xk}

.
The function FX is also referred to as the joint distribution function of the ran-
dom variables X1,...,Xk. When it is clear from the context with which random
variable or vector X a distribution function is associated, we sometimes omit the
subscript X.
A distribution function of a random variable X satisﬁes the following prop-
erties (Grimmett and Stirzaker, 1992, Lemma 2.1.6):
(i) limx→−∞ FX(x) = 0, limx→+∞ FX(x) = 1;
(ii) if x < y, then FX(x) ≤ FX(y);
(iii) FX is right-continuous, i.e., limh↓0 FX(x + h) = FX(x).
We say that a random variable X is discrete if the support of the distribution
function FX is a ﬁnite or countable subset of R. If X is discrete, the (probability) mass
function or distribution of X is the function f from its support S to (0,1] deﬁned by:
∀x ∈ S : f(x) := P({ω ∈ Ω | X(ω) = x}),
so that
P
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A collection {X`}`∈I of random variables deﬁned on Ω1 is independent, or,
equivalently, the random variables {X`}`∈I are independent, if, given any collection
{B`}`∈I of Borel sets, the collection of events {ω ∈ Ω1 | X`(ω) ∈ B`} is independent.
This is equivalent to requiring that
∀{`1,...,`k} ⊆ I,∀x = (x1,...,xk) ∈ Rk : FX(x) = FX`1(x1)···FX`k(xk),
where FX is the distribution function of the random vector X = (X`1,...,X`k).
2.2.3 Integration and expectation
Let (Ω,F,µ) be a measure space, and let f be a real function on Ω that is F/B-
measurable, where we recall that B is the Borel σ-algebra. We want to deﬁne the
integral of f with respect to µ.
To deﬁne this integral, we need to deal with sums and products involving
inﬁnity. Regarding products involving inﬁnity, we use the following conventions:
0 · ∞ = ∞ · 0 = 0,
x · ∞ = ∞ · x = ∞ if x ∈ (0,∞),
∞ · ∞ = ∞.





means that either of the following is the case:
(i) x = ∞ and x` = ∞ for some `;
(ii) x = ∞ and x` < ∞ for all `, and
P
` x` is a divergent inﬁnite series;
(iii) x < ∞ and x` < ∞ for all `, and (2.2) holds in the usual sense for
P
` x` a ﬁnite
sum or convergent inﬁnite series.
First suppose that f is nonnegative. For each k ∈ N, for each partition E =










Note that if E` = ∅ for some ` = 1,...,k, then the inﬁmum in (2.3) is equal to
∞ by convention, but then µ(E`) = 0, so that the contribution of the term to the2 P 34
sum (2.3) is zero. Let D be the set of all ﬁnite partitions or decompositions of Ω
into F-measurable sets. Then, the integral of the nonnegative real function f on
Ω with respect to µ is deﬁned by:
Z
Ω
f dµ := sup
E∈D
S(E).
Now let f be a general real function on Ω that is F/B-measurable, i.e., f is
not necessarily nonnegative. For all ω ∈ Ω, deﬁne:
f+(ω) := max{f(ω),0}, f−(ω) := −min{f(ω),0}.
It is easily veriﬁed that the functions f+ and f− are nonnegative and F/B-
measurable, and that
f = f+ − f−.






f− dµ = ∞.










See Billingsley (1995, Ch. 3) for a discussion of general properties of the integral.
We can deﬁne the integral for a subset of Ω in the following way. For any E ∈ F,
deﬁne the function gE by:
∀ω ∈ Ω : gE(ω) := f(ω) · 1E(ω).












E f+ dµ and
R
E f− dµ are ﬁnite, then f is (µ)-integrable on E. If E = Ω, we
simply say that f is (µ)-integrable. We sometimes omit the subscript Ω or E to the
integral if the domain of integration is clear from the context.2.2 P    35
Wearemostlyconcernedwithtwotypesofintegrals,theLebesgueintegralon
the real line R, and the expectation of a random variable. To start with the former,
recall that λ is the Lebesgue measure on the Borel σ-algebra B in R. Let E ∈ B.
Let f be a real function that is B/B-measurable. Then, f is Lebesgue integrable on
E if f is λ-integrable on E, and its Lebesgue integral
R




It can be shown that













so that if E is an interval, i.e., E is equal to (u,v),[u,v),(u,v] or [u,v] for some




u f(x)dx without risk
of ambiguity. Similarly, when E is equal to [a,∞) or (a,∞) for a ∈ R, we write R ∞
a f(x)dx, etcetera.
We now turn to the expectation of a random variable. The expectation of
a random variable is simply the integral of the random variable—a measurable
function—with respect to the probability measure of the probability space.
Deﬁnition 2.2.18. Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, and let X be a random variable






X− dP = ∞.
Then, the expectation of X on (Ω,F,P), denoted E[X], is the integral of X with respect






We refer to E as the expectation operator. The integral
R
E XdP over a set E ∈ F is
deﬁned by E[X1E], analogous to the case of general measurable functions.
It can readily be veriﬁed that the expectation operator is linear. Let X1,...,Xk
be a sequence of random variables such that E[|X`|] < ∞ for all ` = 1,...,k. Then,
for any a1,...,ak ∈ R,
E










The expectation operator has some important continuity properties which we
discuss in Section 2.2.6.
Example 2.2.15 (continued). Consider the indicator function 1E of the event E
again. The expectation of 1E is P(E), and its variance is P(E)(1 − P(E)). /
We now turn to an important special case of (2.4). Let X be a random variable
with distribution function F. The function F gives rise to a probability measure µ0
F
on the Borel sets of R in the following way:
(i) for all a,b ∈ R,a < b, deﬁne µ0
F ((a,b]) := F(b) − F(a);
(ii) extend the domain of µ0
F to include the Borel σ-algebra B.
Then,the triple (R,B,µ0
F)is aprobabilityspace.The completionofthisprobability
space is denoted by (R,BF,µF), where BF is the smallest σ-algebra containing B
and all subsets of µ0
F-null events, and µF is the extension of µ0
F to the domain BF.
We refer to µF as the Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure associated with F.
Suppose that the function g : R → R is BF-measurable, i.e., condition (2.1) is













Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, and let X be a random variable on Ω with
distribution function FX. Then, the distribution function FX has (probability) density
function f (with respect to Lebesgue measure) if f is a nonnegative Borel function
on R, and








f(x)dx = 1.2.2 P    37
Itcanbeshown(usingThm.3.3ofBillingsley,1995)that(2.5)holdsforeveryBorel
set E if it holds for every interval, i.e., if




Moreover, note that f is determined only to within a set of Lebesgue measure 0: if
f = g except on a set of Lebesgue measure 0, then g is also a density function for
FX.
ThedistributionfunctionFX hasadensityfunctionifandonlyFX isabsolutely
continuous. In that case, we say that X is continuous. If FX is absolutely continuous,
it is almost everywhere diﬀerentiable, and its derivative can be used as its density
function. Note that the distribution function of a discrete random variable does
not admit a density function.
We close this section with various deﬁnitions related to the expectations of
random variables that we will use throughout this thesis. Let (Ω,F,P) be a prob-
ability space, and let X be a random variable deﬁned on Ω. For k ∈ N, the k-th
moment of X is the value E[Xk] if the expectation exists. The ﬁrst moment of X is
also called the mean of X. It follows immediately from the deﬁnitions that if X > 0
(almost surely), then E[Xk] < ∞ for k ∈ N implies E[Xk−1] < ∞. Finally, a related
operator that will prove useful is the variance operator. The variance of a random







We can deﬁne the conditional expectation of a random variable given an event:
Deﬁnition 2.2.19. Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, and let X be a random variable
deﬁned on Ω. Let E ∈ F such that P(E) > 0. Then, the conditional expectation of X
given E is given by:





More importantly, we can also condition on σ-algebras:2 P 38
Deﬁnition 2.2.20. Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, and let X be a random variable
deﬁned on Ω. Let H ⊆ F be a σ-algebra. Then, the conditional expectation of X given
H is a function Y from Ω to R that satisﬁes:
(i) Y is H -measurable;
(ii) it holds that







If such a function exists, we denote it by E[X | H ].
Some remarks are in order. Firstly, one may be concerned that a conditional expec-
tation may not exists for a given random variable and σ-algebra, or when it does,
that it is not unique. However, we have the following result (Dudley, 2002, Thm.
10.1.1):
Theorem 2.2.21. Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, and let X be a random variable
deﬁned on Ω. Let H ⊆ F be a σ-algebra. If X is integrable under (Ω,F,P), then a
conditional expectation of X given H exists, and any two conditional expectations Y1 and
Y2 are equal P-almost surely.
Secondly, note that the conditional expectation of a random variable given a σ-
algebra is itself a random variable. In particular, if X is measurable with respect to
H (for instance when H = F), then X itself satisﬁes the deﬁnition of E[X | H ],
and E[X | H ] = X, P-almost surely. The case that X is not measurable with respect
to H is of course more interesting.
We are particularly interested in conditional expectations given a certain class
of σ-algebras:
Deﬁnition 2.2.22. Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, and let X,Y be two random
variables deﬁned on Ω with X integrable under (Ω,F,P). The conditional expectation
of X given Y, denoted by E[X | Y], is the conditional expectation of X given the σ-algebra
σ(Y) generated by Y.
When we take the conditional expectation of an indicator function of an event
given a σ-algebra, we obtain the probability of the event conditional on the σ-
algebra.
Deﬁnition 2.2.23. Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, and let F ∈ F, with 1F its
indicator function. Let H ⊆ F be a σ-algebra. Then, the conditional probability of F2.2 P    39
given H is deﬁned as
P(F | H ) := E[1F | H ]. 
Again, we can condition on the class of σ-algebras generated by random variables:
Deﬁnition 2.2.24. Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, and let F ∈ F, with 1F its
indicator function. Let Y be a random variable deﬁned on Ω. Then, the conditional
probability of F given Y, denoted P(F | Y), is deﬁned as E[1F | Y]
Note that P(F | H ) and P(F | Y) are themselves random variables.
Since the conditional expectation of a random variable given another random
variable is itself a random variable, we can take its expectation. It follows directly







a result that will prove useful in the following.
2.2.5 Convergence of random variables
We now turn to the topic of convergence of sequences of random variables. We
focus here on three principal modes of convergence.





{ω ∈ Ω | X`(ω) → X(ω) as ` → ∞}
is an event that has probability 1.





∀ε > 0 : P

{ω ∈ Ω | |X`(ω) − X(ω)| > ε}

→ 0
as ` → ∞.
3 The set on which a sequence of random variables converges is measurable, see e.g. Dudley (2002,
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Deﬁnition 2.2.27. Let X,X1,X2,... be random variables. Then, the sequence X1,X2,...
converges in distribution to X, denoted X`
d
→ X, if for all x ∈ R such that FX is
continuous at x,
FX`(x) → FX(x)
as ` → ∞.
Some remarks are in order. Firstly, it can be shown (Grimmett and Stirzaker,
1992, Thm. 7.2.3) that almost sure convergence implies convergence in probability,
whichinturnimpliesconvergenceindistribution.Convergenceindistributionisa
condition only on the distribution functions of the random variables. In particular,
itcontainsnoreferencetotheunderlyingprobabilityspace.Hence,convergencein
distribution can be deﬁned for random variables that are not even deﬁned on the
same probability space. Secondly, it can be shown that convergence of a sequence
ofrandomvariablesinprobabilitytoaconstantx ∈ Risequivalenttoconvergence
of their laws to a point mass (of weight 1) at x (e.g. Grimmett and Stirzaker, 1992,
Thm. 7.2.4).
A useful criterion to test whether a sequence of random variables taking
values in the set of nonnegative integers N0 converges in distribution to a certain
limitcanbederivedusingprobabilitygeneratingfunctions,whichwedeﬁnenow.4
Deﬁnition 2.2.28. Let(Ω,F,P)beaprobabilityspace,andletX : Ω → N0 bearandom
variable. For ` ∈ N0, let
q
(X)
` := P({ω ∈ Ω | X(ω) = `}).









` t` for all t ∈ R such that the sum converges.
Example 2.2.29 (Bernoulli random variables). Suppose X is a random variable
on some sample space Ω with
P({ω ∈ Ω | X(ω) = 1}) = p, P({ω ∈ Ω | X(ω) = 0}) = 1 − p,





= (1 − p) + pt (2.6)
4 Other criteria for more general classes of random variables also exist; see e.g. Van der Hofstad
(2007, Ch. 2).2.2 P    41
for all t ∈ R such that the sum converges.
A well-known result is that if two random variables X and Y are independent,
then (e.g. Grimmett and Stirzaker, 1992, Thm. 5.1.23)
GX+Y(t) = GX(t)GY(t) (2.7)
for all t ∈ R such that GX(t) and GY(t) are well deﬁned.
Example 2.2.30 (Binomially distributed random variables). Let X1,...,Xk be in-
dependent Bernoulli random variables on some sample space Ω with parameter
p ∈ [0,1], and deﬁne S := X1 + ··· + Xk. Then, using (2.6) and applying (2.7)






(1 − p) + pt
k
for all t ∈ R such that the sum converges. The random variable S is said to have
the binomial distribution with parameters k and p. /
A result that we will use extensively in Chapter 5 is the following (e.g. Rotar, 1998,
Thm. 11.6.2):
Theorem 2.2.31. Let X,X1,X2,... be random variables taking values in N0, with prob-
ability generating functions GX,GX1,,GX2,.... Then,




k as ` → ∞,
if and only if
GX`(t) → GX(t) as ` → ∞.
for all t ∈ [0,1] such that GX(t) is well deﬁned. That is, the sequence X1,X2,... converges
to X in distribution if and only if the sequence of the associated generating functions
converges to the probability generating function of X.
Often, we are interested in the convergence of sums of random variables.
Deﬁnition 2.2.32. Let X1,X2,... be a sequence of random variables on some probability
space (Ω,F,P), with partial sums Sk :=
Pk
`=1 X`. The sequence X1,X2,... obeys the
weak law of large numbers if there exists x ∈ R such that
k−1Sk
p
→ x when k → ∞.2 P 42
The sequence obeys the strong law of large numbers if there exists x ∈ R such that
k−1Sk
a.s.
→ x when k → ∞.
Obviously, when a sequence of random variables satisﬁes the strong law of large
numbers, it satisﬁes the weak law of large numbers. One may try to identify suf-
ﬁcient, and if possible necessary, conditions on sequences of random variables
for the weak and the strong law of large numbers to hold. Here, we only use
the following result, which is commonly and somewhat confusingly (cf. Deﬁni-
tion 2.2.32) referred to as the strong law of large numbers (Dudley, 2002, Thm.
8.3.5).
Theorem 2.2.33 (Strong law of large numbers). Let X1,X2,... be a sequence of inde-
pendentandidenticallydistributedrandomvariablesonsomeprobabilityspace(Ω,F,P).







→ x for some x ∈ R
if and only if E[|X1|] < ∞. In that case, x = E[X1].
Finally, a useful result is Markov’s inequality:
Lemma 2.2.34 (Markov’s inequality). Let X be a random variable with ﬁnite ﬁrst
moment deﬁned on some sample space Ω. Then,
∀a > 0 : P







Proof. Deﬁne A := {ω ∈ Ω | |X(ω)| ≥ a}. Then, |X(ω)| ≥ a1A(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Taking
expectations gives the desired result. 
We sometimes use the somewhat stronger result below.
Lemma 2.2.35. Let X be a random variable with ﬁnite ﬁrst moment deﬁned on some
sample space Ω. Then,
∀a > 0 : P







Proof. Again, deﬁne A := {ω ∈ Ω | |X(ω)| ≥ a}. Then, X(ω)1A(ω) ≥ a1A(ω) for all
ω ∈ Ω. Taking expectations gives the desired result. 2.3 R  43
2.2.6 Continuity of the expectation operator
The expectation operator satisﬁes some useful continuity properties (Billingsley,
1995):
Lemma 2.2.36. Let X,X1,X2,... be random variables.
• Monotone convergence: Suppose that X,X1,X2,... are all deﬁned on the same
probability space and suppose that X`
a.s.
→ X. If for all ` ∈ N, X` ≥ 0 a.s. and
X` ≤ X`+1 a.s., then
E[X`] → E[X] when ` → ∞.
• Dominated convergence: Suppose X`
d
→ X. If there exists a random variable Y
with E[|Y|] < ∞ such that
∀` ∈ N,x > 0 : 1 − F|X`|(x) ≤ 1 − F|Y|(x),
then E[|X|] < ∞ and
E[X`] → E[X] when ` → ∞.
• Bounded convergence: Suppose X`
d
→ X. If there exists x ∈ R such that |X`| ≤ x
a.s., then E[|X|] < ∞ and
E[X`] → E[X] when ` → ∞.
Notethatboundedconvergenceisinfactaspecialcaseofdominatedconvergence.
Remark 2.2.37. It is customary in probability theory to omit the argument ω. In
particular,[X ∈ B]isoftenusedasshorthandfor{ω ∈ Ω | X(ω) ∈ B}.Theprobability
ofthiseventisdenotedbyP(X ∈ B)(withoutthesquarebrackets),anditsindicator
function is written as 1[X∈B]. For the remainder of this thesis, we will follow this
convention for ease of notation, unless confusion may arise. /
2.3 Random networks
Random network models are a special class of probability spaces. The theory
of random networks can therefore be seen as a subﬁeld of probability theory.
However, given its central place in Part I of this thesis and because it is also2 P 44
intimately related to other ﬁelds such as graph theory, we treat the theory of
random networks separately here. In this section, we ﬁrst introduce the main
concepts and deﬁnitions. Subsequently, we discuss a class of random network
models that has recently received considerable interest in economics, the class of
random network models with a given degree distribution.
Books on random networks in mathematics generally cover a limited number
of random network models in depth. Bollob´ as (2001) and Janson et al. (2000) are
classic references for the Erd˝ os-R´ enyi random network models that we discuss
shortly. Durrett (2006), Jackson (2008) and Van der Hofstad (2007) additionally
discuss some other well-known random network models. Bollob´ as and Riordan




2.3.1 Basic concepts and deﬁnitions
Before we can deﬁne random networks, we need to specify what we mean by the
term network. A network g is a pair consisting of a ﬁnite, nonempty set V(g) of
vertices and a ﬁnite set E(g) of edges, with an edge being an unordered pair of two
distinct vertices. Let g be a network. If {v,w} ∈ E(g), where v,w ∈ V(g),v , w, then
v and w are neighbors in g; alternatively, we say that v and w are adjacent in g. For
ease of notation, an edge {v,w} ∈ E(g) is sometimes denoted by vw. An independent
set in a network is a set of vertices that are pairwise nonadjacent. A network is
bipartite if its vertex set is the union of two disjoint (possibly empty) independent
sets. This is illustrated in Figure 2.4. Finally, two networks g, g0 are isomorphic if
V(g) = V(g0) =: V and there is a permutation π of V such that {i, j} ∈ E(g) for
i, j ∈ V,i , j, if and only if {π(i),π(j)} ∈ E(g0). This deﬁnes an equivalence relation;
hence, the set of all networks with a given vertex set can be partitioned into a ﬁnite
number of isomorphism classes, i.e., sets of isomorphic networks.
We now turn to random networks. A random network model is a probability
space (i.e., a triple consisting of a sample space, a σ-algebra, and a probability
measureontheσ-algebra)inwhichthesamplespaceisanonemptysetofnetworks.
This set can be ﬁnite or countable. The probability measure on the σ-algebra is
determined by a random construction process, the experiment. The outcome of





Figure 2.4. (a) A bipartite network, with independent sets {1,4} and
{2,3}; (b) a network that is not bipartite: while vertex 2 and 3 are not
connected, vertex 1 and 4 are now neighbors, so there do not exist two
independent sets that partition the vertex set {1,2,3,4}.
Example 2.3.1 (Erd˝ os-R´ enyi random networks). Thenotionofarandomnetwork
originated in a paper by Erd˝ os (1947). In the random network model proposed
by Erd˝ os (1947), a network is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all
2(
n
2) networks with n vertices, where n ∈ N. Hence, the probability space is
(G(n),F(n),P
(n)
1/2), where G(n) is the set of all networks with n vertices, F(n) is the set
of all subsets of G(n), and










(hence the subscript 1/2), one for each pair of vertices, with an edge being drawn
between two vertices if the toss gives heads (say). This model can of course be
generalized: we can draw an edge between each pair of vertices with probability
p = p(n), rather than with probability 1/2 (Gilbert, 1959). In that case,
∀g ∈ G(n) : P
(n)
p (g) = (p)mg (1 − p)(
n
2)−mg,
where mg is the number of edges in g. Erd˝ os and R´ enyi (1959) proposed the closely
related random network model consisting of all networks with n vertices and
M = M(n) edges, with all networks having equal probability. For many purposes,
the latter two models are essentially equivalent for appropriate choices of p and
M.AsErd˝ osandR´ enyiaregenerallyrecognizedtobethefoundersofthetheoryof
random networks, these models are commonly referred to as Erd˝ os-R´ enyi random
network models. /
Let n ∈ N, and let V(n) := {1,...,n}. Let G(n) be the set of all networks with










Let F be the σ-algebra generated by the set of singletons of G.
We deﬁne some random variables that will be useful in the following. Note
that if a function is F/H -measurable for some σ-algebra H , the function with
its domain restricted to G(n) is F(n)/H -measurable for all n ∈ N. Hence, if we
deﬁne a measurable function on G, it is deﬁned on G(n) for all n ∈ N. Let Q be the
(countable) set of all ﬁnite subsets of V.
We are interested in the local environment of vertices. Let v ∈ V, and deﬁne
the function Nv : G → Q by:
∀g ∈ G : Nv(g) :=
n
w ∈ V(g)
   vw ∈ E(g)
o
.
Hence, Nv(g) is the set of neighbors of vertex v in network g. We refer to the mea-
surable function Nv as the neighborhood of v, and to Nv(g), g ∈ G, as the neighborhood
of v in g. Also, deﬁne the function Dv : G → N0 by:
∀g ∈ G : Dv(g) := |Nv(g)|.
That is, Dv(g) is the number of neighbors of vertex v in network g. We refer to
Dv(g) as the degree of v in g, and to the random variable Dv as the degree of v. Note
that the degree of v in g can be 0 for two distinct reasons. It could be that v is a
vertex in the network, but does not have any neighbors, or that v is not a vertex of
the network.
We also consider the number of neighbors the neighbors of a given vertex
have. Loosely speaking, the neighbor degree proﬁle of a vertex in a given network
is a list of the degrees of the neighbors of the vertex, in a non-increasing order. For
t ∈ N, let
Ωt
K := {(k1,...,kt) ∈ Nt | k1 ≥ k2 ≥ ... ≥ kt−1 ≥ kt}.
For t = 0, let Ωt
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1 2
3 4
Figure 2.5. The network g of Example 2.3.2.
Let FK be the σ-ﬁeld generated by the set of singletons of ΩK. For g ∈ G and v ∈ V
such that Dv(g) = 0, we set Kv(g) := 0. Otherwise, deﬁne
N1 := Nv(g),
j(1) := max{w ∈ N1 | Dw(g) ≥ Dz(g) for all z ∈ N1},
Kv,1(g) := Dj(1)(g),
and for ` = 2,...,Dv(g):
N` := N`−1 \ {j(` − 1)},
j(`) := max{w ∈ N` | Dw(g) ≥ Dz(g) for all z ∈ N`},
Kv,`(g) := Dj(`)(g).
Then, Kv(g) := (Kv,1(g),...,Kv,Dv(g)(g)) is the neighbor degree proﬁle of v in g, and the
function Kv : G → ΩK is the neighbor degree proﬁle of v.
Example 2.3.2. Supposewedrawnetwork ginFigure2.5fromthesetG.Itsvertex
set is V(g) = {1,2,3,4}, and its edge set is E(g) = {{1,2},{1,3},{1,4},{3,4}}. The
neighborhoodofvertex1in gisN1(g) = {2,3,4},anditsdegreein gisD1(g) = 3.The
neighbordegreeproﬁleofvertex1in gisK1(g) = (D4(g),D3(g),D2(g)) = (2,2,1). /
Throughout this thesis, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2.A (Finite expected number of vertices). Let(G,F,P)bearandom







Random network models with this property exist. For instance, any random net-
work model with P(G(n)) = 1 for some n ∈ N satisﬁes this property. The random
network model in Example 4.9 of Bollob´ as et al. (2007) is an instance of a random
network model with a random number of vertices that satisﬁes this property.2 P 48
Remark 2.3.3. We have deﬁned a random network model as a probability space,
where the sample space is (a subset of) G. An alternative approach is to deﬁne
a random network model as a measurable function from some underlying prob-
ability space to (a subset of) G. The two approaches are equivalent (Billingsley,
1999, p. 25). We have chosen to outline the former approach here as it is the more
natural one for deﬁning network belief systems in the context of network games
(Chapter 3 and 4). We pursue the latter approach in Chapter 5. /
Often, one is interested in random network models with a ﬁxed number of
vertices in which vertices are ex ante identical in terms of their neighbor degree
proﬁle:
Deﬁnition 2.3.4. Let (C(n),H (n),P) be a random network model such that C(n) ⊆ G(n)
for some n ∈ N and H (n) the σ-algebra generated by the set of singletons of C(n). The
neighbor degree proﬁles K1,K2,...,Kn are exchangeable under (C(n),H (n),P) if for
any k ∈ {1,...,n}, any v1,...,vk ∈ V(n), the random vector (Kv1,Kv2,...,Kvk) has the
same distribution as (Kπ(v1),Kπ(v2),...,Kπ(vk)) for any permutation π : {v1,...,vk} →
{v1,...,vk}.
Examples of a random network model with a ﬁxed number of vertices and ex-
changeable neighbor degree proﬁles are discussed in Section 2.3.2 and in Chap-
ters 3–5. Note that if neighbor degree proﬁles are exchangeable under a random
network model (C(n),H (n),P) where C(n) ⊆ G(n) for some n ∈ N, then in particular,
for any v,w ∈ V(n) and for each t ∈ N0,
P





{g ∈ C(n) | Dw(g) = t}

,
i.e., the probability that a vertex has a certain degree is the same for each vertex.
This means that if we want to consider the probability that an arbitrary vertex has
a given degree t ∈ N0, we can simply consider the probability that a ﬁxed vertex,
say vertex 1, has degree t. This we use in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.3.5. Let (C(n),H (n),P) be a random network model with C(n) ⊆ G(n) for
some n ∈ N and H (n) the σ-algebra generated by the set of singletons of C(n). Sup-
pose neighbor degree proﬁles are exchangeable under (C(n),H (n),P). Then, the degree












{g ∈ C(n) | D1(g) = t}

.
That is, the degree distribution of a random network model gives for each t ∈ N0 the
probability that a vertex selected uniformly at random from the network has degree t.2.3 R  49
Remark 2.3.6. It is also possible to deﬁne the degree distribution for more general
classesofrandomnetworkmodels.Wedonotpursuethatdirectionhere,andrefer
the reader to Chapter 4 for an example of how to deﬁne the degree distribution in
a random network model with a random number of vertices. /
Example 2.3.1 (continued). Forn ∈ N,considertheErd˝ os-R´ enyirandomnetwork
model (G(n),F(n),P
(n)
p ), where p = p(n). It is not hard to see that the probability that






i.e., the degree of a vertex is a binomial random variable with parameters n − 1
and p. If we set p(n) = c/n for n ∈ N, where c > 0, the degree distribution
of (G(n),F(n),P
(n)
p ) converges to the Poisson distribution with parameter c when
n → ∞ (Van der Hofstad, 2007, Thm. 5.9). /
The degree distribution is an important property of random network models.
Many networks in economic and social contexts are characterized by power law
degree sequences (Newman, 2003b). The degree sequence of a network gives for
each t the fraction of vertices with degree t, and is thus the deterministic analogue
of the degree distribution.5 In a network with a power law degree sequence, the
fractionofverticeswithdegreetfallsoﬀapproximatelyast−α,whereα > 0,atleast
for some range of t. In the case of degree distributions, the interest is merely in the
(right) tail behavior, i.e., the probability that a vertex has a very high degree. We
say that a cumulative distribution function F is heavy-tailed or has a heavy (right)
tail if for all a > 0,
lim
t→∞
eat(1 − F(t)) → ∞.
An example of a heavy-tailed distribution function is a distribution function with
a power law tail, i.e., a distribution function F such that (1−F(t)) ∼ t−α, where α > 0
(recall that ∼ denotes that two functions are asymptotically equal, see page xv for
a precise deﬁnition). A prominent example of a distribution with a distribution
functionwithapowerlawtailistheParetodistribution,whosedistributionfunction
5 There is no consensus on the deﬁnition of a degree sequence. We use the deﬁnition from the
theory of random networks; in graph theory, the degree sequence of a network is usually taken to
be a non-increasing sequence of the degrees of the vertices in the networks, and the term “degree
distribution” is used to denote what we call the degree sequence. We use the current term
to distinguish between the deterministic concept (degree sequence) and the stochastic concept
(degree distribution).2 P 50
is given by





where α,β > 0. A distribution function has thin tails if there exists a > 0 such that
lim
t→∞
eat(1 − F(t)) → 0.
We have seen that the degree distribution of a sequence (G(n),F(n),P
(n)
p )n∈N
of Erd˝ os-R´ enyi random network models with p = c/n for n ∈ N, where c > 0,
converges to the Poisson distribution with parameter c when n → ∞. As the
Poisson distribution is a typical example of a distribution with a distribution
function with thin tails, the Erd˝ os-R´ enyi random network models cannot account
for the power law degree sequence observed in many real networks. By contrast,
the class of random network models discussed in the next section can generate
arbitrarydegreedistributions,includingso-calledpowerlawdegreedistributions.
For that reason, it recently has received considerable attention in diﬀerent ﬁelds,
including economics (e.g. Jackson, 2008; Vega-Redondo, 2007). In Chapter 5, we
propose another random network model that can also generate power law degree
distributions.
2.3.2 Random networks with a given degree distribution
We deﬁne a class of random network models that can generate arbitrary degree
distributions. We use the erased conﬁguration model of Britton et al. (2006). Let
ξ be a distribution with support in the set of nonnegative integers. Let n ∈ N,
and consider a random network model (G(n),F(n),P
(n)
ξ ), where G(n) is the set of all
networks on vertex set V(n), F(n) is the set of all subsets of G, and the probability
measure P
(n)
ξ is deﬁned indirectly as follows.
For each vertex v ∈ V(n), draw a number Hv independently from the distribu-
tion ξ, and attach Hv “half-edges” to v. We want to pair these half-edges in such
a way that each half-edge is paired with exactly one other half-edge. Clearly, if
the sum
P
v∈V(n) Hv is odd, this is not possible. In that case, we select a vertex w
uniformly at random from V(n) and replace Hw by Hw + 1. We then select pairs of
half-edges uniformly at random (without replacement) and connect the elements
of the pair, until no half-edges are left. If we have connected a half-edge from v
to a half-edge from w, where v,w ∈ V(n), we say that there is a potential edge with2.3 R  51
endpoints v and w. Note that there can be more than one potential edge with a given
pair of vertices as its endpoints, or that there can be potential edges for which the
two endpoints are equal. We construct a random network by drawing an edge
between two vertices v,w ∈ V(n),v , w, if and only if there is at least one potential
edge with v and w as its endpoints.
Remark 2.3.7. The erased conﬁguration model of Britton et al. (2006) we discuss
here is a variant of the conﬁguration model (Bender and Canﬁeld, 1978; Bollob´ as,
1980), which many authors in economics refer to in order to construct random
networks. The conﬁguration model is essentially identical to the model presented
here, except that each potential edge is replaced by an edge.6 Hence, under the
conﬁguration model, there can be multiple edges between a pair of vertices, or
therecanbeself-loops,i.e.,edgesfromagivenvertextoitself.Forgame-theoretical
applications, this is undesirable. We therefore use the erased conﬁguration model




degree proﬁles are exchangeable under this random network model. The degree
distribution of this random network model is not identical to ξ. The reason is that,
even though the number of half-edges of each vertex is distributed according to
ξ, the degree distribution will diﬀer somewhat from that distribution, because
not every potential edge is replaced by an edge.7 However, when the number of
half-edges (distributed as ξ) of each vertex has ﬁnite ﬁrst moment, the degree
distribution of (G(n),F(n),P
(n)
ξ ) comes arbitrarily close to ξ when n grows large:
Theorem 2.3.8 (Britton et al. (2006), Thm. 2.1). For each n ∈ N, let the number of
half-edges of a vertex be distributed as ξ, with support in N, and suppose it has ﬁnite
ﬁrst moment. Let (G(n),F(n),P
(n)
ξ ) be deﬁned as above, and let (p
(n)
t )t∈N0 be its degree
distribution. Then,





ξ )convergestoξwhenn → ∞.
Proof. See Britton et al. (2006). 
6 The conﬁguration model is often used with a ﬁxed sequence (hv)v∈V(n) that gives for each vertex
v ∈ V(n) the number of half-edges hv of v, rather than with an i.i.d. sequence (Bollob´ as, 2001). The
conﬁguration model with a ﬁxed sequence and the conﬁguration model with an i.i.d. sequence
are intimately related, see Van der Hofstad (2007).
7 Also, when the sum of half-edges is odd, we increase the number of half-edges by 1 of a vertex
selected uniformly at random from the vertex set. In the limit of large n, this eﬀect is negligible
(Britton et al., 2006, also see Appendix 2.A).2 P 52
We refer to (G(n),F(n),P
(n)
ξ ) as the random network model with n vertices and
(asymptotic) degree distribution ξ. The intuition behind Theorem 2.3.8 is that, even
though with positive probability, there are multiple potential edges between some
vertex and another vertex, or potential edges from some vertex to itself,8 the prob-
ability that this is the case for a given vertex becomes vanishingly small as the
number of vertices grows large (as long as the ﬁrst moment of the number of
half-edges of each vertex is ﬁnite).
A similar intuition lies behind the following result, which states that the
degrees of neighbors are asymptotically independent when the ﬁrst moment of
the number of half-edges is ﬁnite. Before we state this result, ﬁrst note that if
the probability that a vertex selected uniformly at random from the network has
degree t is qt ∈ [0,1] for t ∈ N0, then the probability that a neighbor of a vertex
selected uniformly at random from the network has degree t is proportional to tqt,
as a vertex of degree t has t times more neighbors than a vertex of degree 1. For
each t ∈ N0, θ = (θ1,...,θt) ∈ Ωt
K and k ∈ N0, deﬁne ck(θ) to be the number of







ing to θ. Also, recall that x0 = 1 for x > 0.
Theorem 2.3.9. For each n ∈ N, let the number of half-edges of a vertex be distributed
as ξ, with support in N, and suppose it has ﬁnite ﬁrst moment. Let (G(n),F(n),P
(n)
ξ ) be


















Since there is no explicit proof of this result in the literature, as far as we are aware,
we give the full proof in Appendix 2.A.9
8 In fact, it can be shown that this probability is bounded away from zero for all n ∈ N (Bender
and Canﬁeld, 1978).
9 There are some results on the asymptotic independence of degrees for certain random network
models, but these are generally of a diﬀerent type: it is shown that the degrees of some ﬁxed
ﬁnite set of vertices are independent. However, for game-theoretic applications, one needs that
the degrees of a ﬁxed vertex and its neighbors are independent.2.A P  T 2.3.9 53
InChapter 3and4,weshowthatthedependenciesorindependenciesamong
vertex degrees can aﬀect game-theoretic predictions when we study strategic in-
teractions on a network. In Chapter 5, we deﬁne a random network model with a
given asymptotic degree distribution in which vertex degrees are not asymptoti-
cally independent.
2.A Proof of Theorem 2.3.9
Firstweneedsomemoredeﬁnitions.Weﬁrstgeneralizethenotionofanetwork.A
pseudograph gP isatripleconsistingofaﬁnite,nonemptyvertexsetV(gP),aﬁniteset
of pseudo-edges EP(gP),10 and a relation that associates with each pseudo-edge two
vertices (not necessarily distinct) called its endpoints. A pseudograph may contain
multiple edges, i.e., distinct pseudo-edges with the same pair of vertices as its
endpoints, or self-loops, pseudo-edges whose endpoints are equal. A pseudograph
is simple if it does not contain multiple edges or self-loops; see Figure 2.6 for an
illustration. Hence, a network is a simple pseudograph.11 Two distinct vertices
v,w ∈ V(gP),v , w, are adjacent in a pseudograph gP if there is a pseudo-edge
e ∈ EP(gP) with v and w as its endpoints; alternatively, we say that v and w are
neighbors.
In Section 2.3.2, we considered a random construction process where for a
given probability measure ξ and a given n ∈ N potential edges were drawn
between pairs of vertices in V(n) = {1,...,n}. If we identify each potential edge
with a pseudo-edge, we obtain a pseudograph. The random construction process,
together with the identiﬁcation of each potential edge with a pseudo-edge, thus









P is the (countable) set of all pseudographs with vertex set V(n);
• F
(n)





ξ,P is the probability measure on G
(n)









10 In graph theory, pseudo-edges are simply called edges (e.g. West, 2001). We use the current
terminology to avoid confusion with the notion of an edge that we introduced in Section 2.3.2.
11 There is no consensus on deﬁnitions here. Some authors deﬁne a network (or graph) to be what
we call a pseudograph, and refer to what we call a network as a simple network. Others use the






Figure 2.6. (a) A pseudograph with multiple edges; (b) a pseudograph
with multiple edges and a self-loop.
to be the set of all ﬁnite pseudographs, and let FP be the σ-algebra generated by
the set of singletons of GP. Recall the deﬁnition of V and V(n), where n ∈ N.
We deﬁne some random variables that will be useful in the following. Note
that if a function is FP/H -measurable for some σ-algebra H , the function with




P /H -measurable for all n ∈ N. Let v ∈ V. The
pseudo-degree of v is the random variable DP
v : GP → N0 deﬁned by:
∀gP ∈ GP : DP
v(gP) :=
  {e ∈ EP(gP) | v is an endpoint of e}
  ,
i.e., the pseudo-degree of a vertex in a pseudograph is the number of pseudo-
edges that have v as its endpoint, with self-loops being counted once. As before,
we can deﬁne the set of vertices that are adjacent to a given vertex. The reduced
neighborhood of v is the function NR
v : GP → Q, with for each gP ∈ GP,
NR
v(gP) := {w ∈ V(gP) \ {v} | ∃e ∈ EP(gP) such that v and w are its endpoints}.
The reduced pseudo-degree of v is then the random variable DR
v : GP → N0 deﬁned
by:
∀gP ∈ GP : DR
v(gP) := |NR
v(gP)|,
i.e., the reduced pseudo-degree of a vertex in a pseudograph is the number of
vertices adjacent to it. The diﬀerence between the pseudo-degree of a vertex and
its reduced pseudo-degree is that the latter discards multiple edges and self-
loops. Hence, the reduced pseudo-degree and the pseudo-degree of a vertex in
a pseudograph coincide if the vertex does not have multiple edges or self-loops.
In particular, in a simple pseudograph, the pseudo-degree (and thus the reduced
pseudo-degree) of a vertex is equal to its degree. Finally, note that the pseudo-
degree and the reduced pseudo-degree of v ∈ V in a pseudograph gP are equal to
zero if v < V(gP).2.A P  T 2.3.9 55
We now deﬁne the pseudo-degree proﬁle and the reduced pseudo-degree
proﬁle of a vertex in a pseudograph. For each v ∈ V, the reduced pseudo-degree
proﬁle of v is the function KR
v : GP → ΩK which can be deﬁned in a way analogous
totheneighbordegreeproﬁleKv ofvinanetwork,withthereducedneighborhood
taking the role of the neighborhood of a vertex and the reduced pseudo-degree
takingtheroleofthedegreeofavertex.Thedeﬁnitionofthepseudo-degreeproﬁle
of a vertex is somewhat more involved, as we have to account for multiple edges
and self-loops. First, recall the deﬁnitions of ΩK and Ωt
K, t ∈ N0. For v ∈ V and
gP ∈ GP, deﬁne
EP
v(gP) := {e ∈ EP(gP) | v is an endpoint of e}
to be the set of pseudo-edges of which v is an endpoint in gP. Also, for each
pseudo-edge e ∈ EP
v(gP), deﬁne nv(e; gP) in the following way. If there is a vertex
w ∈ V(gP),w , v, that is an endpoint of e, then nv(e; gP) = w. Otherwise, e is a
self-loop with both endpoints equal to v, and we set nv(e; gP) = v. Then, for gP ∈ GP
and v ∈ V such that DP
v(gP) = 0, we set KP
v(gP) := 0. Otherwise, deﬁne
N1 := EP
v(gP),
j(1) := e, for some e ∈ N1 such that






and for ` = 2,...,DP
v(gP):
N` := N`−1 \ {j(` − 1)},
j(`) := e, for some e ∈ N` such that










v(gP)(gP)) is the pseudo-degree proﬁle of v in gP, and
the function KP
v : GP → ΩK is the pseudo-degree proﬁle of v.
Example 2.A.1. Considerthepseudograph gP inFigure2.6(b).Thepseudo-degree
of vertex 1 and 3 in gP is DP
1(gP) = DP
3(gP) = 4, and the pseudo-degree of vertex 2
in gP is DP
2(gP) = 3. The pseudo-degree of vertex 4 in gP is DP
4(gP) = 2. The reduced2 P 56









and the reduced pseudo-degree proﬁle in gP is (2,2) for all vertices. /
Finally, for t ∈ N and θ = (θ1,...,θt) ∈ Ωt
K, deﬁne
kθk = max{t,θ1,...,θt}.
Theorem 2.3.9 uses Lemma 2.A.3, which in turn uses Lemma 2.A.2.
Lemma 2.A.2. Suppose X1,X2,... are independent and identically distributed random
variables on some probability space (Ω,F,P) with ﬁnite kth moment, where k ∈ N. Then,
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as n → ∞, which proves the ﬁrst claim. To prove the second claim, notice that for









so that the second claim follows by dominated convergence. 
Lemma 2.A.3. For each n ∈ N, let the number of half-edges of a vertex be distributed




deﬁned as above. Then, for each ﬁxed θ ∈ ΩK such that P
(n)
ξ,P(KP


















1(gP) = θ} for ﬁxed θ ∈ ΩK, the pseudo-degrees of vertex 1 and his neighbors are
bounded by kθk. Let n ∈ N such that P
(n)
ξ,P(KP
1 = θ) > 0. For each vertex v ∈ V(n),
number the half-edges of v arbitrarily in each realization. For each i, j ∈ V(n), let
1
ij
st be the indicator function of the event that half-edge s of vertex i is connected























































That is, the random variable S counts the number of self-loops of vertex 1, while
b S counts the number of self-loops of the neighbors of 1. Similarly, M equals the
number of multiple edges of vertex 1, while b M is the number of multiple edges







1(gP)} = {gP ∈ G
(n)
P | S(gP) +b S(gP) + M(gP) + b M(gP) = 0},
i.e., the event that the reduced pseudo-degree proﬁle of vertex 1 coincides with its
pseudo-degree proﬁle is equal to the event that the sum of the self-loops of vertex
1 and his neighbors and the multiple edges of vertex 1 and his neighbors are zero.
Hence, it is suﬃcient to show that S,b S,M, b M all converge to zero in probability
(given that KP
1 = θ), i.e., it suﬃces to show that




ξ,P(X ≥ ε | KP
1 = θ) = 0










































     
     KP
1 = θ
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     
where in the last line we have used that the pseudo-degrees of vertex 1 and his
neighbors are bounded by kθk (conditional on the event [KP
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where we have used that the number of half-edges of each vertex (distributed as
ξ) has ﬁnite mean.12 Note that
P
t∈N0 tξ(t) > 0 as ξ(0) = 0 by assumption. Hence,
as n → ∞,
n
Pn
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for the strong law of large numbers to hold. We can do this by deﬁning an underlying probability
space that contains all relevant random variables (e.g. Billingsley, 1999, also see Remark 2.3.3 and


































     KP
1 = θ

































     ,























































     KP
1 = θ


















































































     .












   KP
1 = θ
i
→ 0. 2.A P  T 2.3.9 61












We can now prove Theorem 2.3.9. First, note that the distribution of DP
j of
each vertex j is very close to ξ, as the number of half-edges of each vertex is
distributed as ξ, and each half-edge becomes a pseudo-edge in the corresponding
pseudograph, unless the sum of all half-edges is odd and the vertex is selected to
have its number of half-edges increased by 1. When n → ∞, the probability that
the pseudo-degree of vertex 1 or of one of its neighbors is increased goes to zero,13










as n → ∞. Let t ∈ N and θ ∈ Ωt






f(θ) ≥ 1 − ε.
Since ΘTε := {θ ∈ ΩK | kθk ≤ Tε} is a ﬁnite set, P
(n)
ξ,P(KP
1 = θ) converges to f(θ)
uniformly for those θ such that kθk ≤ Tε. In particular, there exists Nε ∈ N such










≥ 1 − 2ε. (2.8)






















13 Note that it is not an event in F
(n)
P that the pseudo-degree of vertex 1 or one of its neighbors
is increased. However, we can deﬁne an underlying probability space for the random network
model with an appropriate σ-ﬁeld such that it is measurable with respect to that σ-ﬁeld (also see



























































































































































By (2.8), the ﬁrst term of (2.10) is at most 2ε for n > Nε. Consider the second term
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≤ ε





















≤ 2ε + ε. (2.11)



















= f(θ). Part I
Networks and Games3 Convergence of beliefs in Bayesian network games
Summary
In this chapter, which is based on Kets (2007b), we study a setting in
which players are located on a network and play a ﬁxed game with
their neighbors. Players have incomplete information on the network
structure. They have a common prior over the network, and in addition,
theyknowthenumberofconnectionstheyhave.Westudythesensitivity
of game-theoretic predictions to the speciﬁcation of players’ beliefs. We
show that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and only if they
assign similar probabilities to all local events, i.e., to all events involving
the types of a player and his neighbors. This means that in order to fully
explore the range of possible strategic outcomes, it suﬃces to vary the
type distribution and the correlation among player types.
3.1 Introduction
In many contexts, an agent’s well-being primarily depends on the behavior of
those with whom he has a direct relationship, rather than on the behavior of the
population at large. Indeed, Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) and Tucker (2006) ﬁnd
that an individual’s decision to adopt a particular communication technology is
primarily inﬂuenced by the adoption decisions of those with whom he interacts
directly,ratherthanbytheoveralladoptionlevelinthepopulation.Also,anagent’s
connections provide access to various resources such as information, knowledge
and capital. For instance, a key success factor for a ﬁrm in a high-tech sector such
as the biotechnology industry is its position in a network of R&D partnerships
(Powelletal.,1996).1 Hence,inavarietyofsettings,thenetworksformedbyagents’
relations are important in determining economic outcomes. These networks are
generallylargeandcomplex,andevolverapidlyovertime(e.g.Powelletal.,2005).
This suggests that agents often do not know the exact structure of the network
they belong to.2 At the same time, it is unclear what beliefs agents have about
1 Other empirical studies that highlight the role of networks in economic settings include Coleman
et al. (1966) and Conley and Udry (2005) on the diﬀusion of new technologies in medicine and
agriculture, respectively, Granovetter (1974) on job search, and Fafchamps and Lund (2003) on
informal insurance networks in developing countries.
2 Krackhardt and Hanson (1993) report that informal networks are mostly unobservable to senior
executives. Also, Powell et al. (1996, p.120) observe that in R&D collaborations in biotechnology,
“beneath most formal ties [. . . ] lies a sea of informal relations”.3.1 I 65
their networks.3 Hence, in settings where agents interact strategically with their
neighborsonanetworkunderincompleteinformationonthenetworkstructure,it
is important to assess how game-theoretic predictions depend on the assumptions
on players’ beliefs. This is the topic of the current chapter.
Morespeciﬁcally,westudyasettinginwhichplayersarelocatedonanetwork
andplayaﬁxedgamewiththeirneighbors.Payoﬀsonlydependonaplayer’sown




the interest in such games is usually on the eﬀect of network characteristics on the
behavior of players, we focus on symmetric equilibria, as in much of the literature
(cf. Galeotti et al., 2006; Jackson and Yariv, 2007; Sundararajan, 2005). We deﬁne a
function that for any two priors gives their strategic distance. Loosely speaking, the
strategicdistancebetweentwopriorsissmallifforanygameinwhichplayershold
one of these priors, for any symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in that game,
thereisasymmetricapproximateequilibriumintheassociatedgamewiththeother
prior such that ex ante expected payoﬀs are close under both equilibria (cf. Kajii
and Morris, 1998). If that is the case, players can obtain approximately the same ex
ante expected payoﬀs under both priors, and we say that the two priors are close
inastrategicsense.Westudythenecessaryandsuﬃcientconditionsfortwopriors
to be close in a strategic sense. We thus consider a type of lower hemicontinuity
of the correspondence of (interim) approximate equilibria in Bayesian network
games (see Engl, 1995, for a discussion of diﬀerent continuity concepts).
Our main result (Theorem 3.4.2) shows that two priors are close in a strategic
sense if and only if they assign similar probabilities to local events, i.e., events
that involve the types of a player and his neighbors. This result has two important
implications. Firstly, it indicates that in order to fully explore the possible strategic
outcomes in Bayesian network games, it is suﬃcient to vary the type distribution
and the correlation among player types. Hence, on the one hand, varying the type
distribution, as has been the focus of much of the literature so far (see below for
a discussion of this literature), is not enough. On the other hand, the result limits
the set of priors that one needs to consider, as we show that priors need only be
varied along two dimensions.
3 Evidence suggests that agents use simple heuristics (Janicik and Larrick, 2005), and that their
perception of the network is biased (e.g. Kumbasar et al., 1994), even in an environment with

















Figure 3.1. The networks in (a) and (b) are identical in their local prop-
erties. That is, in both networks, there are 6 vertices with degree 2 that
are only connected to other vertices with degree 2, and 4 vertices with
degree 1, which are connected exclusively with other vertices with de-
gree 1.
Secondly, Theorem 3.4.2 implies that we can interpret a Bayesian network
game as a set of overlapping “local” games, so that we do not need to concern
ourselves with the nonlocal features of priors. This can best be understood by
means of a concrete example. For instance, consider two priors, and suppose that
one of the priors assigns positive probability only to networks that are isomorphic
tothenetworkinFigure3.1(a),witheachofthenetworksinthisisomorphismclass
having equal probability, while the other prior assigns positive probability only
to networks isomorphic to the network in Figure 3.1(b), and each of the networks
in this isomorphism class has equal probability. Clearly, these priors are identical




of their strategic implications.
The motivation for the question we study comes from empirical work. The
last few years, there has been a surge in empirical work on networks, owing
to the availability of data on large-scale networks such as the World Wide Web
(see Jackson, 2008, for an overview). This work has shown that networks that are
relevant for economic applications are characterized by a number of properties.
Someofthesepropertiesrelatetothelocalenvironmentofaplayer.Forinstance,an
importantpropertyofnetworksisthedistributionofthenumberofdirectcontacts
that people have. Other properties are deﬁned on a larger scale. The clustering
coeﬃcient of a network, for instance, quantiﬁes the extent to which friends of3.1 I 67
your friends are also your friends. Another example is the degree correlation, i.e.,
the correlation in the number of contacts people have. An important question for
game-theoretic applications is then how these diﬀerent properties aﬀect strategic
interactions on networks.
So far, most of the literature has focused on the eﬀect of varying the degree
distribution, i.e., the distribution of player types, on game-theoretic outcomes, as-
sumingthatplayers’typesareindependent(e.g.GaleottiandVega-Redondo,2005;
Jackson and Yariv, 2007; L´ opez-Pintado, 2006; Sundararajan, 2005), using the ran-
dom network model with a given degree distribution discussed in Section 2.3.2.4
An important question is whether game-theoretic predictions obtained under the
assumption that players’ types are independent continue to hold if we relax this
assumption. The current chapter shows that this is not the case. We show that for
two priors to give rise to similar outcomes (from a player’s ex ante perspective),
it is not suﬃcient that they are close in terms of the type distribution they induce,
they also need to be close in terms of the correlation among player types. Hence,
whilevaryingthetypedistributionmaybeagoodstartingpoint,thecurrentchap-
ter shows that one needs to go beyond the class of random network models with
a given degree distribution to fully explore the range of strategic outcomes. At the
same time, our result restricts the set of priors that one needs to consider, as we
show that priors need only be varied along two dimensions, the distribution of
types and the correlation among player types.
To illustrate these points, we present a simple example in Section 3.4.2. We
study a game in which players can choose whether to invest or not. Not investing
gives a payoﬀ of zero, independent of others’ actions, while investing is only
proﬁtable if all neighbors invest. Hence, this is a game of strategic complements.
We compare two priors which are identical in terms of the type distribution they
induce, but which diﬀer in terms of the correlation among types. We show that
thereexistsasymmetricstrategyproﬁlethatisaBayesian-Nashequilibriumunder
one prior that is not an (approximate) equilibrium under the other prior, and vice
versa, and ex ante expected payoﬀs under equilibria under the two priors diﬀer.
These priors are thus diﬀerent in terms of strategic predictions.
Theworkinthischapterisrelatedtotwodistinctliteratures.Firstly,thecurrent
chaptercontributestotheliteratureonBayesiannetworkgames(e.g.Galeottietal.,
2006; Galeotti and Vega-Redondo, 2005; Jackson and Yariv, 2007; Sundararajan,
2005). This literature studies the eﬀect of network structure on game-theoretic
outcomes. In particular, Galeotti et al. (2006) study the eﬀect of varying the type
4 Note however, that degrees are only asymptotically independent in this model (Proposition 2.3.9).3 C    B   68
distribution and the correlation among players’ types in a particular way in games
with strategic complements and substitutes. They show that predictions change
when the type distribution and the correlation among players’ types are varied.
This illustrates that it is important to go beyond the assumption of independent
types made in the earlier literature. The current chapter complements the work of
Galeotti et al. (2006) in two ways. First, we show that varying the type distribution
and the type correlation, as Galeotti et al. (2006) do, is indeed suﬃcient to capture
all possible strategic behavior in any class of Bayesian network games. Second,
while Galeotti et al. (2006) focus on gradual changes in equilibrium behavior
as priors are continuously varied in terms of the distribution of types and the
type correlation, our results emphasize that it is possible to obtain qualitatively
diﬀerent outcomes if priors diﬀer in these two dimensions (see e.g. the example in
Section 3.4.2).
The second literature to which this chapter is related is the literature on
(payoﬀ) continuity in games. Continuity issues in general Bayesian games have
been studied by a number of authors (Kajii and Morris, 1998; Milgrom and Weber,
1985; Monderer and Samet, 1996). The question we study is similar to the question
studied by Kajii and Morris (1998). While Kajii and Morris (1998) study payoﬀ
continuity in general Bayesian games, we restrict attention to the class of Bayesian
network games. Moreover, we focus on symmetric equilibria. By exploiting the
symmetry of the game, we are able to weaken the conditions of Kajii and Morris
(1998). That this can be done is not obvious. While payoﬀs only depend directly
on the actions of neighbors in our setting, actions and beliefs of those further away
in the network may have a considerable eﬀect on the payoﬀs to a player, through
the eﬀect on the neighbors of those players and the neighbors of the neighbors
of those players, and so on. There is thus a tension between the local nature of
the payoﬀs and the interdependencies intrinsic to the network setting. Our results
show that Bayesian network games can nevertheless be treated as a collection of
overlapping local games. The value of this result is that it implies that priors need
only be varied in terms of the type distribution and the correlation among player
types that they induce to explore the possible strategic outcomes.
Thischapterisorganizedasfollows.PreliminariesarediscussedinSection3.2.
Bayesian network games are deﬁned in Section 3.3. The main result is presented
in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes. Proofs that are not included in the main text
can be found in Appendix 3.A.3.2 P 69
3.2 Preliminaries
In our framework, players are located on a network. Networks and random net-
work models have been deﬁned in Section 2.3.1; for ease of reference, we brieﬂy
recall the most important deﬁnitions here. A network g is a pair consisting of a
ﬁnite, nonempty set V(g) of vertices and a ﬁnite set E(g) of edges, with an edge
being an unordered pair of two distinct vertices. Let g be a network. If {i, j} ∈ E(g),
where i, j ∈ V(g),i , j, then i and j are neighbors in g; alternatively, we say that i
and j are adjacent in g. For notational simplicity, an edge {i, j} ∈ E(g) is sometimes
denoted by ij.
A random network model is a probability space (i.e., a triple consisting of a
samplespace,aσ-algebra,andaprobabilitymeasureontheσ-algebra)inwhichthe
sample space is a nonempty (ﬁnite or countable) set of networks. The probability
measure on the σ-algebra is determined by a random construction process, the
experiment. The outcome of such an experiment is called a random network. In the
current setting, we associate a player with each vertex, so that edges represent the
relations between players. In the following, we therefore refer to players rather
than to vertices. Furthermore, random network models represent players’ beliefs.
Throughout this chapter, we therefore refer to a random network model as a
network belief system.
Let n ∈ N and V(n) := {1,...,n}. Let G(n) be the set of all networks with player
set V(n), and let F(n) be the set of all subsets of G(n). Let M(n) be the set of all
probability measures on (G(n),F(n)). Let i ∈ V(n) and g ∈ G(n). The degree Di of
player i is a random variable that gives for each g ∈ G(n) the number of neighbors
of i in g. The neighborhood Ni(g) of i in g is the set of neighbors of i in g. The
neighbor degree proﬁle of i in g is a list of the degrees of the neighbors of player i, in
a non-increasing order. For t ∈ N, Ωt
K is the set of all neighbor degree proﬁles of a




We are interested in the case in which players are ex ante identical in terms of
their network position. Throughout this chapter, we therefore make the following
assumption on network belief systems:
Assumption 3.A (Exchangeability). Let (G(n),F(n),µ) be a network belief sys-
tem. The neighbor degree proﬁles K1,K2,...,Kn are exchangeable. That is, for
any k ∈ {1,...,n}, i1,...,ik ∈ V(n), the random vector (Ki1,Ki2,...,Kik) has the
samedistributionastherandomvector(Kπ(i1),Kπ(i2),...,Kπ(ik))foranypermutation3 C    B   70
π : {i1,...,ik} → {i1,...,ik}. In particular, for all i, j ∈ V(n), for all θ ∈ {0,...,n − 1},
µ({g ∈ G(n) | Di(g) = θ}) = µ({g ∈ G(n) | Dj(g) = θ}),
i.e., the probability that a player has a certain degree is the same for each player.
Network belief systems (G(n),F(n),µ) with this property exist. For instance, let µ
be the uniform distribution on the ﬁnite set G(n). Also the network belief systems








∀t ∈ N0 : p(n)(t) := µ

{g ∈ G(n) | D1(g) = t}

.
That is, the degree distribution of a network belief system gives for each t ∈ N0 the
probability that a player selected uniformly at random from the network has degree t.
Finally, for notational convenience, we assume:
Assumption 3.B (No isolated vertices). The network belief system (G(n),F(n),µ)
is such that with probability 1, each player has at least one neighbor. That is,
µ({g ∈ G(n) | Di(g) > 0 for all i ∈ V(g)}) = 1. /
3.3 Bayesian network games
A Bayesian network game is a Bayesian game where the states of nature are
networks drawn according to a network belief system and in which each player
is informed of the number of neighbors he has. Formally, let n ∈ N. A Bayesian
network game is a Bayesian game
hN,G(n),(Ai)i∈N,(Ti)i∈N,(τi)i∈N,µ,(ui)i∈Ni,
where N = {1,...,n} is the set of players and (G(n),F(n),µ) is a network belief
system on vertex set V(n) = N such that Assumptions 3.A and 3.B are satisﬁed. The
probabilitymeasureµisplayers’(common)prior.Eachplayeri ∈ N hasanonempty,
ﬁnite set Ai of pure strategies or actions. If the state of nature/network is g ∈ G(n),
player i’s private information is his degree. Hence, the set of types or signals of3.3 B   71
player i is Ti = {0,...,n−1} =: T and his signal function τi : G(n) → T assigns to each
network g ∈ G(n) the degree τi(g) := Di(g) of player i. Finally, each player i ∈ N has
a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui : (×i∈N Ai) × G(n) → R.
Henceforth, we speak of type and neighbor type proﬁle rather than of degree
and neighbor degree proﬁle. Also, we will refer to the type distribution of a net-
work belief system that satisﬁes Assumption 3.A to denote its degree distribution
(Deﬁnition 3.2.1).
We assume that there exists a ﬁnite set A such that Ai = A for all i ∈ N.
Furthermore,weassumethatthereexistsaproﬁleoflocalpayoﬀfunctionsv = (vt)t∈T
that for each t ∈ T gives the payoﬀ to a player of type t. More speciﬁcally, for t = 0,
vt is a real function on A, and for each (ai,a−i) ∈ An, g ∈ G(n) and i ∈ V(n) such
that τi(g) = 0, ui(ai,a−i, g) = v0(ai), i.e., the payoﬀs to an isolated player only
depend on his own type and action. For t > 0, vt is a real function on A × At × Tt
that is symmetric in At and Tt, i.e., for all permutations π on {1,...,t}, for all










Then, for each i ∈ V(n), g ∈ G(n) and a = (a1,...,an) ∈ An,
ui(a, g) = vτi(g)(ai,(aj)j∈Ni(g),(τj(g))j∈Ni(g)).
Thatis,aplayer’spayoﬀonlydependsonhisownactionandtype,andtheactions
and types of his neighbors, and does so in an anonymous way. The bound B of a








This maximum exists, as the signal set T and the action set A are ﬁnite.
Throughout this chapter, we ﬁx the player set N and the action set A. A
Bayesian network game is then fully characterized by the common prior µ and its
proﬁle v of local payoﬀ functions. We henceforth denote a Bayesian network game
hN,G(n),(Ai)i∈N,(Ti)i∈N,(τi)i∈N,µ,(ui)i∈Ni by the pair (µ,v).
For i ∈ N, a (mixed) strategy for player i is a function σi : T → ∆(A). Denote the
set of all strategies by Σ. The probability that action ai ∈ A is played under strategy
σi by player i ∈ N given that he has type ti ∈ T is denoted by σi(ai | ti). A strategy
proﬁle is a function σ = (σi)i∈N ∈ Σn, with σi a strategy of player i for each i ∈ N. For3 C    B   72
strategy proﬁle σ = (σj)j∈N and i ∈ N, we write σ−i to denote the strategy proﬁle
σ = (σj)j∈N\{i} of the opponents of i. We say that a strategy proﬁle σ is symmetric if
σi = σj for all i, j ∈ N.
We can now deﬁne expected payoﬀs. First, we introduce some notation that
will be useful in the following. For t ∈ T, F ∈ FK, and θ ∈ ΩK, deﬁne
µ(t) := µ({g0 ∈ G(n) | D1(g0) = t}),
µ(F) := µ({g0 ∈ G(n) | K1(g0) ∈ F}),
µ(θ) := µ({g0 ∈ G(n) | K1(g0) = θ}).
By Assumption 3.A, µ(t) is the prior probability that any ﬁxed player has type t,
and µ(F) is the prior probability that the neighbor type proﬁle of any ﬁxed player
liesinthesetF.Finally,µ(θ)isthepriorprobabilitythataﬁxedplayerhasneighbor
type proﬁle θ.
We also introduce some short-hand notation for various conditional proba-
bilities. Let t ∈ T be such that µ(t) > 0. For g ∈ G(n), F ∈ FK and θ ∈ ΩK, let
µ(g | t) := µ({g} | {g0 ∈ G(n) | D1(g0) = t}),
µ(F | t) := µ({g0 ∈ G(n) | K1(g0) ∈ F} | {g0 ∈ G(n) | D1(g0) = t}),
µ(θ | t) := µ({g0 ∈ G(n) | K1(g0) = θ} | {g0 ∈ G(n) | D1(g0) = t}).
In words, µ(g | t) is the conditional probability that the network is g given that
player 1 has degree t. Similarly, µ(F | t) is the conditional probability that the
neighbor type proﬁle of player 1 lies in the set F given that he has type t. Finally,
µ(θ | t) is the conditional probability that the neighbor type proﬁle of player 1 is
equal to θ, given that he has type t.
Then, the interim expected payoﬀ to player i ∈ N of action ai ∈ A under common
prior µ ∈ M(n) when he receives signal ti ∈ T with µ(ti) > 0 and when the other
















wherewehavedeﬁnedσNi(g) := (σj(τj(g)))j∈Ni(g) andτNi(g) := (τj(g))j∈Ni(g).Similarly,
the ex ante expected payoﬀ to a player i ∈ N of the strategy proﬁle σ when players’3.3 B   73













Deﬁnition 3.3.1. Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σn is an (interim) ε-equilibrium of a
Bayesian network game (µ,v) if for each player i ∈ N, for each ti ∈ T with µ(ti) > 0, each
ai ∈ A with σi(ai | ti) > 0,
ϕi(ai,σ−i;t,µ) ≥ ϕi(bi,σ−i;t,µ) − ε
for all bi ∈ A. That is, in an ε-equilibrium, a player can gain at most ε from unilateral
deviation. An ε-equilibrium is symmetric if it is a symmetric strategy proﬁle.
A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is a 0-equilibrium. A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
exists for Bayesian network games by standard arguments. We also have the
following result:
Proposition 3.3.2. Let (µ,v) be a Bayesian network game. Then there exists a symmetric
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of (µ,v).
For a proof, see Appendix 3.A. For ε ≥ 0, denote the set of symmetric ε-equilibria
of the Bayesian network game (µ,v) by Nε(µ,v). In particular, the set N0(µ,v)
denotes the set of symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibria of (µ,v).
When players play according to a symmetric strategy proﬁle, we can simplify
the expressions for players’ expected payoﬀs. A symmetric strategy proﬁle σ =
(σ1,...,σn) ∈ Σn can be denoted by ˆ σ := (ˆ σt)t∈T, with ˆ σt(a) = σi(a | t) for any i ∈ N
the probability that a player of type t ∈ T takes action a ∈ A. Let σ be a symmetric
strategy proﬁle, and let ˆ σ = (ˆ σt)t∈T, with, for all t ∈ T, ˆ σt(·) = σi(· | t) for any i ∈ N.
For t ∈ T and type proﬁle θ = (θ1,...,θt) ∈ ΩK, we write ˆ σθ to denote (ˆ σθ1,..., ˆ σθt).
Then, for t ∈ T such that µ(t) > 0, and a ∈ A, we deﬁne




µ(θ | t)vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ)
= ϕi(a,σ−i;t,µ) for any i ∈ N
to be the interim expected payoﬀ to an arbitrary player of type t of action a when
players play according to the symmetric strategy proﬁle σ and the common prior3 C    B   74
is µ. Similarly, for a symmetric strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σn, we deﬁne







ˆ σt(a) ˆ ϕt(a, ˆ σ;µ)
= Φi(σ;µ) for any i ∈ N
tobetheexanteexpectedpayoﬀtoanarbitraryplayerwhenplayersplayaccording
to the symmetric strategy proﬁle σ and the prior is µ.
3.4 Strategic convergence
3.4.1 Strategic distance
Our objective is to deﬁne a “measure” of similarity of priors such that if two priors
are similar according to this measure, then, for each Bayesian network game in
which beliefs are given by one of the priors, for each symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium of the game, there exists a symmetric approximate equilibrium in the
game with the same proﬁle of local payoﬀ functions but with beliefs given by the
other prior such that ex ante payoﬀs are close under the two equilibria. If that is
the case, then, for all possible payoﬀ functions, players can obtain approximately
thesamepayoﬀs(exante)underbothpriors.Inthatcase,thetwopriorsaresimilar
from players’ (ex ante) perspective. At the same time, we do not want to make the
conditions on priors to be similar any stricter than necessary. We thus look for the
weakest condition that guarantees that the above holds.
Formally, let µ,µ0 ∈ M(n), and let v = (vt)t∈T be a proﬁle of local payoﬀ





| ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ) − ˆ Φ(ˆ σ0;µ0)|,
where ˆ Φ is the ex ante expected payoﬀ function given proﬁle v of local payoﬀ
functions, and σ and σ0 are the symmetric strategy proﬁles corresponding to ˆ σ
and ˆ σ0, respectively. Hence, χ(µ,µ0;v,ε) is a measure of the diﬀerence in outcomes
under µ0 and µ in terms of ex ante expected payoﬀs when players play according
to a symmetric strategy. More speciﬁcally, for a given ε ≥ 0, for each symmetric
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under µ, we ﬁrst ﬁx a symmetric ε-equilibrium under
µ0 which minimizes the (absolute) diﬀerence in ex ante expected payoﬀs under
bothequilibria,andwethentakeasymmetricBayesian-Nashequilibriumunderµ3.4 S  75
which maximizes this diﬀerence. This formalizes the idea that for each symmetric
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian network game with one of the priors,
there exists some symmetric approximate equilibrium of the Bayesian network
game with the other prior, such that ex ante expected payoﬀs are similar under
both equilibria. However, the function χ(µ,µ0;v,ε) is not symmetric in µ and µ0,






We refer to χ∗(µ,µ0;v,ε) as the strategic distance between µ and µ0 for the proﬁle
v given ε. The supremum of χ∗(µ,µ0;v,ε) over v is called the strategic distance
between µ and µ0 given ε.
Notethatwhenεincreases,thesetofsymmetricε-equilibriaweaklyincreases,
as more and more symmetric strategies will satisfy the equilibrium criterion, and
the (absolute) diﬀerence in ex ante expected payoﬀs will decrease weakly. Hence,
the interesting case is when ε comes arbitrarily close to 0. This leads us to the
following deﬁnition (cf. Kajii and Morris, 1998):
Deﬁnition 3.4.1. Take any µ ∈ M(n), and consider a sequence (µk)k∈N in M(n). The
sequence(µk)k∈N convergesstrategicallytoµifforeachproﬁlevoflocalpayoﬀfunctions




In the next section, we give an example which illustrates the factors that are
important for strategic convergence.
3.4.2 Example: Local investment
For reasons that will become clear shortly, let N be the set of integers that can be
written as
Nν = (21 + 1)n1 + (22 + 1)n2 + ··· + (2ν + 1)nν
for some ν ∈ N, with nν = 1 and for each ` ∈ {1,...,ν − 1}, n` = 2` n`+1.
Let ν ∈ N and consider the following game. There is a set of n = Nν players.
Each player has two actions, S and R. Action S is the safe action. It always gives a3 C    B   76
payoﬀof0,independentofaplayer’stypeortheactionsandtypesofhisneighbors.
The payoﬀs to the risky action R depend on the actions of a player’s neighbors in
the network. More precisely, the payoﬀs to a player of type t ∈ T,t > 0, of action R

















` = R for all ` ∈ {1,...,t},
−c otherwise,
where c > 0 is some constant. An interpretation of this game is that players need
to decide whether to invest (play R) or not (play S). Investment is risky. Only if all
his neighbors invest, a player gets a positive payoﬀ from investing, otherwise he
looses. Clearly, this is a game of (strict) strategic complements, since the incentives
for a player to invest increase strictly when the number of neighbors who invest
increases.
We consider two priors on (G(n),F(n)), the independent types prior and the
core-periphery prior. The core-periphery prior µcp assigns probability one to the
isomorphism class of networks that, for ` ∈ {1,...,ν}, consist of n` components
with 2`+1 players, of which one player—the core player—is connected to all other
players, and the other 2` players—the peripheral players—are connected to the
core player and to 2`−1 −1 peripheral players. Hence, the type (degree) of the core
player in a component with 2` + 1 players is 2`, and the type of the peripheral
players in such a component is 2`−1. We assume that each of the networks in the
isomorphism class has equal probability. See Figure 3.2 for components that occur
with positive probability when ν is at least 3. Note that we can only construct such
networks when the number of players is an element of N.
If we deﬁne n0 = nν+1 = 0, it can easily be veriﬁed that the type distribution
under µcp is given by (ξ(n)(t))t∈N0, where
ξ(n)(t) :=
( 1
Nν(nlog2(t) + 2tnlog2(t)+1) if t ∈ {1,2,4,...,2ν},
0 otherwise.
It can be readily checked that
P
t∈N0 ξ(n)(t) = 1. In addition, it can be shown that







We refer to (ξ(t))t∈N0 as the limiting (type) distribution. Furthermore, it is not hard
to verify that for ` = 2,3,...,ν−1 the conditional probability that a player of type3.4 S  77
Figure 3.2. Components that occur with positive probability under the
core-periphery prior when ν is at least 3. The core players are indicated
with white dots, the peripheral players by black dots.
t = 2` is a core player is
1 · n`





independent of `, where we have used that n` = 2`n`+1. For future reference, note
that a player with type 2` who is a core player interacts with players of type
t0 = 2`−1. Similarly, the conditional probability that a player with type t = 2` is a
peripheral player is
2`+1 · n`+1





In that case, he interacts with players of type t0 = 2`+1.
We now deﬁne the independent types prior. We follow the literature (e.g.
Galeotti et al., 2006; Jackson and Yariv, 2007; Sundararajan, 2005) by assuming that
under the independent types prior, players believe that the type distribution is
given by some ﬁxed distribution and that players’ types are independent. Here,
we assume that the type distribution is (ξ(t))t∈N0. Note that these assumptions
require some bounded rationality on the part of players. for two reasons. Firstly,
there exists no prior on the ﬁnite set G(n) that gives rise to independent types.
Moreover,undersuchbeliefs,playersassignpositiveprobabilitytoaplayerhaving
a type (degree) that exceeds the number of players (minus one), which is clearly
impossible. However, these assumptions can be justiﬁed in the following way. In
Section2.3.2,wehavediscussedanetworkbeliefsystemthatgivesrisetoaprioron
G(n) thatinducesadegreedistribution(typedistribution)thatisclosetothelimiting3 C    B   78
distribution (ξ(t))t∈N0 such that degrees (types) are almost independent when the
number of players is large. Furthermore, as shown in the next section, priors that
are close in terms of the type distribution and the correlation among player types
that they induce are similar in terms of game-theoretic predictions. This means
that the results we would obtain under a type distribution close to (ξ(t))t∈N0 and
under almost independent types will be very similar in game-theoretic terms to
the results we derive here for type distribution (ξ(t))t∈N0 and independent types.
Hence, we assume that for each t ∈ N0, players’ prior belief that the type of
an arbitrary player is t is µind(t) := ξ(t). We now derive the conditional probability
that a ﬁxed player has a given neighbor type proﬁle, given his type. First note that
if the probability that a player selected uniformly at random from the network
has type (degree) t is ξ(t), t ∈ N0, then the probability that a neighbor of a player
selected uniformly at random from the network has degree t is proportional to
tξ(t), as a player of degree t has t times more neighbors than a player of degree
1. Hence, for each t ∈ N0, the probability that the neighbor of a player selected





Then, for each neighbor type proﬁle θ = (θ1,...,θt) ∈ Ωt
K, for all k ∈ N0, let ck(θ)







ing to θ. Then, for each t ∈ N0 such that µ(t) > 0, for each θ = (θ1,...,θt) ∈ Ωt
K,
the conditional belief that a player’s neighbor type proﬁle is θ given that he has
type t is










where we have used that x0 = 1 for x > 0.5 In words, the conditional distribution
of neighbors’ type, given that the “central” player has type t is given by the
multinomial distribution. That is, the types of the player’s neighbors are drawn in
5 Note that µind(t),t ∈ N0, and µind(θ | t) for t ∈ N0,θ ∈ Ωt
K, are not derived from some prior on a
set of networks, as in the rest of the chapter.3.4 S  79
t independent trials, with the probability that a neighbor has type s given by η(s).
It is important to note that µind(θ | t) does not depend on t.
Hence, the core-periphery prior and the independent types prior are very
similar in terms of the type distribution they induce. Under the independent types
prior, the type distribution is exactly (ξ(t))t∈N0, while under the core-periphery
prior it is close to (ξ(t))t∈N0 (assuming that the number of players is large). How-
ever, the two priors are very diﬀerent in the type correlation they induce. Under
the independent types prior, types are independent. By contrast, under the core-
periphery prior, players of type 2 only interact with players of type 1,2 and 4,
players of type 4 only interact with players of type 2,4 and 8, and so on.
An important question is whether the two priors are similar from a game-
theoretic perspective. It is easy to see that under both priors, there is a symmetric
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which all players invest, regardless of their type,
and a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which no player invests for any
type he ends up having. There are also so-called threshold equilibria in which
players invest if and only if their type is above or below some threshold. We show
that there is a threshold equilibrium under the independent types prior such that
there is no corresponding symmetric approximate equilibrium under the core-
periphery prior and vice versa. Hence, the set of equilibria changes substantively
when we change the correlation among player types.
We start by showing that there is a threshold equilibrium under the inde-
pendent types prior such that there is no corresponding approximate equilibrium
under the core-periphery prior. First, for t, ¯ t ∈ N0, deﬁne














    .
Whenthenumberofplayersissuﬃcientlylarge,thereisaunique ¯ t ∈ {1,2,...,2ν−1}
such that6
f(t; ¯ t) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ t ≤ ¯ t.
In that case, the expected payoﬀs under the independent types prior to a player of
type t who chooses action R when other players follow the strategy of investing
if and only if their type does not exceed the threshold ¯ t are given by f(t; ¯ t). Then,
6 Suchathresholdexists.Foreach ¯ t ∈ N0, f(t; ¯ t)isdecliningint,andforeacht ∈ N0, f(t; ¯ t1) > f(t; ¯ t2)
whenever ¯ t1 > ¯ t2. Hence, there exists a unique ¯ t ∈ N0 such that f(t; ¯ t) ≥ 0 if and only if t ≤ ¯ t; by
choosing the number of players large enough, we have ¯ t ∈ {1,2,3,...,2ν−1}.3 C    B   80
it is easy to see that there is a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under the
independent types prior in which players invest if and only if their type is at most
¯ t.7
Bycontrast,theredoesnotexistacorrespondingε-equilibriumunderthecore-
periphery prior for ε suﬃciently small. To see this, suppose by contradiction that
there would exists a threshold ¯ t such that players would invest if and only if their
type is at most ¯ t, and consider the lowest type smin := min{s ∈ {1,2,4,...,2ν} | s > ¯ t}
that does not invest under this proposed equilibrium. The conditional probability
that a player of type t = 2`, where ` ∈ {1,2,...,ν − 1}, is a core player rather
than a peripheral player, i.e., that all his neighbors invest under the proposed
equilibrium, is
1 · n`





independent of t. Consequently, the interim expected payoﬀs to a player with type










Hence, for ε < c/3, it is an ε-best response to choose R for players with type
smin. But then, by the same argument, players with the next lowest type that does
not invest under the proposed strategy will also ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest (in
terms of ε-best responses), and so on. Hence, there exists no ε-equilibrium under
the core-periphery prior corresponding to the threshold equilibrium under the
independent types prior if ε is suﬃciently small.
We now show that there is a threshold equilibrium under the core-periphery
prior which is not an (approximate) equilibrium under the independent types
prior.Let ˆ t ∈ {1,2,3,...,2ν−1},andconsiderthesymmetricstrategyproﬁleinwhich
players invest if and only if their type is at least ˆ t. As the interim expected payoﬀs
of R to players of type t are declining in t for any such threshold strategy under the
independent types prior, this strategy cannot be an ε-equilibrium under this prior
for ε suﬃciently small. However, such a strategy is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
for any ˆ t ∈ {1,2,3,...,2ν−1} under the core-periphery prior. Fix ˆ t, and suppose
7 This result is not in contradiction with Proposition 2 of Galeotti et al. (2006), which shows
that under independent types and strict strategic complements, every symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium is monotone increasing in type (in the current setting, if low types invest, then high
types invest, but not vice versa), as they assume that payoﬀs satisfy some additional property
that is not satisﬁed by the current example.3.4 S  81
players play R if and only if their type is at least ˆ t. Consider a player of type
t = 2` ≥ ˆ t. With conditional probability
2`+1 · n`+1












some neighbors play S, giving him a payoﬀ of −c. His interim expected payoﬀs are
thus(6c/3)−(2c/3) > 0,sothathecannot gain bydeviating.Nowconsideraplayer
of type t < ˆ t. With probability 1, at least some of his neighbors play S, so his best
response is to play S as well. Hence, under the core-periphery prior, there exists
a threshold equilibrium in which players invest if and only if their type exceeds
some threshold.
These examples show that strategy proﬁles that are Bayesian-Nash equilibria
under one prior, may not be (approximate) equilibria under a prior which only
diﬀers from the ﬁrst prior in the type correlation it induces. Note that if the
number of players is suﬃciently large, there are multiple threshold strategies
that induce a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under the core-periphery
prior. By contrast, there is a unique threshold equilibrium strategy under the
independent types prior. Hence, by choosing the constant c appropriately, we can
ﬁnd a threshold equilibrium under the core-periphery prior such that there is no
symmetric approximate equilibrium under the independent types priors that is
close to this threshold equilibrium in terms of ex ante expected payoﬀs. Hence,
even though the priors are very close in terms of the type distribution they induce
(for a large number of players), the strategic distance between them (given c and
ε) can be large.
Similarexamplescanbeconstructedforothergames,e.g.gameswithstrategic





player types are an important determinant of the strategic distance between two3 C    B   82
priors. It is intuitive that also the type distribution induced by priors plays an
important role. As we show in Lemma 3.4.3 below, closeness of priors in terms
of the type distribution and the correlation among player types is equivalent to
closeness in terms of the prior probabilities assigned to local events, i.e., events




That is, d∗(µ,µ0) measures the diﬀerence in probabilities assigned by µ and µ0 to lo-
calevents,or,equivalently(byLemma3.4.3),thediﬀerenceinthetypedistribution
and the type correlations induced by µ and µ0.
Theorem 3.4.2 establishes that convergence of priors in terms of prior prob-
abilities assigned to local events is in fact necessary and suﬃcient for strategic
convergence.
Theorem 3.4.2. Let µ ∈ M(n) and let (µk)k∈N be a sequence in M(n). Then, (µk)k∈N






assigned to local events, then for any Bayesian network game, for any symmetric
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game in which players hold the prior µ, there
exists a symmetric approximate equilibrium in the game with prior µ0 such that
ex ante payoﬀs are similar. Proposition 3.4.5 uses Lemma 3.4.3 and Lemma 3.4.4.
Lemma 3.4.3. Let µ ∈ M(n), and let (µk)k∈N be a sequence in M(n). Let T0 be the set of
types t ∈ T such that µ(t) > 0 and µk(t) > 0 for all k ∈ N. Suppose that T0 is nonempty,





|µ(F)−µk(F)| = 0 ⇐⇒
(
limk→∞ maxt∈T|µ(t) − µk(t)| = 0,
limk→∞ maxt∈T0,F∈FK|µ(F | t) − µk(F | t)| = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A. 
Lemma 3.4.4. Let µ,µ0 ∈ M(n), and let γ > 0. Let v be a proﬁle of local payoﬀ functions
with bound B. There exists δ > 0 such that if σ is a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
of (µ,v) and d∗(µ,µ0) ≤ δ, then there exists a symmetric 3γB-equilibrium σ0 of the game
(µ0,v) with σ0(· | t) = σ(· | t) for all t ∈ T such that µ(t) > 0 and µ0(t) > 0.3.4 S  83
Proof. Deﬁne
Sµ,µ0 := {t ∈ T | µ(t) > 0 and µ0(t) > 0}
to be the set of types that occur with positive probability under both µ and µ0.
Recall that ˆ σ = (ˆ σt)t∈T is deﬁned by:
∀t ∈ T,a ∈ A : ˆ σt(a) = σi(a | t) for any i ∈ N.
Set ˆ σ0
t := ˆ σt for all types t ∈ Sµ,µ0. For t < Sµ,µ0, take ˆ σ0
t such that (ˆ σ0
t)t<Sµ,µ0 induces
a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the reduced game where each player
i ∈ N with a type t ∈ Sµ,µ0 is required to play ˆ σ0
t = ˆ σt. Such an equilibrium exists
by Proposition 3.3.2. By construction, σ0 is a best response for players with types
t < Sµ,µ0. We need to show that σ0 is a 3γB-best response for a type t ∈ Sµ,µ0. First,
let
Sµ0 := {t ∈ T | µ0(t) > 0}
be the set of types that have positive probability under µ0. Also, let H ∈ FK be the
event that a player interacts with at least one player with a type that has positive







   ∃` ∈ {1,...,t} : θ` ∈ Sµ0 \ Sµ,µ0
o
,
and let Hc be the complement (relative to ΩK) of H. By deﬁnition,
µ(H | t) = 0 for all t ∈ Sµ,µ0. (3.1)




|µ(F | t) − µ0(F | t)| ≤ γ. (3.2)
Combining (3.1) and (3.2) gives
∀t ∈ Sµ,µ0 : µ0(H | t) ≤ γ. (3.3)
Let t ∈ Sµ,µ0, and let a,b ∈ A with ˆ σ0
t(a) > 0. Then,









  vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) − vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ)
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By (3.3), recalling that the bound on v is B, the ﬁrst sum in (3.4) is at most γB. To
evaluate the second sum, ﬁrst note that the neighbors of a player with neighbor
type proﬁle θ ∈ Hc play according to ˆ σ. As a lies in the support of the symmetric
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium σ of (µ,v),
X
θ∈ΩK
µ(θ | t)vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) ≥
X
θ∈ΩK
µ(θ | t)vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ). (3.5)
Using that µ(θ | t) = 0 for all θ ∈ H, we can rewrite (3.5) to ﬁnd:
X
θ∈Hc
µ(θ | t)[vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) − vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ)] ≥ −
X
θ∈H
µ(θ | t)[vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) − vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ)]
= 0. (3.6)
Deﬁne Gt := {θ ∈ Hc | µ(θ | t) − µ0(θ | t) > 0} and let Gc
t be the complement of Gt
relative to Hc. For notational simplicity, deﬁne
Vµ,µ0(a,b; ˆ σ) :=




µ(θ | t) − µ0(θ | t)

vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) − vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ)
    .
Using (3.2), it follows that




µ(θ | t) − µ0(θ | t)
  vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) − vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ)





µ0(θ | t) − µ(θ | t)
  vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) − vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ)
  
≤ 2γB. (3.7)
Combining (3.6) and (3.7) gives
| ˆ ϕt(a, ˆ σ0;µ0) − ˆ ϕt(b, ˆ σ0;µ0)| ≤ 3γB. 
Proposition 3.4.5. Let µ,µ0 ∈ M(n), and ﬁx γ > 0. Let v be a proﬁle of local payoﬀ
functions with bound B, and let δ > 0 as in Lemma 3.4.4. Let η ∈ (0,δ], and suppose that
d∗(µ,µ0) ≤ η.
Then, if σ is a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game (µ,v), there exists a
symmetric 3γB-equilibrium σ0 of the game (µ0,v) such that
| ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ) − ˆ Φ(ˆ σ0;µ0)| ≤ 4ηB,
where ˆ σ = (ˆ σt)t∈T and ˆ σ0 = (ˆ σ0
t)t∈T are deﬁned by ˆ σt = σi(· | t) and ˆ σ0
t = σ0
i(· | t) for any
i ∈ N for all t ∈ T.3.4 S  85
Proof. Let σ be a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of (µ,v). By Lemma 3.4.4,
there exists a symmetric 3γB-equilibrium σ0 of the game (µ0,v) such that ˆ σ0
t = ˆ σt
for t ∈ T such that µ(t) > 0 and µ0(t) > 0. Deﬁne
G := {θ ∈ ΩK | µ(θ) − µ0(θ) > 0},
and let Gc be the complement of G relative to ΩK. Deﬁne the function ζ : ΩK → T
by ζ(θ) = t whenever θ ∈ Ωt
K. That is, the function ζ gives the type of a player for
each possible neighbor type proﬁle he may have. Then,














ˆ σζ(θ)(a)|vζ(θ)(a, ˆ σθ,θ)|
≤ 2ηB. (3.8)
Also, deﬁne
Fµ0 := {θ ∈ ΩK | µ0(ζ(θ)) > 0},
Fµ,µ0 := {θ ∈ ΩK | µ(ζ(θ)) > 0 and µ0(ζ(θ)) > 0}.
Then, as µ(Fµ0 \ Fµ,µ0) = 0 by deﬁnition,
µ0(Fµ0 \ Fµ,µ0) ≤ η.
Recalling that ˆ σ0
t = ˆ σt for t such that µ(t) > 0 and µ0(t) > 0, this yields
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ˆ σζ(θ)(a)vζ(θ)(a, ˆ σθ,θ)
    
≤ 2ηB. (3.9)
Combining (3.8) and (3.9) gives
| ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ) − ˆ Φ(ˆ σ0;µ0)| ≤ 4ηB. 
Proposition 3.4.5 establishes the suﬃciency of our condition for strategic con-
vergence. Lemma 3.4.6 below shows that the condition that d∗ should be small is
also necessary for strategic convergence.3 C    B   86
Lemma 3.4.6. Let δ ∈ [0,1], and let µ,µ0 ∈ M(n). If
d∗(µ,µ0) > δ,
then there exists a proﬁle v of local payoﬀ functions with bound B = 1 and a symmetric
Bayesian-Nashequilibriumσofthegame(µ,v)suchthatforanysymmetricδ-equilibrium
σ0 of (µ0,v), it holds that
| ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ) − ˆ Φ(ˆ σ0;µ0)| > δ,
where ˆ σ = (ˆ σt)t∈T and ˆ σ0 = (ˆ σ0
t)t∈T are deﬁned by ˆ σt = σi(· | t) and ˆ σ0
t = σ0
i(· | t) for any
i ∈ N for all t ∈ T.
Proof. By assumption, there exists a set of neighbor type proﬁles F ∈ FK such that




1 if θ ∈ F,
0 otherwise.
It is easy to see that
| ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ) − ˆ Φ(ˆ σ0;µ0)| > δ
for any two symmetric strategy proﬁles σ,σ0 ∈ Σn. 
We can now prove Theorem 3.4.2:
Proof. (If) Let v be a proﬁle of local payoﬀ functions with bound B. Let γ > 0 be
arbitrarily small, and let δ > 0 be as in Lemma 3.4.4. Take any ε ∈ (0,δ]. Since
d∗(µ,µk) → 0 as k → ∞, it holds that d∗(µ,µk) ≤ ε for all k suﬃciently large. Hence,
by Proposition 3.4.5,
χ∗(µ,µk;v,3Bγ) ≤ 4Bε
for k suﬃciently large. That is, if d∗(µ,µk) → 0 as n → ∞, then, for any v and any
c > 0, we have χ∗(µ,µk;v,c) → 0 as k → ∞.
(Only if) Let µ,µ0 ∈ M(n). For δ ∈ [0,1), if d∗(µ,µ0) > δ, then, by Lemma 3.4.6,
there exists a proﬁle of local payoﬀ functions v with bound B = 1 and a sym-
metric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σn of (µ,v) such that for any symmetric
δ-equilibrium σ0 ∈ Σn of (µ0,v), | ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ) − ˆ Φ(ˆ σ0;µ0)| > δ. 
Theorem 3.4.2 shows that for two priors to be close in a strategic sense, it
is necessary and suﬃcient for them to be close in terms of prior probabilities3.4 S  87
they assign to local events, i.e., events that involve the types of a player and his
neighbors. This result has two important implications. Firstly, this result means
that in order to explore the full range of strategic outcomes in Bayesian network
games,itissuﬃcienttovarythetypedistributionandthecorrelationamongplayer
types. Hence, on the one hand, it suggests that varying the type distribution, as
has been the focus of much of the literature so far, is often not enough. On the
other hand, it limits the set of priors that one needs to consider. We show that
priors need only be varied along two dimensions. A second important implication
is that we can interpret a Bayesian network game as a set of overlapping “local
games”, and that we do not need to concern ourselves with the nonlocal features
of network belief systems. Refer back to the networks in Figure 3.1(a) and (b),
and consider two priors, one that assigns positive probability only to networks
that are isomorphic to the network in Figure 3.1(a), with each of the networks in
this isomorphism class having equal probability, and the other assigning positive
probability only to networks isomorphic to the network in Figure 3.1(b), with each
of the networks in this isomorphism class having equal probability. Theorem 3.4.2
tells us that these priors are identical in terms of their game-theoretic predictions,
even though they are very diﬀerent in terms of the networks they predict.
Hence, by exploiting the symmetry of the game and the local features of the
payoﬀ functions, it is possible to weaken the conditions of Kajii and Morris (1998)
for this particular class of Bayesian games. Kajii and Morris (1998) show that for
general Bayesian games with ﬁnite type sets, priors need to be close in terms of the
prior probabilities they assign to all possible events. By contrast, we only require
that priors are close in terms of the prior probabilities assigned to local events.
While it is not surprising that we can weaken the general result of Kajii and Morris
(1998)forasubclassofgames,ityieldstheusefulinsightthatwecantreatBayesian
network games as a collection of overlapping local games, and that the important
features of priors in terms of strategic outcomes are the type distribution and
correlation among player types that they induce.
We end this section with a discussion of our framework and our assumptions.
Firstly, in the current chapter, we have focused on symmetric equilibria, as this
is the focus of much of the literature on Bayesian network games (e.g. Galeotti
et al., 2006; Jackson and Yariv, 2007; Sundararajan, 2005). It is possible to derive
similar results for general Bayesian-Nash equilibria, though it will not be possible
to exploit the symmetry of the game as we have done here. If one would consider
general equilibria, results similar to those of Kajii and Morris (1998) would be
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Secondly, our deﬁnition of strategic closeness requires that ex ante expected
payoﬀs be close in equilibria under two priors, i.e., we focus on payoﬀ continuity.
Analternativecontinuitynotionwouldrequirethatwithhighprobability,aplayer
and his neighbors follow the same strategies under the two priors (cf. Monderer
and Samet, 1996). Indeed, from the proof of Proposition 3.4.5, it follows that if
two priors are close in terms of the measure d∗, then for each symmetric Bayesian-
Nashequilibriumunderoneofthepriors,thereexistsanapproximateequilibrium
under the other prior which coincides with the ﬁrst equilibrium for all types that
have positive probability under both priors, i.e., there is also continuity in terms of
strategies. However, in the current setting (unlike in the setting of e.g. Monderer
and Samet, 1996), we also have to consider the diﬀerence in prior probabilities that
players have a given type under the two priors in order to ensure that the two
priors give rise to similar outcomes from a player’s ex ante perspective. Hence,
the appropriate deﬁnition of strategic closeness in the current setting considers
diﬀerences in ex ante expected payoﬀs.
Thirdly, while we study the general case in which payoﬀs depend on the
actions and types of a player and his neighbors, one could also consider the
special case in which a player’s payoﬀs depend only on his own action and type
and on the actions of his neighbors, and not on his neighbors’ types. Obviously,
for this subclass of games, the condition we derived for strategic convergence is
still suﬃcient, though it may not be necessary. Our conjecture is that the condition
cannot be weakened substantially for this subclass of games.
Finally, in line with the literature, we have studied games in which a player’s
payoﬀs only depend on the actions and types of his direct neighbors. Our result
caneasilybegeneralizedtothecasewhereaplayer’spayoﬀdependsontheactions
and types of those within k steps in the network, for some k ∈ N. Of course, when
k increases, the condition for two priors to be close becomes more strict, ultimately
recovering the condition of Kajii and Morris (1998) that priors need to be close
in terms of the prior probabilities they assign to global events. Indeed, when the
payoﬀs to a player depend on the actions and types of all others in the network
(even on the actions and types of those with whom he is not directly connected),
the game can be alternatively modeled as a standard Bayesian game, with some
suitable restrictions on payoﬀs.3.5 C 89
3.5 Conclusions
Networks are ubiquitous in economics, and they can have a large eﬀect on eco-
nomic outcomes. The current chapter considers a setting in which players are
located on a network and play a ﬁxed game with their neighbors. Players have
incomplete information on the network structure. They have a common prior on
a given class of networks, and, in addition, they have some local information on
the network structure. Given the complexity of many social and economic net-
works, it is important to study whether game-theoretic predictions are sensitive
to assumptions on players’ beliefs.
In the current chapter, we have studied the conditions that are necessary
and suﬃcient for two (common) priors to be close in a strategic sense. More
speciﬁcally,wehavestudiedtheconditionsunderwhichforanyBayesiannetwork
game in which players hold one of these priors, for any symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium in that game, there is a symmetric approximate equilibrium in the
associated game with the other prior such that ex ante expected payoﬀs are close
under the two equilibria. Our main result (Theorem 3.4.2) states a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for two priors to be close in this sense is that they be close in
terms of the prior probabilities they assign to local events, i.e., events involving
the type of an arbitrary player and his neighbors. An equivalent condition is that
two priors be close in terms of the type distribution and the correlation among
player types they induce (Lemma 3.4.3). Hence, the essential features of a prior
in Bayesian network games are the type distribution and the type correlation it
induces.
This result suggests that one needs to go beyond priors with independent
types, which has been the focus of much of the literature so far. We have illus-
trated this point in Section 3.4.2, where we show that priors with the same type
distribution can give rise to very diﬀerent equilibria in a simple game, depending
on the correlation among player types. The current result also puts restrictions on
the set of priors one needs to consider. We show that one only needs to vary the
type distribution and the correlation among types.
There are several directions for further research. Firstly, the current result
indicates that it is important to systematically assess the eﬀect of varying the type
distributionandthecorrelationsamongplayertypesongame-theoreticoutcomes.
While several authors study the eﬀect of varying the type distribution in speciﬁc
games (e.g. Jackson and Yariv, 2007; Sundararajan, 2005), there is little work on
the eﬀect on game-theoretic outcomes of changing the correlation among players’3 C    B   90
types. Galeotti et al. (2006) analyze the eﬀect of some speciﬁc changes in the type
distribution and the correlation among player types in certain classes of games.
However, there is no systematic exploration of the eﬀect of changing the type
correlations. Such an analysis will not be easy. There are two prime diﬃculties.
The ﬁrst is that it is not clear how type correlation should be measured. Galeotti
etal.(2006)deﬁnetheconceptsofpositiveandnegativeassociation,buttheseonly
seem to capture some dimensions of type correlation. The second is that it is hard
todeﬁnesuitablerandomnetworkmodelsinwhichtheappropriatedimensionsof
type correlations can be varied continuously. Of the diﬀerent candidate classes of
random network models, especially those featuring community structures seem
promising. Social and economic networks are typically structured in communities
(e.g. Copiˇ c et al., 2005; Palla et al., 2005). The community structure induces a
nonzero correlation among players’ degrees (see Newman and Park, 2003, for a
discussion). Random network models with a community structure, such as the
one discussed in Chapter 5 thus seem to be natural candidates.
A second natural extension of the current work would be to allow for un-
certainty over the network size. The observation of Myerson (1998) that in some
contexts, it is reasonable to assume that players are uncertain about the number
of other players in the game holds a fortiori for network games, as in these games,
players only interact with a small subset of players and have no direct information
about the players they do not interact with. In the next chapter, we therefore allow
for uncertainty over the network size, and show that this gives rise to qualitatively
diﬀerent results, as in that case, players’ higher order beliefs play an important
role.
3.A Proofs
3.A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3.2
Deﬁne the strategic game
G := hN,(Mi)i∈N,( ˇ Φi(·;µ))i∈Ni,
where for each i ∈ N, the set of pure strategies Mi is the set of maps mi : T → A.
Hence, we have Mi =: M for all i ∈ N, and the set M is ﬁnite. For each i ∈ N, the
payoﬀ function ˇ Φi(·;µ) is deﬁned by:




Mixed strategies are obtained by randomizing over strategies in the set M. Denote
thesetofmixedstrategiesinGby∆(M).Payoﬀscanbeextendedtomixedstrategies
















      vτi(g)(mi(τi(g)),mNi(g),τNi(g)),
where we have deﬁned mNi(g) := (mj(τj(g)))j∈Ni(g) and τNi(g) := (τj(g))j∈Ni(g).
The proof now follows from two steps:
Step 1: There exists β = (βj)j∈N ∈ (∆(M))n with βi = βj for all i, j ∈ N such that for
all i ∈ N,




Proof of Step 1: The set ∆(M) is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of the Eu-
clideanspaceR|M|,and,bystandardarguments, ˇ Φi(·;µ)iscontinuousinβ = (βi,β−i)
and quasiconcave inβi. Furthermore, the gameGis symmetric by Assumption 3.A
and the symmetry of the payoﬀ functions. Deﬁne the correspondence B on ∆(M)
by:
∀β ∈ ∆(M) : B(β) := arg max
α∈∆(M)
ˇ Φi(α,β,...,β;µ) for any i ∈ N,
i.e., B(β) is the set of best responses (mixed strategies) of a player when other
players play according to β. By standard arguments, the correspondence B is
nonempty,convex-valued,andupper-hemicontinuous(e.g.FudenbergandTirole,
1991, pp. 29–30). Hence, by Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem (e.g. Ok, 2007, p. 331),
a ﬁxed point exists for B, i.e., there exists β ∈ ∆(M) such that β ∈ B(β).
Step 2: Let β = (βj)j∈N ∈ (∆(M))n with βi = βj for all i, j ∈ N be such that for all
i ∈ N,
ˇ Φi(β;µ) ≥ ˇ Φi(β0
i,β−i;µ)
for all β0
i ∈ ∆(M), and deﬁne σ = (σj)j∈N ∈ Σn by:
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Proof of Step 2: From substituting the relevant expressions, we obtain
∀i ∈ N : Φi(σ;µ) = ˇ Φi(β;µ).





i ∈ ∆(M) by:






Then, again by substitution,
ˇ Φ(β0
i,β−i;µ) = Φi(σ0
i,σ−i;µ) > Φi(σ;µ) = ˇ Φ(β;µ),
which contradicts that no player in G can gain by deviating unilaterally from β.





i ∈ Σ,andσi = σj foralli, j ∈ N,i.e.,thereexistsasymmetricBayesian-Nash
equilibrium for (µ,v). 
3.A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.4.3
(If) Suppose that limk→∞ maxF∈FK|µ(F) − µk(F)| = 0. Then, clearly, for all k ∈ N,
max
t∈T








|µ(t) − µk(t)| = 0.3.A P 93
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|µ(F | t) − µk(F | t)| = 0.











|µ(F | t) − µk(F | t)| = 0. (3.11)
Fix ε > 0. For each F ∈ FK and each k ∈ N, it holds that
|µ(F) − µk(F)| =









µk(F | t)[µ(t) − µk(t)]




|µ(F | t) − µk(F | t)|µ(t) +
X
t∈T0
µk(F | t)|µ(t) − µk(t)|.
By (3.10) and (3.11), there exists Q ∈ N such that for all t ∈ T0, k > Q implies that
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Hence, for k > Q,











































|µ(F) − µk(F)| = 0. 4 Higher order beliefs in network games
Summary
In this chapter, which is based on Kets (2007a), we consider network
games in which players have incomplete information on the network
structure, as in the previous chapter. In contrast with Chapter 3, we
allow for uncertainty over the network size. As in the previous chapter,
westudythesensitivityofgame-theoreticpredictionstothespeciﬁcation
of beliefs. We show that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and
only if (i) they assign similar probabilities to all local events; (ii) with
high probability, a player believes, given his type, that his neighbors’
conditional beliefs are close under the two priors, and that his neighbors
believe, given their type, that. . . the conditional beliefs of their neighbors
are close, and so on, for any number of iterations. The reason that we
obtain diﬀerent conditions than in Chapter 3 is that priors may now be
sensitive to small probability events through players’ conditional beliefs.
4.1 Introduction
The last few decades, a wealth of empirical studies has emerged that has docu-
mented how social and economic networks shape behavior and determine eco-
nomic outcomes. Since the seminal work of Coleman et al. (1966) on the diﬀusion
of technologies and of Granovetter (1974) on job contact networks, it is widely rec-
ognized that networks—be they networks of ﬁrms, countries, or individuals—act
as conduits for information, knowledge, and capital, and that they shape individ-
uals’ behavior (e.g. Conley and Udry, 2005; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Glaeser
et al., 1996; Powell et al., 1996; Tucker, 2005).
Socialandeconomicnetworksareoftenlargeandcomplex,andevolverapidly
over time, so that it is natural to assume that agents belonging to the network will
not know its precise structure. In a setting where agents on a network interact
strategically with their neighbors, we therefore have to model the beliefs they
have over the network structure. Considering a player’s beliefs over his direct
neighborhood may not be suﬃcient: a player’s optimal action depends on the
actions he expects his neighbors to take, but what actions they take will depend
on the actions they expect their neighbors to take, and so on. This means that a
player needs not only have beliefs over his neighbors, but also on the beliefs of
his neighbors, and on the beliefs of his neighbors on the beliefs of their neighbors,
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In the current chapter, we consider a setting in which agents are located
on a network and interact strategically with their neighbors under incomplete
information on the network structure. In particular, there may be uncertainty
about the size of the network. More speciﬁcally, players have a common prior
over the network structure, and, in addition, they have some local information:
they are informed of the number of neighbors they have in the network, i.e., their
typeistheirdegree.Interactionsarelocal:aplayer’spayoﬀonlydependsonhisown
action and type, and the actions and types of his direct neighbors in the network.
This deﬁnes the class of network games of incomplete information. The diﬀerence
with the class of Bayesian network games studied in the previous chapter is that
in network games of incomplete information, there may be uncertainty over the
network size. In the context of network games, this is a natural assumption, as
playersonlyinteractwithasmallsubsetofplayers.Becausethesizeofthenetwork
is not known, the set of players is not common knowledge, so that network games
of incomplete information are not Bayesian games.1
As in the previous chapter, we study the sensitivity of game-theoretic predic-
tions to the speciﬁcation of players’ beliefs on the network. We ask under what
conditions on two priors it is the case that for any network game, for any equilib-
rium in the game with one prior, there is an approximate equilibrium in the game
with the other prior, such that ex ante expected payoﬀs are close under the two
equilibria. If that is the case, we say that the two priors are close in a strategic sense.
We study the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for two priors to be close in a
strategic sense, that is, we study a type of lower hemicontinuity of the correspon-
dence of (interim) approximate equilibria in network games (see Engl, 1995, for a
discussion of diﬀerent continuity concepts).
The diﬀerence with the setting studied in the previous chapter, where we
studied a similar question, is that we now allow for uncertainty over the network
size. This seemingly innocuous extension turns out to have a large impact: if
we allow for uncertainty over the network size, player’s higher order beliefs
1 In games with uncertainty over the player set in which all players interact directly, it is possible
to obtain the Bayesian setting as a special case of the case with population uncertainty. When
the number of players is ﬁxed with probability one, it is possible to link a player’s type with
his identity, thus recovering the standard Bayesian setting (Milchtaich, 2004; Myerson, 1998).
This is not possible in the current setting, where the interpretation of a player’s type is given:
a player’s type is his degree. However, one could deﬁne a class of network games with two-
dimensional types in which one dimension is a player’s degree and the second is a dummy that
can be interpreted as a player’s identity. Then both the class of network games with incomplete
information and the class of Bayesian network games are equivalent to special cases of this more
general framework.4.1 I 97
play an important role in the sense that priors may now be sensitive to small
probability events: events that have small probability ex ante can have a large eﬀect
on outcomes through players’ conditional beliefs. Suppose that there is a set of
types for which conditional beliefs are very diﬀerent under two priors, leading
players with these types to choose diﬀerent strategies under the two priors, and
suppose that this set has small probability ex ante. Then, this set of types may
“infect” the behavior of other types through players’ conditional beliefs: a player
may think it is likely, given his type, that his neighbors think it is likely, given their
type,. . . the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are very diﬀerent. Even if the set
of types for which conditional beliefs are very diﬀerent under the two priors has
smallprobabilityexante,thesetofinfectedtypesmayhavelargepriorprobability,
so that equilibria (in terms ex ante expected payoﬀs) will be very diﬀerent under
the two priors.
This is reﬂected in our main result (Theorem 4.5.3), which states that two
priors are close in a strategic sense if and only if (i) the priors assign similar
probabilities to all local events, i.e., events that involve a player and his neighbors,
and (ii) with high probability, a player believes, given his type, that his neighbors’
conditional beliefs are close under the two priors, and that his neighbors believe,
given their type, that. . . the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are close, and so
on, for any number of iterations. The ﬁrst condition is analogous to the condition
we derived in the previous chapter when we studied strategic convergence in
Bayesian network games. The second condition is new, and rules out the situation
described above, where a set of players with small ex ante probability aﬀects the
behavior of a set of types with large prior probability.
The reason that we require condition (ii) for strategic closeness in network
games of incomplete information but not in Bayesian network games lies in the
uncertainty over the network size. In Section 4.5.2 we show that a necessary
condition for a prior to be sensitive to small probability events is that the set
of types which has positive probability is countably inﬁnite, and that types are
not independent. When the set of types with positive probability is ﬁnite or when
typesareindependent,closenessofthetwopriorsintermsofthepriorprobabilities
assigned to local events (condition (i)) implies that there is a suﬃciently large set
of players whose conditional beliefs are close (condition (ii)). Hence, priors in
Bayesian network games are not sensitive to small probability events, while priors
in network games of incomplete information can be.
Theorem 4.5.3 has an important result, for two reasons. Firstly, it underlines
the need for careful modeling, as seemingly innocuous assumptions about play-4 H      98
ers’ beliefs can have large ramiﬁcations. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly,
Theorem 4.5.3 provides insights in the way higher order beliefs aﬀect behavior
in network games. Interestingly, condition (ii) can also be stated in terms of cor-
relation among types: an equivalent formulation of condition (ii) is that the set
of types for which conditional beliefs are close under two priors must have high
probability and is suﬃciently cohesive in the sense that with high conditional
probability, a type in that set interacts only with types in that set that, with high
conditional probability, only interact with types in that set, and so on.
Compare this formulation of our result to the results of Morris (2000) on
contagion. Morris (2000) studies interactions on a ﬁxed network, i.e., in his setting,
thereiscompleteinformationonthenetworkstructure.Heﬁndsthatbehaviordoes
not spread contagiously on such a network starting from a ﬁnite set of players X
by myopic best-reply dynamics if and only if the network of players not belonging
to X contains a large group of players Y that is suﬃciently cohesive, in the sense
that players from Y interact mostly with other players from Y, who in turn interact
primarily with other players from Y, and so on.
Our result is a direct stochastic analogue of this result. Rather than a ﬁxed
network of players, we consider a random network of players, which induces a
ﬁxed interaction structure for the players’ types, and the situation we consider is
the following. Suppose that there is a set of types with small prior probability
for whom conditional beliefs are very diﬀerent under two priors (so that they
may follow diﬀerent strategies under the two priors). We analyze under what
conditions these types do not “infect” a large (in terms of ex ante probability)
set of types through players’ higher order beliefs. This is the case precisely when
there is a group of types with high prior probability which is suﬃciently cohesive.
Note that contagion is not physical in the current setting: players do not need even
be in the same network to be aﬀected by each other’s behavior; rather, it is the
correlation among players’ types that leads—or does not lead—to contagion. This
relation between our results and those of Morris (2000) shows that we can use the
formalrelationbetweennetworkgameswithcompleteinformationandincomplete
information games identiﬁed by Morris (1997, 2000) to study network games with
incompleteinformationbyconsideringtheﬁxednetworkformedbytypesandtheir
correlations that is induced by the random network of players, which is a result of
independent interest.
The work in this chapter is related to three distinct literatures. Firstly, it is
related to the literature on Bayesian network games (e.g. Galeotti et al., 2006; Jack-
son and Yariv, 2007; Sundararajan, 2005, also see Chapter 3). In Bayesian network4.1 I 99
games, the size of the network is commonly known. Moreover, it is often assumed
that players’ types are (asymptotically) independent.2 By contrast, the class of
network games of incomplete information we introduce in the current chapter al-
lows for uncertainty about the network size, and for arbitrary correlations among
player types.
Allowing for uncertainty about the network size and for correlation among
player types is both important and natural. It is important because, as we have
argued above, the assumptions on players’ beliefs about the network size and the
correlations among player types can have a qualitative eﬀect on game-theoretic
predictions. It is natural because agents will often be uncertain about the extent of
their networks, and may well believe the types of other players to be correlated.
As for uncertainty on the network size, the observation of Myerson (1998) that
in some contexts, it is reasonable to assume that players are uncertain about the
number of other players in the game holds a fortiori for network games, as in these
games, players only interact with a small subset of players and have no direct
information about the players they do not interact with. As for players’ beliefs
on the correlation among player types, there is ample evidence that many social
and economic networks display positive assortativity, meaning that agents with
a high (low) degree tend to be linked primarily with agents with a high (low)
degree (see Jackson, 2008, and references therein). Moreover, evidence from social
psychologysuggeststhatindividualsbelievetheirnetworkstobehighlyclustered,
i.e., that their networks contain a large number of small cycles (e.g. Crockett, 1982;
Krackhardt and Kilduﬀ, 1999). Hence, it is natural to assume that players believe
that there is nonzero correlation among neighbor types.
The second literature to which the current work is related is the literature
on games with population uncertainty. Games with population uncertainty in
which all players interact directly have been studied by a number of authors (e.g.
Kalai,2004;McAfeeandMcMillan,1987;Milchtaich,2004;Myerson,1998).Inthese
games, players do not know how many players they interact with. By contrast, we
consider a setting in which players interact locally, i.e., they only interact directly
with a subset of players, and in which each player knows the number of players
he interacts with. However, a player does not know the number of players his
neighbors interact with. Hence, population uncertainty plays a distinctly diﬀerent
role here than in games with global interactions.
Finally, the current work builds on a literature that relates higher order beliefs
to the equilibria of incomplete information games, in particular Monderer and
2 Galeotti et al. (2006) is a notable exception.4 H      100
Samet (1989) and Kajii and Morris (1998), and we use extensively concepts and
techniquesfromthisliterature.KajiiandMorris(1998)studylowerhemicontinuity
of the approximate equilibrium correspondence in Bayesian games with a (ﬁxed)
ﬁnite player set and a countably inﬁnite state space.3 They show that two priors
over this state space are strategically close if and only if the prior probabilities of
eventsaresimilarunderthetwopriorsandwithhighprobability,itisapproximate
common knowledge that all players attach similar conditional probabilities to all
events, i.e., with high probability, each player believes with high conditional prob-
ability that the conditional beliefs of all players are similar under the two priors
and that all players believe with high conditional probability that the conditional
beliefs of all players are similar, and that all players believe with high conditional
probability that all players believe with high conditional probability. . . that the
conditional beliefs of all players are similar under the two priors (for any number
of iterations). Our result can thus be seen as a “spatial” analogue of this result:
rather than requiring that all players believe that all players believe. .. that the
conditional beliefs of all players are similar, we require that a player believes that
his neighbors believe that their neighbors believe. . . that the conditional beliefs of
their neighbors are similar.
AlthoughwestudythesameissuesasKajiiandMorris(1998),andfollowtheir
line of argument in our proofs,4 conceptually, there are marked diﬀerences. We
introduce the local p-belief operator, a belief operator in the sense of Monderer and
Samet (1989). The local p-belief operator associates with each set of types a set of
types that with conditional probability at least p interact exclusively with types in
thatset.Itthusprovidesameasureofthe“cohesiveness”ofasetoftypes.Weshow
that this operator quantiﬁes players’ higher order beliefs regarding local events
in network games, i.e., a player’s beliefs about his neighbors’ beliefs about their
neighbors’ beliefs, and so on. The local p-belief operator is closely related to the
p-belief operator of Monderer and Samet (1989), which quantiﬁes players’ higher
orderbeliefsinBayesiangames.Whilethep-beliefoperatorofMondererandSamet
(1989) can be used to characterize players’ higher order beliefs over the global
structure of the network, the local p-belief operator is well suited to characterize
players’ higher order beliefs over local events. Indeed, we show in Appendix 4.A
that the local p-belief operator and the p-belief operator of Monderer and Samet
(1989) (extended to the context of network games of incomplete information) are
3 Monderer and Samet (1996) study the related question under what conditions two information
partitions are close in a strategic sense. That is, they ﬁx the distribution over the states and vary
players’ information partitions. Milgrom and Weber (1985) study upper hemicontinuity of the
Bayesian equilibrium correspondence.
4 Also see Rothschild (2005).4.2 P 101
complementary in this respect.
The local p-belief operator is also related to the neighborhood operator of
Morris (1997, 2000). Morris (1997) introduces the neighborhood operator in the
context of games on a ﬁxed network. For a given network, the neighborhood
operatorassignstoeachsubsetofplayersthesetofplayersinthatsubsetforwhom
at least proportion p of their interactions is only with players in that subset. That
is, the neighborhood operator relates to the cohesiveness of a group of players,
just like the local p-belief operator relates to the cohesiveness of a set of types.
Hence, the local p-belief operator shares features of both the p-belief operator of
MondererandSamet(1989)andtheneighborhoodoperatorofMorris(1997,2000).
Like the p-belief operator, the local p-belief operator pertains to players’ (higher
order) beliefs in incomplete information games. Like the neighborhood operator,
the local p-belief operator refers to the local interactions of players.
Thischapterisorganizedasfollows.PreliminariesarediscussedinSection4.2.
InSection4.3,weintroducetheclassofnetworkgamesofincompleteinformation.
The local p-belief operator and players’ higher order beliefs in network games are
discussed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 contains our main result and a discussion
of its implications. Section 4.6 concludes. Appendix 4.A relates the local p-belief
operator we introduce to the p-belief operator of Monderer and Samet (1989).
Appendix 4.B contains the proofs that are not included in the main text.
4.2 Preliminaries
We assume that players are located on a network. Networks and random net-
work models were introduced in Section 2.3; we brieﬂy recall the most important
deﬁnitions here for ease of reference. A network g is a pair consisting of a ﬁnite,
nonempty set V(g) of vertices and a ﬁnite set E(g) of edges, with an edge being an
unordered pair of two distinct vertices. Let g be a network. If {v,w} ∈ E(g), where
v,w ∈ V,v , w, then v and w are neighbors in g. For ease of notation, an edge
{v,w} ∈ E(g) is sometimes denoted by vw.
We consider a setting where the network is drawn from a class of networks
according to some probability measure. Let n ∈ N, and let V(n) := {1,...,n}. Let
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Let F be the σ-algebra generated by the set of singletons of G. Let M denote the
set of all probability measures on (G,F), and let µ ∈ M. The probability space
(G,F,µ) is a random network model. Example 4.2.1 gives a simple example of a ran-
dom network model with a random number of vertices; for a particularly elegant
model of a random network with a random number of vertices, see Bollob´ as et al.
(2007).
Example 4.2.1. Suppose that a population evolves in (discrete) generations, in-
dexed by m ∈ {0,1,...}. Each member of the mth-generation gives birth to a family
(possibly empty) of members of the (m+1)th generation. The number of oﬀspring
that each individual produces is a random variable, and is independent of the
number of oﬀspring of all other individuals. The distribution of the number of
oﬀspring is the same for each individual. This is a simple branching process (e.g.
Grimmett and Stirzaker, 1992). If we associate a vertex with each individual and
if we interpret ancestry relations as (undirected) edges, this random process gives
rise to a network with a random number of vertices. /
In the current framework, we associate a player with each vertex, so that edges
represent the relations between players. In the following, we therefore refer to
players rather than to vertices. Furthermore, random network models represent
players’ beliefs. Throughout this chapter, we therefore refer to a random network
model as a network belief system.
We are interested in the local environment of vertices. Let g ∈ G, and let
i ∈ V(g). Then, Ni(g) is the set of neighbors of player i in g, i.e., his neighborhood in
g.Thenumberofneighborsofiin gishisdegreeDi(g)in g.Wearealsointerestedin
the number of neighbors the neighbors of a given vertex have. Loosely speaking
(see Section 2.3 for a precise deﬁnition), the neighbor degree proﬁle Ki(g) of player i
in g is a list of the degrees of the neighbors of the vertex, in a non-increasing order.
For t ∈ N, Ωt
K denotes the set of all neighbor degree proﬁles for a player of degree
t, and we deﬁne ΩK :=
S
t Ωt
K. Finally, let FK be the σ-ﬁeld generated by the set of
singletons of ΩK.
The following deﬁnition will be useful when specifying players’ beliefs in
the next section. Let n ∈ N. Two networks g, g0 ∈ G(n) are isomorphic if there is





Figure 4.1. Two isomorphic networks. To see that these networks are
isomorphic, notice that there are two permutations of the vertex set
V(4) = {1,2,3,4} that renders the network under (a) into the network
under (b): (i) π(i) = 5 − i for each i ∈ V(4), (ii) π0(1) = 4,π0(2) = 3,π0(3) =
1, π0(4) = 2.
{π(i),π(j)} ∈ E(g0). This deﬁnes an equivalence relation; hence, the set G(n) can
be partitioned into a ﬁnite number of isomorphism classes, i.e., sets of isomorphic
networks. Let C (n) be the collection of isomorphism classes of G(n), and let C := S
n∈N C (n) be the collection of isomorphism classes of G. Figure 4.1 depicts two
networks that are isomorphic.
Throughoutthischapter,wemakethefollowingtwoassumptionsonnetwork
belief systems:
Assumption 4.A (Finite expected number of vertices). The network belief sys-







Assumption 4.B (No isolated vertices). The network belief system (G,F,µ) is
such that with probability 1, each vertex has at least one neighbor. That is,
µ({g ∈ G | Di(g) > 0 for all i ∈ V(g)}) = 1. /
Assumption 4.B is for notational convenience only and can easily be relaxed.4 H      104
4.3 Network games of incomplete information
4.3.1 Game
A network game of incomplete information is a game on a network, in which
players are associated with a vertex in the network, and each player’s payoﬀ
depends on the types and actions of himself and his neighbors. Players have
incomplete information on the network: they have a common prior over the class
G of all ﬁnite networks, and they know the number of neighbors they have,
i.e., their degree. In particular, they may not know the number of players in the
network.
Formally, let (G,F,µ) be a network belief system satisfying Assumptions 4.A
and 4.B. A network g ∈ G is drawn according to (G,F,µ). Each vertex in the set
V(g) represents a player, and we refer to a player by his vertex label. Players do
not know their vertex label, however.5 Each player i ∈ V(g) knows the number of
neighborshehasinthenetwork:histypeishisdegree.Hence,thetypesetisT = N0.
Henceforth, we will speak of type and neighbor type proﬁle, rather than of degree
and neighbor degree proﬁle. Each player is endowed with a ﬁnite, nonempty set A
ofpure strategiesoractions. For eacht ∈ T, thepayoﬀsof aplayerof typetaregiven
by a function vt. For t = 0, vt is a real function on A, i.e., the payoﬀs to an isolated
player only depend on his own action. For t > 0, vt is a function from A × At × Tt
to R that is symmetric in At and Tt, i.e., for all permutations π on {1,...,t}, for all


















the payoﬀs to a player of type t with neighbor
type proﬁle (θ1,...,θt) when he chooses action a ∈ A, and his neighbors play
according to the action proﬁle (a1,...,at).
Deﬁnition 4.3.1. A network game of incomplete information is a tuple
hT,A,(G,F,µ),(vt)t∈Ti
with its elements deﬁned as above.
We ﬁx the action set A. A network game of incomplete information is then fully
characterized by the common prior on (G,F) and its proﬁle of payoﬀ functions.
5 Thevertexlabellingisintroducedmerelytobeabletodeﬁnerandomvariablessuchasthedegree
of vertices. However, the labelling is completely arbitrary and carries no meaning.4.3 N     105
A network game of incomplete information hT,A,(G,F,µ),(vt)t∈Ti is henceforth
denoted by the pair (µ,v), where v := (vt)t∈T.
Let B ∈ R. A proﬁle v of payoﬀ functions is bounded by B if for all t ∈ T,t , 0,
θ ∈ Ωt






If there exists B ∈ R such that the proﬁle v is bounded by B, we say that it is
bounded.
As in games with population uncertainty and random-player games (Myer-
son,1998;Milchtaich,2004),theplayersetisnotcommonlyknown,sothatplayers
are not aware of the particular identities of the other players in the game. Hence,
we cannot assign a separate strategy to each individual player. Rather, a strategy
can only depend on a player’s type. Hence, for each type t ∈ T, let σt be a real
function deﬁned on A which satisﬁes
σt(a) ≥ 0




with σt(a) the probability that a player of type t chooses action a. The set of all
distributions on A is denoted by Σ. An element σ = (σ0,σ1,σ2,...) ∈ ΣT is referred
to as a strategy function.
4.3.2 Beliefs
To calculate expected payoﬀs, we need to specify players’ beliefs. There are two
issuestonote.Firstly,asingameswithpopulationuncertaintyandrandom-player
games, players condition on their type, as well as on the fact that they are selected
to play. That is, from a player’s perspective, even if all networks in the support
of µ have equal probability ex ante, he believes that he is more likely to belong
to a network with many players: there are simply more vertices to be associated
with in large networks (cf. Myerson, 1998; Milchtaich, 2004). This is illustrated in
Example 4.3.2.
Secondly, a player cannot distinguish between networks in a given isomor-
phism class, as he does not know his vertex label or the vertex labels of his op-
ponents. Hence, to calculate players’ beliefs that they have a given neighbor type4 H      106
(a) (b)
Figure 4.2. The networks of Example 4.3.2. (a) The network g(3); (b) The
network g(300).
proﬁle, we need to consider the probability measure on the collection of isomor-
phism classes induced by µ, and for each isomorphism class, we need to take into
account the number of vertices with that neighbor type proﬁle in the isomorphism
class.
Example 4.3.2. Suppose that the network belief system assigns probability 1
2 to
the network g(3) consisting of a triangle of three players, and probability 1
2 to
the network g(300) consisting of 300 players, connected in a cycle (see Figure 4.2).
Though the prior probability of the two networks is 1
2, from the perspective of
a player, it is much more likely that network g(300) is realized, as to each “player
position”in g(3),thereare100playerpositionsin g(300).UsingBayes’rule,aplayer’s










Formally, recall that C is the collection of isomorphism classes of G, and that
FK is the σ-ﬁeld associated with the set of all neighbor type proﬁles ΩK. For each
C ∈ C, and each F ∈ FK, let nC(F) be the number of vertices in a network in C
with their neighbor type proﬁle in F. Note that nC(F) is well deﬁned: for any two








be the expected number of players in the network belief system. By Assump-
tion 4.A, ˆ n is ﬁnite. Consider a player who is called upon to play, but who does not
know his type yet. The probability that the neighbor type proﬁle of such a player



































Figure 4.3. The networks representing the isomorphism classes of Ex-
ample 4.3.3 that have positive probability.
where we recall that µ(C) is the prior probability that a network from the isomor-
phismclassCisrealized.Inwords,qµ(F)isequaltotheexpectedfractionofplayers
with a neighbor type proﬁle in F. We refer to qµ(F) as the prior probability that a
player’s neighbor type proﬁle is in F. In particular, for each t ∈ T,
qµ(t) := qµ(Ωt
K)
denotes the prior probability that a player’s type is t. It can be readily checked
from the deﬁnitions that qµ is indeed a probability measure on the measurable
space (ΩK,FK) of neighbor type proﬁles:
(a) qµ(∅) = 0, and qµ(ΩK) = 1;










Example 4.3.3 illustrates the calculation of players’ beliefs.
Example 4.3.3. Suppose that a network belief system assigns positive probability
only to the networks g1, g2,..., g5 in Figure 4.3 or to networks isomorphic to them.
Suppose that all isomorphism classes associated with the networks in Figure 4.3
have equal probability, i.e., for each isomorphism class C ∈ C of G, µ(C) = 1
5 if
there is a network g ∈ {g1, g2,..., g5} such that g ∈ C, and µ(C) = 0 otherwise.4 H      108
To calculate a player’s prior belief that his neighbor type proﬁle is in some set
F ∈ FK, we now simply need to count the number of vertices in g1,..., g5 with
their neighbor type proﬁle in F, and compare this to the total number of vertices
in g1,..., g5. For instance, a player’s prior belief that his type is t = 2 is
qµ(t) =
1
5 · 3 + 1
5 · 3 + 1
5 · 1
4 · 1






andaplayer’spriorbeliefthathisneighbortypeproﬁleisθ = (2,2)isqµ(θ) = 8/24.
This is intuitive: there are 24 vertices in total in the networks g1,..., g5, of which
9 vertices have type t = 2 and 8 vertices have neighbor type proﬁle (2,2). Noting
that from a player’s perspective, he is equally likely to be associated with any of
the vertices in g1,..., g5, we obtain the values above. /
Conditional probabilities can be calculated in the usual way. Let t ∈ T be such that
qµ(t) > 0. A player’s belief that his neighbor type proﬁle is in the set F ∈ FK given
that his type is t is given by













With minor abuse of notation, we write qµ(θ | t) to denote qµ({θ} | t) for θ ∈ ΩK.
We refer to qµ(F | t) as the conditional belief of (a player of) type t that his neighbor
type proﬁle is in F.
Example 4.3.3 (continued). In order to calculate a player’s conditional belief that
his neighbor type proﬁle is in some set F ∈ FK given that his type is t ∈ T, we need
to count the number of vertices in g1,..., g5 with type t and neighbor type proﬁle
in F, and compare this to the total number of vertices in g1,..., g5 with type t. For
instance, a player’s conditional belief that his neighbor type proﬁle is θ = (2,2)
given that his type is t = 2 is
qµ(θ | t) =
1
5 · 5 + 1
5 · 3
1
5 · 5 + 1






Indeed, eight out of the nine vertices in g1,..., g5 with type t = 2 have neighbor
type proﬁle θ = (2,2). /
Remark 4.3.4. Tacitly we have assumed that there is some pool of candidate play-
ers from which (actual) players are drawn. We have not speciﬁed this pool, nor4.3 N     109
have we speciﬁed the method by which players are selected. There is no need to
specify this, however, as we are solely interested in players’ beliefs given that they
have been selected to play. Hence, the probability measure qµ gives the probabil-
ity that an arbitrary player has a certain neighbor type proﬁle. Also see Myerson
(1998, pp. 382–384) on this point. /
4.3.3 Payoﬀs and equilibrium
Now that we have calculated players’ beliefs, we can deﬁne expected payoﬀs. Let
t ∈ T,t , 0, θ = (θ1,...,θt) ∈ Ωt




















For each type t ∈ T such that qµ(t) > 0, the expected payoﬀs to a player of type t of an






qµ(θ | t)vt(a,σ(θ),θ). (4.1)
For t ∈ T such that qµ(t) = 0, set ϕt(a,σ;µ) := 0 for all a ∈ A and σ ∈ ΣT. Also, for










The type-averaged payoﬀ of a strategy function σ ∈ ΣT is the weighted average of
the expected payoﬀs of the diﬀerent types under the strategy function σ, and gives
the expected payoﬀ of a player who is called upon to play the game, but does not
know his type yet. Hence, the expected payoﬀs of a type correspond to the interim
expected payoﬀs of a player in standard Bayesian games, while the type-averaged
payoﬀs correspond to the ex ante expected payoﬀs in Bayesian games.
Deﬁnition 4.3.5. Letε ≥ 0.Astrategyfunctionσ ∈ ΣT isanε-equilibriumofanetwork
game of incomplete information (µ,v) if for each t ∈ T such that qµ(t) > 0, for each action
a ∈ A such that σt(a) > 0,
ϕt(a,σ;µ) ≥ ϕt(b,σ;µ) − ε4 H      110
for all b ∈ A. We refer to a 0-equilibrium as an equilibrium.
Proposition 4.3.6. Let (µ,v) be a network game of incomplete information. If the proﬁle
of payoﬀ functions v is bounded, the game has an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 4.B. 
Let (µ,v) be a network game of incomplete information. Then, Nε(µ,v) denotes
the set of ε-equilibria of (µ,v). In particular, N0(µ,v) denotes the set of equilibria
of (µ,v).
4.4 The local belief operator and higher order beliefs
To answer the question under which conditions two priors are close in a strategic
senseinnetworkgamesofincompleteinformation,weneedsometoolstoquantify
players’ (higher order) beliefs. In this section, we develop these tools, which we
will use in the next section to address the question of strategic closeness.
Let µ ∈ M, and let p ∈ [0,1]. The local p-belief operator B
p
µ associates with each
set of types the subset of types that with conditional probability at least p inter-
act exclusively with types in that set (whenever they have positive probability).
Formally, let S ⊆ T. Then,
B
p
µ(S) := {t ∈ S | qµ(t) > 0 ⇒ qµ(St | t) ≥ p}. (4.4)
Note that B
p
µ(S) includes the types in S that have zero probability. By deﬁnition,
B
p
µ(S) ⊆ S. If also
B
p
µ(S) ⊇ S, (4.5)
we say that the set of types S is p-closed (under µ).6 If a set of types is p-closed, then
each type in the set interacts with high conditional probability only with types in
that set, who in turn interact with high conditional probability only with types in
that set, and so on.









is the set of types t ∈ B
p
µ(S) such that with conditional probability
6 We follow the convention in the literature on higher order beliefs of making the one-sided
implications explicit, as it is the one-sided implication in (4.5) that captures the nature of a set
being p-closed.4.4 T        111
at least p, they interact exclusively with types in B
p
µ(S), that is, with types in S that




































be the set of types that with conditional probability at least p interact exclusively
with types that with conditional probability at least p. . . interact exclusively with
types in S, for any number of iterations.
Example 4.3.3 (continued). LetS := {1,2,3}.Itiseasytocheckthattheconditional
belief of a player with type t = 1 or t = 2 that he interacts exclusively with
players with types in S is qµ(St | t) = 1, while the conditional belief of a player






3. Hence, for p ∈ [0, 1
3], we have B
p




µ(S) = {1,2}. Now consider the conditional beliefs of players with types in
the set B
p
µ(S) that they only interact with players with a type in B
p
µ(S). For instance,
for p ∈ (1

















Hence, for p ∈ (1
3, 2










µ(S)) = {2}. /
The local p-belief operator satisﬁes the following desirable properties:7






7 See Monderer and Samet (1989, 1996) for a discussion of these axioms. Note that the axiom of
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Continuity: Let S ⊆ T, and for k ∈ N, let Tk ⊆ T. If Tk ↓ S, i.e., if (Tk)k∈N is a
(weakly) decreasing sequence and
T






Continuity in p: If pk ↑ p, then, for any S ⊆ T,
B
pk
µ (S) ↓ B
p
µ(S).
For proofs, see Appendix 4.B.
The following two results, which we will use later on, have well-known
counterparts in the literature on higher order beliefs (Monderer and Samet, 1989,
Prop. 3).
Lemma 4.4.1. Let S ⊆ T, and let p ∈ [0,1]. The set of types C
p












Lemma 4.4.2. Let p ∈ [0,1]. Let t ∈ T, and let T0 ⊆ T. We have that t ∈ C
p
µ(T0) if and
only if there exists a subset of types S ⊆ T0 that is p-closed such that t ∈ S and S ⊆ B
p
µ(T0).
The proofs of Lemmas 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 can be found in Appendix 4.B.
Though at ﬁrst sight the local p-belief operator seems to refer primarily to
the “cohesiveness” of a set of types, we can use the local p-belief operator to
characterize players’ higher order beliefs, i.e., the beliefs players have over the
beliefs of other players over the beliefs of other players, and so on. For instance,
consider the set B
p




whose types lie in S. An alternative formulation is that a player with a type
t ∈ B
p
µ(S) believes, given his type, that with probability at least p, all his neighbors
have their types in the set S. When the local p-belief operator is iterated, we





with type t believes (with conditional probability at least p) that his neighbors







µ(S))), a player believes that his neighbors believe that their neighbors
believe that their neighbors’ types are in S (see Figure 4.4(b)). That is, the local
p-belief operator is a belief operator in the sense of Monderer and Samet (1989)
restricted to events of the form “the types of all neighbors of an arbitrary player
are in a given set”. We discuss the relation between the local p-belief operator and
the p-belief operator more extensively in Appendix 4.A.4.4 T        113
i
Player i believes that
i
his neighbors believe that
(a)
i
their neighbors’ types lie in S.
i
Player i believes that
i
his neighbors believe that
i
their neighbors believe that
(b)
i
their neighbors’ types lie in S.
Figure 4.4. Higher order beliefs in a network. (a) Suppose player i has








. Then, with conditional probability at least p, he be-
lieves that his neighbors have a type in S, and that with conditional
probability at least p, they believe that their neighbors’ types lie in S.












. Then, with conditional
probability at least p, he believes that his neighbors have a type in S,
and that with conditional probability at least p, they believe that their
neighbors have a type in S, and that with conditional probability at
least p, they believe that their neighbors’ types lie in S.
Thelocalp-beliefoperatoralsoallowsustocharacterizeaplayer’sbeliefsover
others’ beliefs about himself and his beliefs. Indeed, a player is a neighbor of his
neighbors, so that when a player believes (with high conditional probability) that





µ(S))), then he believes that the players he interacts with believe that his type
is in S. Similarly, if a player believes that his neighbors believe that their neighbors







then he believes that his neighbors believe that he believes that their types are in S.
Wewillusethelocalp-beliefoperatorextensivelyinthenextsectiontoanalyze
players’ beliefs in network games of incomplete information.4 H      114
4.5 Strategic convergence
4.5.1 Main result
We want to quantify the extent to which priors are similar in a strategic sense. To
that aim, we deﬁne a measure on the set of priors such that if two priors are close
accordingtothismeasure,then,foreachnetworkgameofincompleteinformation,
for each equilibrium of the game in which beliefs are given by one of these priors,
there exists an approximate equilibrium of the game with the other prior, such
that type-averaged payoﬀs are close in both equilibria. If that is the case, then, for
each possible proﬁle of payoﬀ functions, each player who is called upon to play
can obtain approximately the same payoﬀs (in an ex ante sense) under both priors:
from a player’s (ex ante) perspective, the two priors are similar. We want to ﬁnd
the weakest conditions that guarantees that the above holds.
Formally, let µ,µ0 ∈ M, and let v := (vt)t∈T be a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions. For






where Φ is the type-averaged payoﬀ given proﬁle v of payoﬀ functions. That is, for
a given ε ≥ 0, for each equilibrium under µ, we ﬁrst ﬁnd an ε-equilibrium under
µ0 which minimizes the (absolute) diﬀerence in type-averaged payoﬀs under both
equilibria, and we then look for the equilibrium under µ which maximizes this
diﬀerence.Thisformalizestheideathatforeachequilibriumofthenetworkgameof
incomplete information with one prior, there exists some approximate equilibrium
of the network game of incomplete information with the other prior, such that
type-averaged payoﬀs are similar under both equilibria. To obtain a symmetric






We refer to χ∗(µ,µ0;v,ε) as the strategic distance between µ and µ0 for the proﬁle v
given ε. The supremum of χ∗(µ,µ0;v,ε) over proﬁles v that are bounded is called
the strategic distance between µ and µ0 given ε.
Clearly, when ε increases, the set of ε-equilibria weakly increases, as more
and more strategies will satisfy the equilibrium criterion, so that the (absolute)
diﬀerence in type-averaged expected payoﬀs will decrease weakly. Hence, we are
interestedinthestrategicdistancebetweenpriorsgivenεwhenεcomesarbitrarily
close to 0. This leads us to the following deﬁnition (cf. Kajii and Morris, 1998):4.5 S  115
Deﬁnition 4.5.1. Let µ ∈ M, and consider a sequence (µk)k∈N in M. The sequence
(µk)k∈N converges strategically to µ if for each proﬁle v of payoﬀ functions that is




A natural requirement for strategic convergence is that priors attach similar prob-
abilities to the event that a player has a neighbor type proﬁle in a certain set, i.e.,
that priors converge in the weak topology on ΩK (cf. Chapter 3). Hence, deﬁne
d0(µ,µ0) := sup
F∈FK
|qµ(F) − qµ0(F)|. (4.6)
We also need to consider players’ conditional beliefs, i.e., the beliefs they have





   qµ(t) > 0,qµ0(t) > 0 ⇒ sup
F∈FK
|qµ(F | t) − qµ0(F | t)| ≤ δ
o
(4.7)
be the set of types such that players’ conditional beliefs on their neighbors’ types
are within δ, whenever the type has positive probability under µ and µ0. If δ is
small, the conditional beliefs of a player with a type t ∈ Tδ
µ,µ0 over the types of his
neighbors are close under µ and µ0. If a player has a type t < Tδ
µ,µ0, then his optimal
strategy under µ and µ0 may diﬀer substantially, as he believes (given his type)
that his local environment is very diﬀerent under µ and µ0.
However, even if with high (prior) probability, a player has a type such that
his conditional beliefs on his neighbors’ types are similar under µ and µ0 (i.e., that
histypeisinTδ
µ,µ0),outcomescanbeverydiﬀerentunderthetwopriors.Thereason
is that a player may believe with high conditional probability that the conditional
beliefs of some of his neighbors on their neighbors’ types are very diﬀerent under
µ and µ0 (i.e., t < B
p
µ(Tδ
µ,µ0) for some p ∈ [0,1]), or that some of his neighbors
believe with high conditional probability that the conditional beliefs of some of









), and so on.




µ,µ0), for some large p ∈ [0,1]. In that case, a player’s conditional beliefs are
similar under µ and µ0, and, he believes with high conditional probability that the
conditional beliefs of his neighbors are similar under the two priors and that his
neighbors believe with high conditional probability that the conditional beliefs of
their neighbors are similar under the two priors, and so on. This makes that the
actions that are optimal for a player of type t ∈ C
p
µ(Tδ
µ,µ0) under µ will be (almost)4 H      116
optimal under µ0, as he expects his neighbors to behave similarly under µ and µ0
(as his neighbors expect their neighbors to behave similarly, as the neighbors of
his neighbors expect their neighbors. . . ).

















≥ 1 − δ
o
. (4.8)
If d1(µ,µ0) is small, then, with high prior probability (under µ), a player has a
type such that his conditional beliefs are similar under µ and µ0, and with high
conditional probability, he interacts exclusively with players whose conditional
beliefs are close, and who, with high conditional probability, interact exclusively
with players whose conditional beliefs are close, and so on.
Remark 4.5.2. One may think that requiring that with high prior probability, a
player has a type in C
p
µ(Tδ
µ,µ0) may not be suﬃcient. Even if a player believes, given
his type, that with high probability his neighbors will choose the same actions
under µ and µ0 (allowing for ε-best responses), they may not do so if in fact their
type is not in C
p
µ(Tδ
µ,µ0). That is, if with high probability, some of the neighbors of
a player have a type t < C
p
µ(Tδ




can be very diﬀerent under µ and µ0.8 However, Lemma 4.5.4 below shows that, if
the probability is high that a player has a type in the set C
p
µ(Tδ
µ,µ0), then in fact also
the probability that his neighbors have a type in C
p
µ(Tδ
µ,µ0) will be high. Hence, it is










It is immediate that d∗ is nonnegative and symmetric. Moreover, d∗(µ,µ0) = 0 if
and only if µ = µ0. However, d∗ need not satisfy the triangle inequality, so that it is
not a metric. Yet, d∗ generates a topology on the set M of probability measures on
(G,F): a sequence (µk)k∈N converges to µ if and only if for any ε > 0, there exists
Kε ∈ N such that d∗(µk,µ) ≤ ε for all k > Kε.
8 Indeed, Kajii and Morris (1998) require that the prior probability that all players have close
conditional beliefs should be high.4.5 S  117
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 4.5.3. Let µ ∈ M and let (µk)k∈N be a sequence in M. Then, (µk)k∈N converges




Theorem 4.5.3 follows from Propositions 4.5.6–4.5.8. The proof of Proposition 4.5.6
uses Lemma 4.5.4 and Lemma 4.5.5.
Lemma 4.5.4. Let µ ∈ M, and ﬁx α,p ∈ [0,1]. For each S ⊆ T, if the probability that a
player has a type in the set C
p










then the probability that this player and his neighbors have their types in C
p













Proof. See Appendix 4.B. 
Lemma 4.5.5. Let µ,µ0 ∈ M, and let δ ∈ [0,1]. Let v be a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions. If
σ ∈ ΣT is an equilibrium of the game (µ,v) and if v is bounded by B, then there exists a
5δB-equilibrium σ0 of the game (µ0,v), with σ0
t = σt for all t ∈ C1−δ
µ0 (Tδ
µ,µ0).
Proof. For ease of notation, deﬁne Q := C1−δ
µ0 (Tδ
µ,µ0), so that Qt is the t-fold cartesian
product of C1−δ
µ0 (Tδ
µ,µ0) for t ∈ T. For each t ∈ Q, set σ0
t = σt. For t < Q such that
qµ0(t) > 0, let σ0
t be such that (σ0
t)t∈T is an equilibrium of the reduced game where
each player with a type t ∈ Q is required to play σ0
t = σt. Such an equilibrium exists
by Proposition 4.3.6. By construction, σ0
t is a best response to σ0 for t < Q. Hence,
it remains to show that σ0
t is a 5δB-best response for a type t ∈ Q. Hence, let t ∈ Q
such that qµ(t) > 0 and qµ0(t) > 0. By Lemma 4.4.1,
qµ0

Qt    t

≥ 1 − δ. (4.10)
Furthermore, by the deﬁnition of Q = C1−δ
µ0 (Tδ
µ,µ0), for each F ∈ FK,
  qµ(F | t) − qµ0(F | t)
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Let a ∈ A such that σt(a) > 0, and let b ∈ A. Then,















  . (4.12)









   < δB. (4.13)
To evaluate the second sum in (4.12), ﬁrst note that for θ ∈ Qt, all neighbors play











   (4.14)




K \ Qt    t

≤ 2δ. (4.15)




  vt(a,σ(θ)) − vt(b,σ(θ))
   ≤ 2δB. (4.16)
Let Pt := {θ ∈ Qt | qµ0(θ | t) − qµ(θ | t) ≥ 0} be the set of neighbor type proﬁles θ in
Qt such that the conditional probability of θ under µ0 is at least as high as under





qµ0(θ | t) − qµ(θ | t)

vt(a,σ(θ)) − vt(b,σ(θ))




qµ0(θ | t) − qµ(θ | t)





qµ(θ | t) − qµ0(θ | t)
  vt(a,σ(θ)) − vt(b,σ(θ))
   ≤ 2δB. (4.17)




  vt(a,σ(θ)) − vt(b,σ(θ))








  qµ0(θ | t) − qµ(θ | t)
  
  vt(a,σ(θ)) − vt(b,σ(θ))
   ≤ 4δB. (4.18)4.5 S  119
Combining (4.12), (4.13) and (4.18) gives
|ϕt(a,σ0;µ0) − ϕt(b,σ0;µ0)| ≤ 5δB. 
Proposition 4.5.6 establishes the suﬃciency of the condition in Theorem 4.5.3.
Proposition 4.5.6. Let µ,µ0 ∈ M, and let δ ∈ [0,1]. Let v be a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions.
Suppose that d∗(µ,µ0) ≤ δ. Then, if σ is an equilibrium of the game (µ,v) and v is bounded
by B, then there exists a 5δB-equilibrium σ0 of the game (µ0,v) such that





Proof. For ease of notation, deﬁne Q := C1−δ
µ0 (Tδ
µ,µ0). As d∗(µ,µ0) ≤ δ,
|qµ(F) − qµ0(F)| ≤ δ (4.19)





≥ 1 − δ. (4.20)
Let σ ∈ ΣT be an equilibrium of (µ,v). By Lemma 4.5.5, there exists a 5δB-
equilibrium σ0 ∈ ΣT of (µ0,v) such that σ0
t = σt for all t ∈ Q. Hence, using (4.20) and
Lemma 4.5.4 (with α = p = 1 − δ),
  Φ(σ0;µ0) − Φ(σ;µ0)




















































Deﬁne the function ζ : ΩK → T by ζ(θ) = t whenever θ ∈ Ωt
K. That is, the function
ζ gives the type of a player for each possible neighbor type proﬁle he may have.4 H      120
Let P := {θ ∈ ΩK | qµ0(ζ(θ)) − qµ(ζ(θ)) ≥ 0}. Then,
  Φ(σ;µ0) − Φ(σ;µ)
















Combining (4.22) and (4.23) gives the desired result. 
We now establish necessity. Proposition 4.5.7 establishes that d0(µ,µ0) should
be small for strategic outcomes to be similar (in the sense deﬁned above).
Proposition 4.5.7. Let δ ∈ [0,1], and let µ,µ0 ∈ M. If
d0(µ,µ0) > δ,
then there exists a proﬁle v of payoﬀ functions with bound B = 1 and an equilibrium σ of
the game (µ,v) such that for any δ-equilibrium σ0 of (µ0,v), it holds that
|Φ(σ;µ) − Φ(σ0;µ0)| > δ.
Proof. If d0(µ,µ0) > δ, there exists a set of neighbor type proﬁles F ∈ FK such that




1 if θ ∈ F,
0 otherwise.
It is easy to see that
|Φ(σ;µ) − Φ(σ0;µ0)| > δ
for any two strategy functions σ,σ0 ∈ ΣT. 
Proposition 4.5.8 establishes that strategic outcomes can be very diﬀerent if
d1(µ,µ0) is large.
Proposition 4.5.8. Let δ ∈ [0,1], and let µ,µ0 ∈ M. If
d1(µ,µ0) > δ,
then there exists a proﬁle v of payoﬀ functions with bound B = 3 and an equilibrium σ of
the game (µ,v) such that for any δ-equilibrium σ0 of the game (µ0v), it holds that
|Φ(σ;µ) − Φ(σ0;µ0)| > δ2.4.5 S  121















> 1 − δ. (4.24)
Without loss of generality, assume that (4.24) holds. Recall that for each t < Tδ
µ,µ0,
there exists a set of neighbor type proﬁles Ft ∈ FK such that
qµ0(Ft | t) − qµ(Ft | t) > δ.
Write A = {b1,b2,...,bm}, where m ∈ N, and let payoﬀs be deﬁned as follows.9 For





       
       
2 if t ∈ Tδ
µ,µ0 and a
(t)
j = b2 for some j ∈ {1,...,t},
−δ if t ∈ Tδ
µ,µ0 and a
(t)
j = b1 for all j ∈ {1,...,t},
1 − qµ(Ft | t) if t < Tδ
µ,µ0 and θ ∈ Ft,
−qµ(Ft | t) if t < Tδ
µ,µ0 and θ < Ft,
and for ` ∈ {3,...,m}, let
vt(b`,a(t),θ) := −2.
Hence, action b1 always gives a payoﬀ of 0, regardless of the actions and types of a
playerandhisneighbors.Forplayerswithtypet ∈ Tδ
µ,µ0,actionb2 isonlyproﬁtable
if there is at least one neighbor who also takes action b2. By contrast, the payoﬀs
of b2 to players with type t < Tδ
µ,µ0 only depends on their neighbor type proﬁle θ:
action b2 is proﬁtable only if θ belongs to Ft. All other actions than b1 and b2 are
strictly dominated.
Consider the network game of incomplete information (µ,v). In this game,
there is an equilibrium σ ∈ ΣT in which all types t ∈ T choose action b1 with
probability1.Foreachtypet,expectedpayoﬀsare0,sothattype-averagedpayoﬀs
are 0. Now consider the game (µ0,v). By deﬁnition, for each type t < Tδ
µ,µ0, qµ0(Ft |
t) − qµ(Ft | t) > δ. The interim expected payoﬀs of playing b2 are then
ϕt(b2,σ;µ0) = qµ0(Ft | t)





1 − qµ0(Ft | t)

qµ(Ft | t) > δ
9 This game is based on the “infection game” of Kajii and Morris (1998).4 H      122
for any strategy function σ ∈ ΣT. Hence, in any δ-equilibrium, players with type
t < Tδ
µ,µ0 will play action b2. Let
ˆ Tδ
µ,µ0 := {t ∈ Tδ
µ,µ0 | qµ(t) > 0}
be the set of types in Tδ
µ,µ0 that have positive probability under µ, and let t ∈ ˆ Tδ
µ,µ0.
If qµ((Tδ
µ,µ0)t | t) < 1 − δ, then, with conditional probability at least δ, a player with
type t has at least one neighbor who plays b2. Hence, the interim expected payoﬀs
of b2 to such a type are at least
δ · 2 − (1 − δ) · δ > δ,
so that in any δ-equilibrium, players with type t ∈ ˆ Tδ
µ,µ0 such that qµ((Tδ
µ,µ0)t | t) <




µ,µ0))t | t) < 1−δ will play b2 in any δ-equilibrium. This argument can be




µ,µ0))t | t) < 1 − δ will play b2 in any δ-equilibrium.
By(4.24),theprobabilitythataplayerhasatypet < Cµ0(Tδ
µ,µ0)isgreaterthanδ.
As by Lemma 4.4.1 the set C1−δ
µ0 (Tδ
µ,µ0) is (1−δ)-closed, the probability that a player
has a type t ∈ ˆ Tδ
µ,µ0 such that qµ((C1−δ
µ0 (Tδ
µ,µ0))t | t) < 1 − δ is greater than δ. Hence,
in any δ-equilibrium σ0 ∈ ΣT of (µ0,v), type-averaged expected payoﬀs are greater
than δ2, so that
|Φ(σ;µ) − Φ(σ0;µ0)| > δ2. 
We can now prove Theorem 4.5.3.
Proof.(If)Letvbeaproﬁleofpayoﬀfunctions.ByProposition4.5.6,forvbounded






Hence, for all proﬁles of payoﬀ functions v that are bounded and for all ε > 0, if
d∗(µ,µk) → 0, then χ∗(µ,µk;v,ε) → 0.
(Only if) Let µ,µ0 ∈ M. For δ ∈ [0,1), if d0(µ,µ0) > δ or d1(µ,µ0) > δ, then, by
Propositions 4.5.7 and 4.5.8, there exists a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions v bounded by
B = 3 and an equilibrium σ ∈ ΣT of (µ,v) such that for any δ-equilibrium σ0 ∈ ΣT
of (µ0,v), |Φ(σ;µ) − Φ(σ0;µ0)| > δ2. 
Before we discuss the implications of Theorem 4.5.3 in more detail, some
remarks are in order.4.5 S  123
Remark 4.5.9. In the current setting, all players with the same payoﬀ function
independently implement the same strategies, i.e., strategies do not depend on
a player’s identity. This does not drive our results. We study the continuity of a
given equilibrium correspondence; whether the equilibrium is deﬁned in terms
of deviations of individual players or of types, is irrelevant for the question we
study. Secondly, in Chapter 3, we have shown that a counterpart of Theorem 4.5.3
holdsforBayesiannetworkgames(wheretheplayersetisﬁxedandstrategiesmay
depend on a player’s identity) when one deﬁnes strategic convergence in terms
of symmetric Bayesian ε-equilibria.10 As we discuss more extensively in the next
section, convergence of priors in terms of the prior probabilities assigned to local
events is necessary and suﬃcient for strategic convergence when the type set is
ﬁnite, which is the direct analogue of the condition we identiﬁed in Chapter 3. /
Remark 4.5.10. Our deﬁnition of strategic closeness requires that type-averaged
expected payoﬀs be close in equilibria under two priors. An alternative notion
would require that with high probability, a player and his neighbors follow the
same strategiesunder the twopriors (cf. Monderer and Samet, 1996). Indeed, from
theproofofProposition4.5.6,itfollowsthatfortwopriorsµ,µ0 ∈ M,ifd∗(µ,µ0) ≤ δ
for some δ ∈ [0,1], and σ ∈ ΣT is an equilibrium of (µ,v) for a proﬁle v bounded by
B, then there is a 5δB-equilibrium of (µ0,v) such that the prior probability (either
under µ or µ0) that a player or his neighbors have a type t ∈ T such that σ0
t , σt is at
most δ(2−δ). However, this alone does not imply that the two priors µ and µ0 give
similar outcomes from a player’s ex ante perspective: one should also consider the
diﬀerence in prior probabilities under µ and µ0. This is done in the last step of the
proof of Proposition 4.5.6. Hence, the appropriate deﬁnition of strategic closeness
in the current setting considers diﬀerences in type-average expected payoﬀs. /
Remark 4.5.11. Strategic convergence requires that players choose approximate
best responses given their type. If, alternatively, we would only have required
that they choose approximate best responses before learning their type, i.e., if we
would have considered some ex ante or type-averaged notion of approximate
equilibrium, then convergence in the weak topology on ΩK (i.e., d0(µ,µk) → 0)
is necessary and suﬃcient for strategic convergence, see Theorem 4.B.9 in Ap-
pendix 4.B. /
Remark 4.5.12. We allow for a player’s payoﬀ to depend on the types of his
10 Noticethatthesetofsymmetricequilibriaofagameneednotcoincidewiththesetofequilibriain
which all players of the same type are required to follow the same strategy. Symmetric equilibria
need to be robust to deviations of Harsanyi’s player-types, while equilibria need only be robust
to deviations of types in the latter case (see Deﬁnition 4.3.5).4 H      124
neighbors. Obviously, for the subclass of games in which a player’s payoﬀs do not
depend on his neighbors’ types, the condition we derive for strategic convergence
is still suﬃcient, though it may not be necessary. We conjecture that the current
conditions cannot be weakened substantially for this subclass of games. /
Remark 4.5.13. Theassumptionthataplayer’spayoﬀsonlydependontheactions
and types of his direct neighbors is not essential. Under some suitable modiﬁca-
tions and some additional technical assumptions, one could obtain similar results
for games in which players’ payoﬀs depend on the actions and types of players
that are less than k steps away from them in the network, for arbitrary k ∈ N. /
Theorem 4.5.3 states that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and only
if they are similar in terms of two conditions. Firstly, the priors need to be similar
in terms of the prior probabilities they assign to all local events, i.e., events that
concern a player and his neighbors. The second condition states that with high
probability, a player has to have a type such that his conditional beliefs are close
under the two priors, and that he believes that it is likely, given his type, that the
conditional beliefs of his neighbors are close, and that they believe, given their
type, that it is likely. . . that the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are close, for
any number of iterations. An alternative formulation for this second condition is
that the set of types with close conditional beliefs needs to be suﬃciently cohesive.
Formulating this condition in terms of cohesiveness of the set of types with
close conditional beliefs has the advantage that it draws out the parallel between
our results and the results of Morris (2000). Morris studies the spread of a certain
actionbymyopicbest-replydynamicsonaﬁxednetworkwithacountablenumber
of players starting from a ﬁnite group of players X. He shows that an action will
not spread contagiously if and only if the network of players not belonging to X
contains a large group of players Y that is suﬃciently cohesive, in the sense that
players from Y interact mostly with other players from Y, who in turn interact
mostly with other players from Y, and so on.
Rather than a ﬁxed network of players, we consider a random network of
players, which induces a ﬁxed interaction structure for the players’ types. Suppose
thereisasetoftypeswithsmallpriorprobabilitywithdisparateconditionalbeliefs
under two priors. This is the analogue of the small (ﬁnite) group of players in the
setting that Morris studies. Since their conditional beliefs are very diﬀerent, the
strategies (distributions over actions) chosen by these types may be very diﬀerent
under the two priors. We want to know under which conditions these types do
not “infect” a large (in terms of ex ante probability) set of types. This is the case4.5 S  125
precisely when there is a group of types with high prior probability which is
suﬃciently cohesive, just like contagion is prevented in the setting of Morris when
there is a large set of players that are suﬃciently cohesive.
Interestingly, this relation between our results and the results of Morris (2000)
illustrates how we can use the formal relation between network games with com-
plete information and incomplete information games identiﬁed by Morris (1997,
2000)tostudynetworkgameswithincompleteinformationbyconsideringtheﬁxed
networkoftypesandtheircorrelationsinducedbytherandomnetworkofplayers.
4.5.2 Conditional beliefs and strategic convergence
Theorem 4.5.3 shows that it is not suﬃcient if two priors assign similar (prior)
probabilities to all events in the space of neighbor type proﬁles for them to be
strategically close, as in Bayesian network games (see Chapter 3). In addition,
it needs to hold that with high probability, a player has a type such that his
conditional beliefs are similar under the two priors, and that he thinks it is likely,
givenhistype,theconditionalbeliefsofhisneighborsareclose,andthattheythink
it is likely, given their type, . . . that the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are
similar, for any number of iterations. In the current section we investigate when
this latter condition will be binding.
To shed some light on this, we ﬁrst investigate when this condition plays no
role. We adopt the following deﬁnition from Kajii and Morris (1998):
Deﬁnition 4.5.14. Apriorµ ∈ Misinsensitivetosmallprobabilityeventsifforeach
sequence (µk)k∈N in M,
lim
k→∞
d0(µ,µk) = 0 ⇒ lim
k→∞
d∗(µ,µk) = 0.
In words, a prior µ ∈ M is insensitive to small probability events if a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for strategic convergence of any sequence (µk)k∈N in M
to µ is that d0(µ,µk) converges to zero when k goes to ∞. The next proposition
establishes that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a prior to be insensitive to
small probability events is that it can be approximated on a ﬁnite subset of T that
is suﬃciently closed:
Proposition 4.5.15. A prior µ ∈ M is insensitive to small probability events if and only
if for each ε > 0, there exists a ﬁnite set of types Sε ⊆ T that is (1−ε)-closed under µ such4 H      126





≥ 1 − ε.
The proof can be found in Appendix 4.B.
It is easy to see that the following conditions are suﬃcient for a prior µ to be
insensitive to small probability events:
Finite support: The set of types that have positive probability under µ is ﬁnite,
i.e.,
|{t ∈ T | qµ(t) > 0}| < ∞.
Independent types: Neighbors’ types are independent, i.e., for all t ∈ T, all θ =
(θ1,...,θt) ∈ Ωt
K,













where ck(θ) is the number of elements in θ that are equal to k.
Perfect correlation across neighbor types: Players only interact with players of
their own type, i.e., for all t ∈ T such that qµ(t) > 0, qµ((t,...,t) | t) = 1, where
(t,...,t) is a vector in T of length t.
One case of interest in which a prior has ﬁnite support is when the number of
playersisﬁxed,asintheclassofBayesiannetworkgamesdiscussedintheprevious
chapter. An example of a network belief system with an unbounded number of
players and independent types is given in Example 4.2.1. Finally, network belief
systems in which types are perfectly correlated are studied by e.g. Ellison (1993).
Proposition 4.5.15 also gives some insight into the question under which
conditions a prior is most sensitive to small probability events. Consider two
priors µ,µ0 ∈ M, and let δ ∈ [0,1]. Suppose that with probability at least 1 − δ,
a player has a type t ∈ Tδ
µ,µ0, i.e., a type such that his conditional beliefs under µ
and µ0 are within δ. Let Θ0 ⊆ Tδ
µ,µ0 be the (possibly empty) set of types in Tδ
µ,µ0
that with high conditional probability interact with types that do not belong to
Tδ
µ,µ0, and, for ` = 1,2,..., let Θ` ⊆ (Tδ
µ,µ0 \ Θ`−1) be the set of types in Tδ
µ,µ0 \ Θ`−1
that interact with high conditional probability with types that do not belong to
Tδ
µ,µ0 \ Θ`−1. If a player has a type in one of the sets Θ`, his own conditional beliefs










Figure 4.5. Even if with high probability, a player has a type in Tδ
µ,µ0,
the probability that he has a type in C1−δ
µ (Tδ
µ,µ0) may be small.
with types whose conditional beliefs are very diﬀerent under µ and µ0, or who,
with high conditionally probability, interact with types whose conditional beliefs
are very diﬀerent under µ and µ0, and so on. If the probability is high that a player
has such a type, then even if it is a high probability event that a player has a type
in Tδ
µ,µ0, the probability that he has a type in C1−δ
µ (Tδ
µ,µ0) will be small, as illustrated
in Figure 4.5. In that case, there will be contagion among types: a player whose
conditional beliefs are similar under µ and µ0 may be induced to follow a diﬀerent
strategy under µ0 than under µ because he thinks it is likely that his neighbors’
beliefs are diﬀerent, or that they think that their neighbors’ beliefs are diﬀerent,
and so on. Note that players do not have to interact directly or indirectly to be
“infected” by others’ behavior. It suﬃces that players believe (given their type) that
it is likely that their neighbors believe that . . . their neighbors have a certain type.
Such contagion is ruled out under the following two conditions. Either we
need that player’s prior is insensitive to small probability events (e.g., the set of
types that has positive probability is ﬁnite, or types are independent), or we need
that the set Tδ
µ,µ0 is suﬃciently cohesive, in the sense that all types in Tδ
µ,µ0 interact
(with high conditional probability) only with types in Tδ
µ,µ0, who in turn interact
only with types in Tδ
µ,µ0, and so on. In that case, if it is a high probability event that
a player has a type in Tδ
µ,µ0, it will be a high probability event that a player has
a type in C1−δ
µ (Tδ
µ,µ0). Hence, when there is some correlation among types, but the
set Tδ
µ,µ0 is not suﬃciently cohesive, players’ conditional beliefs play an important
role so that small probability events can have a large eﬀect on outcomes.4 H      128
One implication of this is that one should be careful in deﬁning the game. In
particular, it is often assumed in the literature on network games that the size of
the network is ﬁxed and that types are independent. The current analysis shows
that these assumptions are not innocuous. If players believe that there is some
correlation among types and there is uncertainty about the size of the network,
then priors may be sensitive to small probability events, which is not the case
when the number of players is ﬁxed or when types are independent.
4.6 Conclusions
Given the complexity of many social and economic networks, it is natural to as-
sume that the agents in the network do not have complete information on the
structure of the network. We consider a setting in which agents interact strategi-
cally on a network and have incomplete information on the network structure. An
important question is how sensitive game-theoretic predictions are to the speciﬁ-
cation of agents’ beliefs and information on the network. In the current chapter,
we have studied the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions to assumptions on
players’ (common) prior in network games of incomplete information. We have
asked under what conditions on two priors it holds that for any network game of
incomplete information with bounded payoﬀs in which players hold one of these
priors, for any equilibrium in that game, there is an approximate equilibrium in
the game with the other prior such that ex ante expected payoﬀs are close.
Our main result (Theorem 4.5.3) shows that two priors are close in a strategic
sense if and only if (i) they assign similar prior probabilities to all events involving
a player and his neighbors, (ii) with high probability, a player believes, given
his type, that his neighbors’ conditional beliefs are similar under the two priors,
and that his neighbors believe, given their type, that. . . the conditional beliefs
of their neighbors are similar, for any number of iterations. Interestingly, this
latter condition can also be formulated in terms of correlations among types: an
alternativeformulationofcondition(ii)isthatthesetoftypesforwhichconditional
beliefs are similar has high probability, and is suﬃciently cohesive in the sense
that with high conditional probability, a type in that set interacts only with types
in that set that, with high conditional probability, only interact with types in that
set, and so on.
An important motivation for this work comes from the realization that net-
works are often large and complex. This suggests that is natural to assume that4.A B     129
players on a network have incomplete information about its structure, thus moti-
vatingthestudyoftherobustnessofgame-theoreticpredictionstothespeciﬁcation
of players’ beliefs on their network. There seems to be some tension between this
motivation and our results. On the one hand, we assume that players are subject
to information constraints. Yet, our results are derived in a setting where players
use sophisticated arguments to form expectations over their opponents’ behavior.
However,itcanbeshownthatthesameresultsareobtained(inthelimit)whenthe
game is played repeatedly and to the behavior of his neighbors in the last period
(cf. Jackson and Yariv, 2007; Morris, 2000).
To establish our results, we have used ideas and concepts from the literature
on higher order beliefs. There are other important questions in the setting of
network games of incomplete information that can be answered using ideas from
thisliterature.Oneimportantquestionishowsensitivegame-theoreticpredictions
are to the assumptions on players’ information about the network structure. As
in much of the literature on network games, we have assumed that players only
know their degree. Indeed, Friedkin (1983) ﬁnds that the “observational horizon”
of individuals is limited in communication networks in organizations: individuals
only know their local environment in the network. However, there may well
be a large variation among individuals. In addition, players can also represent
entities like ﬁrms or countries, whose horizon is likely to be larger. For these
reasons,itisimportanttoinvestigatethesensitivityofpredictionstoinformational
assumptions. Galeotti et al. (2006) study the eﬀect of varying players’ information
about the network in a speciﬁc setting. Their results indicate that informational
assumptions can have an important eﬀect on results. However, to date, there is
no systematic investigation how assumptions players’ information aﬀects results.
The link with the literature on higher order beliefs may also be helpful here, as
this literature contains numerous results on the eﬀect of perturbing information
structures.Thecurrentresultssuggestthatsuchsensitivityquestionsareimportant
to study in network games of incomplete information, and they illustrate how
one can utilize ideas from the literature on higher order beliefs to answer such
questions.
4.A Belief operators for network games
In this section, we extend the deﬁnition of the p-belief operator of Monderer and
Samet (1989) for Bayesian games to the class of network games of incomplete
information. We then discuss its applicability for the problems we study.4 H      130
First we need some more notation. The p-belief operator of Monderer and
Samet (1989) quantiﬁes players’ beliefs on “global” events. In the current context,
these events would be sets of networks. Since players cannot distinguish between
networks that belong to the same isomorphism class, it is possible to speak of a
player’s belief that the network he is in belongs to a given isomorphism class,
or to some collection of isomorphism classes, but we cannot speak of a player’s
belief that the network he belongs to is some particular network. Technically, a
singleton{g},where g ∈ G(n),or,moregenerally,asetofnetworks{g1,..., g`},where
g1,..., g` ∈ G, that does not coincide with the union of one or more isomorphism
classescannotbeameasurablesetinourframework.Hence,therelevantσ-algebra
is the σ-algebra generated by the set of singletons of the collection of isomorphism
classes; the events we are interested in are sets of networks that consist of one or
more isomorphism classes.
This leads us to the following deﬁnitions. Let FC be the σ-ﬁeld generated by
the set of singletons of the collection of isomorphism classes C. For G ∈ FC, let
CG := {C ∈ C | C ∩ G , ∅}
be the set of isomorphism classes of G contained in G, and let µ ∈ M. We deﬁne a
probability measure rµ induced by µ on the measurable space (G,FC) by











That is, rµ(G) is the prior probability that a player belongs to a network in the set
G (cf. Example 4.3.2). For t ∈ T such that qµ(t) > 0, let







be the conditional probability that a player belongs to a network in G given that




µ(G) := {g ∈ G | ∀i ∈ V(g),qµ(Di(g)) > 0 ⇒ rµ(G | Di(g)) ≥ p}.
That is, the p-belief operator for network games of incomplete information asso-
ciates with each set of networks G ∈ FC the set of networks in which all players4.A B     131
believe that their network belongs to G with probability at least p, given their type
(whenever their type has positive probability). Notice that since for any G ∈ FC,
for any g ∈ G, it holds that g ∈ ˜ B
p
µ(G) if and only g0 ∈ ˜ B
p
µ(G) for all g0 ∈ G that
belong to the same isomorphism class as g, the set ˜ B
p
µ(G) is an element of FC.
Hence, the p-belief operator is a mapping from FC to FC, and can be iterated
to deﬁne the event (set of networks) that all players believe that their network
belongs to G ∈ FC with probability at least p and that all players believe with
conditional probability at leastp that all players believe that their network belongs
to G with conditional probability at least p, and so on.
Unfortunately, the p-belief operator cannot deal with the events we are inter-
ested in. We would like to consider sets of networks such as
E =
n
g ∈ G | i ∈ V(g) ⇒ Dj(g) ∈ S for all j ∈ Ni(g)
o
,
where S ⊆ T. That is, E is the set of networks in which all players have their
types in some set S. If E ∈ FC, we could use the p-belief operator for network
games of incomplete information to obtain the event that all players believe with
conditional belief at least p that their neighbors have their type in S, etcetera.
However, the set E is not an event in this setting, i.e., E < FC. The problem
is that, while we can only deﬁne players’ beliefs over isomorphism classes, to use
the p-belief operator ˜ B
p
µ for our purposes, we need to consider players’ beliefs over
the types of particular players. The local p-belief operator has the advantage that
this is not necessary: we can consider the probability that an arbitrary player has
a certain neighbor type proﬁle. On the other hand, the local p-belief operator is
ill suited to analyze players’ beliefs over global properties of the network, such
as the size or component structure of a network. Hence, the p-belief operator of
MondererandSamet(1989)(extendedtotheclassofnetworkgamesofincomplete
information) and the local p-belief operator developed in the current chapter are
complementary in the analysis of players’ beliefs in network games.
Remark 4.A.1. A possible solution to the problem alluded to above could be to
make the additional assumption on priors of conditional exchangeability: given that
the total number of players is n ∈ N, the neighbor degree proﬁles K1,...,Kn of the
n players are exchangeable. We could then exploit this in a way analogous to the
way we used exchangeability in the case of Bayesian network games (Chapter 3)
to deﬁne beliefs over the event that an arbitrary player has a neighbor type proﬁle
insomesetofneighbortypeproﬁlesusingthep-beliefoperatorfornetworkgames
of incomplete information. There is a complication, though, that does not arise in
the current approach. When calculating the probability of an event in this setting,4 H      132
one needs to take into account a player’s belief that the total number of players is
n, for each n ∈ N, which is not necessary in the current approach. The problem is
that by learning his type, a player obtains information about the total number of
players. If a player has type t ∈ T, he knows that there are at least t + 1 players.
More generally, a player of type t will attach a higher weight to large networks
than a player of type t0 < t. It is not immediate how to deal with these issues. /
4.B Proofs
4.B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.3.6
Proposition 4.3.6 uses Lemma 4.B.1.
Lemma 4.B.1. Let(µ,v)beanetworkgameofincompleteinformationsuchthattheproﬁle
v of payoﬀ functions is bounded. For each t ∈ T, let the function ϕt(·;µ) on ΣT be deﬁned
as in (4.2). Then, ϕt(·;µ) is continuous on the (topological) product space ΣT.
Proof. For each t ∈ T and n ∈ N, let
Ω
t,n
K := {(k1,...,kt) ∈ {1,...,n}t | k1 ≥ k2 ≥ ... ≥ kt−1 ≥ kt}
be the set of neighbor type proﬁles of a player of type t such that the type of each
neighbor is at most n. Clearly, Ω
t,n
K is a ﬁnite subset of the countable set Ωt
K. For
















if qµ(t) > 0,
0 otherwise.
For t ∈ T such that qµ(t) = 0, it holds that ϕ
(n)
t (σ;µ) = ϕt(σ;µ) = 0 for all σ ∈ ΣT. Let
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qµ(θ | t) = 0.
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 ≤ ε (4.25)







uniformly on ΣT to ϕt(·;µ). As for each n ∈ N, the function ϕ
(n)
t (·;µ) is continuous
on ΣT, the function ϕt(·;µ) is continuous on ΣT. 
We are now ready to prove Proposition 4.3.6. Consider a network game of in-
complete information (µ,v) such that v is bounded, and ﬁx some strategy function
τ ∈ ΣT. Let n ∈ N, and let T(n) := {1,...,n}. Recall the deﬁnition of the function
ϕt(·;µ) on ΣT in (4.2).







each t ∈ T(n), Σt = Σ and ˜ ϕ
(n)
t (·;µ) is the real-valued function on Σn deﬁned by















That is, the payoﬀ of a player t ∈ T(n) in the game G(n) is the expected payoﬀ of a
player of type t in the original game (µ,v), given that players with type t ∈ T \T(n)
play according to τ. The set Σ is a nonempty, convex, compact subset of a ﬁnite-
dimensional Euclidean space, and for each t ∈ T(n), ˜ ϕ
(n)
t (·;µ) is a continuous real-
valued function on Σn that is quasi-concave in σt on Σ. Hence, the best-response
correspondence bt : Σn ⇒ Σn of each player t ∈ T(n) is nonempty, convex-valued,









∈ Σn exists for G(n).











198), there exists a subsequence (¯ σ(nj))j∈N of the sequence (¯ σ(n))n∈N that converges
tosome ¯ σ = (¯ σ1, ¯ σ2,...) ∈ ΣT.Weclaimthat ¯ σisanequilibriumoftheoriginalgame
(µ,v). Suppose not. Then there exists t ∈ T and σt ∈ Σ such that
ϕt(¯ σ1, ¯ σ2,..., ¯ σt−1, ¯ σt, ¯ σt+1,...;µ) < ϕt(¯ σ1, ¯ σ2,..., ¯ σt−1,σt, ¯ σt+1,...;µ).4 H      134
By Lemma 4.B.1, ϕt is continuous on the topological product space ΣT. Hence,





1 ,..., ¯ σ
(nj)






















is a Nash equilibrium of the game G(nj). 
4.B.2 Properties of the local belief operator
In this section, we prove the properties of the local p-belief operator as listed in
Section 4.4, and we prove Lemma 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.
Lemma 4.B.2 (Continuity). Let S ⊆ T, and for k ∈ N, let Tk ⊆ T. If Tk ↓ S, i.e., if
(Tk)k∈N is a decreasing sequence and
T









µ(Tk) for all k ∈ N, i.e., (B
p
µ(Tk))k∈N is a decreasing

















µ(Tk). Then, obviously, t ∈ Tk for all k ∈ N. We need
to distinguish two cases: qµ(t) = 0 and qµ(t) > 0. Suppose that qµ(t) = 0. Then,




k∈N Tk). So suppose qµ(t) > 0. Then, qµ(Tt
k | t) ≥ p for all
k ∈ N. Furthermore, (Tt
k)k∈N is a decreasing sequence, and
T
k∈N Tt
k = St. Hence














     t

.






    t

≥ p,














. Then, obviously, t ∈ Tk for all k ∈ N.
Again, we need to consider two cases. If qµ(t) = 0, then it follows directly from4.B P 135
the deﬁnition of B
p
µ that t ∈ B
p





So suppose qµ(t) > 0. Then, qµ(St | t) ≥ p implies that qµ(Tk | t) ≥ p for all k ∈ N.
Hence, t ∈ B
p






















Lemma 4.B.4 (Continuity in p). If pk ↑ p, then, for any S ⊆ T, B
pk






















µ (S). If qµ(t) = 0, then it follows directly from the deﬁnition
that t ∈ B
p
µ(S). So suppose qµ(t) > 0. Then, qµ(St | t) ≥ pk for all k ∈ N, and therefore
qµ(St | t) ≥ p. Hence, t ∈ B
p
µ(S).
Conversely, suppose t ∈ B
p
µ(S). If qµ(t) = 0, then it follows directly that t ∈ T
k∈N B
pk
µ (S). So suppose qµ(t) > 0. Then, qµ(St) ≥ p, and hence qµ(St) ≥ pk for all
k ∈ N. We conclude that t ∈ B
pk





Finally, we present the proofs of Lemmas 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.















































































Proof of Lemma 4.4.2. Suppose t ∈ C
p
µ(T0). By Lemma 4.4.1, the set C
p
µ(T0) is p-




µ(T0). Hence, we can set S = C
p
µ(T0), and the
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(T0) for all ` ∈ N, from which it follows
that t ∈ C
p

































4.B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.5.4
By Lemma 4.4.1, C
p
µ(S) is p-closed. Hence, for all t ∈ C
p
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Remark 4.B.5. Note that Lemma 4.5.4 can be generalized: we can replace C
p
µ(S) in
the lemma by any subset of T that is p-closed. We have presented it in its current
form for expositional reasons. /
4.B.4 Continuity of the type-averaged equilibrium correspondence
In an (approximate) equilibrium, as we deﬁned it, players are required to choose
best responses given their type, i.e., equilibria are deﬁned in terms of expected
payoﬀs. Alternatively, we could deﬁne equilibrium in terms of type-averaged ex-
pected payoﬀs, allowing types with low prior probability to follow strategies that4.B P 137
are suboptimal. In standard Bayesian games, lower hemicontinuity of the ex ante
ε-equilibriumhasbeenstudiedbyEngl(1995).Heshowsthattheweaktopologyis
suﬃcient for lower hemicontinuity of the ex ante ε-equilibrium in countable state
spaces. Here, we derive an analogous result for the type-averaged ε-equilibrium
correspondence (see below for a precise deﬁnition). We show that the weak topol-
ogy is suﬃcient (and also necessary) to guarantee lower-hemicontinuity of this
correspondence.
First we need some deﬁnitions. Recall the deﬁnition of type-averaged ex-
pected payoﬀs from Section 4.3.
Deﬁnition 4.B.6. Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy function σ ∈ ΣT is a type-averaged ε-
equilibrium of a network game of incomplete information (µ,v) if
Φ(σ;µ) ≥ Φ(σ0;µ) − ε
forallσ0 ∈ Σ.Werefertoatype-averaged0-equilibriumasatype-averagedequilibrium.
Proposition 4.B.7. Let (µ,v) be a network game of incomplete information. If the proﬁle
of payoﬀ functions v is bounded, the game has a type-averaged equilibrium.
The proof follows directly from the proof of Proposition 4.3.6. Let Nε
τ(µ,v) denote
the set of type-averaged ε-equilibria of (µ,v).
We deﬁne a notion of strategic convergence for the current setting. Let µ,µ0 ∈















Deﬁnition 4.B.8. Take any µ ∈ M, and consider a sequence (µk)k∈N in M. The sequence
(µk)k∈N converges strategically in the sense of type-averaged expected payoﬀs to µ





Recall the deﬁnition of d0 from Section 4.5, and notice that the metric d0 generates
the weak topology.4 H      138
Theorem 4.B.9. Let µ ∈ M and let (µk)k∈N be a sequence in M. Then, (µk)k∈N converges




The proof follows from Proposition 4.B.10 and 4.B.11.
Proposition 4.B.10 establishes that the weak topology is suﬃcient.
Proposition 4.B.10. Let µ,µ0 ∈ M, and let δ ∈ [0,1]. Let v be a proﬁle of payoﬀ
functions. Suppose that d0(µ,µ0) ≤ δ. Then, if σ ∈ ΣT is a type-averaged equilibrium of
the game (µ,v) and if v is bounded by B, then σ is a type-averaged 4δB-equilibrium of the
game (µ0,v), and
|Φ(σ;µ) − Φ(σ;µ0)| ≤ 2δB.
Proof. Let t ∈ T be such that qµ(t) > 0, and let σ0
t ∈ Σ. As σ is a type-averaged
equilibrium of (µ,v),
Φ(σ0;µ) − Φ(σ;µ) ≤ 0.
Hence,
Φ(σ;µ0) − Φ(σ0;µ0) ≥ Φ(σ;µ0) − Φ(σ;µ) + Φ(σ0;µ) − Φ(σ0;µ0). (4.28)
As d0(µ,µ0) ≤ δ,
Φ(σ;µ) − Φ(σ;µ0) ≥ −2δB, (4.29)
Φ(σ0;µ) − Φ(σ0;µ0) ≥ −2δB. (4.30)
Substituting (4.29) and (4.30) in (4.28), we ﬁnd
Φ(σ;µ0) ≥ Φ(σ0;µ0) − 4δB,
proving the ﬁrst claim. The second claim follows directly from (4.29). 
The next proposition shows that the topology generated by d0 is also necessary.
Proposition 4.B.11. Let δ ∈ [0,1], and let µ,µ0 ∈ M. If
d0(µ,µ0) > δ,
then there exists a proﬁle v of payoﬀ functions with bound B = 1 and an equilibrium σ of
the game (µ,v) such that for any δ-equilibrium σ0 of (µ0,v), it holds that
|Φ(σ;µ) − Φ(σ0;µ0)| > δ.4.B P 139
The proof follows directly from the proof of Proposition 4.5.7.
We can now prove Theorem 4.B.9.
Proof. (If) Let v be a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions. By Proposition 4.B.10, for v
bounded by B, and for k ∈ N such that 4Bd0(µ,µk) ≤ ε,
χ∗
τ(µ,µk;v,ε) ≤ 2d0(µ,µk)B.
Hence, for all proﬁles of payoﬀ functions v that are bounded and for all ε > 0, if
d0(µ,µk) → 0, then χ∗
τ(µ,µk;v,ε) → 0.
(Only if) Let µ,µ0 ∈ M. For δ ∈ [0,1), if d0(µ,µ0) > δ, then, by Proposition 4.B.11,
there exists a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions v bounded by B = 1 and a type-averaged
equilibrium σ ∈ ΣT of (µ,v) such that for any type-averaged δ-equilibrium σ0 ∈ ΣT
of (µ0,v), |Φ(σ;µ) − Φ(σ0;µ0)| > δ. 
4.B.5 Proof of Proposition 4.5.15
Proposition 4.5.15 uses Lemma 4.B.12.
Lemma 4.B.12. Let µ ∈ M, and let (µk)k∈N be a sequence in M. If
lim
k→∞







Proof. Let ε > 0. By assumption, there exists K ∈ N such that for all k > K,
sup
F∈FK


















Let k > K. Recall that for t ∈ T
ε/2
µ,µk such that qµ(t) > 0 and qµk(t) > 0,
sup
F∈FK
|qµ(F | t) − qµk(F | t)| ≤
ε
2









   qµ(t) > 0
o
.
Note that, unlike T
ε/2
µ,µk, the set ˆ T
ε/2
µ,µk is not symmetric in µ and µk, i.e., ˆ T
ε/2
µk,µ , ˆ T
ε/2
µ,µk.
















































































≥ 1 − ε.
Combining these results gives
inf
n






≥ 1 − δ
o
≤ ε. 
We can now prove Proposition 4.5.15.
(If) Let ε > 0, and let (µk)k∈N be a sequence in M. Suppose that Sε ⊆ T is such that







≥ 1 − ε. (4.36)
ByLemma4.B.12,ifd0(µ,µk) → 0andd1(µ,µk) → 0,thenalsod1(µk,µ) → 0.Hence,
it is suﬃcient to show that d1(µ,µk) → 0 whenever d0(µ,µk) → 0.
Let ˆ Sε := {t ∈ Sε | qµ(t) > 0} be the set of types in Sε that have positive
probability under µ. By (4.34), there exists c > 0 such that qµ(t) = qµ(Ωt
K) ≥ c for all4.B P 141
t ∈ ˆ Sε. Then, for all k ∈ N, for all t ∈ ˆ Sε,
sup
F∈FK
|qµ(F | t) − qµk(F | t)| = sup
F∈FK

























  qµ(F ∪ Ωt
K) − qµk(F ∪ Ωt
K)















|qµ(F) − qµk(F)|. (4.37)
Suppose that limk→∞ d0(µ,µk) = 0. Then there exists K ∈ N such that for all k > K,
sup
F∈FK





Let k > K. Then, by (4.37), for all t ∈ ˆ Sε such that qµk(t) > 0, it holds that
sup
F∈FK
|qµ(F | t) − qµk(F | t)| ≤ ε,
so that Sε ⊆ Tε
µ,µk. By monotonicity of the local p-belief operator and (4.35),
Sε = B1−ε







Using Lemma 4.4.2 and (4.35), we obtain


















≥ 1 − ε.






(Only if) Suppose that
lim
k→∞
d0(µ,µk) = 0 ⇒ lim
k→∞
d1(µ,µk).
First we show that there exists a sequence (νk)k∈N in M such that4 H      142
(a) for each k ∈ N, the set of types {t ∈ T | qνk(t) > 0} that have positive probability
under νk is ﬁnite;





|qµ(F) − qνk(F)| = 0.
The sequence (νk)k∈N is easy to construct. If µ has ﬁnite support in T, i.e., if the
set {t ∈ T | qµ(t) > 0} is ﬁnite, then simply set νk = µ for all k ∈ N. Otherwise, we
construct (νk)k∈N as follows. For each k ∈ N, deﬁne
ˆ G(k) := {g ∈ G | ∀i ∈ V(g),Di(g) ≤ k}
tobethesetofnetworksinwhichthemaximumdegreeisk.Notethatthesequence






µ( ˆ G(k)) if g ∈ ˆ G(k) and µ( ˆ G(k)) > 0,
0 otherwise.
It is easy to see that (a) is satisﬁed. To see that (b) is also satisﬁed, deﬁne ˆ C (k) to be
the collection of isomorphism classes in ˆ G(k) for k ∈ N. For each k ∈ N such that
µ( ˆ G(k)) > 0, we have
sup
F∈FK
|qµ(F) − qνk(F)| = sup
F∈FK










    
= sup
F∈FK
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it follows that (b) holds.4.B P 143
Since µ is insensitive to small probability events, we also have that d1(µ,νk) →
0. Hence, for all ε > 0, there exists K ∈ N such that for all k > K,
sup
F∈FK


























   qνk(t) > 0
o
to be the set of types in Tε
µ,νk that have positive probability under νk. By (4.39) and


















































≥ 1 − ε.
By deﬁnition, ˆ Tε




















we obtain the desired result. 5 Random networks with a group structure
Summary
The current chapter, which is based on Deijfen and Kets (2007), develops
a random network model with a group structure, and characterizes its
degree distribution and clustering. The clustering of a random network
model is deﬁned as the probability that two agents are connected given
that they have a common neighbor. The model proposed in the current
chapter is a suitable model for many social and economic settings, and
provides a ﬂexible framework to model players’ beliefs over the group
structure in network games with incomplete information on the network
structure.
5.1 Introduction
In many social and economic contexts, agents interact in communities or groups.
For instance, individuals belong to a family, work at an oﬃce, frequent a sports’
club, etcetera. Similarly, ﬁrms participate in diﬀerent R&D alliances with several
diﬀerent partners, and they compete with diﬀerent ﬁrms on diﬀerent markets. The
diﬀerent R&D alliances or markets can be seen as groups. Also the coauthorship
networks that have recently attracted attention in economics (Goyal et al., 2006)
can be seen as an example. In these networks, researchers are connected if they
have coauthored at least one paper together. The coauthored papers can then be
interpretedasgroups.Thegroupstructureinducesanetwork:agentsinteractwith
other agents in their group, and the partial overlap of these groups gives rise to
a network with a group structure. The agents are the vertices in the network, and
the edges represent the relations between them, which are induced by the group
structure. An example of this is shown in Figure 5.1, where the group structure is
clearly visible.
The current chapter develops a random network model with a group struc-
ture. We refer to this model as the random community model. Each agent is assigned
randomly to a subset of groups. A pair of agents is connected in the network if
and only if they share at least one group. The probability with which an agent
is assigned to groups depends on a random variable, the agent’s weight. Agents









Figure 5.1. An example of an R&D network in the biotechnology sector.
The ﬁgure displays all common R&D alliances of seven ﬁrms (Abbott
Laboratories (AL), Astra AB (AAB), Eli Lilly & Co (EL), Hoﬀmann-La
Roche Inc. (HLR), American Home Products Corp (AHP), Millennium
(M), and Pﬁzer (P)) in the period 1994–2007. Other ﬁrms in the net-
work are Genetics Institute Inc. (G), and Roche Holding AG (RH). Data
are from the Thomson SDC Platinum database, and have been courte-
ously provided by Bastian Westbrock.
a large number of contacts, i.e., to have a high degree. In the setting of social
networks, the weight of an agent can be interpreted as a measure of the eﬀort he
invests in socializing. In the context of R&D networks, the weight of a ﬁrm could
represent the amount it invests to become an attractive R&D partner, etcetera.
We characterize the degree distribution and the clustering of the random
community model. The degree distribution and clustering are the stochastic ana-
logues of the degree sequence and the clustering coeﬃcient, which are important
properties of networks.1 Many social and economic networks have a power-law
degree sequence, meaning that the fraction of agents with a given degree falls oﬀ
roughly as a power law (see below for precise deﬁnitions). In that case, we say
that the degree sequence is heavy-tailed. Moreover, many social and economic
networks are characterized by a high clustering coeﬃcient. Loosely speaking, the
clustering coeﬃcient of a network measures the number of closed triangles (sets
of three agents each of which is connected to each of the others) in the network
1 While the degree sequence of a network gives the fraction of vertices with a certain degree in
a network, the degree distribution of a random network model speciﬁes the probability that a
vertexselecteduniformlyatrandomfromanetworkhasacertaindegree.Similarly,theclustering
coeﬃcient of a network measures the number of closed triangles in a network relative to the
numberofconnectedtriples,whereastheclusteringofarandomnetworkmodelistheconditional






Figure 5.2. (a) A network with a single connected triple (with agent i
as the central agent) and no closed triangles; (b) a network with one
closed triangle, consisting of agents i, j, and k, and three connected
triples (each with another agent as the central agent).
relative to the number of connected triples (a single agent with edges running to
an unordered pair of others; see Figure 5.2).2 In the context of social networks,
if the clustering coeﬃcient of a network is high, the friend of a friend is likely
to be your friend. One reason why the clustering coeﬃcient of social networks is
typically high is indeed that people tend to interact in groups (Newman and Park,
2003).
The random community model we propose can account for these features
of real networks. By choosing the parameters appropriately, we can control the
tail behavior of the degree distribution in the model, and we can vary the clus-
tering continuously. This allows us to obtain random network models with high
clustering and a degree distribution with a power law tail. The clustering of the
random community model follows from the group structure. Suppose all agents
belong to a single group with probability one. In that case, the clustering would
be equal to 1: all agents that have a common friend, are also directly connected.
At the other extreme, suppose each agent belongs to a large number of groups.
Then, two agents having a common neighbor, meaning that they share at least
one group with this third agent, may well belong to diﬀerent groups of this third
agent, so that it is quite likely that they are not directly connected. In that case, the
clustering of the random community model will be negligible. In the intermediate
cases, in which there is a partial overlap of groups, as in Figure 5.1, the clustering
will be between 0 and 1. The degree distribution of the random community model
follows from the distribution of the weights of the agents. We show that if the
distribution function of the weights is a power law with a given exponent, then
the degree distribution has power law tails as well.
2 Also other deﬁnitions of the clustering coeﬃcient exist in the literature, but the main idea behind
these deﬁnitions is the same; see e.g. Newman (2003b).5.1 I 147
The motivation for this model is twofold. Firstly, the current random network
modeloﬀersaﬂexibleframeworktomodelplayers’beliefsoverthegroupstructure
in network games with incomplete information on the network structure. As
discussed in the previous two chapters, random network models provide a means
to model players’ beliefs over the network when there is incomplete information
about the network structure. The current model allows one to choose a suitable
degree distribution and to continuously vary the clustering of the network. This
allows for a study of the eﬀect of players’ beliefs on the group structure on game-
theoretic predictions. The previous two chapters have argued that it is not just
the degree distribution of a random network model that is important for game-
theoretic predictions, but that local dependencies between the degrees of agents
also play a role. The clustering of a random network model is one aspect of these
localdependencies.Thesecondmotivationforthismodelisthatitisaverynatural
model for many social and economic settings, given the prevalence of groups and
communities in such settings. The main parameter, the weight of an agent, has
a clear and intuitive interpretation: it can be seen as the agent’s investment in
forming connections.
The random community model we propose is a generalization of the so-
called random intersection graph model.3 The random intersection graph model
was introduced by Singer (1995) and Karo´ nski et al. (1999), and has been further
studied and generalized in Fill et al. (2000), Godehardt and Jaworski (2002), Stark
(2004) and Jaworski et al. (2006). Newman (2003a) and Newman and Park (2003)
discuss a model that is closely related to the model of Godehardt and Jaworski
(2002)andJaworskietal.(2006).4 Unlikethemodelproposedinthecurrentchapter,
the original random intersection graph model cannot account for the heavy-tailed
degree sequences observed in many real-world networks (Stark, 2004, Thm. 2). By
contrast, the current framework allows us to obtain random network models in
which the tail behavior of the degree distribution can be tuned.
The diﬀerence between the current model and other random intersection
graph models that can account for power law degree distributions such as the
modelofGodehardtandJaworski(2002),isthatratherthanpositingadistribution
of number of groups per agent, we derive this distribution from the distribution
of agents’ weights. The advantage of this approach is twofold. Firstly, it allows for
a behavioral explanation of the distribution of the number of groups per agent,
3 The terms “graph” and “network” have the same meaning in the current context and can be used
interchangeably.
4 Thereisalsoarelatedliteratureonrandomhypergraphmodelswhichfocusesmostlyonnetworks
in which the groups have a ﬁxed size, see Bollob´ as (2001) for an overview.5 R      148
e.g. in terms of heterogeneity in terms of preferences, as in Cabrales et al. (2007).
Secondly,thecurrentmodelisparticularlytractable,allowingustogiveacomplete
characterization of its most important properties as the clustering and the degree
distribution. The current model is inspired by a generalization of the Erd˝ os-R´ enyi
random network models, the generalized random graph model of Britton et al.
(2006) (also see Bollob´ as et al., 2007). In that model, agents are also endowed
with weights, but these weights determine agents’ propensity to form bilateral
connections, rather than their propensity to join groups, as in the current model.
Yao et al. (2005) discuss a model closely related to ours. The main diﬀerence
between their work and the work presented here is that Yao et al. (2005) only
considerpower-lawdegreedistributions,whileweallowforawideclassofdegree
distributions, and that they do not characterize the clustering of their model.
Furthermore,intheirmodel,alsothegroupsareendowedwithweights,sothatthe
probability that an agent joins a group depends on the weights of both the agent
and the group. The weight of a group could for instance represent its intrinsic
attractiveness. Our model can be adapted to allow for this, but for game-theoretic
purposes, the current approach in which only agents are endowed with weights
seems to be more natural.
This chapter is organized as follows. The random community model is intro-
ducedinSection5.2.Section5.3presentsthemainresultsonthedegreedistribution
and the clustering of the model. In Section 5.4, we analyze the clustering for the
important example of a power law weight distribution. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 The random community model
Inthissection,wedeﬁnetherandomcommunitymodel.Letn ∈ N,andletα,β > 0.
Deﬁne
m := bβnαc. (5.1)
Let V(n) = {1,...,n} be a set of n agents and let C(m) be a set of m groups or commu-
nities. Let F be a cumulative distribution function with support in R+ := [0,∞),
and let µF be the Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure associated with F (Section 2.2.3).
For normalization purposes, we assume that a random variable with cumulative
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andletW1,W2,...bearandomsequenceinR+,witheachW`,` ∈ V,independently
distributedwithdistributionfunctionF.Fori ∈ V,werefertotherandomvariable
Wi as the weight of agent i.
We now deﬁne the relevant probability space. For n ∈ N, let (U
(n)
i,c )i∈V(n),c∈C(m) be










Y := U ∪ {W1,W2,...}.
Let (Xt)t∈T be a countable collection of random variables such that for each t ∈ T,
thereisexactlyoneY ∈ Y suchthatXt = Y.Fort ∈ T,let(Ωt,Ft)bethemeasurable
space to which Xt maps. That is, if we let B+ and B[0,1] denote the restriction of
the Borel σ-algebra to R+ and [0,1], respectively, (Ωt,Ft) is equal to (R+,B+) if
Xt = Wi for some i ∈ V, and to ([0,1],B[0,1]) otherwise. For each t ∈ T, let Pt be the
distribution of Xt.
Let Ω := ×t∈TΩt. We deﬁne the inﬁnite product σ-algebra F on Ω in the
standard way (e.g. Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Sec. 14.6). For each ﬁnite subset S
of T, deﬁne
CS := {×t∈S Et | ∀t ∈ S,Et ∈ Ft},






and extend PS to FS in the usual way (e.g. Billingsley, 1995).
Then, by Kolmogorov’s extension theorem (e.g. Aliprantis and Border, 1999,
Sec. 14.6), there is a unique probability measure P on the σ-algebra F in Ω such
that for each ﬁnite subset S of T,
P ◦ π−1
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Figure 5.3. We construct the network in the right panel from the bipar-
tite network with agent set {1,2,...,12} and group set {A,B,C,D} in the
left panel by drawing an edge between two distinct agents if and only
if they share at least one group in the bipartite network. For clarity,
only the group labels in the right panel are indicated.
where πST is the natural projection of Ω on ×t∈SΩt. In particular, for any i ∈ V, for


















where µu is the Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure associated with the uniform distribu-
tion on [0,1].
We can now deﬁne the random community model. Let γ > 0, and let n ∈ N.








Notice that we can ignore the min-operator in Equation (5.2) for a given value
of an agent’s weight when n is suﬃciently large. Let G(n,m)





B . Deﬁne the F/F(n,m)
B -measurable function B(n,m)
F as follows. For each ω ∈ Ω,
B
(n,m)
F (ω) is the bipartite network that is obtained by adding an edge between agent
i ∈ V(n) and group c ∈ C(m) if and only if
P
(n)
i (ω) ≥ U
(n)
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This means that there is an edge between i and c with probability P
(n)
i (ω), indepen-
dent of other edges given Wi. Denote the law of B(n,m)
F by P(n,m)
F,B . We refer to B(n,m)
F
as the random bipartite network, and to (G(n,m)
B ,F(n,m)
B ,P(n,m)
F,B ) as the random bipartite




B : ˆ P
(n,m)
F,B (E) := P
n
ω ∈ Ω | B
(n,m)
F (ω) ∈ E
o    {Wi}i∈V(n)

.
That is, ˆ P
(n,m)
F,B is the conditional law of B
(n,m)
F . Notice that ˆ P
(n,m)
F,B (E) is a random
variable for all E ∈ F(n,m)
B (Section 2.2.4).
From any bipartite network gB ∈ G
(n,m)
B with independent sets V(n) and C(m),
we can obtain a network with vertex set V(n) by drawing an edge between two
agents i, j ∈ V(n),i , j, if and only if they have a common adjacent vertex c ∈ C(m)
in gB, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. Let G
(n,m)
G be the set of all networks with n vertices
that can be obtained in this way, and let F
(n,m)
G be the set of all subsets of G
(n,m)
G .
This deﬁnes the F/F(n,m)
G -measurable function G(n,m)
F , referred to as the random
community network. Denote the law of G(n,m)
F by P(n,m)




the random community model. As before, deﬁne
∀E ∈ F
(n,m)
G : ˆ P
(n,m)
F,G (E) := P
n
ω ∈ Ω | G
(n,m)
F (ω) ∈ E





F,G is the conditional law of G
(n,m)
F . Again, ˆ P
(n,m)
F,G (E) is a random variable for
all E ∈ F
(n,m)
G .5
Hence, in a realization of the random community network, vertices represent
the agents, and the edges represent the relations among agents. The groups de-
termine the network structure. Notice that there is “double randomness” in the
model: ﬁrst we draw the weights of agents according to some distribution func-
tion, and then agents are randomly assigned to groups, with the probability with
which agents are assigned to groups being determined by their weights.
Remark 5.2.1. Inthedeﬁnitionoftherandomcommunitymodel,weusetheterms
“agents” and “groups”, with the understanding that the model is of course much
more general; see Section 5.1 for some examples in economics, and see Palla et al.
(2005) for examples in other ﬁelds. /
5 The random bipartite network, the random community network and the associated random
network models are deﬁned for given α,β and γ; to simplify notation, indices α,β and γ are
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Remark 5.2.2. In the current model, weights are assigned at random according
to some distribution function F (which could be degenerate, i.e., assign weight
w ∈ R+ with probability 1). This distribution could follow from the strategic
choices of agents or players. For instance, in Cabrales et al. (2007), who apply a
random network model that is similar to the current model, each player has to
choose a networking investment. The networking investment of a player deter-
mines the probability with which he forms bilateral links with other players, just
like the weight determines the probability with which an agent joins groups in
our model. A player’s networking investment is a strategic choice in the model
of Cabrales et al. (2007): it depends on a player’s preferences and the choices of
other players. Heterogeneity in preferences leads to a non-degenerate distribution
functionofnetworkinginvestmentsandthustoheterogeneousnetworks.Alsosee
the discussion in Section 5.5. /
Remark 5.2.3. The particular functional form (5.1) for the number of groups is
chosen in order to obtain an interesting class of random network models; see
Karo´ nski et al. (1999) for a discussion. Intuitively, the number of groups has to
grow with the number of agents. If it were to remain constant as the number of
agents grows, then, asymptotically, given the functional form of P
(n)
i , i ∈ V(n), the
expected number of groups per agent would be zero, so that the network would
be empty. At the other extreme, suppose that the number of groups would grow
muchfasterthanthenumberofagents.Inthatcase,agentswouldbelongtoalarge
number of groups, but often, these groups contain at most one other agent, so that
there is no nontrivial group structure. These intuitions are reﬂected in our main
results on the degree distribution (Theorem 5.3.2) and clustering (Theorem 5.3.4)
of the random community network model, see below for a discussion. /
We are interested in the properties of the model when n → ∞, in particular
the degree distribution and the clustering, which we deﬁne now. Recalling that







Let FB be the σ-algebra generated by the set of singletons of GB. Deﬁne GG and FG
analogously to GB and FB, respectively. Let Q be the set of all ﬁnite subsets of V,
and let V : GG → Q and VB : GB → Q be the functions that assign to each g ∈ GG,
respectively each gB ∈ GB, its agent set. That is, if g ∈ G
(n,m)
G for some n ∈ N, then
V(g) = V(n), and if gB ∈ G
(n,m)
B , then VB(gB) = V(n). By deﬁnition, for each g ∈ GG
there is at least one corresponding bipartite network gB ∈ GB, but there may be
more than one. For each g ∈ GG, denote by B(g) ⊆ GB the set of bipartite networks5.2 T    153
that correspond to it.
For i ∈ V, let Di be the function on GG that assigns to each g ∈ GG the number

















It can be easily checked that Di(G
(n,m)
F ) is a random variable. We refer to Di(G
(n,m)
F )
as the degree of i in G
(n,m)
F . We now derive a convenient expression for the degree of
an agent in a random community network. For i, j ∈ V,i , j, let Zij be the function
on GB that assigns to each gB ∈ GB the number of groups that agent i and agent

















Again, it is straightforward to verify that Zij(B
(n,m)
F ) is a random variable. Since two
agents are connected in a network if and only if they share at least one group in
the corresponding bipartite network, it holds that
∀g ∈ GG,∀gB, g0
B ∈ B(g),∀i, j ∈ V,i , j : Zij(gB) ≥ 1 ⇐⇒ Zij(g0
B) ≥ 1,
and we can write












where we recall that 1E is the indicator function of the event E (see Section 2.2.2).
Finally, let Nc be the function that assigns to each gB ∈ GB the number of groups
agent 1 belongs to. For each n ∈ N, deﬁne Nc(B
(n,m)
F ) by:















F ) is a random variable deﬁned on Ω.







or equivalently, of the random community network G(n,m)
F , gives for each t ∈ N0
the probability that an agent selected uniformly at random from the network has
degree t (also see Section 2.3.1). A degree distribution with associated cumulative
distribution function H is heavy-tailed or has heavy tails if for all a > 0
lim
t→∞
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A degree distribution is a power law if the associated cumulative distribution
function H satisﬁes (1 − H(t)) ∼ t−α, where α > 0 (recall that ∼ denotes that two
functions are asymptotically equal, see page xv for a precise deﬁnition). A power
lawdegreedistributionisaprimaryexampleofaheavy-taileddegreedistribution.
We also study the clustering of random network models. While the degree
distributionisapurelylocalpropertyofarandomnetworkmodel,referringsolely
to the connections of a single agent, the clustering is a property that refers to the
connections of an agent and his neighbors. Informally, the clustering of a random
network model is the probability that there is an edge between two vertices given
that they have a common neighbor, as illustrated in Figure 5.4. More formally,
let n ∈ N, and for i, j ∈ V(n),i , j, denote the event (in F
(n,m)
B ) that agents i and
j have a common group in the random bipartite network by E(n)
ij (note that this
is equivalent to the event (in F
(n,m)
G ) that there is an edge between i and j in the
random community network). Let i, j,k ∈ V(n) be three distinct agents. Then, the



















where the expectation is taken over the weights. Clearly, the agents in V(n) are
indistinguishable, so that c
(n,m)







to be the (asymptotic) clustering of the random community model.
Remark 5.2.4. Other deﬁnitions for the clustering in random network models
exist. For instance, one could look at the expected ratio of closed triangles to the
number of connected triples. Alternatively, one could consider the expectation of
the ratio of the number of triangles (sets of three agents each of which is connected
to each of the others) connected to a vertex relative to the number of connected
triples (a single agent with edges running to an unordered pair of others) centered
onthatvertex,averagedoverallvertices(e.g.Jackson,2008).Ourdeﬁnitionshould
give similar results as the ﬁrst deﬁnition; further research is needed to determine
the exact relation between the diﬀerent clustering deﬁnitions in random network
models. /5.3 A 155
i
j k
Figure 5.4. The clustering of a random network model is the condi-
tional probability that two arbitrary vertices i, j are neighbors given
that they have a common neighbor k.
5.3 Analysis
In this section, we characterize the (asymptotic) degree distribution and the
(asymptotic) clustering in the random community model as a function of the
parameters α,β and γ and the distribution function F for the weights. All unspec-
iﬁed limits are taken as n → ∞. We ﬁrst characterize the degree distribution and
then proceed to the clustering.
5.3.1 Degree distribution

















By summing the expectations of the edge indicators over j, it is easy to see that, at
least when the weights have ﬁnite second moment, the expected degree of agent
i given his weight Wi is asymptotically βγ2Wi (recall that if Wi has ﬁnite mean,
we assume that E[Wi] = 1). Theorem 5.3.2 below, which is a generalization of
Theorem 2 of Stark (2004), gives a full characterization of the degree distribution
for diﬀerent values of the parameters. Theorem 5.3.2 uses Lemma 5.3.1, the proof
of which can be found in Appendix 5.B.
Lemma 5.3.1. Fix η > 0. If W1 has ﬁnite ﬁrst moment, then, conditional on the weight

































Theorem 5.3.2. Let n ∈ N. Consider the random community network G
(n,m)
F with m =
bβnαc and P
(n)
i , i ∈ V(n), as in (5.2).
(a) If α < 1 and if W1 has ﬁnite ﬁrst moment, then the probability mass function of
the degree Di(G
(n,m)
F ) of agent i ∈ V(n) in the random community network G
(n,m)
F
converges to a point mass (of weight 1) at 0 as n → ∞.
(b) If α = 1 and if W1 has ﬁnite ﬁrst moment, then the degree Di(G
(n,m)
F ) of an agent i
in the random community network G
(n,m)
F with weight Wi converges in distribution
to a sum of a Poisson(βγWi) distributed number of Poisson(γ) variables as n → ∞,
where all variables are independent. That is, Di(G
(n,m)
F ) converges in distribution to a
random variable with a compound Poisson distribution.
(c) If α > 1 and if W1 has ﬁnite ﬁrst moment, then the degree Di(G
(n,m)
F ) of an agent i in
the random community network with weight Wi is asymptotically Poisson(βγ2 Wi)
distributed.
Proof. We prove the theorem for agent i = 1. As agents are indistinguishable, this
proves the theorem for all agents.
(a): If there is no group to which agent 1 belongs, then clearly his degree is 0.





F ) = 0

→ 1
as n → ∞. Let n ∈ N. Conditional on W1, the random variable Nc(B
(n,m)
F ) is bino-

























By the deﬁnitions of m and P
(n)
1 , we have that mP
(n)
1 ≤ βγW1n(α−1)/2. By Markov’s
inequality (Lemma 2.2.34),







Ifα < 1andE[W1] < ∞,thentheright-handsideoftheexpressionaboveconverges








   Nc(gB) = 0
o p
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 Nc(gB) = 0
oi
→ 1
as n → ∞
(b, c): To prove (b) and (c), we show that the generating function of D1(G
(n,m)
F ) con-
verges to the generating function of a random variable with distribution function
as speciﬁed in (b) and (c), respectively (recall Theorem 2.2.31).
Foreaseofnotation,writeZj := Z1j(B
(n,m)
F )andNn := Nc(B
(n,m)
F ).Conditionalon
Nn and {Wj}j∈V(n)\{1}, the random variables Z2,...,Zn are independent and for each
j = 2,...,n, Zj is binomially distributed with parameters Nn and P(n)
j . Hence, using


















1[Zj≥1]    {Wj}j∈V(n),Nn
i      W1

      
= E










   {Wj}j∈V(n)\{1},Nn
      W1

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      








where in the last line we have deﬁned
Rn := exp








      

      exp

      O











      

       − 1

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For the remainder over the proof, all unspeciﬁed summations over j run over
V(n) \ {1}. Since the product in (5.5) is the conditional expectation of tD1(G
(n,m)
F ) with




j ) ∈ (0,1] ,
































, if α > 1;
(iii) E[Rn | W1]
a.s.
→ 0.
The limits in (i) and (ii) are the generating functions for random variables with the
compound Poisson and Poisson distributions speciﬁed in part (b) and (c) of the
theorem, respectively. Hence (recall Theorem 2.2.31), establishing (i)-(iii) proves
part (b) and (c) of the theorem.


































m     W1

. (5.6)
For α = 1, we have m = bβnc and P(n)
j = min{γWjn−1,1} for each j ∈ V(n). Recall
that E[Wj] = 1 for all j ∈ V(n) if Wj has a ﬁnite mean. Hence, by the strong law of

























as n → ∞. Noting that t ∈ [0,1], it then follows from the theorem of bounded



















as n → ∞,
proving (i).5.3 A 159
To show (ii), let j ∈ V(n), and for α > 1, deﬁne qj := n(α−1)/2P(n)
j . Recall that
m = bβnαc and that P(n)
j = min{γWjn−(1+α)/2,1} for each j ∈ V(n). We assume that n















    1 +







    
e(t−1)n(1−α)/2 P
j qj − 1
(t − 1)n(1−α)/2 P
j qj

    

    
bβnαc
. (5.7)




→ γ. Since (eax − 1)/x → a for a ∈ R+
as x → 0, it follows that the right-hand side of (5.7) converges almost surely to
exp(βγ2W1(t − 1)) as n → ∞. By (5.6) and bounded convergence, this proves (ii).











Since t ∈ [0,1], this implies that Rn converges in probability to 0, so that (iii) then
follows from bounded convergence. 
Theorem5.3.2statesthat,dependingonthevalueofα,thedegreedistribution
converges to a point mass at 0 (for α < 1), a compound Poisson distribution (for
α = 1) or a Poisson distribution (for α > 1). Importantly, this result means that for
α = 1, we can tune the tail behavior of the degree distribution. In particular, as
demonstrated in Appendix 5.A, we can obtain a degree distribution with power
law tails by choosing the weight distribution to be a power law. Intuitively, the
distribution of the summands in part (b) of the theorem has so-called thin tails,
whilethedistributionofthenumberofsummandswillinherittheheavytailsofthe
weight distribution. The heavy tails of the latter distribution will then dominate
the tail behavior of the degree distribution.
To get some intuition for Theorem 5.3.2, note that the expected number of
groups that agent i ∈ V(n) belongs to is roughly βγWin(α−1)/2. If α < 1 and if Wi
has ﬁnite mean, this number converges in probability to 0, and hence, the degree
of an agent in a random community network converges in probability to 0 in that
case, as stated in part (a) of the theorem. For α = 1, the number of groups that
agent i is a member of is Poisson(βγWi) distributed as n → ∞, and the number
of other agents in each of these groups is approximately Poisson(γ) distributed,
which explains part (b) of the theorem. Finally, for α > 1, an agent belongs to
inﬁnitely many groups as n → ∞. This means that the edge indicators will be
asymptotically independent, giving rise to the Poisson distribution as speciﬁed in
part (c) of the theorem.5 R      160
5.3.2 Clustering
To characterize the asymptotic clustering of the random community model, we
need some more notation. Let n ∈ N. For three distinct agents i, j,k ∈ V(n), denote
by E
(n)
ijk the event (in F
(n,m)
B ) that there is at least one group in the random bipartite
network to which all three agents i, j and k belong, and write E(n)
ij,ik,jk for the event
that there are at least three distinct groups to which i and j, i and k, and j and k
respectivelybelong.Similarly,theeventthattherearetwodistinctgroupstowhich
agents i and k, and j and k respectively belong is denoted by E(n)
ik,jk. Notice that both
events E(n)
ijk and E(n)
ij,ik,jk are equivalent to the event in F(n,m)
G that there is an edge
between i and j, between j and k and between i and j in the random community
network.
We use the following lemma:
Lemma 5.3.3. Let n ∈ N. Consider the random community network G
(n,m)
F with m =
bβnαc and P
(n)

















































































The proof can be found in Appendix 5.B.
We are now ready to state and prove Theorem 5.3.4.
Theorem 5.3.4. Let n ∈ N. Consider the random community network G
(n,m)
F with m =
bβnαc and P
(n)
i , i ∈ V(n), as in (5.2). If W1 has ﬁnite mean,
(a) cF = 1 for α < 1;




for α = 1;
(c) cF = 0 for α > 1.
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By Markov’s inequality, when α < 1,
P






E[WiWjWk] for any η > 0.
Hence, since Wi, Wj and Wk are independent and have ﬁnite mean,
P

WiWjWk n−(3−α)/2 > η

→ 0.




Furthermore, it is easy to see that for α < 1,
n(α−1)/2 → 0
as n → ∞. Hence, the fraction in (5.8) converges in probability to 1 for α < 1.
Hence, by bounded convergence c
(n,m)
F → 1 for α < 1.
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As the weights are independent and have ﬁnite mean, Markov’s inequality can be
applied to conclude that WiWjWkn−1 converges in probability to 0 as n → ∞. The
result then follows from bounded convergence.


















































Obviously, n(1−α)/2 → 0 when α > 1 if n → ∞. Moreover, by Markov’s inequality,
WiWjWkn−1 converges in probability to 0 when n → ∞. Hence, the fraction in (5.8)
converges in probability to 0. By bounded convergence, c
(n,m)
F → 0 when α > 1. 
To get some intuition for Theorem 5.3.4, consider three distinct agents i, j,k ∈
V(n) for some n ∈ N. Suppose that i and k share a group and that j and k share a
group in a bipartite network. Then, the probability that i and j also have a group in
commondependsonthenumberofgroupsthatthecommonneighborkbelongsto.
Indeed, the fewer groups k belongs to, the more likely it is that i and j in fact share
the same group with k. Recall that the expected number of groups that k belongs
to is roughly βγWkn(α−1)/2. If α < 1 (and Wk has a ﬁnite mean), the expectation of
this expression goes to 0 as n → ∞. In that case, it is very unlikely that k belongs
to more than one group when n is large. Consequently, two edges ik and jk in the
community network are likely to be generated by the same group. This implies
that i and j are connected as well. Hence, when α < 1, the clustering will be equal
to 1: conditional on i and k and j and k being connected, the probability that i and
j also have a link is asymptotically equal to 1. On the other hand, when α > 1,
the number of groups that k belongs to is asymptotically inﬁnite. Hence, the fact
that the agents i and j each belong to one of these groups, does not imply that
it is likely that they actually belong to the same group. Hence, the clustering is
asymptotically 0 when α > 1. Finally, when α = 1, agent k belongs to βγWk groups
on average, explaining the expression in part (b) of the theorem.
FromTheorem5.3.4itfollowsthatweshouldchooseα = 1toobtainarandom
community model with nontrivial clustering. For a given distribution function F
for the weights (when the weights have ﬁnite mean), the clustering can then
be varied continuously between 0 and 1 by adjusting the parameters β and γ.5.4 E: P    163
Furthermore, as shown in Theorem 5.3.2(b), when α = 1, the degree distribution
for a given vertex is asymptotically compound Poisson with the weight of the
vertex as one of the parameters. In Appendix 5.A we show that if F is a power law
distribution with a given exponent, then the degree distribution of the random
community model with weight distribution F will have power law tails with
the same exponent when the number of agents grows large. Since the mean of
an agent’s weight is normalized to 1, the asymptotic mean degree is βγ2. Taken
together,thismeansthatwecanobtainarandomcommunitymodelwitharbitrary
clustering and a power law degree distribution with a given exponent and a given
meanbysettingα = 1andchoosingFtobeapowerlawwiththedesiredexponent.
One can then tune the parameters β and γ to obtain the desired values for the
clustering and the expected degree. This we explore in the next section.
5.4 Example: Power law weight distributions
Whenα = 1,theasymptoticclusteringofarandomcommunitymodelwithweight
distribution F is given by E[(1 + βγWk)−1]. In general, it is not possible to give an
explicit expression for this expectation, but for the important case that the weight
distributionFisapowerlaw,itispossibletoexpresstheclusteringintermsofsome










When λ > 2, random variables with this distribution have mean 1, as desired. The






(1 + βγx)−1x−λ dx.































where 2F1 is the hypergeometric function, a function whose properties are well
characterized (Abramowitz and Stegun, 1964, Ch. 15). For βγ ≥ (λ − 1)/(λ − 2), a5 R      164
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Figure 5.5. (a) The clustering as a function of λ for diﬀerent values of βγ:
βγ = 1 (—), βγ = 5 (−−−), βγ = 10 (−·−). (b) The clustering as a function
of βγ for diﬀerent values of λ: λ = 2.1 (—), λ = 2.5 (− − −), λ = 4 (− · −).
































where Φ is the Lerch transcedent (Gradshteyn and Ryzhik, 2000). Furthermore,




















     .
Since 2F1(a,b;c;·) is increasing in its last argument for all a,b,c ∈ R, the clustering
falls monotonically in βγ. Also, the clustering decreases when λ increases, since
more mass is then put on large values of x where the function (1+ βγx)−1 is small.
This is illustrated in Figures 5.5(a) and (b), respectively. Hence, for any c ∈ (0,1)
and a given tail exponent τ := λ − 1, we can ﬁnd a value of βγ such that the
clustering is equal to c. We can combine this with a condition on βγ2 to ﬁx the
average degree of the random community network. Together, this determines the
parameters β and γ.5.5 C 165
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have proposed a random network model that is especially
suitable to describe social and economic networks with a group structure such
as R&D networks. In our model, the random community model, agents are orga-
nized in groups. The group structure determines the network structure: agents are
connected in the network if and only if they share at least one group. The group
structure is in turn determined by a random process: agents are assigned weights
atrandomaccordingtosomedistribution,andagentswithlargerweightsaremore
likely to belong to a large number of groups. These weights can be interpreted as
the “network investments” of agents. In the context of R&D networks, the groups
would be the diﬀerent research alliances, and the weights of ﬁrms could be their
investments to become an attractive R&D partner.
Wehavecharacterizedthedegreedistributionandtheclusteringofthemodel
for diﬀerent values of the parameters and for any weight distribution when the
weights have ﬁnite mean. Moreover, we have shown that by choosing the pa-
rameters and the weight distribution appropriately, we can obtain a network in
which both the degree distribution and the clustering can be controlled. We have
illustrated this for the important example of a power law degree distribution.
There are a number of possible directions for future research. These directions
can be classiﬁed into two broad categories. The ﬁrst class concerns a further char-
acterization of the current model. A ﬁrst step would be to generalize the model
to allow for a random number of agents. This should be a straightforward exten-
sion using the results of Bollob´ as et al. (2007, Sec. 8.1) for a related model. Such a
generalization could be interesting for game-theoretic purposes, as the previous
chapter has shown that allowing for uncertainty over the number of players in
network games with incomplete information on the network structure can aﬀect
predictions.
Aseconddirectionforfurtherresearchwouldbetocharacterizethecorrelation
in the degrees of neighboring agents. Apart from the degree distribution and the
clustering, an important feature of many real networks is that there is signiﬁcant
correlation in the degrees of neighboring nodes. That is, either vertices with a
high (low) degree tend to be connected to other vertices with high (low) degree
(positive correlation), or vertices with a high (low) degree tend to be connected to
vertices with a low (high) degree (negative correlation). As the previous chapter
has pointed out, such correlations can be important for game-theoretic predictions
in network games when players have incomplete information on the network5 R      166
structure (also see Galeotti et al., 2006). A next step is therefore to quantify the
correlations in the current model. We conjecture that the group structure will
inducepositivecorrelationsinthedegreesofvertices:agentswhobelongtoalarge
group will have many connections, as will the agents with whom they share this
group. Hence, as long as agents do not belong to too many groups, the correlation
in the degrees of neighbors will be positive. This would agree well with empirical
observations on social networks (Newman, 2003a). The correlation in degrees has
been studied heuristically by Newman and Park (2003) for a similar model, but
no exact results have been obtained. It may be hoped that the tractable form of the
current model makes it possible to obtain precise results.
Also other features of the model are worth investigating. For instance, many
real networks are “small worlds”, meaning roughly that the distances between
vertices remain small even in very large networks. It would be interesting to study
the relation between the distances among vertices, the degree distribution and the
clustering in the current model. The relation is not directly obvious. On the one
hand, when the clustering is high, there are many “redundant” edges, connecting
agents that are also indirectly connected through a common neighbor. This would
meanthattheaveragedistancebetweenagentsinhighlyclusterednetworkswould
be larger than in networks with lower clustering with the same edge density. On
theotherhand,whentheclusteringislarge,agentstendtobeorganizedingroups,
and once a path reaches a group, all members of the group are only one step away.
This acts to reduce the distances in clustered networks, as it does in the original
small-world model of Watts and Strogatz (1998) (see Newman and Park, 2003, for
a related argument in the context of epidemics on group-structured networks).
Thesecondclassofdirectionsforfurtherresearchconcernsgame-theoreticap-
plications and extensions. Firstly, one could endogenize the weights, with agents
choosing their weights strategically. The distribution over agents’ weights, which
we have taken to be exogenous, would then be the outcome of strategic interac-
tions. This direction is pursued by Cabrales et al. (2007) in the context of a related
random network model. While in their model, players choose their networking
eﬀorts strategically to form bilateral links with other players, in the current set-
ting, players would choose their networking eﬀorts to join groups. This is natural
in many contexts. For instance, in the context of R&D collaborations, ﬁrms can
choose to invest in general purpose R&D to become an attractive R&D partner.
Secondly, an important question is how the group structure of networks af-
fects the behavior of players located on these networks. So far, the literature on
network games in which players have incomplete information about the network5.5 C 167
structure has focused on settings in which players only know their degree. How-
ever, there are settings where it does not only matter how many connections one
has, but also what kind of connections. The sociological literature, for instance,
distinguishes bridging and bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000). Bonding social
capital (Coleman, 1988) refers to the value assigned to social networks between
homogeneous groups, while bridging social capital (Burt, 1992) refers to that of
social networks between heterogeneous groups. In the context of our model, one
question one could ask is how group structures aﬀect the functioning of risk shar-
ing networks. In risk sharing networks the degree of individuals—the number of
people with whom they share risk—is obviously an important characteristic, but
it is not the only one. If a player has a high degree, it could be that he belongs
to a large number of small groups, or that he belongs to a small number of large
groups. If income shocks are correlated within groups but not across groups, his
bridging social capital will be high in the former case. However, when players
belong to a limited number of groups, clustering will be high. High clustering
is often associated with low monitoring costs, as information about a player’s
deviant behavior can spread quickly among those with whom he interacts (e.g.
Bloch et al., 2005). Hence, in the latter case, bonding social capital will be high. In
our model, we can keep the average degree ﬁxed and vary the clustering.
Another example of a setting in which group structure or clustering can
have an important eﬀect is that of information aggregation and coordination. For
instance, DeMarzo et al. (2003) argue that persuasion bias, i.e., the phenomenon
that individuals fail to adjust properly for repetitions in the information they
obtain, is especially strong in clustered networks.6 Similarly, Calv´ o-Armengol and
De Mart´ ı (2007b) show that in team decision problems where players want to
match their action to the state of the world as well as to other players’ actions,
increasing the clustering in a network (by increasing the number of edges) will
increase the accuracy of agents’ estimate of the state of the world and improve
coordination among agents.
In the models of DeMarzo et al. (2003) and Calv´ o-Armengol and De Mart´ ı
(2007b)(alsoseeCalv´ o-ArmengolandDeMart´ ı,2007a),playersdonotformbeliefs
about their network. From social psychology it is well known that individuals be-
lieve that their networks are highly clustered (e.g. Crockett, 1982; Krackhardt and
Kilduﬀ, 1999). Therefore, it would be of interest to study how players’ beliefs on
6 Suppose two individuals discuss a certain topic after they have discussed it both with a common
friend. Then, if they do not account for the fact that their discussion partner’s opinion is partly
basedonsomeofthesame(thirdparty)informationastheirownopinion,theywilldouble-count
the third party’s opinion.5 R      168
the clustering of their networks aﬀect strategic interactions in games with incom-
plete information on the network structure. For instance, in the setting considered
by DeMarzo et al. (2003), one could study how agents’ beliefs on the clustering in
their network would aﬀect their opinions. In the model of DeMarzo et al., agents
act as if there is no clustering in the network. If they would believe that there is
some clustering in the network, they could partly correct for their persuasion bias.
This would oﬀer a middle ground between the boundedly rational models of in-
formation spreading and opinion formation studied by DeMarzo et al. (2003) (also
see Golub and Jackson, 2007) and highly rational social learning models (e.g. Gale
and Kariv, 2003). The random community model we propose provides a suitable
starting point, as one can vary the clustering continuously.
5.A Compound Poisson distributions with power law tails
We show that if a random variable W has a distribution function with power
law tails with some exponent τ > 1, then the distribution function of a sum of
a Poisson(W)-distributed number of Poisson(a) random variables, a ∈ (0,∞), has
power law tails with the same exponent.
Firstweneedsomemoredeﬁnitions.ArandomvariableX hasamixedPoisson
distribution with mixing distribution Q if













Let W be a random variable whose cumulative distribution function F has
power law tails with exponent τ > 0, i.e., (1 − F(k)) ∼ k−τ. Consider a sequence
X1,X2,... of i.i.d. random variables with a Poisson(a) distribution, where a ∈ R,
and let N be a random variable with a Poisson(W) distribution. Deﬁne the random






We use the following result:
Proposition 5.A.1. Let X be a random variable that has a mixed Poisson distribution
with mixing distribution Q. If Q has density function q such that
q(x) ∼ x−λ
for some λ > 1, then
P(X = k) ∼ k−λ.
Proof. Let k be such that k − λ > 0, and for ease of notation, deﬁne

































To deal with the ﬁrst integral in (5.10), recall the deﬁnition (5.9) of the Gamma
functione Γ and Stirling’s formula, which states thate Γ(r) ∼ rr−1/2e−r. This yields
Z ∞
0
xk−λe−x dx = e Γ(k − λ + 1)
∼ (k − λ + 1)k−λ+1/2e−(k−λ+1).5 R      170
Also note that, sincee Γ(k + 1) = k! for k ∈ N, it follows from Stirling’s formula that
k! ∼ (k + 1)k+1/2e−(k+1). Substituting these estimates in (5.10) gives
fk ∼
(k − λ + 1)k−λ+1/2e−(k−λ+1) − ξk−λ
Q
(k + 1)k+1/2e−(k+1) ∼ k−λ. 
Remark 5.A.2. Proposition 5.A.1 is formulated for the case that the random vari-
able with distribution function Q is continuous, but the proof is completely anal-
ogous for the discrete case. /
ToobtaintheresultthatthedistributionfunctionofYhaspowerlawtailswith
the same exponent τ as W, ﬁrst recall that a sum of independent Poisson variables
is Poisson distributed, so that Y is distributed as a Poisson(Na) random variable.
Then,applyProposition5.A.1toconcludethat,sinceW hasadistributionfunction
with power law tails with exponent τ, the random variable N (which has a mixed
PoissondistributionwithmixingdistributionF)hasadistributionwithpowerlaw
tails with the same exponent. We can then apply Proposition 5.A.1 once more to
obtain that Y, which is a Poisson(Na) random variable, has a distribution function
with power law tails and exponent τ.
5.B Proofs
5.B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.3.1


















Then, conditional on W1,
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This implies that B
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5.B.2 Proof of Lemma 5.3.3
(a): The probability that three distinct agents i, j and k in V(n) do not share a group
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Using the deﬁnitions of m and P
(n)






























     .
(b): First note that the probability that there is exactly one group in the random





























Given that i and j share one group, the probability that i and k share exactly one





























Finally, the conditional probability that there is a third group to which both j and

























Combining these estimates, and noting that scenarios in which i and j or i and k



































































     .
(c): The proof is analogous to the proof of part (b).




ik,jk occurs when there is at least one group that is shared
by all three agents i, j and k and another group shared by either i and k or j and
k. Denote by r the probability that agent k and at least one of the agents i and j













































Conditional on the event that there is exactly one group to which i, j and k belong,
the probability that there is at least one other group that is shared by either i and k
or by j and k is































     . Part II
Learning in Games6 Learning with a recency bias
Summary
Often, individuals are unwilling to deviate from recent choices. This
chapter, which is based on Kets and Voorneveld (2005), proposes a learn-
ing process in which players display precisely such a recency bias. It is
shown that these behaviorally plausible models of adaptive play even-
tually settle down in so-called minimal prep sets, a set-valued solution
concept for strategic games proposed by Voorneveld (2004). The current
chapter thus provides a dynamic motivation for such sets.
6.1 Introduction
The behavioral economics literature provides several motivations for the common
observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from their recent
choices. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1982, p.11) mention the bias to-
wards recent choices as an example of the availability bias, the ease with which
instances come to mind. Similarly, Schelling (1960) argues that players, when in-
diﬀerent between strategies, choose the most salient strategy. In combination with
the so-called recency eﬀect (Miller and Campbell, 1959), this may explain why
agents appear to have a preference for recent choices. The recency eﬀect refers to
the cognitive bias that results from disproportionate salience of recent stimuli or
observations. Other motivations include models for agents displaying defaulting
behavior or inertia (e.g. Vega-Redondo, 1993, 1995; Madrian, 2001), the formation
of habits (Young, 1998), the use of rules of thumb (Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993), or
the locking in on certain modes of behavior due to learning by doing (Grossman
et al., 1977) or, as Joosten et al. (1995) express it: unlearning by not doing.
This chapter provides a class of discrete-time adjustment processes for mixed
extensions of ﬁnite strategic games in which players display precisely such a bias
towards recent choices. Apart from this behavioral assumption, the assumptions
underlyingtheadaptiveprocessesinthischapterareinconformancewithmuchof
the literature onlearning (e.g.Hurkens, 1995;Fudenberg and Levine,1998; Young,
1998): players choose best replies to beliefs that are supported by observed play6.1 I 177
in the recent past. The purpose of this chapter is to show that these behaviorally
plausible models of adaptive play eventually settle down in so-called minimal
prep sets, thus providing a dynamic motivation for such sets.
Minimal prep sets (“prep” is short for “preparation”) were introduced and
studied in a static framework in Voorneveld (2004, 2005). This set-valued solution
concept for strategic games combines a standard rationality condition, stating that
the set of recommended strategies to each player must contain at least one best
reply to whatever belief he may have that is consistent with the recommendations
to the other players, with players’ aim at simplicity, which encourages them to
maintain a set of strategies that is as small as possible. The latter feature discerns
minimal prep sets from minimal curb sets Basu and Weibull (1991), which are
product sets of pure strategies containing not just some, but all best responses
against beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the remaining players, and
from persistent retracts (Kalai and Samet, 1984), which also require the recom-
mendations to each player to contain at least one best reply to beliefs in a small
neighborhood of the beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the other players.
The choice of the term “preparation” in connection with minimal prep sets is
motivated by the rationality requirement. Given an arbitrary belief of a player that
is consistent with the recommendations to the other players, his recommended
set of strategies leaves him well prepared: it contains an optimal response against
all such eventualities. On the other hand, one does not have to be exhaustive to
be prepared: the notion of prep sets avoids the potential avalanche eﬀect from the
requirement that all best replies against a given belief (and all best replies against
all these best replies, and so on. . . ) need to be included, as demanded by the curb
sets of Basu and Weibull (1991).
The game in Figure 6.1 provides a simple example to illustrate the diﬀerence
between pure Nash equilibria, minimal curb sets, and minimal prep sets. The
game has no pure Nash equilibria. Its only—hence minimal—curb set is the entire
pure strategy space {R1,R2,R3} × {C1,C2,C3}. There are two minimal prep sets,
{R1,R2}×{C1,C2} and {R2,R3}×{C2,C3}, roughly speaking the “Matching pennies”
subgames.
Voorneveld (2004, 2005) contains a general existence proof and a detailed
comparison of minimal prep sets with Nash equilibria, rationalizability, minimal
curbsets,andpersistentretracts.Chapter7providesanaxiomaticcharacterization
of minimal prep sets and minimal curb sets. Tercieux and Voorneveld (2005) show
that minimal prep sets provide sharp predictions in many economic applications,6 L     178
C1 C2 C3
R1 1,−1 −1,1 −100,−100
R2 −1,1 1,−1 −1,1
R3 −100,−100 −1,1 1,−1
Figure 6.1. A 3 × 3 game
including potential games, congestion games, and supermodular games, even
in cases where minimal curb sets have no cutting power whatsoever and simply
consistoftheentirestrategyspace.Thecurrentchaptercomplementsthisliterature
by providing a dynamic motivation for minimal prep sets.
For play to settle down in a speciﬁc set, like a minimal prep or minimal curb
set, players somehow need to learn to coordinate on actions from within this set.
Crawford and Haller (1990, p. 577) indicate that an important coordination device
is the fact that players “use asymmetric history to “label” actions that cannot be
distinguishedatthestart”.Modelingabehavioralbias,likeourbiastowardsrecent
best replies, does exactly that.
The work that is closest in spirit to our analysis is that of Hurkens (1995).
In both his work and in the current chapter, convergence to a set-valued solution
conceptisestablished,ﬁrstly,fordiscrete-timeadjustmentprocessescharacterized
by conditions on transition probabilities (zero or positive), secondly, for all ﬁnite
games (in contrastwith e.g. Young (1998), who restricts attention to weakly acyclic
games), and, thirdly, for all memory lengths exceeding a certain lower bound.
There are, however, important diﬀerences. The behavioral bias towards recent
choices that players use to distinguish between best replies is absent in the model
of Hurkens (1995): there, players indiscriminately choose best replies to their
beliefs. As a consequence, players in our model need to keep track of whether one
best reply was chosen more recently than another. However, this does not mean
that a player needs to have perfect memory of his own past action choices. This is
particularly clear if a player has only two actions: if both happen to be a best reply
to his current belief, the action he chose in the previous round is the most recent
one and therefore all he needs to recall. We return to this issue in more detail in
Remarks 6.3.1 and 6.5.4.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Deﬁnitions are recalled in Section 6.2.
The evolution of play is discussed in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 contains the conver-
gence theorem and explains the steps towards the proof. Section 6.5 discusses a
more general class of adjustment processes for which play also settles down in6.2 P 179
minimal prep sets, thus providing some insight in what assumptions are essential
to obtaining the convergence result. Section 6.6 contains concluding remarks. All
proofs are contained in the appendices.
6.2 Preliminaries
Recall the deﬁnition of a (ﬁnite strategic) game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni (Sec-
tion 2.1.1), where N is a ﬁnite, nonempty set of players, and each player i ∈ N
is endowed with a ﬁnite, nonempty set Ai of actions and a (von Neumann Morgen-
stern) utility function on the set of pure strategy proﬁles A = ×j∈NAj. Throughout
this chapter, we label the players N = {1,...,n}. For i ∈ N, let Xi be a nonempty
subset of Ai. The set of mixed strategies of player i ∈ N with support in Xi is
denoted by ∆(Xi). Payoﬀs are extended to mixed strategies in the usual way. Let
i ∈ N and let α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Aj) be a belief of player i. The set
BRi(α−i) = {ai ∈ Ai | ∀bi ∈ Ai : ui(ai,α−i) ≥ ui(bi,α−i)}.
is the set of pure best replies of player i against α−i.
Deﬁnition 6.2.1. A prep set of a game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ is a nonempty
product set Q = ×i∈NQi ⊆ A such that for each i ∈ N and each belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Qj)
of player i, the set Qi contains at least one best response of player i against his belief:
∀i ∈ N,∀α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Qj) : BRi(α−i) ∩ Qi , ∅.
A prep set Q is minimal if no prep set is a proper subset of Q.
In the adaptive processes we study, a game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni is played
once every period in discrete time. A history (of play) is a sequence h = (a1,...,aL) ∈
AL of some arbitrary length L ∈ N, whose leftmost element
`(h) := a1 ∈ A
is interpreted as the action proﬁle chosen in the previous period according to
history h, with `i(h) := a1
i ∈ Ai the action played by i ∈ N. Generally, the k-th
element from the left is the action proﬁle ak ∈ A chosen k = 1,...,L periods ago.
A successor of history h = (a1,...,aL) is a history obtained after one more
period of play, i.e., a history h0 = (b1,b2,...,bL+1) obtained from h by appending a
new leftmost element: b1 ∈ A and bk = ak−1 for all k = 2,...,L + 1.6 L     180
Fix a history h = (a1,...,aL) and a player i ∈ N. The set of actions chosen by i




The order oi,h of player i’s actions in history h is deﬁned as follows: his most
recent action, i.e., the ﬁrst encountered action is oi,h(1) := a1
i and, inductively, for
k = 2,...,|{a1
i ,...,aL
i }|, the k-th encountered action is oi,h(k) := am
i with
m = min{q ∈ {1,...,L} | a
q
i < {oi,h(1),...,oi,h(k − 1)}}.
Example 6.2.2. Consider a two-player game with N = {1,2} and action spaces
A1 = {T,B},A2 = {L,R}. Consider the history
h = ((T,R),(B,R),(B,L))
of length three. Then `(h) = (T,R). The set of actions player 1 chose during the
most recent two periods is λ1(h,2) = {T,B}, whereas λ2(h,2) = {R}. As to orders,
player 1’s action T is encountered ﬁrst, then B, so o1,h(1) = T,o1,h(2) = B. Similarly,
o2,h(1) = R,o2,h(2) = L. /
6.3 Adaptive play
This section presents a class of Markov chains to model adaptive play with a bias
towards choices from the recent past. A game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni is played
once every period in discrete time. In line with much of the literature on learning
models (e.g. Hurkens, 1995; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Young, 1998), players
choose, at each moment in time, best replies to beliefs supported by a limited
horizon of observed past play of ﬁxed length T ∈ N.2 Consequently, the state space
H is deﬁned to consist of all histories h = (a1,...,aL) with length at least T, i.e.,
h ∈ ∪K∈N,K≥T AK.
HavingdeﬁnedthesetH ofstates,weproceedtotransitionprobabilityfunctions
P : H × H → [0,1], where P(h,h0) is the probability of moving from state h ∈ H to
state h0 ∈ H in one period and
P
h0∈H P(h,h0) = 1 for all h ∈ H. To do so, beliefs and
responses to them need to be modeled.
1 Hence our choice of the alliterative λ (lambda).
2 Our adjustment processes are deﬁned for a ﬁxed game G and memory length T; to simplify
notation, indices G and T are suppressed.6.3 A  181
Beliefs: Players’ beliefs are based on observed play in the past T ∈ N periods.
Formally, for each state h ∈ H, if the sequence of action proﬁles played in the past
T periods is (a1,...,aT) ∈ AT, then player i’s beliefs are drawn from a probability




j }) = ×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h,T))
with support in the product set of actions chosen in the previous T periods. For
the convergence result, the exact probabilities are irrelevant: what matters is that
some are positive, others zero. We therefore refrain from restricting attention to
speciﬁc belief formation processes or updating procedures. As long as beliefs are
suﬃciently diverse—see Remark 6.3.2 or the related discussion in Hurkens (1995,
pp. 310–311)—it is immaterial how they are formed.
Responses: Given a belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h,T)), it is assumed that player i
chooses the most recent best reply to α−i if such a best reply exists, that is, if in
state h some best reply to α−i has been played before. Otherwise, player i chooses
each best reply to α−i with positive probability, i.e., it is drawn from a probability
measure Pα−i over Ai whose support coincides with the set of best replies BRi(α−i).
Players thus have a bias towards recent choices.3
Together, the probability distributions P(i,(a1,...,aT)) that ﬁx for each player i ∈
N and account of recent play (a1,...,aT) ∈ AT the way beliefs are drawn, and
the assumption that players are biased towards recent choices, determine the
transition probabilities P(h,h0) ∈ [0,1] for each pair of states (h,h0) ∈ H × H. If
P(h,h0) > 0, then histories h,h0 ∈ H satisfy the following two conditions:
P1: h0 is a successor of h := (a1,...,aL);
P2: For each i ∈ N,`i(h0) is a best reply to some belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h,T)). It is
the most recent best reply, if such a best reply exists. Formally:
• `i(h0) ∈ BRi(α−i);
• if BRi(α−i) ∩ {a1
1,...,aL
i } , ∅, then `i(h0) = ak
i, where
k = min{m ∈ {1,...,L} | BRi(α−i) ∩ {a1
i ,...,am
i } , ∅}.




i.e., α−i 7→ Pα−i(ai) is assumed to be Borel measurable.6 L     182
Condition P1 is standard for discrete-time processes, stating that between
time periods the game is played once: the process moves from a history h to one of
its successors h0. Condition P2 requires that for each i ∈ N, `i(h0) is a best reply to
some belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h,T)), and that it is the most recent best reply, if such
a best reply exists. This condition thus states, ﬁrstly, that the process P is a best-
reply process: the action `i(h0) ∈ Ai chosen by each player i ∈ N is a best reply to
some belief α−i about the remaining players’ behavior based on recent experience,
i.e., with support in ×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h,T)). Secondly, it models the bias towards recent
choices: whenever possible, each player i ∈ N chooses the most recent best reply
to belief α−i.
Let P be the class of transition probability functions P achieved in this way,
i.e., from probability distributions {P(i,(a1,...,aT)) : i ∈ N,(a1,...,aT) ∈ AT} and the
behavioralbias,andwithP(h,h0) > 0ifandonlyifstatesh,h0 ∈ Hsatisfyconditions
P1 and P2.
Remark 6.3.1. The behavioral bias towards recent choices modeled in P2 requires
that a player with multiple best replies against his current belief recalls whether
oneofthemwasplayedmorerecentlythananother.However,thisdoesnotrequire
players to have perfect memory about their own actions: if you played one best
reply yesterday and another a week ago, your choice is independent of whether
you also adopted these actions further away in the past. All that matters is that
each player i ∈ N in history h ∈ H recalls the order oi,h deﬁned in Section 6.2. This
is a considerably more modest requirement than remembering the entire history
of own actions: oi,h speciﬁes a simple linear order of at most |Ai| actions. Between
consecutive rounds of play, this linear order either remains the same or changes
in the following way: the action ranked ﬁrst (the most recent action) is changed
and the other actions are moved one step down the ladder. For instance, even after
numerous rounds of play, the only thing a player with just two actions needs to
recall from his own past is last period’s action. /
Remark 6.3.2. Inherent in the deﬁnition of the class P of transition probability
functions is that beliefs must be “suﬃciently diverse” to assure that player i ∈ N
has a positive probability of selecting ai ∈ Ai whenever it is a (most recent) best
reply to some belief over recent past play. More speciﬁcally, by P2, player i is
tempted to play ai against beliefs α−i over recent past play to which it is the most
recent best reply or—if no such most recent best reply exists—to which it is an
arbitrary best reply. If the set of such “tempting” beliefs is nonempty, player i
assigns positive probability to it. /6.4 C      183
Foreachk ∈ N,letPk : H×H → [0,1]denotethek-steptransitionprobabilities
of our Markov process with transition probability function P ∈ P: P1 = P and
Pk = P ◦ Pk−1 for all k > 1.
6.4 Convergence and steps towards the proof
This section presents the main result of this chapter. Theorem 6.4.1 states, for
each game G and adjustment process in the class P, that if beliefs are based on
recent experience of suﬃcient length T, then play will eventually settle down in a
minimal prep set. The steps of the proof are brieﬂy explained in this section; the
proof itself is contained in Appendix 6.A. Proposition 8.5.1 in Chapter 8 presents
a short proof of our convergence result for the special case of minority games and
may therefore provide the reader with helpful intuition for the general case.
Given a game G and an adjustment process P ∈ P, the process is said to
eventually settle down in a minimal prep set of G if the probability that the process
after k steps is in a state h ∈ H where
• the most recently played action proﬁle `(h) lies in some minimal prep set Q
of G:
`(h) ∈ Q
• all future action proﬁles remain inside Q:
`(h0) ∈ Q whenever Pm(h,h0) > 0 for some m ∈ N,h0 ∈ H,
converges to one as k goes to inﬁnity.
Theorem 6.4.1. Let G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni be a game. Let the horizon T ∈ N of recent












If P ∈ P, then play eventually settles down in a minimal prep set of G.
Remark 6.4.2. If the game has several minimal prep sets, the one selected by the
learning process typically depends on initial conditions. For instance, if the initial
state is such that the collection of most recent actions is a minimal prep set Q, the
process settles down in Q. /6 L     184
Remark 6.4.3. Condition P2 assures that play will not settle down in proper sub-
sets of a minimal prep set. To see this, suppose play settles down in a product set
Y properly contained in a minimal prep set Q. Since Y is not a prep set, there is a
player i with a belief over recent past play against which Yi contains no best reply.
Condition P2 assures that player i with positive probability chooses such a best
reply, i.e., an action outside Yi, contradicting the assumption that play has settled
downinY.AsimilarintuitionisusedintheproofoftheTheoreminAppendix6.A
(Lemma 6.A.1). /
Remark 6.4.4. The statement of Theorem 6.4.1 follows the traditional pattern (cf.
Hurkens, 1995; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Young, 1998): if memory is ‘suﬃ-
ciently long’, play settles down in sets of a certain type. Thus, we have indicated a
suﬃcient length in (6.1), without aiming at sharpness. When one exploits speciﬁc
features of a game, the bound can sometimes be relaxed. The analysis in Section
8.5 provides an instance of this. /
Steps towards the proof: The proof of Theorem 6.4.1 proceeds in four steps:
Step 1: Let h0 ∈ H. The process moves with positive probability in T − 1 steps to a
state h1 ∈ H where the product set ×i∈Nλi(h1,T) ⊆ A of actions played in the past T
periods is a prep set.
The intuition behind this step is the following. If, for some state g ∈ H and
some k ≤ T, the product set ×i∈Nλi(g,k) is a prep set, then with positive probability,
players choose actions from this prep set for T −k periods in a row. If on the other
hand, ×i∈Nλi(g,k) is not a prep set, then there is a nonempty set of players i ∈ N
withabeliefα∗
−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(λj(g,k))overplayinthepastk periodstowhichλi(g,k)
does not contain a best reply. In that case, one can construct a sequence of states
g1, g2,... ∈ H with g1 = g, P(gk, gk+1) > 0 for all k = 1,2,..., such that the sequence
of product sets ×i∈Nλi(gk,k) is strictly increasing with respect to set inclusion (see
Lemma 6.A.1 in Appendix 6.A). All these sets are contained in the ﬁnite set A of
action proﬁles which is a prep set. Since there are only ﬁnitely many actions, the
sequence reaches, after a ﬁnite number of steps, a state gK ∈ H where ×i∈Nλi(gK,K)
is a prep set. From that state onwards, players choose with positive probability
actions from the prep set for T − K periods in a row.
Step2:Fromstateh1,theprocessmoveswithpositiveprobabilityinaﬁnitenumber
of steps to a state h2 ∈ H where Q := ×i∈Nλi(h2,T) is a minimal prep set.
Indeed, let Q = ×i∈NQi ⊆ ×i∈Nλi(h1,T) be a minimal prep set. The proof of this
step relies on the fact that one can—under some conditions—perform so-called6.5 A     185
neighbor switches: from a state h ∈ H, the process moves with positive probability
in T steps to a state h0 ∈ H whose horizon of recent past play is identical to the
one in h, except that two neighboring actions of some player have changed places
(see Lemma 6.A.6). As all permutations of a ﬁnite set can be obtained by a chain of
such neighbor switches, the process moves with positive probability from state h1
to a state h0 where, for each player i ∈ N, λi(h0,|Qi|) = Qi, i.e., the |Qi| most recent
actions of each player i are exactly those in his component of the minimal prep
set Q. Then it is easy to show that the process moves with positive probability to
a state h2 within a ﬁnite number of steps such that ×i∈Nλi(h2,T) = Q is a minimal
prep set.
Step 3: After reaching state h2, all action proﬁles that are played with positive
probability lie in Q, i.e.,
∀k ∈ N,∀h ∈ H : Pk(h2,h) > 0 ⇒ `(h) ∈ Q.
In state h2, the product set ×i∈Nλi(h2,T) = Q is a minimal prep set, which
by deﬁnition contains at least one best reply to whatever belief a player may
have about other players’ choices from Q. Hence, by induction, the actions from
minimal prep set Q will always be fresher in players’ recollection of past play than
actions outside Q, so that to any belief that a player i may have about opponents’
play, there is an action in Qi that is the most recent best reply. Hence, from state h2
onwards, each player i ∈ N only chooses actions from Qi.
Step 4: Starting from an arbitrary history h0, Step 1 and 2 show that there is a
positive probability of proceeding to a history h2 in a ﬁnite number of steps, after
which play settles down in a minimal prep set, i.e., a positive probability of pro-
ceeding to an absorbing set of states in ﬁnitely many steps. Since the initial history
was chosen arbitrarily, this eventually happens with probability one, ﬁnishing the
proof.
6.5 Allowing for other behavioral biases
This section describes a more general class of adjustment processes, permitting
other behavioral biases, for which play still converges to a minimal prep set of
the game. Example 6.5.2 provides an explicit scenario where players no longer
strictly focus on the most recent best replies, but choose more freely among their
best replies. In addition to enlarging the class of processes that settle down in a6 L     186
minimal prep set, this section also gives some insight into which assumptions on
learning processes are essential to obtain convergence to minimal prep sets.
To show that processes from P eventually settle down in minimal prep sets,
the proof of Steps 1 and 2 of Theorem 6.4.1 (see Appendix 6.A) uses that certain
transition probabilities are positive to show that the process can move from any
initial state h0 ∈ H in a ﬁnite number of steps to a state h2 ∈ H where ×i∈Nλi(h2,T)
is a minimal prep set. The proof of Step 3 uses that certain transition probabilities
are zero to show that each player—once such a state h2 is reached—continues to
play action proﬁles from the minimal prep set. These conditions on the transition
probabilities are motivated by assuming that players, whenever possible, choose
the most recent best reply to a certain belief. However, any class of adjustment
processes that respects these conditions on the sign of the transition probabilities
will converge to minimal prep sets. Hence, one can easily extend the class of
adjustment processes with this limit behavior.
In particular, suppose that for each player i ∈ N, the response to a belief
drawn from recent past play in state h ∈ H is chosen according to a probability
distribution (mixed strategy) Ri,h ∈ ∆(Ai) depending on (i) the account (a1,...,aT)
of recent past play, and (ii) the order in which the players’ used actions appear in
h. That is, for each pair of states h = (a1,...,aL), g = (b1,...,bK) ∈ H:
(a1,...,aT) = (b1,...,bT)
oi,h = oi,g for all i ∈ N
)
⇒ Ri,h = Ri,g for all i ∈ N. (6.2)
The collection of functions R = (Ri,h)i∈N,h∈H determines, for each pair of states
h,h0 ∈ H, the transition probability PR(h,h0) ∈ [0,1]. If PR(h,h0) > 0, then h0 is a





istheprobabilityoftheplayerschoosingactionproﬁle`(h0).Let f P bethecollection
of transition probability functions {PR : H×H → [0,1] | R = (Ri,h)i∈N,h∈H} satisfying
the restrictions on the sign of the transition probabilities instrumental to the proof
of Theorem 6.4.1, i.e., for each pair of histories h,h0 ∈ H:
(α) If P1 and P2 hold, then PR(h,h0) > 0.
(β) If the product set of actions played during the most recent k ≥ T rounds
of h is a minimal prep set, play settles down within this set. Formally, if
Q := ×i∈Nλi(h,k) is a minimal prep set for some k ≥ T and PR(h,h0) > 0, then
×i∈Nλi(h0,k + 1) = Q, i.e., `(h0) ∈ Q.6.5 A     187
Let us start by verifying that P ⊆ f P.
Remark 6.5.1. Let P ∈ P. The probability Ri,h(ai) that player i ∈ N in state h =
(a1,...,aL) ∈ H chooses action ai ∈ Ai equals the probability of drawing a belief α−i
from P(i,(a1,...,aT)) to which:
(i) ai is the most recent best reply, or, alternatively,
(ii) no best reply was played before, but response ai is drawn from Pα−i.
Hence, there are functions R = (Ri,h)i∈N,h∈H such that P = PR. Conditions (α) and (β)
follow trivially from P1 and P2 in the deﬁnition of P. Conclude that P ∈ f P. /
The set inclusion P ⊆ f P is strict: one easily ﬁnds processes in f P \ P by letting
players choose more freely among recent best replies.
Example 6.5.2. Let h = (a1,...,aL) ∈ H, i ∈ N, and let α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h,T)) be
a belief over recent past play. If BRi(α−i) ∩ {a1
i ,...,aL
i } , ∅, let Yi(h,α−i) ⊆ Ai be
the singleton set consisting of the most recent best reply to α−i; otherwise, let
Yi(h,α−i) = BRi(α−i) consist of all best replies. Take the union over all beliefs over
recent past play to obtain
Yi(h) = ∪α−i∈×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h,T))Yi(h,α−i).
For condition (α) to hold, Ri,h must assign positive probability to each action in
Yi(h). But player i can choose more freely among recent best replies, not just the
most recent ones. Let
Zi(h) = BRi(×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h,T))) ∩ λi(h,T)
be the set of all of i’s best replies to beliefs over ×j∈N\{i}λj(h,T) that he played
during the horizon of recent past play T. Fix a probability distribution Ri,h over Ai
with support Yi(h) ∪ Zi(h). For the purpose of illustration, take a simple uniform
distribution:
∀ai ∈ Ai : Ri,h(ai) =
(
1/|Yi(h) ∪ Zi(h)|, if ai ∈ Yi(h) ∪ Zi(h);
0, otherwise.
(6.3)
Alternatively, one could for instance assign higher probability to more recent best
replies in Yi(h) than to less recent best replies in Zi(h) \ Yi(h). With R = (Ri,h)i∈N,h∈H
as in (6.3), it follows easily that PR ∈ f P:
• condition (6.2) holds: if states h, g ∈ H satisfy the conditions in (6.2), then
Yi(h) = Yi(g) and Zi(h) = Zi(g);6 L     188
• condition(α)holds:eachplayeri ∈ Nassignspositiveprobabilitytoallactions
in Yi(h);
• condition (β) holds: if Q := ×i∈Nλi(h,k) is a minimal prep set for some k ≥ T,
then Yi(h) ⊆ Qi and Zi(h) ⊆ λi(h,T) ⊆ Qi for all i ∈ N. Hence, using (6.3),
`i(h0) ∈ Yi(h) ∪ Zi(h) ⊆ Qi for all i ∈ N, i.e., `(h0) ∈ Q.
Since the process also assigns positive probability to possible other recent best
replies over observed past play during the last T rounds, PR < P. /
By construction, if players’ memory is suﬃciently long, processes in f P even-
tually settle down in minimal prep sets. To summarize (the proof can be found in
Appendix 6.B):
Proposition 6.5.3. Let G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni be a game and let T ∈ N. Then P ⊂ f P.
Moreover, if PR ∈ f P and the horizon T ∈ N of recent past play is suﬃciently long, then
play eventually settles down in a minimal prep set of G.
Finally, we show why it is essential for convergence to minimal prep sets that
players keep track of the order oi,h deﬁned in Section 6.2, rather than just the order
of their actions over the past T rounds of play.
Remark 6.5.4. If players remember from their own past only their actions in the
previousTperiods,theresultingprocessesneednotconvergetominimalprepsets:
none of the players i ∈ N can condition his behavior on the order oi,h of actions
chosen more than T periods ago at state h. To see why this prevents convergence
to minimal prep sets, refer back to Figure 6.1. Suppose that over the past T rounds,
players have chosen the actions from minimal prep set X = {R1,R2} × {C1,C2}.
Why would play not settle down in this product set of actions? Suppose players
play (R1,C2) at a given round, which are best replies to beliefs over X. In response
to these actions, there is a positive probability that they choose (R2,C2) for T
consecutive periods. At that point, player 2’s only feasible belief over past play is
that player 1 chooses R2. Player 2 recalls only his past T actions, i.e., just C2 which
is not a best reply to R2. Therefore, he chooses among the best replies {C1,C3} to
R2, which means that he may “jump” outside the minimal prep set X by selecting
C3. /6.6 C 189
6.6 Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to study discrete-time best-response processes
with a behaviorally plausible bias towards recent actions. Such processes were
showntosettledowninminimalprepsets.Thisdynamicmotivationcomplements
other work on minimal prep sets in a static environment, where the concept
is compared with many other solution concepts (Voorneveld, 2004, 2005, and
Chapter7ofthisthesis)andshowntohavegenuine“bite”ineconomicapplications
(Tercieux and Voorneveld, 2005), even in cases where, for instance, the minimal
curb sets of Basu and Weibull (1991) have no cutting power whatsoever.
Several modiﬁcations of these processes were discussed in the previous sec-
tion. It is impossible to do justice to the long list of choice biases discussed in the
behavioraleconomicsliterature.Aninterestingdirectionforfutureresearchwould
be to study which assumptions underlying diﬀerent learning processes determine
which solution concept these processes converge to. A ﬁrst step in this direction
is taken in Section 6.5.
6.A Proof of Theorem 6.4.1
Fix a game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni, length T ∈ N of recent past play with T ≥
max{
P
i∈N |Ai| − n + 1,2|A1|,...,2|An|}, and an adjustment process with transition
probability function P ∈ P. First, we need some additional notation. Fix an arbi-
trary history h = (a1,...,aL) ∈ H and player i ∈ N. The action player i chose in h a
number of t ∈ {1,...,T} periods ago is denoted by
ai(h,t) := at
i
and the action player i chose in h exactly T periods ago is denoted by
τi(h) := aT
i = ai(h,T).
Action ai ∈ λi(h,T) is blocked in h if there is no belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h,T)) against
which it is the most recent best reply. Finally, the frequency with which player i





   ai(h,t) = ai
o  .
We now prove the four steps of Theorem 6.4.1.6 L     190
6.A.1 Proof of Step 1
Step 1: Let h0 ∈ H. The process moves with positive probability in T − 1 steps to a
state h1 ∈ H where the product set ×i∈Nλi(h1,T) ⊆ A of actions played in the past T
periods is a prep set. The proof uses the following lemma.
Lemma 6.A.1. Consider state h = (a1,...,aL) ∈ H and a number t ∈ {1,...,T − 1}.
(a) Suppose that ×i∈Nλi(h,t) ⊆ A is not a prep set. Then the process moves with positive
probability to a successor h0 of h where
×i∈Nλi(h,t) ⊂ ×i∈Nλi(h0,t + 1). (6.4)
(b) Suppose that ×i∈Nλi(h,t) ⊆ A is a prep set. Then the process moves with positive
probability to a successor h0 of h where
×i∈Nλi(h,t) = ×i∈Nλi(h0,t + 1). (6.5)
Proof. (a): Since ×i∈Nλi(h,t) ⊆ A is not a prep set, there is a nonempty set S ⊆ N
of players such that each players i ∈ S has a belief α∗
−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(λj(h,t)) over
the play in the past t periods to which λi(h,t) does not contain a best reply:
BRi(α∗
−i) ∩ λi(h,t) = ∅. Fix such a belief α∗
−i for each i ∈ S and let bi ∈ BRi(α∗
−i)
be a best reply to α∗




i } , ∅. For each i ∈ N \ S, let bi ∈ λi(h,t) be the most recent
best reply to an arbitrary belief over play in the past t periods. Such a best reply
exists by deﬁnition of S. By P1 and P2, the process moves with positive probability
from state h to successor h0 = (b,a1,...,aL). Now (6.4) holds by construction: if
i ∈ N \ S, then bi ∈ λi(h,t), so λi(h,t) = λi(h0,t + 1), and if i ∈ S, then bi < λi(h,t), so
λi(h,t) ⊂ λi(h,t) ∪ {bi} = λi(h0,t + 1).
(b): Fix, for each i ∈ N, a belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(λj(h,t)) over the play in the past t
periods. Since ×i∈Nλi(h,t) is a prep set, there is an action bi ∈ λi(h,t) which is the
most recent best reply to this belief. By P1 and P2, the process moves with positive
probability from h to h0 = (b,a1,...,aL). Since bi ∈ λi(h,t) for all i ∈ N, it follows
that λi(h0,t + 1) = λi(h,t), so (6.5) holds. 
Applying Lemma 6.A.1 T−1 times, one can construct a sequence g1,..., gT in
H with g1 := h0 and for all k = 1,...,T − 1: P(gk, gk+1) > 0 and
×i∈Nλi(gk,k) ⊆ ×i∈Nλi(gk+1,k + 1),
with strict inclusion if ×i∈Nλi(gk,k) is not a prep set and equality otherwise. The
sequence of product sets ×i∈Nλi(gk,k) in A can increase strictly during at most6.A P  T 6.4.1 191
P
i∈N |Ai| − n steps: the action space A is a prep set containing
P
i∈N |Ai| actions;




a state gK+1 ∈ H where ×i∈Nλi(gK+1,K+1) is a prep set.4 In the ﬁnal T−K−1 steps,
we proceed to a state gT, where
×i∈Nλi(gT,T) = ×i∈Nλi(gT−1,T − 1) = ··· = ×i∈Nλi(gK+1,K + 1)
remains a prep set. Taking h1 := gT ﬁnishes the proof of Step 1.
6.A.2 States without blocked actions
In this section it is shown that the process moves with positive probability within
a ﬁnite number of steps from a state h ∈ H such that ×i∈Nλi(h,T) is a prep set
to a state h0 ∈ H where ×i∈Nλi(h0,T) ⊆ ×i∈Nλi(h,T) is a prep set without blocked
actions.ThisisestablishedinLemma6.A.3,whichusesLemma6.A.2.Furthermore,
in Lemma 6.A.4 it is shown that when considering a sequence g1,..., gK of states
such that, for all k = 1,...,K, ×i∈Nλi(gk,T) is a prep set and ×i∈Nλi(g1,T) ⊇ ··· ⊇
×i∈Nλi(gK,T), we can assume without loss of generality that none of the states
g1,..., gK contains a blocked action. This result is used in the lemmata of the
following subsections.
Lemma 6.A.2. Let h ∈ H be such that ×i∈Nλi(h,T) is a prep set. For each player i ∈ N,
deﬁne βi(h) ∈ λi(h,T) as follows:
• if τi(h) is blocked, let βi(h) ∈ λi(h,T) be an arbitrary non-blocked action;
• if τi(h) is not blocked, let βi(h) = τi(h).
Set h0 = (β(h);h), with β(h) = (βi(h))i∈N. Then,
(i) P(h,h0) > 0;
(ii) ×i∈Nλi(h0,T) ⊆ ×i∈Nλi(h,T);
(iii) ×i∈Nλi(h0,T) is a prep set.
Proof. For all i ∈ N, βi(h) ∈ λi(h,T) is not blocked by deﬁnition: there is a belief
α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h,T)) against which βi(h) is the most recent best reply. By P1 and
P2, (i) holds. Since βi(h) ∈ λi(h,T) for all i ∈ N, (ii) holds. To prove (iii), let i ∈ N and
α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h0,T)). To show: BRi(α−i)∩λi(h0,T) , ∅. By construction, λi(h0,T)
4 This motivates the term M :=
P
i∈N |Ai|−n+1 in the lower bound on T in (6.1): reaching a prep set
can take M−1 steps; recalling the added actions and those in g1 can consequently take a memory
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equals either λi(h,T) or, if τi(h) was blocked and chosen only once in the most
recent T periods of history h, λi(h,T) \ {τi(h)}. Consequently, λi(h0,T) still contains
a best reply to every belief over ×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h,T)), in particular to every belief over
the subset ×j∈N\{i}∆(λj(h0,T)). 
Claim (ii) means that in going from h to h0 = (β(h);h), the pool of feasible beliefs
is weakly decreased. This implies that if ai := τi(h) was blocked in h, but was
chosen more than once in the last T rounds of h, i.e., if ai ∈ λi(h0,T), then it remains
blocked:
(iv) if ai := τi(h) was blocked in h and ai ∈ λi(h0,T), then it is blocked in h0.
By deﬁnition, blocked actions are not chosen in going from h to h0. Thus, if an
action is blocked in h, it is either no longer contained in ×i∈Nλi(h0,T), in which case
claim (ii) holds with strict inclusion, or it remains blocked in h0 by (iv), but lies
further back in players’ memory. Hence, repeated application of Lemma 6.A.2 to
the sequence g1, g2,... in H with g1 = h and gk+1 = (β(gk); gk) for all k ∈ N, yields
thatablockedactiondisappearsfrommemoryinatmostT steps,inwhichcasethe
product set of recent actions has become strictly smaller in the weakly decreasing
sequence
×i∈Nλi(g1,T) ⊇ ×i∈Nλi(g2,T) ⊇ ···
By (iii), the product set remains a prep set. Since there are only ﬁnitely many prep
sets, it follows that we eventually reach a state gk without blocked actions. This
proves:
Lemma 6.A.3. Let h ∈ H be such that ×i∈Nλi(h,T) is a prep set. Either h contains no
blocked actions, or the process moves with positive probability in a ﬁnite number of steps to
a state h0 ∈ H where ×i∈Nλi(h0,T) ⊂ ×i∈Nλi(h,T) is a prep set and h0 contains no blocked
actions.
The proof of Step 2 uses so-called drag-to-front operations (Section 6.A.3) and
neighbor switches (Section 6.A.4) to establish the following: Given a state g1 ∈ H
where ×i∈Nλi(g1,T) is a prep set, the process moves with positive probability in a
ﬁnite number of steps through a sequence of states g1, g2,..., gK such that
∀k = 1,...,K : ×i∈Nλi(gk,T) is a prep set, (6.6)
×i∈Nλi(g1,T) ⊇ ×i∈Nλi(g2,T) ⊇ ··· ⊇ ×i∈Nλi(gK,T), (6.7)
and gK has the property that for some minimal prep set Q = ×i∈NQi and each i ∈ N:
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that is, for each player i ∈ N, the most recent |Qi| actions are exactly those in i’s
component of the minimal prep set Q. If any of the states gk contains a blocked
action, apply Lemma 6.A.3 to move to a state g0 where ×i∈Nλi(g0,T) ⊂ ×i∈Nλi(gk,T)
is a prep set and g0 contains no blocked actions. Then, we can start the repeated
use of drag-to-front operations and neighbor switches anew from g0. Since there
are only ﬁnitely many prep sets and the prep set ×i∈Nλi(g0,T) is strictly contained
in ×i∈Nλi(gk,T), we eventually reach in a ﬁnite number of steps a state from which
we can apply drag-to-front operations and neighbor switches without ever en-
countering a state with a blocked action. Hence:
Lemma 6.A.4. Inasequenceofstates(gk)k=1,...,K satisfying(6.6)and(6.7),obtainedusing
drag-to-front operations and neighbor switches, we may assume without loss of generality
that none of the states contains a blocked action.
6.A.3 Drag-to-front operations
Consider a state h ∈ H containing no blocked actions for which ×i∈Nλi(h,T) is a
prepset.Then,bydeﬁnition,foreachi ∈ N,βi(h) = τi(h),theactionplayerichoseT
periodsagoinstateh(seeLemma 6.A.2).Hence,inthesuccessor(β(h);h) = (τ(h);h),
this action is dragged to the front of player i’s account of recent past play. For easy
reference, call the transition from h to (β(h);h) = (τ(h);h) a drag-to-front operation.
Supposesomeplayer j ∈ N hasanactionaj ∈ λj(h,T)withfrequency fj(h,aj) =
1. Since T ≥ 2|Aj| by (6.1), there must be an action bj ∈ λj(h,T) with frequency
fj(h,bj) ≥ 3.5 By Lemma 6.A.4, and using drag-to-front-operations if necessary, we
can assume without loss of generality that player j chose bj exactly T periods ago:
τj(h) = bj. For each player i ∈ N, deﬁne γi(h) ∈ λi(h,T) as follows:
γi(h) =
(
τi(h) if i , j,
aj if i = j.
Set h0 = (γ(h);h) with γ(h) = (γi(h))i∈N. Recall: (i) γi(h) ∈ λi(h,T) for all i ∈ N, (ii)
×i∈Nλi(h,T) is a prep set, and (iii) no actions in h are blocked; so each γi(h) is the
most recent best reply to a belief α−i ∈ ×k∈N\{i}∆(λk(h,T)). By P1 and P2, P(h,h0) > 0.
By construction, ×i∈Nλi(h0,T) = ×i∈Nλi(h,T) remains a prep set. The frequency
of the actions of players i , j is unaﬀected: ∀i ∈ N \ {j},∀ci ∈ λi(h0,T) = λi(h,T) :
5 This motivates the term 2|Aj| in the lower bound on T. If the memory length is below this bound,
neighbor switches as deﬁned in Section 6.A.4 may cause actions from prep sets to disappear from
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fi(h0,ci) = fi(h,ci). For player j and cj ∈ λj(h0,T) = λj(h,T):
fj(h0,cj) =

   
   
fj(h,cj) if cj < {aj,bj},
fj(h,aj) + 1 = 2 if cj = aj,
fi(h,bj) − 1 ≥ 2 if cj = bj.
By going from h to h0, the number of actions with frequency one has strictly
decreased, whereas there is no action with frequency larger than or equal to two
whose frequency becomes less than two.
Repeating this process, we eventually reach a state where all actions in
the history of recent past play have frequency greater than or equal to two. By
Lemma 6.A.3, we may assume that none of its actions is blocked. This proves:
Lemma 6.A.5. Let h ∈ H be such that ×i∈Nλi(h,T) is a prep set. Then the process moves
with positive probability in a ﬁnite number of steps to a state h0 ∈ H with ×i∈Nλi(h0,T) ⊆
×i∈Nλi(h,T) such that
[C1] ×i∈Nλi(h0,T) is a prep set,
[C2] all actions have frequency at least 2: ∀i ∈ N,∀ai ∈ λi(h0,T) : fi(h0,ai) ≥ 2,
[C3] h0 contains no blocked actions.
6.A.4 Neighbor switches
Repeatedly applying drag-to-front operations starting in a state h ∈ H where no
actions are blocked and ×i∈Nλi(h,T) is a prep set, we get a sequence of states
g0, g1,··· ∈ H with g0 := h such that for all players i ∈ N and all t ∈ N: `i(gt) =
τi(gt−1), i.e., we get a periodic repetition of each player’s actions.
Instead, it is possible that some player i chooses his actions in such a way
that the process moves to a state in which the order in which player i plays
two neighboring actions—say those chosen t and t + 1 periods ago in state h—
is changed, while the others continue to play actions in their given order. For
instance, the process may move from Figure 6.2(a) to Figure 6.2(e), where player
i’s order of actions b and c, chosen 2 and 3 periods ago in Fig 6.2(a), respectively,
is reversed while the order of actions of players j , i is unchanged. In Figure 6.2,
the length of recent past play T is 4; actions chosen during the most recent four
periods are contained in the boxed part of the table; actions outside the boxes have
disappeared from recent past play. For instance, in Figure 6.2(c), player i chose c
ﬁve periods ago, d six periods ago. Since T = 4, these actions are no longer part of
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(a)
player i: a b c d
player j: α β γ δ
(b)
player i: d a b c d
player j: δ α β γ δ
(c)
player i: b d a b c d
player j: γ δ α β γ δ
(d)
player i: c b d a b c d
player j: β γ δ α β γ δ
(e)
player i: a c b d a b c d
player j: α β γ δ α β γ δ
Figure 6.2. Switch i’s actions b and c, keeping those of players j , i in the
same order.
The idea is simple:6 use drag-to-front operations until the actions to be
switched are those chosen T − 1 and T periods ago (the transition from Figure
6.2(a) to Figure 6.2(b)); in the next two periods, let players j , i continue with
drag-to-front operations, while player i chooses the actions that are to be switched
in reverse order (in going from Figure 6.2(b) to Figure 6.2(c), i chooses b instead of
c, in going from the Figure 6.2(c) to Figure 6.2(d), i chooses c instead of b). Finally,
use drag-to-front operations until the switched actions are again at coordinates t
and t+1 in the recent past play (the transition from Figure 6.2(d) to Figure 6.2(e)).
Formally:
Lemma 6.A.6. Let h ∈ H satisfy [C1]-[C3]. Let i ∈ N,t ∈ {1,...,T − 1}. Assuming
without loss of generality (Lemma 6.A.4) that we encounter no blocked actions, the process
moves with positive probability in T steps to a state h0 ∈ H satisfying [C1] - [C3] and in
which aj(h0,k) = aj(h,k) if j = i and k < {t,t+1}, or if j , i, whereas ai(h0,t) = ai(h,t+1)
and ai(h0,t + 1) = ai(h,t).
Proof. For notational convenience, let ai and bi be the actions player i chose t + 1
and t periods ago in h, respectively. Performing T −t−1 drag-to-front operations,
we reach a state g1 satisfying [C1] - [C3] in which ai is the action i chose T periods
ago and bi the action he chose T − 1 periods ago.
6 Figure 6.2 is for illustration only; it is assumed that all steps described there are feasible.6 L     196
Construct a successor g2 of g1 as follows: for each j ∈ N \ {i}, set s1
j = τj(g1)
and set s1
i = bi. Deﬁne g2 = (s1; g1), where s1 = (s1
j)j∈N.
Construct a successor g3 of g2 as follows: for each j ∈ N \ {i}, set s2
j = τj(g2)
and set s2
i = ai. Deﬁne g3 = (s2; g2), where s2 = (s2
j)j∈N.
For players j , i, these two steps involve simple drag-to-front operations. For
player i it involves reversing the order: in going from g1 to g2, i chooses bi, in going
from g2 to g3, i chooses ai, rather than playing ﬁrst ai, then bi.
As ×i∈Nλi(g1,T) is a prep set and no actions are blocked in g1, it follows from
P1 and P2 that P(g1, g2) > 0. Moreover, as all actions in h have frequency at least
2, we have that λi(g1,T) = λi(g2,T) for all i ∈ N. Hence, also ×i∈Nλi(g2,T) is a prep
set. By Lemma 6.A.4 we may assume that g2 contains no blocked actions. Hence,
also P(g2, g3) > 0. Moreover, it is easy to see that frequencies in g3 are identical to
frequencies in g1, i.e., at least equal to 2. We can thus conclude that also g3 satisﬁes
[C1] - [C3].
In g3, the two actions that are played most recently are ai and bi, respectively.
Thus, performing t − 1 drag-to-front operations leads to the desired state h0. 
6.A.5 Proof of Steps 2 to 4
Step 2: Let h1 ∈ H be such that ×i∈Nλi(h1,T) is a prep set. The process moves with
positive probability in a ﬁnite number of steps to a state h2 ∈ H where ×i∈Nλi(h2,T)
is a minimal prep set.
Proof of Step 2: By Lemma 6.A.5, the process moves with positive probability in
a ﬁnite number of steps from h1 to a state g ∈ H satisfying [C1] - [C3]. Let Q =
×i∈NQi ⊆ ×i∈Nλi(g,T) be a minimal prep set. Assuming without loss of generality
(Lemma 6.A.4) that from g onward we do not encounter blocked actions, Lemma
6.A.6allowsustoperformneighborswitches.Everypermutationofaﬁnitesetcan
be obtained by a chain of neighbor switches; thus, repeated application of Lemma
6.A.6 yields that the process moves in a ﬁnite number of steps to a state g0 ∈ H
withthepropertythatforeachplayeri ∈ N,λi(g0,|Qi|) = Qi,thatis,foreachplayer
i ∈ N, the most recent |Qi| actions in g0 are exactly those in i’s component of the
minimal prep set Q.
For each k ∈ N, let gk := ((ai(gk−1,|Qi|))i∈N; gk−1) ∈ H, i.e., gk is the successor of
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in gk−1. Recalling that Q is a minimal prep set, a simple inductive proof establishes
that for all k ∈ N it holds that P(gk−1, gk) > 0 and for all players i ∈ N we have
λi(gk,min{|Qi| + k,T}) = Qi.
Set k = T to ﬁnd that ×i∈Nλi(gT,T) = Q. Taking h2 := gT ﬁnishes the proof of Step 2.
Step 3: Let h2 ∈ H be such that Q = ×i∈Nλi(h2,T) is a minimal prep set. After
reaching h2, all action proﬁles that are played with positive probability lie in Q:
∀k ∈ N,∀h ∈ H : Pk(h2,h) > 0 ⇒ `(h) ∈ Q. (6.8)
Proof of Step 3: By P1 and P2, players always base beliefs on the actions played
in the last T periods and choose the most recent best reply to such beliefs. In h2,
their account of recent play ×i∈Nλi(h2,T) equals the minimal prep set Q, which by
deﬁnition contains at least one best reply to whatever belief a player may have
aboutotherplayers’choicesfromQ.Hence,byinduction,theactionsfromminimal
prep set Q will always be fresher in players’ recollection of past play than actions
outside Q, i.e., beliefs and best replies to these beliefs will, by P1 and P2, always
have support in Q. Formally, for all k ∈ N and h ∈ H:
if Pk(h2,h) > 0, then ×i∈N λi(h,T + k) = Q,
and hence
×i∈Nλi(h,T) ⊆ Q.
In particular, this means `(h) ∈ Q, i.e., (6.8) holds.
Step 4: For every state h0 ∈ H, the process eventually reaches a state h2 ∈ H
satisfying the conditions in Step 2, i.e., where according to Step 3 play settles
down in a minimal prep set.
Proof of Step 4: Call two states h = (a1,...,aL) and g = (b1,...,bK) in H equivalent,
denoted h ∼ g, if they have the same account of recent past play and the same
order in which each player i’s actions are encountered:
h ∼ g ⇔
(
(a1,...,aT) = (b1,...,bT),
oi,h = oi,g for all i ∈ N.
Notice that ∼ is an equivalence relation on H; for each h ∈ H, let [h] = {h0 ∈
H : h ∼ h0} be the equivalence class containing h. Recall from Section 6.3 that6 L     198
in each state h ∈ H, if the sequence of action proﬁles from the past T periods is
(a1,...,aT) ∈ AT, then, ﬁrstly, player i’s beliefs α−i are drawn from a probability
distribution P(i,(a1,...,aT)) and, secondly, his response is (whenever possible) the most
recent best reply to this belief or (otherwise) drawn from a probability distribution
Pα−i over his best replies. Thus, player i’s choice behavior is the same in two
equivalentstates.SincethereareonlyﬁnitelymanyelementsinAT andN,itfollows
that the set of positive transition probabilities {P(h,h0) | h,h0 ∈ H,P(h,h0) > 0} is a
ﬁnite set. Let ε > 0 be its minimum.
By Steps 1 to 3, it is possible, from any history h0 ∈ H, to reach a state h2 ∈ H in
an absorbing set where play settles down in a minimal prep set in a ﬁnite number
of steps, say k(h0) ∈ N. By deﬁnition of equivalence, k(h) = k(h0) for all h ∈ [h0]: the
set {k(h0) | h0 ∈ H} is ﬁnite. Let κ ∈ N be its minimum.
By deﬁnition of ε and κ, the probability of entering an absorbing set where
play settles down in a minimal prep set in at most κ steps is at least εκ from any
state. Hence, the probability of not reaching an absorbing set in κ steps is at most
1 − εκ, which is less than 1. So the probability of not reaching an absorbing set in
kκ steps is less than or equal to (1−εκ)k, which goes to zero as k goes to inﬁnity. 
6.B Proof of Proposition 6.5.3
The set inclusion P ⊂ f P was established in Remark 6.5.1 and Example 6.5.2. To
establishtheconvergencepart,theproofofTheorem6.4.1inAppendix6.Aapplies
with minor changes to PR as well:
– condition (α) guarantees that Steps 1 and 2 hold without change,
– condition (β) guarantees that Step 3 holds without change,
– by (6.2), there are only ﬁnitely many diﬀerent functions in R = (Ri,h)i∈N,h∈H, so
the equivalence relation in Step 4 is well-deﬁned and there are again ﬁnitely many
equivalence classes; hence, also Step 4 holds. 7 An axiomatization of minimal prep sets
Summary
In the previous chapter, it was shown that behaviorally plausible adjust-
ment processes settle down in minimal prep sets. This chapter, which
is based on Voorneveld, Kets, and Norde (2005, 2006), investigates this
set-valued solution concept further by providing an axiomatic charac-
terization. We show that the concept satisﬁes the axiom of consistency.




a recency bias converge to a minimal prep set (Voorneveld, 2004). Here, we study
the properties of this set-valued solution concept by providing an axiomatic char-
acterization of this concept and of the closely related concept of a minimal curb set
(Basu and Weibull, 1991). We provide an axiomatization of these solution concepts
intermsofconsistencyandotheraxioms,thusclarifyingthecloserelationbetween
the two concepts.
Consistency is a central axiom in game theory. The notion of consistency for
solutions of noncooperative games was introduced by Peleg and Tijs (1996) and
Pelegetal.(1996).Consistencyessentiallyrequiresthatifanonemptysetofplayers
commits to playing according to a certain solution, the remaining players in the
reduced game should not have an incentive to deviate from it. This appears to be
a minimal requirement on a solution concept (see also Aumann (1987, pp. 478–
479): given that others play the game according to a certain solution, the solution
concept should recommend you to do the same.
While Norde et al. (1996) proves that the unique point-valued solution con-
cept for the set of strategic games that satisﬁes consistency, utility maximizing
behaviorinone-playergamesandnonemptiness,istheNashequilibriumconcept,
Dufwenbergetal.(2001)showbymeansofexamplesthatatransitiontoset-valued7 A      200
solutionconceptsovercomesconsistencyproblems.Theyshowthatthereisamul-
tiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and
recommend utility maximization in one-player games. Among these concepts are
minimal prep sets and minimal curb sets.
Building on these papers, which strive for characterizations of solution con-
cepts in terms of consistency and other properties or axioms, we provide a similar
axiomatization of minimal prep sets and minimal curb sets. Section 7.2 describes
properties of set-valued solution concepts. It is shown that the set-valued solution
concept that assigns to each game its collection of minimal prep sets satisﬁes these
properties (Proposition 7.2.3); indeed, it is the only one (Theorem. 7.3.1). More-
over, the properties are logically independent (Proposition 7.3.2). In Section 7.4,
we give an axiomatization of minimal curb sets, and discuss the relation between
minimal prep sets and minimal curb sets. In addition, we discuss some variants
and extensions of the main result.
7.2 Properties of set-valued solution concepts
Recall the deﬁnition of a (ﬁnite strategic) game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni (Sec-
tion 2.1.1), where N is a ﬁnite, nonempty set of players, and each player i ∈ N
is endowed with a ﬁnite, nonempty set Ai of actions and a (von Neumann Morgen-
stern) utility function on the set of pure strategy proﬁles A = ×j∈NAj. The set of all
ﬁnite strategic games is denoted by Γ. The set of mixed strategies of player i ∈ N
with support in Xi ⊆ Ai is denoted by ∆(Xi). Payoﬀs are extended to mixed strate-
gies in the usual way. As usual, (ai,α−i) is the proﬁle of strategies where player
i ∈ N plays ai ∈ Ai and his opponents play according to the mixed strategy proﬁle
α−i = (αj)j∈N\{i} ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj). For i ∈ N and α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj),
BRi(α−i) = {ai ∈ Ai | ∀bi ∈ Ai : ui(ai,α−i) ≥ ui(bi,α−i)}.
is the set of pure best replies of player i against α−i.
Deﬁnition 7.2.1. A prep set of a game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ is a nonempty
product set Q = ×i∈NQi ⊆ A such that for each i ∈ N and each belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Qj)
of player i, the set Qi contains at least one best response of player i against his belief:
∀i ∈ N,∀α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Qj) : BRi(α−i) ∩ Qi , ∅.
A prep set Q is minimal if no prep set is a proper subset of Q.7.2 P  -   201
Deﬁnition 7.2.2. A curb set of a game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ is a nonempty
product set Q = ×i∈NQi ⊆ A such that for each i ∈ N and each belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Qj)
of player i, the set Qi contains all best responses of player i against his belief:
∀i ∈ N,∀α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Qj) : BRi(α−i) ⊆ Qi.
A curb set Q is minimal if no curb set is a proper subset of Q.
Theset-valuedsolutionconceptthatassignstoeachgameitscollectionofminimal
prep sets is denoted by min-prep, and the set-valued solution concept that assigns
to each game its collection of minimal curb sets is denoted by min-curb.
Weprovidepropertiesofset-valuedsolutionconceptsandshowthatmin-prep
satisﬁes these properties. Section 7.4 discusses the properties of minimal curb sets,
and discusses some variants. Throughoutthis section,ϕs is anarbitrary set-valued
solution concept on the set of all ﬁnite strategic games Γ.
The ﬁrst three properties we discuss here are well known from Peleg and Tijs
(1996),Pelegetal.(1996),andNordeetal.(1996)forpoint-valuedsolutionslikethe
Nash equilibrium concept. We restate them here for set-valued solution concepts.
The property of nonemptiness requires that the solution concept assigns to each
game a nonempty collection of solutions. One-person rationality requires that in
one-player games, the solution simply maximizes the player’s utility.
Nonemptiness: ϕs(G) , ∅ for each G ∈ Γ.
One-person rationality: for each one-player game G = h{i},Ai,uii ∈ Γ it holds that
ϕs(G) = {{bi} | bi ∈ argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai)}.
The idea behind consistency is that if some players commit to playing according
to a certain solution, the remaining players should have an incentive to do so as
well. This requires appropriate ways to model (i) the reduced game that arises if
someplayerscommittoacertainbehavior,(ii)theabsenceofincentivestodeviate,
i.e., the statement that the solution of the original game gives rise to a solution of
the reduced game.
Diﬀerent models of these issues yield diﬀerent forms of consistency. In this
chapter we use the notion of reduced games as deﬁned by Peleg and Tijs (1996),
Peleg et al. (1996), and Norde et al. (1996): given a game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ
with at least two players and a mixed strategy proﬁle α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai), ﬁx a coalition
S ⊂ N,S , ∅, and suppose that the players in N \S commit to playing their part of
α. The reduced game with respect to S and α is the game GS,α = hS,(Ai)i∈S,(vi)i∈Si ∈ Γ
where only players i ∈ S choose from their set of pure strategies Ai, while their7 A      202
payoﬀ functions reduce to vi : ×j∈SAj → R deﬁned as vi(·) = ui(·,αN\S), i.e., the
payoﬀ in the original game, given that members of N \ S play αN\S = (αj)j∈N\S in
accordance with α.
The next step models the statement that a solution of the original game gives
rise to a solution of the reduced game. Consider a solution Q ∈ ϕs(G) of G ∈ Γ.
Playing according to Q implies restricting attention to mixed strategy proﬁles
α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Qi). Fix some coalition S ⊂ N,S , ∅, of players and suppose that the
members of N \ S commit to such a strategy proﬁle α, thus yielding the reduced
game GS,α. Consistency now requires that the initial solution Q ∈ ϕs(G) yields a
solution of the reduced game in the following sense: the reduced game GS,α has a
solution in ×j∈SQj, the relevant part of Q ∈ ϕs(G).
Consistency: for each G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ, each Q = ×i∈NQi ∈
ϕs(G), each α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Qi), each S ⊂ N,S , ∅, there is a solution Y ∈
ϕs(GS,α) with Y ⊆ ×j∈SQj.
The other properties are speciﬁc for set-valued solution concepts, but remain
standard.
Nonnestedness: for each G ∈ Γ, there are no Q,Y ∈ ϕs(G) with Q ⊂ Y.
Many common set-valued solution concepts satisfy nonnestedness, including
those deﬁned by product sets of actions which (i) survive some iterated elimi-
nation process, for instance of strictly/weakly dominated actions, or, in the case
of rationalizability, of never-best replies, or (ii) are minimal or maximal sets with
some desirable property. This includes persistent retracts (so-called minimal ab-
sorbing retracts, see Kalai and Samet, 1984, pp. 134–135), the product set of all
minimax/maximin actions in two-person zero-sum games, the product set of all
rationalizable actions (the so-called maximal tight curb set, see Basu and Weibull,
1991, p. 145), or the largest consistent set of Chwe (1994, pp. 313–318); his use of
the word “consistent” is unrelated to our notion of consistency.
The next property, satisfaction, uses the notion of a subgame of a game. The
subgame obtained from G by restricting the action set of each player i ∈ N to a
subset Qi ⊆ Ai is denoted by hN,(Qi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni. Note that this is with minor abuse
of notation as we restrict the domain of the payoﬀ functions ui to ×i∈NQi. The
property of satisfaction is a simple revealed-preference property. A product set
of strategies is called satisfactory, given the solution concept ϕs, if players can
credibly commit to playing actions from that set if they believe that others do so:
it always contains a solution of the associated reduced game. Given such credible
commitment, satisfaction1 states that a way of ﬁnding solutions of the original
game is to solve the subgame restricted to a satisfactory set.7.2 P  -   203
Formally, consider a game G ∈ Γ with at least two players and a product set
Q = ×i∈NQi ⊆ A. Such a set is called satisfactory under ϕs if for each α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Qi)
and each S ⊂ N,S , ∅, there exists a Y ∈ ϕs(GS,α) with Y ⊆ ×j∈SQj.
Satisfaction: for each G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ with |N| ≥ 2 and each
Q ⊆ A which is satisfactory under ϕs, one has ϕs(hN,(Qi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni) ⊆
ϕs(G).
This property is reminiscent of the converse consistency axiom of Peleg and Tijs
(1996) and Peleg et al. (1996), which roughly states that if a solution candidate
always yields a solution in the associated reduced games, it is indeed a solution of
the original game. Note that satisfaction is much weaker, as satisfactory sets need
not be contained in the solution of the game.
Proposition 7.2.3. The set-valued solution concept min-prep satisﬁes nonemptiness,
one-person rationality, consistency, nonnestedness, and satisfaction.
Proof. Nonemptiness: See Proposition 2.1.7.
One-person rationality: Let G = h{i},Ai,uii ∈ Γ be a one-player game. In a one-
player game, the set of best responses is simply the set of maximizers of the utility
function. Hence, Qi ⊆ Ai is a prep set of G if and only if argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai)∩Qi , ∅;
it is a minimal prep set of G if and only if Qi = {bi} for some bi ∈ argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai).
Hence, min-prep(G) = {{bi} | bi ∈ argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai)}.
Consistency: Let G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ, Q = ×i∈NQi ∈ min-prep(G), α ∈
×i∈N∆(Qi), and S ⊂ N,S , ∅. We need to show that there is a Y ∈ min-prep(GS,α)
with Y ⊆ ×j∈SQj. Since Q ∈ min-prep(G), it follows that ×j∈SQj ∈ prep(GS,α). Since
×j∈SQj ∈ prep(GS,α) and there are only ﬁnitely many prep sets in GS,α, it contains a
minimal one. Hence, there is a Y ∈ min-prep(GS,α) with Y ⊆ ×j∈SQj.
Nonnestedness: Holds by minimality.
Satisfaction:LetG = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γwith|N| ≥ 2.LetQ ⊆ Abeasatisfactory
set under min-prep. To show:
min-prep(hN,(Qi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni) ⊆ min-prep(G). (7.1)
We ﬁrst show that Q ∈ prep(G). Let i ∈ N and α ∈ ×j∈N∆(Qj). Since Q is a
satisfactory set under min-prep, there is a Y ∈ min-prep(G{i},α) with Y ⊆ Qi. But
1 Theadjective“satisfactory”describesapropertyofproductsets,thenoun“satisfaction”describes
a property of a solution concept.7 A      204
G{i},α is the one-player game h{i},Ai,vii ∈ Γ with vi(ai) = ui(ai,α−i) for each ai ∈ Ai.
Hence, min-prep(G{i},α) = {{bi} | bi ∈ argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai,α−i)}, so Y = {bi} for some
bi ∈ argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai,α−i). As Y ⊆ Qi, Qi contains at least one best reply to the
belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Qj). Since this holds for arbitrary i ∈ N and α ∈ ×j∈N∆(Qj), it
holds by deﬁnition that Q ∈ prep(G).
We now prove (7.1) by contradiction. Let Y ∈ min-prep(hN,(Qi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni).
Since Q ∈ prep(G), we also have Y ∈ prep(G). If Y < min-prep(G), there is a
Z ∈ min-prep(G) with Z ⊂ Y. But since Z ∈ min-prep(G), it is also a prep set of the
subgame G0 = hN,(Qi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni, contradicting that Y ∈ min-prep(G0). Conclude
that (7.1) holds. 
7.3 Axiomatization
In this section, we show that min-prep is the unique solution concept satisfying
the properties in Section 7.2 and that these properties are logically independent.
Theorem 7.3.1. The unique set-valued solution concept on Γ satisfying nonemptiness,
one-person rationality, consistency, nonnestedness, and satisfaction is min-prep.
Proof. Proposition 7.2.3 shows that min-prep satisﬁes the properties. Let ϕs be a
set-valued solution concept on Γ that also satisﬁes them. We need to show that
ϕs(G) = min-prep(G) for each G ∈ Γ. We show this by induction on the number
of players. In a one-player game G = h{i},Ai,uii ∈ Γ, it follows from one-person
rationality of ϕs and min-prep that
ϕs(G) = min-prep(G) =
(
{bi}





Next, let n ∈ N and assume that ϕs and min-prep coincide on all games in Γ with
at most n players. Let G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ have n + 1 players.
Step 1: ϕs(G) ⊆ prep(G).
Proof of Step 1: Let Q ∈ ϕs(G),i ∈ N, and α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Qj). We need to show
that BRi(α−i)∩Qi , ∅. Let β ∈ ×j∈N∆(Qj) be a mixed strategy proﬁle with β−i = α−i.
By consistency of ϕs, there is a solution Y ∈ ϕs(G{i},β) with Y ⊆ Qi. The game G{i},β
is the one-player game h{i},Ai,vii ∈ Γ with vi(ai) = ui(ai,β−i) = ui(ai,α−i) for each7.3 A 205
















i.e., Y = {bi} for some bi ∈ argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai,α−i). As Y ⊆ Qi, BRi(α−i) ∩ Qi , ∅ as we
had to show.
Step 2: If Q ∈ min-prep(G), then Q is a satisfactory set under ϕs.
Proof of Step 2: Let Q ∈ min-prep(G),α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Qi), and S ⊂ N,S , ∅. By
induction, ϕs(GS,α) = min-prep(GS,α). By consistency of min-prep, there is a Y ∈
min-prep(GS,α) with Y ⊆ ×i∈SQi. Combining these two results, we ﬁnd that there
is a Y ∈ ϕs(GS,α) with Y ⊆ ×i∈SQi. Hence, Q is a satisfactory set under ϕs.
Step 3: If Q ∈ min-prep(G), then there is a Y ∈ ϕs(G) with Y ⊆ Q.
Proof of Step 3: Let Q ∈ min-prep(G). By Step 2, Q is a satisfactory set under ϕs.
Since ϕs satisﬁes nonemptiness and satisfaction, it follows that
∅ , ϕs(hN,(Qi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni) ⊆ ϕs(G). (7.2)
So let Y ∈ ϕs(hN,(Qi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni). Then Y ⊆ Q, and by (7.2), Y ∈ ϕs(G).
Step 4: ϕs(G) ⊆ min-prep(G).
Proof of Step 4: Let Q ∈ ϕs(G). By Step 1, Q ∈ prep(G). Suppose Q < min-prep(G):
there is a Y ∈ min-prep(G) with Y ⊂ Q. By Step 3, there is a Z ∈ ϕs(G) with
Z ⊆ Y. But since Z ⊆ Y ⊂ Q and Q,Z ∈ ϕs(G), we have a contradiction with the
assumption that ϕs is nonnested. Conclude that Q ∈ min-prep(G).
Step 5: min-prep(G) ⊆ ϕs(G).
Proof of Step 5: Let Q ∈ min-prep(G). By Step 3, there is a Y ⊆ Q with Y ∈ ϕs(G).
By Step 1, Y ∈ prep(G). Since Q ∈ min-prep(G) and Y ⊆ Q is a prep set, it follows
that Y = Q, i.e., Q = Y ∈ ϕs(G).
Combining Steps 4 and 5, conclude that ϕs(G) = min-prep(G) also for the
(n+1)-playergameG.Hence,byinduction,ϕs(G) = min-prep(G)foreachG ∈ Γ. 
Proposition 7.3.2. The axioms in Theorem 7.3.1 are logically independent.7 A      206
We show this by presenting ﬁve set-valued solution concepts, each violating
exactly one of the ﬁve axioms in Theorem 7.3.1. Since the veriﬁcation that these
concepts satisfy the given properties proceeds along the same lines as the proof
of Proposition 7.2.3, we only show explicitly which axiom is violated. Solution
conceptsϕs
1 toϕs











min-prep(G) if G is a one-player game,









min-prep(G) if G is a one-player game,
{A} otherwise.
The solution concept ϕs
1 satisﬁes all properties in Theorem 7.3.1, except nonempti-
ness: ϕs
1(G) = ∅ for each game G ∈ Γ with two or more players.
The solution concept ϕs
2 satisﬁes all properties in Theorem 7.3.1, except one-
person rationality: in the one-player game G = h{1},{a,b},u1i with u1(a) = u1(b),
we have
ϕs
2(G) = min-curb(G) = {{a,b}} , {{a},{b}} =
(
{d}





The solution concept ϕs
3 satisﬁes all properties in Theorem 7.3.1, except con-
sistency. In the game G in Figure 7.1, Q = {B} × {L} ∈ ϕs
3(G). Consider the belief
(B,L)in whichplayer 1choosesBwithprobability oneand player 2choosesLwith
probability one. In the reduced game G{1},(B,L) = h{1},{T,B},v1i with v1(T) = 1 and





= min-prep(G{1},(B,L)) = {{T}},
so Q1 = {B} does not contain a solution of the reduced game G{1},(B,L).
The solution concept ϕs
4 satisﬁes all properties in Theorem 7.3.1, except
nonnestedness: in the game G in Figure 7.1, we have ϕs
4(G) = prep(G) = {{T} ×
{L},{B} × {R},{T} × {L,R},{T,B} × {L},{T,B} × {L,R}} with for instance {T} × {L} ⊂




Figure 7.1. A simple two-player game G.
The solution concept ϕs
5 satisﬁes all properties in Theorem 7.3.1, except satis-
faction: in the two-player game G in Figure 7.1, {T}×{L} is a satisfactory set under
ϕs
5, but in the subgame G0 restricted to {T} × {L}, we have ϕs
5(G0) = {{T} × {L}} *
{{T,B} × {L,R}} = ϕs
5(G).
7.4 Variants and extensions
(a) In Theorem 7.3.1, nonnestedness can be replaced by the following property:
Decisiveness: for each G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ and Q ∈ ϕs(G):
ϕs(hN,(Qi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni) = {Q}.
Theintuitionbehinddecisiveness isthatthesolutionconcepttakessomeargument
to its logical conclusion: given a solution Q of a game, the solution of the subgame
restricted to Q is not reﬁned further. Note that min-prep satisﬁes decisiveness.
Nonnestedness is used only in Step 4 of Theorem 7.3.1, the proof of which now is
as follows: Let Q ∈ ϕs(G). By Step 1, Q ∈ prep(G). Let Y ∈ min-prep(G) with Y ⊆ Q.
Then also Y ∈ min-prep(hN,(Qi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni). By Step 3 applied to the subgame
hN,(Qi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni, there is a Z ∈ ϕs(hN,(Qi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni) with Z ⊆ Y. Decisiveness
of ϕs implies that ϕs(hN,(Qi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni) = {Q}. Conclude that Q = Z ⊆ Y ⊆ Q, i.e.,
Q = Y ∈ min-prep(G), proving Step 4.
The set-valued solution concepts ϕs
1 to ϕs
5 can be used to show that the new
axiom system, with decisiveness instead of nonnestedness, uses logically inde-
pendent properties; see Figure 7.3 for a summary.
(b)Sincemostoftheliteratureonminimalprepsetsandminimalcurbsetsconcerns
mixedextensionsofﬁnitestrategicgames,wehavetakenthissettobeourdomain
Γ. The assumption that the games are ﬁnite is not necessary: we essentially need Γ
to be closed with respect to certain subgames and reduced games, and that each
game in Γ has a nonempty collection of minimal prep sets. In particular, deﬁning7 A      208
prep sets and the properties in Section 7.2 in terms of product sets Q = ×i∈NQi
whereeachcomponentQi isanonemptycompactsetofpurestrategies,ouranalysis
carriesthroughalsoonthedomainofgameswhereeachstrategyspaceisassumed
to be compact Hausdorﬀ and utility functions are suﬃciently measurable and
upper semicontinuous on the own strategy space, the domain of games on which
Voorneveld (2004) establishes existence of minimal prep sets.
(c)Rationalityrequiresdecisionmakersinone-playergamestochooseutilitymax-
imizing actions. That is the motivation behind the standard one-person rationality
axiom in the consistency literature. For set-valued solution concepts, it matters
whether one considers the utility-maximizing actions separately, as was done in
the deﬁnition of one-person rationality, or that one collects them in a single set.
For instance, in the one-player game G = h{1},{a,b},u1i with u1(a) = u1(b), we have
min-prep(G) = {{a},{b}}, whereas min-curb(G) = {{a,b}}: while prep sets require the
presence of at least one best reply, curb sets require all “best replies” to be present.
An intuitive modiﬁcation of the one-person rationality axiom in Section 7.2 would
therefore be:







Rewriting our earlier results yields an axiomatization of min-curb:
Theorem 7.4.1. The unique set-valued solution concept on Γ satisfying nonemptiness,
one-person rationality as in (7.3), consistency, nonnestedness, and satisfaction is
min-curb.
Proposition 7.4.2. The axioms in Theorem 7.4.1 are logically independent.
The proofs of these results are virtually identical to those of Propositions 7.2.3,
7.3.2, and Theorem 7.3.1 by interchanging, ﬁrstly, prep and curb and, secondly,
min-prep and min-curb, and are therefore omitted. In analogy with the remark
under (a), nonnestedness can be replaced with decisiveness; the axioms remain
logically independent. In fact, the paper Voorneveld et al. (2005, 2006), on which
this chapter is based, presents all proofs for minimal curb sets, rather than for
minimal prep sets.
Hence, for the most part, min-prep and min-curb satisfy the same natural
properties; in their respective axiomatizations, the only distinguishing property
concerns the treatment of one-player games. This follows directly from the deﬁni-
tions:preprequiresplayerstoholdatleastonebestresponsetoanybelieftheymay7.4 V   209
have that is consistent with the recommendations to other players, while curb re-
quires them to hold all best responses. The interesting issue is that while min-prep
and min-curb sometimes give rise to very diﬀerent solutions (see Tercieux and
Voorneveld (2005) for some appealing examples), all diﬀerences between the two
solution concepts are captured by the way they deal with one-player games.
(d) Basu and Weibull (1991) brieﬂy consider socalled minimal curb∗ sets, a “cau-
tious” variant of minimal curb sets in which players are assumed to abstain from
choosing weakly dominated actions.
Formally, let G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ, let i ∈ N, and let ai ∈ Ai. Re-
call that ai is weakly dominated if there is a mixed strategy αi ∈ ∆(Ai) such that
ui(ai,a−i) ≤ ui(αi,a−i) for each a−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}Aj, with strict inequality for some a−i.
The set of actions of player i that are not weakly dominated (sometimes referred
to as admissible) is denoted by A∗
i.
A curb∗ set of G is a nonempty product set Q = ×i∈NQi ⊆ A such that for each
i ∈ N andeachbeliefα−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Qj)ofplayeri,thesetQi containsalladmissible
best responses of player i against his belief:
∀i ∈ N,∀α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Qj) : BRi(α−i) ∩ A∗
i ⊆ Qi.
A curb∗ set Q is minimal if no curb∗ set is a proper subset of Q. The set-valued
solution concept that assigns to each game its collection of minimal curb∗ sets is
denoted by min-curb
∗. Hence, for each game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ:
min-curb
∗(G) = {Q ⊆ A | Q is a minimal curb∗ set of G}.
It is easily veriﬁed that min-curb
∗ satisﬁes nonemptiness, one-person rationality
as in (7.3), and nonnestedness. All other axioms, however, are violated. The main
reason for this is that the weak dominance relation may change if one goes from
the original game to reduced games or subgames; for instance, an action that is
admissible in the original game may be weakly dominated in a reduced game.
This indicates intuitively that consistency may be violated; we show this formally
below and also indicate violations of satisfaction and decisiveness.
The solution concept min-curb
∗ does not satisfy consistency: in the game
G in Figure 7.2 we have Q = {T,B} × {L} ∈ min-curb
∗(G). Consider the belief
(B,L) in which player 1 chooses B with probability one and player 2 chooses
L with probability one. In the reduced game G{2},(B,L) = h{2},{L,C,R},v2i with
v2(L) = v2(C) = 0,v2(R) = −1, action C is no longer weakly dominated and7 A      210
L C R
T 1,1 1,0 0,−1
B 1,0 0,0 1,−1
L C R
T 1,1 1,0 0,−1
M 1,0 0,1 1,−1
B −1,0 −1,1 −1,−1
(a) (b)
Figure 7.2. (a) min-curb
∗ satisﬁes neither consistency, nor satisfaction; (b)
min-curb
∗ does not satisfy decisiveness.
min-curb
∗(G{2},(B,L)) = {{L,C}}.SoQ2 = {L}doesnotcontainasolutionofthereduced
game G{2},(B,L).
The solution concept min-curb
∗ does not satisfy satisfaction: in the game G in
Figure7.2(a),{T,B}×{L,C}isasatisfactorysetundermin-curb
∗,butinthesubgame
G0 restricted to {T,B} × {L,C} we have min-curb
∗(G0) = {{T} × {L}} * {{T,B} × {L}} =
min-curb
∗(G).
The solution concept min-curb
∗ does not satisfy decisiveness: in the game
G in Figure 7.2(b) we have min-curb
∗(G) = {{T,M} × {L,C}}. But in the subgame
G0 restricted to {T,M} × {L,C}, M is weakly dominated by T and min-curb
∗(G0) =
{{T} × {L}} , {{T,M} × {L,C}}.
(e) Figure 7.3 summarizes which axioms are satisﬁed by the key solution concepts














nonemptiness + − + + + + +
one-person rationality + + − + + + −
consistency + + + − + + −
nonnestedness + + + + − + +
satisfaction + + + + + − −
decisiveness + + + + − + −
one-person rationality as in (7.3) − − + − − − +
Figure 7.3. Solution concepts and the axioms they do (+) or do not (−)
satisfy.8 Equilibrium and learning in the minority game
Summary
In this chapter, which is based on Kets and Voorneveld (2007), we char-
acterize the Nash equilibria of a simple congestion game, the minority
game, and study the limiting behavior of several well-known learning
processes in this game. Interestingly, diﬀerent learning models yield dif-
ferent predictions for this very simple game. In the next chapter, we
discuss an alternative learning model to describe players’ behavior in
this game, and we compare the predictions of diﬀerent learning models
to experimental results.
8.1 Introduction
Congestion games are ubiquitous in economics. In a congestion game (Rosenthal,
1973), players use several facilities from a common pool. The costs or beneﬁts that
a player derives from a facility depends on the number of users of that facility.
A congestion game is therefore a natural game to model scarcity of common
resources. Examples of such systems include vehicular traﬃc (Nagel et al., 1997),
packettraﬃcinnetworks(HubermanandLukose,1997),andecologiesofforaging
animals (DeAngelis and Gross, 1992). Similar problems are encountered in market
entry games (Selten and G¨ uth, 1982).
Congestion games are also interesting from a theoretical point of view. In con-
gestion games, players need to coordinate to diﬀerentiate. This seems to be more
diﬃcultthancoordinatingonthesameaction,asanycommonalityofexpectations
is broken up. For instance, when commuters have to choose between two roads
A and B and all believe that the others choose A, nobody will choose that road,
invalidating beliefs. The sorting of players predicted in the pure-strategy Nash
equilibria of such games violates the common belief that in symmetric games, all
rational players will evaluate the situation identically, and hence, make the same
choices in similar situations (see Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, p. 73). Moreover, in
congestion games, players may obtain asymmetric payoﬀs in equilibrium which
may complicate attainment of equilibrium, as coordination cannot be achieved
through tacit coordination based on historical precedent (cf. Meyer et al., 1992).8.1 I 213
Finally, congestion games often have a large number of equilibria, so that players
also face the diﬃculty of coordinating on the same equilibrium.
Therefore,itisaninterestingquestionwhattypeofbehaviordiﬀerentlearning
models predict in such games. This is the topic of this chapter and the next.
We consider a simple congestion game, the minority game. The minority game
is based on the El Farol bar problem of Arthur (1994). Players have to choose
between two alternatives, where the payoﬀs of these alternatives only depend on
the number of players choosing each option. Congestion is costly, so that players
prefer to choose the alternative that is chosen by the smallest number of players.
We restrict attention to games with an odd number of players, so that there is
always an alternative that is chosen by a smaller number of players than the other,
i.e., there is a well-deﬁned minority. In the current chapter, we characterize the
equilibriaofthegame,andstudythelimitingbehaviorofanumberofwell-known
learning processes. In the next chapter, we discuss an alternative learning model
todescribeplayers’behaviorinsuchgames,andcomparethediﬀerentpredictions
to experimental ﬁndings.
The minority game is closely related to the market entry game, a game ex-
tensively studied in experimental economics (see the survey of Ochs (1999) and
references therein; for a recent contribution see Duﬀy and Hopkins (2005)). While
the market entry game models situations in which players can choose between a
safe option (staying out of the market) and an alternative whose payoﬀs decline in
thenumberofotherplayerschoosingthatoption(entering),theminoritygameisa
suitable model for more symmetric situations in which the payoﬀs of both actions
depend on the number of other players choosing that action. In such situations,
players will need to outsmart other players, so as to be one step ahead of their
opponents. For instance, the minority game may be a good model for ﬁnancial
markets, where investors try to identify the underpriced shares, and try to sell the
shares they expect to fall in the future.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the predictions from diﬀerent learning processes
are not equivocal. While the replicator dynamic predicts that play converges to
a Nash equilibrium with at most one player who chooses a mixed strategy, the
set of stationary points under the perturbed best-response dynamics consists of
the logit quantal response equilibria of the game (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995);
for a deﬁnition of these learning processes, see Section 8.3 and 8.4, respectively.
For the case of three players, we show that the set of Nash equilibria that are
the limit of a sequence of logit quantal response equilibria with vanishing noise
consists of the the pure Nash equilibria, the Nash equilibria with one mixer who8 E       214
mixesuniformly,andtheNashequilibriuminwhichallplayersrandomizeequally
over their two actions. Finally, we study two best-reply learning process in which
playershavelimitedmemory:amodelproposedbyHurkens(1995)andthemodel
we introduced in Chapter 6. In both these models, players choose an action that is
a best reply to some belief over other players’ actions that is consistent with their
recent past play. The diﬀerence between the two models is that in the model of
Chapter 6, players also display a so-called recency bias: when there are multiple
best replies to a given belief, a player chooses the best reply that he most recently
played. We show that while the process of Hurkens oﬀers no sharp predictions
for the minority game, the model we introduced in Chapter 6 predicts that play
converges to one of the pure Nash equilibria of the game when players have a
memory length of at least two periods.
The minority game has been studied by a number of authors in economics.
Renault et al. (2005) consider repeated play in the game. Bottazzi and Devetag
(2007), Chmura and Pitz (2006), and Helbing et al. (2005) study the game exper-
imentally. The game has also been studied extensively in the physics literature.
We relate this literature to the literature on game-theoretic learning models in the
next chapter; Challet et al. (2004) or Moro (2003) provide an overview of the mi-
nority game literature in physics. Furthermore, the work in this chapter is related
to the literature on learning in congestion games and more generally learning in
potentialgames(e.g.HofbauerandHopkins,2005;HofbauerandSandholm,2002;
Sandholm, 2001, 2007). Papers that study learning in games similar to the game
considered here include Blonski (1999), Franke (2003) and Kojima and Takahashi
(2004). Most of these papers focus on the predictions of a single learning model,1
while we compare predictions from diﬀerent learning models. Moreover, while
most results are obtained for games with either a small number or a continuum
of players, we characterize the equilibria of the game and the limiting behavior of
diﬀerent learning processes for any (odd) number of players.
Theoutlineofthischapterisasfollows.InSection8.2,wedeﬁnethegameand
characterizeitsNashequilibria.InSection8.3,wecharacterizethesetofstationary
states and the set of asymptotically stable states under the replicator dynamic.
In Section 8.4, we characterize the set of stationary states under the perturbed
best-response dynamics. In Section 8.5, we characterize the limiting behavior in
the minority game under the best-reply learning processes with limited memory.
Section 8.6 concludes.
1 Duﬀy and Hopkins (2005) and Kojima and Takahashi (2004) are notable exceptions.8.2 T   215
8.2 The minority game
8.2.1 Basic deﬁnitions
Following the notation of Tercieux and Voorneveld (2005), we denote the set of
players by N = {1,...,2k + 1}, with k ∈ N. Each player i ∈ N has a set of pure
strategies Ai = {−1,+1}: agents have to choose between two options. The set of
mixedstrategiesofplayeriisdenotedby∆(Ai).Wedenoteamixedstrategyproﬁle
by α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai), and we use the standard notation α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Aj) to denote a
strategy proﬁle of players other than i ∈ N. A strategy in which a player chooses
actiona = −1withprobabilityp ∈ [0,1]anda = +1withprobability1−pisdenoted
by (p,1 − p). With each action b ∈ {−1,+1}, a function
fb : {1,...,2k + 1} → R
can be associated which indicates for each ` ∈ {1,...,2k + 1} the payoﬀ fb(`) to a
player choosing action b when the total number of players choosing b equals `.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of player i ∈ N is then given by
ui(a) = fai

|{j ∈ N | aj = ai}|

, (8.1)
where a = (aj)j∈N ∈ ×j∈NAj. Payoﬀs are extended to mixed strategies in the usual
way.
The function (8.1) can have several forms. We make the common assumptions
(e.g. Challet et al., 2004) that congestion is costly:
[Mon] f−1 and f+1 are strictly decreasing functions,
and that the congestion eﬀect is the same across alternatives:
[Sym] f−1 = f+1.
We refer to a player who uses a mixed strategy that puts positive probability
on both pure strategies a mixer. A player that puts full probability mass on the
alternative −1 is called a (−1)-player; similarly, a player that puts full probability
mass on the alternative +1 is called a (+1)-player.
8.2.2 Nash equilibria
Throughout this section, let k ∈ N and consider a minority game with 2k + 1
players. We characterize its set of Nash equilibria. The pure Nash equilibria are
easy to characterize:8 E       216
Proposition 8.2.1 (Tercieux and Voorneveld (2005)). ApurestrategyproﬁleisaNash
equilibrium if and only if one of the alternatives −1 or +1 is chosen by exactly k of the
2k + 1 players.
It remains to characterize the game’s Nash equilibria with at least one mixer.
Lemma 8.2.2. Let α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai) be a Nash equilibrium with a nonempty set of mixers.
All mixers use the same strategy: for all i, j ∈ N, if αi,αj < {(1,0),(0,1)}, then αi = αj.
Proof. By [Sym], the 2 × 2 subgame played by two mixers i (row player) and j
(column player) given the strategy proﬁle of the remaining players is of the form
−1 +1
−1 x,x y,z
+1 z, y w,w
where, for instance, y is the payoﬀ to the player choosing −1 if the other player
chooses+1andtheremainingplayerssticktothemixedstrategyproﬁle(αk)k∈N\{i,j}.
By [Mon], a player is better oﬀ if the other chooses diﬀerently, i.e., x < y and z > w.
Let p,q ∈ (0,1) denote the equilibrium probability with which player i and j,
respectively, choose −1. In equilibrium, each player must be indiﬀerent between
playing +1 and playing −1:
px + (1 − p)y = pz + (1 − p)w,
qx + (1 − q)y = qz + (1 − q)w.
Subtracting the latter expression from the former yields
(p − q)(x − y) = (p − q)(z − w).
As x < y and z > w, this can only hold if p = q. Since mixers i and j were
chosen arbitrarily from the set of mixers, this implies that all mixers use the same
strategy. 
Since all mixers use the same strategy and player labels are irrelevant by
[Sym] (if α is a Nash equilibrium, so is every permutation of α), a non-pure Nash
equilibrium can be summarized by its type (`,r,λ), where `,r ∈ {0,1,...,2k + 1}
denote the number of players choosing pure strategy −1 or +1, respectively, and
λ ∈ (0,1) the probability with which the remaining m(`,r,λ) := (2k+1)−(`+r) > 0
mixers choose −1. Moreover, let v−1(`,r,λ) denote the expected payoﬀ to a player
choosing −1; v+1(`,r,λ) is deﬁned similarly. For convenience, write m := m(`,r,λ).8.2 T   217
Letting one of the mixers in (`,r,λ) deviate to a pure strategy, this implies in
particular that







λs(1 − λ)m−1−s f−1(` + 1 + s), (8.2)















λs(1 − λ)m−1−s f+1(r + m − s). (8.3)
For instance, a proﬁle of type (` + 1,r,λ) is obtained from type (`,r,λ) if a mixer
switches to pure strategy −1. In that case, there are m − 1 mixers left. To obtain





λs(1 − λ)m−1−s. Using this notation, the Nash equilibria with at
least one mixer are characterized as follows:
Proposition 8.2.3.
(a) (Characterization of equilibrium) Let `,r ∈ {0,1,...,2k+1} be such that ` +r <
2k + 1. Let λ ∈ (0,1). A strategy proﬁle of type (`,r,λ) is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if
v−1(` + 1,r,λ) = v+1(`,r + 1,λ). (8.4)
(b) (Equilibria with one mixer) There exist equilibria with exactly one mixer. These
equilibriaareoftype(k,k,λ)witharbitraryλ ∈ (0,1),i.e.,themixerusesanarbitrary
mixed strategy, whereas the remaining 2k players are spread evenly over the two pure
strategies.
(c) (Equilibria with more than one mixer) Let `,r ∈ {0,1,...,2k + 1} be such that
`+r ≤ 2k−1.ThereisaNashequilibriumoftype(`,r,λ)ifandonlyifmax{`,r} < k.
The corresponding probability λ ∈ (0,1) solving (8.4) is unique.
Proof. (a): Condition (8.4) says that a mixer is indiﬀerent between choosing −1,
therebyraising`to`+1andobtainingpayoﬀv−1(`+1,r,λ),orchoosing+1,thereby
raising r to r + 1 and obtaining payoﬀ v+1(`,r + 1,λ). Hence, (8.4) is a necessary
condition for Nash equilibrium.
To establish suﬃciency, it remains to show that also players using a pure
strategy—if there are such players, i.e., if ` + r ≥ 1—choose a best reply. Suppose8 E       218
` ≥ 1. The payoﬀ to a (−1)-player is v−1(`,r,λ), while a unilateral deviation to +1
yields v+1(` − 1,r + 1,λ). However:
v−1(`,r,λ) ≥ v−1(` + 1,r,λ) (8.5)
= v+1(`,r + 1,λ) (8.6)
≥ v+1(` − 1,r + 1,λ). (8.7)
Inequality (8.5) uses [Mon]: conditioning on the behavior of one of the m :=
m(`,r,λ) > 0 mixers, write
v−1(`,r,λ) = λv−1(` + 1,r,λ) + (1 − λ)v−1(`,r + 1,λ).
Then
v−1(`,r,λ) − v−1(` + 1,r,λ) = (1 − λ)[v−1(`,r + 1,λ) − v−1(` + 1,r,λ)]







λs(1 − λ)m−1−s 
f−1(` + s) − f−1(` + 1 + s)

≥ 0
by [Mon]. Inequality (8.7) follows similarly and (8.6) is simply condition (8.4). So
if ` ≥ 1, (−1)-players choose a best reply. Similarly, if r ≥ 1, (+1)-players choose a
best reply.
(b):Letλ ∈ (0,1).Substitutionin(8.4) and [Sym]yieldthatstrategyproﬁlesoftype
(k,k,λ) are Nash equilibria:
v−1(k + 1,k,λ) = f−1(k + 1) = f+1(k + 1) = v+1(k,k + 1,λ).
Conversely, consider a Nash equilibrium of type (`,r,λ) with exactly one mixer:
` + r = 2k. We establish that ` = r. Suppose not. Without loss of generality, ` > r.
Since ` + r = 2k, this implies ` ≥ k + 1 and r ≤ k − 1. The expected payoﬀ to a
(−1)-player is
λf−1(` + 1) + (1 − λ)f−1(`),
while deviating to +1 would yield
λf+1(r + 1) + (1 − λ)f+1(r + 2).
Since ` + 1 > r + 1,` ≥ r + 2, and λ ∈ (0,1), it follows from [Sym] and [Mon] that a
(−1)-player would beneﬁt from unilateral deviation, contradicting the assumption
that the proﬁle of type (`,r,λ) is a Nash equilibrium. Conclude that ` = r.8.2 T   219
(c): Without loss of generality, ` ≥ r, so max{`,r} = `. Let m = (2k + 1) − (` + r) ≥ 2
be the number of mixers. By substitution, ` < k if and only if `+1 < r+m. To prove
(c), it therefore remains to establish three things.
Firstly, if ` + 1 < r + m, there is a λ ∈ (0,1) solving (8.4). To see this, use ` ≥ r
to ﬁnd that ` + m > r + 1. By [Sym] and [Mon], it follows that
v−1(` + 1,r,0) = f−1(` + 1) > f+1(r + m) = v+1(`,r + 1,0),
v−1(` + 1,r,1) = f−1(` + m) < f+1(r + 1) = v+1(`,r + 1,1).
By the Intermediate Value Theorem applied to v−1(` + 1,r,·) − v+1(`,r + 1,·), there
is a λ ∈ (0,1) solving (8.4): there is a Nash equilibrium of type (`,r,λ).
Secondly, this λ ∈ (0,1) solving (8.4) is unique. By (8.2), v−1(` + 1,r,·) is the
expectation of a strictly decreasing function of a binomial stochastic variable. By
stochastic dominance (see Appendix 8.A), this makes v−1(` + 1,r,·), the left-hand
side of (8.4), strictly decreasing in λ. Similarly, by (8.3), the right-hand side of (8.4)
isstrictlyincreasinginλ.Concludethatthefunctionsv−1(`+1,r,·)andv+1(`,r+1,·)
intersect at most once. By the previous step, as long as ` +1 < r+m, they intersect
at least once, establishing uniqueness.
Thirdly, if ` + 1 ≥ r + m, there is no λ ∈ (0,1) solving (8.4). To see this, notice
that the inequality implies
` + m > ··· > ` + 2 > ` + 1 ≥ r + m > r + m − 1 > ··· > r + 1,
so by [Sym] and [Mon]:
f−1(`+m) < ··· < f−1(`+2) < f−1(`+1) ≤ f+1(r+m) < f+1(r+m−1) < ··· < f+1(r+1).
Substitution in (8.2) and (8.3) yields that
v+1(`,r + 1,λ) > v−1(` + 1,r,λ)
for all λ ∈ (0,1): there is no solution to (8.4). 
Implications of this characterization of the game’s non-pure Nash equilibria
include:
(i) There are no Nash equilibria where the number of mixers is two, since in that
case, max{`,r} ≥ k.
(ii) Substitution in (8.4) gives that a strategy proﬁle in which the number of (−1)-
players is equal to the number of (+1)-players and the remaining players mix
with probability 1/2, i.e., a proﬁle of type (t,t,1/2) with t ∈ {0,...,k}, is a Nash
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Having characterized the set of Nash equilibria, we now establish that the set
of Nash equilibria with at most one mixer is connected.
Proposition 8.2.4. The set of Nash equilibria with at most one mixer is connected.
Proof. In a Nash equilibrium with exactly one mixer, the completely mixed strat-
egy is arbitrary. Letting the probability go to zero or one, this line piece of Nash
equilibriainthestrategyspacehasapureNashequilibriumasitsendpoint.Hence,
to show connectedness, it suﬃces to show that for each pair of pure Nash equi-
libria, there is a chain of pure Nash equilibria diﬀering in exactly one coordinate
connecting them.
So let x and y be distinct pure Nash equilibria. By Proposition 8.2.1, the
majority action, i.e., the action chosen by exactly k + 1 players in a given Nash
equilibrium, is well deﬁned. We need to consider two cases. Firstly, if this action
is the same in x and y, say −1, then x , y implies that the (k + 1)-player majorities
in x and y must be distinct. Let i be such a majority player, choosing −1 in x, but
+1 in y. Secondly, if the majority action is diﬀerent in x and y, say −1 in x and +1
in y, then by deﬁnition of a majority, the (k + 1)-player majorities in x and y have
a nonempty intersection. Again, let i be a majority player choosing −1 in x, but +1
in y.
Byconstruction,asiisamajorityplayer,thepathofNashequilibriainwhichi
increases the probability of playing the action +1 from 0 to 1 connects x to another
pure Nash equilibrium x∗ with xi , x∗
i = yi and x∗
j = yj for all j , i, i.e., with a
strictlysmallerHammingdistanceto y(recallthattheHammingdistancebetween
two ﬁnite-dimensional vectors is the number of coordinates in which they diﬀer).
As the strategy vectors only have a ﬁnite number of coordinates and we can
reduce the Hamming distance between pure Nash equilibria by the procedure
above, the result now follows by induction. 
8.3 The replicator dynamic
In this section, we study the (multipopulation) replicator dynamic (e.g. Weibull,
1995) for the minority game. There is a set N = {1,...,2k+1} of populations, where
each population is the unit interval [0,1]. The populations represent the 2k + 1
player positions in the minority game. All agents in a population are initially8.3 T   221
programmed to some pure strategy. Hence, each population can be divided into
twosubpopulations(oneofwhichmaycontainnoagents),oneforeachofthepure
strategies in the minority game. A population state is a vector α = (α1,...,α2k+1) in
the polyhedron of mixed-strategy proﬁles, where for each i ∈ N, αi is a point in
the simplex ∆(Ai), representing the distribution of agents in population i across
the diﬀerent pure strategies. The vector αi ∈ ∆(Ai) thus represents the state of
population i, with αi(ai) denoting the proportion of agents programmed to play
the pure strategy ai ∈ Ai.
Time is continuous and indexed by t. Agents, one from each population,
are continuously drawn uniformly at random from these populations to play
the minority game. Suppose payoﬀs represent the eﬀect of playing the game on
an agent’s ﬁtness, measured as the number of oﬀspring per time unit, and that
each oﬀspring inherits its single parent’s strategy. This gives rise to the following
dynamics for the population shares:
∀i ∈ N,∀ai ∈ Ai : ˙ αi(ai) = αi(ai)(ui(ai,α−i) − ui(αi,α−i)). (8.8)
This system of diﬀerential equations deﬁnes the (continuous time multipopulation)
replicator dynamic. In words, the growth rate ˙ αi(ai)/αi(ai) of a pure strategy ai ∈ Ai
in population i ∈ N is equal to the diﬀerence in payoﬀs of the pure strategy and
the current average payoﬀs for the population. Hence, the population shares of
strategies that do better than average will grow, while the shares of the other
strategies will decline. It is easily seen that the subpopulations associated with the
pure best replies to the current population state have the highest growth rates.
Thesystemofdiﬀerentialequations(8.8)deﬁnesacontinuoussolutionmapping




→ ×i∈N∆(Ai) which assigns to each time t ∈ R and each
initial state α0 ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai) the population state ξ(t,α0) ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai). The (solution)
trajectory through a population state α0 ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai) is the graph of the solution
mapping ξ(·,α0).
A population state α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai) is a stationary state of the replicator dynam-
ics (8.8) if and only if for each population i ∈ N all pure strategies ai ∈ Ai that
are used by some agents in the population give the same payoﬀs. In that case,




   ∀i ∈ N,∀ai ∈ Ai : ˙ αi(ai) = 0
o
be the set of stationary states. By deﬁnition, if α ∈ S, then a player i ∈ N either uses
a pure strategy or—if he is a mixer—is indiﬀerent between his two pure strategies:8 E       222
ui(ai,α−i) = ui(αi,α−i) for both ai ∈ Ai. Using the proof of Lemma 8.2.2, all mixers
mustusethesamestrategy.Ifthereismorethanonemixer,theproofofProposition
8.2.3(c) indicates that this mixed strategy solving (8.4) is uniquely determined by
the number of players choosing pure strategy −1 and pure strategy +1. Conclude
that the set of stationary states can be partitioned into three subsets:
S1: The connected set of Nash equilibria with at most one mixer;
and a ﬁnite collection of isolated stationary states, namely
S2: Nash equilibria with more than one mixer;
S3: nonequilibrium proﬁles of some type (`,r,λ), where

   
   
`,r ∈ {0,...,2k + 1},
` + r ≤ 2k + 1,
if ` + r < 2k + 1, then λ ∈ (0,1) uniquely determined by (8.4).
It remains to study the stability properties of these stationary states. We con-
sider Lyapunov stability and asymptotic stability. Roughly speaking, a population
state is Lyapunov stable if no small change in the population shares can lead the
replicator dynamics away from the population state, while a population state is
asymptoticallystableifitisLyapunovstableandinadditionanysuﬃcientlysmall
change in the population shares results in a movement back to the original popu-
lation state. Formally, a population state α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai) is Lyapunov stable if every
neighborhood B of α contains a neighborhood B0 of α such that ξ(t,α0) ∈ B for
every x0 ∈ B∩×i∈N∆(Ai) and t ≥ 0. It is asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov stable,




for each initial state α0 ∈ B∗ ∩ ×i∈N∆(Ai).
The analysis relies heavily on the existence of a Lyapunov function for the
replicator dynamic in the minority game. Tercieux and Voorneveld (2005), using
Theorem 3.1 in Monderer and Shapley (1996), show that a minority game is a
(ﬁnite exact) potential game. That is, there exists a real-valued (so-called potential)
function U on the pure strategy space such that for each i ∈ N, each a−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}Aj,
and all ai,bi ∈ Ai:
ui(ai,a−i) − ui(bi,a−i) = U(ai,a−i) − U(bi,a−i). (8.9)
Taking expectations, (8.9) can be extended to mixed strategies, so the payoﬀ diﬀer-
encein(8.8)equalsthecorrespondingchangeinthepotential.Hence,thereplicator
dynamic can be rewritten as:
∀i ∈ N,∀ai ∈ Ai : ˙ αi(ai) = αi(ai)(U(ai,α−i) − U(αi,α−i)). (8.10)8.3 T   223
This makes the potential U a Lyapunov function of the replicator dynamic. More
precisely:
Proposition 8.3.1. The potential function U of the minority game is a strict Lyapunov
functionforthereplicatordynamic:foreachsolutiontrajectory(α(t))t∈[0,∞),dU(α(t))/dt ≥
0 with equality exactly in the stationary states.
Proof.Fori ∈ N,wewriteEαi andVarαi todenotetheexpectationandvariancewith










































with equality if and only if all variances are zero, i.e., if and only if α is a stationary
point of the replicator dynamics. 
Proposition 8.3.2. The collection of Nash equilibria with at most one mixer in S1 is
asymptotically stable under the replicator dynamic. Stationary states in S2 and S3 are not
Lyapunov stable.
Proof. To see that the collection of Nash equilibria in S1 is asymptotically stable,
notice that S1 is the set of global maxima of U: the potential U in (8.9) has been
extended to mixed strategies by taking expectations, so U achieves a global maxi-
mum in a pure strategy proﬁle which, again by (8.9), is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Bysymmetry,allpureNashequilibriaareglobalmaximaofU andsoareequilibria
with exactly one mixer. Other strategy proﬁles are not global maxima of U: they
are not Nash equilibria or, if they are, they involve more than one mixer, in which
case they put positive probability also on pure strategy proﬁles that are not Nash
equilibria and consequently not global maxima of U. This connected set of global8 E       224
maxima of the Lyapunov function U is asymptotically stable (Weibull, 1995, Thm.
6.4).
We show that elements of S2 are not Lyapunov stable; the case for points in
S3 is similar. Let α∗ ∈ S2, i.e, α∗ is a Nash equilibrium with more than one mixer.
Suppose it is Lyapunov stable. Since it is an isolated point of the collection of
stationary states, there is a neighborhood B of α∗ whose closure contains only the
stationary state α∗: cl(B) ∩ S2 = {α∗}. By Lyapunov stability, as long as the initial
state α(0) lies in a suﬃciently small neighborhood B0 of α∗, the entire solution
trajectory (α(t))t∈[0,∞) remains in B.
Let i ∈ N be one of the mixers in the Nash equilibrium α∗. Since i is indiﬀerent






−i) = U(α∗) for all mixed strategies γi of player i. For γi , α∗
i
suﬃciently close to α∗
i, it follows that (γi,α∗
−i) ∈ B0. Hence, the entire solution
trajectory(γ(t))t∈[0,∞) withγ(0) := (γi,α∗
−i)remainsinB.Sinceitsstartingpointisnot
stationary,Proposition8.3.1impliesthattheLyapunovfunctionUstrictlyincreases
along the trajectory, until it may reach a stationary state. Let γ∗ ∈ ×j∈N∆(Aj) be
a limit point of the trajectory (γ(t))t∈[0,∞): there is a strictly increasing sequence
of time points tm → ∞ such that limm→∞ γ(tm) → γ∗. Such a limit point exists
and has to be a stationary point (Lemma A.1 of Sandholm, 2001, p. 104). Since
cl(B) ∩ S2 = {α∗} and the trajectory lies in B, it follows that γ∗ = α∗. But then
limm→∞ U(γ(tm)) = U(α∗) = U(γ(0)), contradicting that the Lyapunov function is
increasing along the trajectory. Conclude that α∗ cannot be Lyapunov stable. For
α∗ ∈ S3, proceed similarly. As it is not a NE, some i can proﬁtably deviate slightly
(to remain inside B0), so the remaining trajectory must increase the potential, but
still have α∗ as its limit point. 
8.4 Perturbed best-response dynamics and quantal response
equilibria
8.4.1 Perturbed best-response dynamics
Under stochastic ﬁctitious play (e.g. Hofbauer and Hopkins, 2005; Hofbauer and
Sandholm, 2002; Hopkins, 2002), players repeatedly play a normal form game (in8.4 P -      225
discrete time). They choose best replies to their beliefs on other players’ actions
on the basis of a perturbed payoﬀ function, with beliefs determined by the time
average of past play. More speciﬁcally, the state variable at time t ∈ N is a vector
Zt ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai), where the ith component Zt
i denotes the time average of player
i’s past play up to time t. Players’ initial choices are arbitrary pure strategies; in
later periods players best-respond to their beliefs Zt, after their payoﬀs have been
subjected to random shocks. That is, for each i ∈ N, let (εa
i)a∈Ai be a vector of payoﬀ
disturbances. The vector of payoﬀ disturbances is independent and identically
distributed across players and over time. Let α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj) be a belief. The
probability that player i chooses action ai ∈ Ai is equal to the probability that
ui(ai,α−i) + ε
ai
i ≥ ui(bi,α−i) + ε
bi
i
for all bi ∈ Ai. Then, the perturbed best-response dynamics associated with
Gumbel-distributed perturbations with parameter β > 0 is:









 − αi(ai). (8.11)
Gumbel-distributedpayoﬀperturbationscorrespondtocontrolcostsoftherelative
entropy form. By Proposition 4.1 of Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), the process in
(8.11)hasastrictLyapunovfunctionthatcanbeexpressedintermsofthepotential
function andthe controlcost functions. For eachi ∈ N, letαi denote theprobability
with which player i chooses the action ai = −1. Then, the Lyapunov function for
the process in (8.11) is deﬁned by:






αi log(αi) + (1 − αi)log(1 − αi)

, (8.12)
where U is the potential function. Since control cost functions of the relative
entropy form satisfy the smoothness conditions of Proposition 4.2 of Hofbauer
and Sandholm (2002), it follows that:
Proposition 8.4.1. The collection of stationary states and recurrent points of the process
in (8.11) coincide.
Theorem 6.1(iii) of Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) now implies that the perturbed
best-response dynamic converges to these stationary states. Notice that the set of
stationary states coincides with the set of logit quantal response equilibria of the
minority game (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). When the perturbation terms go to
zero,weobtainNashequilibria.AsthesetofNashequilibriaisnotﬁnite,wecannot







Figure 8.1. A potential function of the 3-player minority game
to which the stochastic process (8.11) converges. The set of Nash equilibria that are
the limit points of a sequence of logit quantal response equilibria is generally hard
to characterize. In the next section, we characterize this set for the three-player
minority game.
8.4.2 Stationary points for the three-player minority game
Consider the three-player minority game with f−1 = f+1 = f strictly decreasing in
thenumberofusers.Asitinvolvesasimplerescalingoffunctionssatisfying[Mon]
and [Sym], we may without loss of generality set f(2) = 0 and f(1) − f(3) = 1. A
potential of the game is then given in Figure 8.1. The Nash equilibria of the three-
playergamefolloweasilyfromtheresultsinSection8.2.2.Throughoutthissection,
Nash equilibria are denoted by (p,q,r) ∈ [0,1]3, where p,q,r are the probabilities
with which player 1, 2, and 3, respectively, choose −1. Then, the Nash equilibria




















−β(1 − p − q)
. (8.15)
Given β ≥ 0, we denote a logit QRE in which player 1,2 and 3 play −1 with
probability p,q,r by (p,q,r,β). We now characterize the set of Nash equilibria that
are the limit of a sequence of quantal response equilibria when β → ∞.
Proposition 8.4.2. Let (p(βn),q(βn),r(βn),βn)n∈N be a sequence of logit quantal response
equilibria: βn → ∞ and for each n ∈ N, the quadruple (p(βn),q(βn),r(βn),βn) solves8.5 B-     227
equations (8.13)-(8.15). A Nash equilibrium (p,q,r) is the limit of such a sequence if and
only if one of the following conditions hold:
(a) (p,q,r) is a pure Nash equilibrium,
(b) (p,q,r) is a Nash equilibrium with exactly one mixer who mixes uniformly,
(c) (p,q,r) = (1/2,1/2,1/2).
The proof is in Appendix 8.B. Proposition 8.4.2 thus characterizes the set of sta-
tionary points of the perturbed best response dynamics (8.11) for the three-player
minority game.
8.5 Best-reply learning with limited memory
In this section, we consider discrete time learning models in which players choose
best replies to beliefs that are supported by observed play in the recent past. We
study two such models, the learning model proposed by Hurkens (1995) and the
model proposed in Chapter 6.
In the learning model of Hurkens, players may choose any action that is
a best reply to some belief over other players’ actions that is consistent with
their recent past play. The limiting behavior of this learning process is easy to
characterize. Hurkens shows that the Markov processes deﬁned by his learning
process eventually settle down in minimal curb sets (Basu and Weibull, 1991).
Recall (Section 2.1.2) that a curb set is a product set of pure strategies that contains
all best replies against beliefs consistent with the recommendations of the other
players; a curbset is minimal if itdoes not contain another curb set. Unfortunately,
thelearningprocessofHurkensdoesnotprovideasharppredictionintheminority
game. As shown by Tercieux and Voorneveld (2005), the unique minimal curb set
in the minority game consists of the entire strategy space. That is, over time, all
players will continue to choose both actions.
Bycontrast,thelearningmodelintroducedinChapter6,inwhichplayersbest-
replytotheir beliefs subject toaso-calledrecencybias, oﬀerssharppredictions.As
shown in Chapter 6, play converges to one of the minimal prep sets of the game
under this learning process. Recall (Section 2.1.2) that a prep set is a product set of
purestrategiesthatcontainsatleastonebestreplyagainstbeliefsconsistentwiththe
recommendations of the other players; a prep set is minimal if it does not contain
another prep set. Tercieux and Voorneveld (2005) show that the minimal prep sets
of the minority game and the pure Nash equilibria of the game coincide. Hence,8 E       228
under the learning model of Chapter 6, play in the minority game converges to
one of the pure Nash equilibria of the game.
In both learning models, players need to recall a suﬃciently long period of
play in order for play to converge. We now turn to the question of the lower
bound on players’ memory. In Chapter 6, we have stated a suﬃcient condition on
players’ memory length for play to converge for any ﬁnite strategic game, but we
also remarked that this bound may not be tight. By exploiting speciﬁc features of a
game, the bound can be relaxed for certain games. Hence, an interesting question
is whether we can relax the lower bound given in Chapter 6 for minority games.
Suppose players remember actions that were chosen during the past T ∈ N
periods. It is easy to see that a memory length of T = 1 is insuﬃcient for a best-
reply learning process with limited memory to converge in the minority game (for
generic initial conditions). Suppose that at time t, players choose an action proﬁle
that is not a pure Nash equilibrium of the game. Then, there is an action, say −1,
that is chosen by more than k + 1 players. Hence, at time t + 1, all players chooses
the unique best reply +1. Repeating this argument, we see that play will cycle
forever between action proﬁles in which all players choose −1 and action proﬁles
in which all players choose +1.
However,weshowthatamemorylengthofT = 2issuﬃcientfortheminority
game for play to converge to one of the pure Nash equilibria under the learning
model of Chapter 6. In showing this, we give a simple proof of the general con-
vergence result in Chapter 6 (Theorem 6.4.1) for the special case of the minority
game, which may provide the reader with helpful intuition for the general case.
For ease of reference, we recall the most important deﬁnitions from Chapter 6
here. When the memory length T is equal to 2, the process is a Markov chain with
state space
H = {(a1,a2) | a1,a2 ∈ ×j∈N Aj}.
A history h = (a1,a2) ∈ H indicates that players chose the action proﬁles a1 and
a2 one and two periods ago, respectively. The transition probability functions
P : H × H → [0,1] give the probability of moving from one state to the next, i.e.,
P(h,h0) ∈ [0,1] is the probability of moving from state h ∈ H to state h0 ∈ H. By
deﬁnition,
P
h0∈H P(h,h0) = 1 for all h ∈ H. It is not necessary to specify the relevant
probabilities: for the convergence result, only sign restrictions are needed.
Recall that the class of learning processes studied in Chapter 6 satisﬁes two
conditions. If P(h,h0) > 0, then histories h,h0 ∈ H are such that:8.5 B-     229
P1: The history h0 = (b1,b2) is a successor of h = (a1,a2), i.e., b2 = a1.
P2: Foreachi ∈ N,b1





i if and only if a1
i is a best reply to α−i.
That is, going from h to h0, a new proﬁle of most recent actions is appended to h
(P1), and each player chooses a best reply to a belief with support in the product
set of actions chosen in the previous T = 2 periods, selecting the most recent best
replyifsuchabestreplyexists(P2).Ingameswithtwoactionssuchastheminority
game, this condition simply means that players continue to play the action they
chose in the previous round, unless it is no longer a best reply to his current belief.
Proposition 8.5.1. Consider a Markov chain on H with transition probability function
P, where, for all states h,h0 ∈ H, it holds that P(h,h0) > 0 if and only if [P1] and [P2] are
satisﬁed. This Markov process eventually settles down in a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let h0 = (a1,a2) ∈ H and distinguish two cases:
Case 1: a1 is a pure Nash equilibrium. By [P2], with positive probability, each
playerchooseshisactionunderthebeliefthatallhisopponentswillplayaccording
to a1 in the next period. Each player’s most recent best reply is to continue playing
as in a1, so the process moves with positive probability to the history h1 = (a1,a1).
From this state onwards, the only feasible belief based on the past two periods is
that all players play according to a1 and the most recent best reply implies that
they will continue to play according to a1: the process remains in state h1 and play
has converged to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Case 2: a1 is not a pure Nash equilibrium. By Proposition 8.2.1, one of the
actions, without loss of generality −1, was chosen by a set S ⊆ N of players with
|S| > k + 1. Each player’s unique best response to a1 is therefore to choose +1. By
[P2], the process moves with positive probability to state h1 = ((+1,...,+1),a1).
Let a∗ ∈ ×j∈N Aj be a pure Nash equilibrium in which k + 1 members of S choose
+1 and the others choose −1. Again using [P2], the process moves with positive
probability from h1 to h2 = (a∗,(+1,...,+1)):
• For each of the selected k + 1 members of S, +1 is the unique best reply to the
belief drawn from the past two periods that at least k + 1 other players from
S will choose −1.
• Foreachoftheremainingkplayers,−1istheuniquebestresponsetothebelief
that all other players will continue to play last period’s proﬁle (+1,...,+1).




was chosen arbitrarily, this will eventually happen with probability one (Kemeny
and Snell, 1976): play eventually settles down in a pure Nash equilibrium. 
Remark 8.5.2. Notice that, due to the symmetry of the minority game, by slightly
adapting the proof it can be shown that play converges to one of the pure Nash
equilibria of the game if players only remember their own actions in the past two
periods,aswellashowmanyotherschosetheseactions.Thiscomesattheexpenseof
a more complex notation and a larger deviation from the notation of Chapter 6. /
8.6 Conclusions
Though congestion games are apparently simple, game-theorists’ understanding
of play in such games is far from complete, for two reasons. Firstly, well-known
learning models do not always provide equivocal predictions for such games. In
the current chapter, we have characterized the Nash equilibria and the limiting
behavior of several well-known learning models in a simple congestion game, the
minority game. We have shown that these learning models provide diﬀerent pre-
dictions for this game. Secondly, experimental results are not always in line with
theoretical predictions. In experiments on market entry games, aggregate play is
largely consistent with equilibrium play, with the number of entrants close to the
market capacity. However, individual play generally does not resemble Nash play
(see e.g. Ochs, 1999). In the next chapter, we therefore discuss an alternative learn-
ing model which seems especially suitable to describe players’ behavior in such
games, and compare the predictions of this learning model to the predictions of
the learning models discussed in the current chapter, and to experimental results.
8.A Stochastic dominance for binomial distributions
Let X have a binomial distribution with n ∈ N draws and success probability
p ∈ [0,1]; brieﬂy, a B(n,p) distribution: X = X1 + ··· + Xn, where X1,...,Xn are i.i.d
B(1,p).Distributionswithahighersuccessratepstochasticallydominatethosewitha8.A S     231
lower one (cf. Ross, 1996, Exc. 9.9). Formally, in terms of cumulative distributions,
if p,q ∈ [0,1] and p < q, then















with strict inequality if m < n. This follows by substitution if m = 0 or m = n. So
let m ∈ {1,...,n − 1}. It suﬃces to show that the function
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Consider the term in square brackets. The ﬁrst probability is strictly smaller than
thesecond,astheﬁrstevent(atmostm−1successesintheﬁrstn−1draws)implies
the second one (at most m successes during all n draws), whereas the latter also
includes the positive-probability event that
Pn−1
k=1 Xk = m. Hence, the derivative is
negative, as we had to show.
Write a function g : {0,1,...,n} → R as the sum of indicator functions:
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Then
E[g(X)] = g(n) +
n−1 X
k=0
(g(k) − g(k + 1))P(X ≤ k).
If g is nonconstant, non-increasing, then g(k) − g(k + 1) ≥ 0 for all k = 0,...,n − 1,
with at least one strict inequality. As shown above, the cumulative probabilities
are strictly decreasing in the success probability p. So E[g(X)] becomes a strictly
decreasing function of p: the higher the probability of success, the larger the prob-
ability that g(X) achieves a low value. Of course, for non-decreasing functions the
converse holds.
8.B Proof of Proposition 8.4.2
The only Nash equilibria not covered by (a), (b), and (c) are those with one player
(player 1, say) choosing −1, one player (player 2, say) choosing +1, and the third
player (player 3, say) mixing with probability λ ∈ (0,1) \ {1
2}.
Suppose, to the contrary, that such an equilibrium is the limit of a sequence of
logit QRE (p(βn),q(βn),r(βn),βn)n∈N where βn → ∞ and (p(βn),q(βn),r(βn),βn) solves
equations (8.13) to (8.15) for a logit QRE. In the selected equilibrium, both the
(−1)-player and the (+1)-player choose their unique best response. By Lemma 3 in
Turocy (2005, p. 251), βn(1 − p(βn)) → 0 and βnq(βn) → 0. Substituting this in the










contradicting the assumption that limn→∞ r(βn) = λ , 1/2.
It remainsto show that theclasses of equilibriain the propositionare indeed limits
of a sequence of logit QREs.
(a): By symmetry, it suﬃces to show that the pure Nash equilibrium (p,q,r) =
(1,1,0) is the limit of a sequence of logit QREs.
Step 1: For each β > 4 there is a logit QRE (p,q,r,β) with p = q ∈ (1/2,1), and
r < 1/2.8.B P  P 8.4.2 233
Proof of Step 1: Based on conditions (8.13) - (8.15) for a logit QRE and the substi-
tution p = q, deﬁne for all β > 0 and p ∈ [1/2,1]:
r(p,β) :=
1




1 + exp[−β(1 − p − r(p,β))]
.
Let β > 4. We show that there is a solution p∗ ∈ (1/2,1] to the equation p = f(p,β).
Substitution in (8.13) - (8.15) yields that (p,q,r,β) = (p∗,p∗,r(p∗,β),β) is a logit QRE
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for β > 4, it follows that f(p,β) > p for p slightly larger than 1/2. Moreover,
f(1,β) < 1.Hence,bytheIntermediateValueTheoremappliedto f(·,β), f(p∗,β) = p∗
for some p∗ ∈ (1/2,1).
Step 2: Let β0 > 4 and let p0 ∈ (1/2,1) solve f(p0,β0) = p0. This is possible by Step
1. The function f(p0,·) is strictly increasing on [β0,∞).
Proof of Step 2: By deﬁnition of f, it suﬃces to show that the derivative of
β 7→ β(1 − p0 − r(p0,β)), β ∈ [β0,∞)




+ 1 − p0 − r(p0,β). (8.16)
Using p0 > 1/2 and the deﬁnition of r, it follows that ∂r(p0,β)/∂β < 0, i.e., the
function r(p0,·) is strictly decreasing on [β0,∞). Moreover, as p0 = f(p0,β0) > 1/2,
it follows from the deﬁnition of f that 1−p0 −r(p0,β0) > 0. As r(p0,·) is decreasing,
this implies that 1 − p0 − r(p0,β) > 0 for each β ∈ [β0,∞). Therefore, the expression
in (8.16) is positive.8 E       234
Step 3: The pure Nash equilibrium (p,q,r) = (1,1,0) is the limit of a sequence of
QREs.
Proof of Step 3: Let β0 > 4 and consider a QRE (p0,q0,r0,β0) as in Step 1. Set
β1 = β0 + 1. By Step 2, p0 = f(p0,β0) < f(p0,β1). Moreover, f(1,β1) < 1. By the
Intermediate Value Theorem applied to the function f(·,β1), there is a p1 ∈ (p0,1)
with p1 = f(p1,β1). Conclude that there is a QRE (p1,q1,r1,β1) with
p1 = q1 = f(p1,β1) > p0,
r1 = r(p1,β1),
β1 = β0 + 1.
Repeating this construction allows us to deﬁne a sequence (pn,qn,rn,βn)n∈N of
solutions to (8.13) - (8.15) satisfying the conditions of Step 1 and with βn → ∞ and
(pn)n∈N strictly increasing.
As (pn,qn,rn)n∈N is a sequence in the compact strategy space, we may assume
without loss of generality that the sequence converges. Its limit (p,q,r) must be a
Nash equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). As (pn)n∈N is a strictly increasing
sequence in (1/2,1) and (rn)n∈N is a sequence in (0,1/2), it must be p = q > 1/2
and r ≤ 1/2. The only Nash equilibrium of the game with these properties is
(p,q,r) = (1,1,0).
(b): By symmetry, it suﬃces to show that the Nash equilibrium (p,q,r) = (1,0,1/2)
is the limit of a sequence of logit QREs. The steps are similar to those in (a).
Therefore, the proof is kept short.
Step 1: For each β > 4 there is a logit QRE (p,q,r,β) with p ∈ (1/2,1),q = 1 − p,r =
1/2.
Proof of Step 1: Let β > 4. Based on the substitution q = 1 − p and r = 1/2 in







Weshowthatthereisasolutionp∗ ∈ (1/2,1)totheequationp = g(p,β).Substitution
in (8.13) - (8.15) yields that (p,q,r,β) = (p∗,1 − p∗,1/2,β),β) is a logit QRE with the
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Since g(1/2,β) = 1/2 and ∂g(1/2,β)/∂p = β/4 > 1, it follows that g(p,β) > p for p
slightly larger than 1/2. Moreover, g(1,β) < 1, so the Intermediate Value Theorem
implies that g(p∗,β) = p∗ for some p∗ ∈ (1/2,1).
Step 2: For each p0 ∈ (1/2,1), the function g(p0,·) is strictly increasing on (0,∞).
Proof of Step 2: Immediate from the deﬁnition of g.
Step 3: The Nash equilibrium (p,q,r) = (1,0,1/2) is the limit of a sequence of logit
QREs.
ProofofStep3:Reasoningasintheproofofstep3inpart(a)allowsustoconstruct
a sequence (pn,qn,rn,βn)n∈N of solutions to (8.13) - (8.15) satisfying the conditions
of Step 1 and with βn → ∞ and (pn)n∈N strictly increasing. As (pn,qn,rn)n∈N is a
sequencein thecompact strategyspace,we mayassume withoutloss ofgenerality
that the sequence converges. Its limit (p,q,r) must be a Nash equilibrium (McK-
elvey and Palfrey, 1995). As (pn)n∈N is a strictly increasing sequence in (1/2,1),
qn = 1 − pn and rn = 1/2 for all n ∈ N, it must be p > 1/2,q = 1 − p,r = 1/2. The
only Nash equilibrium of the game with these properties is (p,q,r) = (1,0,1/2).
(c): It follows by substitution that (p,q,r,β) = (1/2,1/2,1/2,β) is a logit QRE for all
β ≥ 0. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium (p,q,r) = (1/2,1/2,1/2) is the limit of a
sequence of logit QREs with β → ∞. 9 Coordinating to diﬀerentiate
Summary
In the previous chapter, we characterized the limiting behavior of a num-
ber of standard learning models for the minority game, a simple con-
gestion game. In the current chapter, we give a critical account of an
alternative learning model. We relate this model to standard learning
models, and compare its predictions to experimental results.
9.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have studied the limiting behavior of several well-






predicting pure strategy equilibria, and others predicting equilibria with some
mixing, making our theoretical understanding of play in such games incomplete.
Moreover,experimentalresultsonsuchcongestiongamesaresometimeshard
to interpret. Though players are remarkably successful at learning to coordinate
in congestion games, rapidly achieving a “magical” degree of coordination in the
words of Kahneman (1988), regularities on the aggregate level generally conceal
non-equilibrium behavior at the individual level. That is, even though aggregate
play is close to the Nash equilibrium, individual players generally do not seem
to play equilibrium strategies (see Ochs (1999) and references therein for results
on market entry games, see e.g. Selten et al. (2007) for similar results on a related
game). In addition, the eﬀect of information on players’ behavior remains unclear.
In some cases, providing players with additional information leads to higher
payoﬀs (e.g. Duﬀy and Hopkins, 2005), where standard learning models predict9.1 I 237
that this information should have no eﬀect on play.
Theseexperimentalﬁndingsarehardtoexplainusingstandardlearningmod-
els, such as the ones discussed in the previous chapter. The current chapter there-
fore discusses an alternative learning model, proposed in the literature on the
minority game. In this model, players condition their behavior on a limited his-
tory of past outcomes, using so-called response modes that prescribe which action
to take given the history of recent outcomes. Players decide on which response
mode to use on the basis of its past performance. There are two important diﬀer-
ences with standard learning models. Firstly, players do not take into account that
their action aﬀects the aggregate outcome. Secondly, it is assumed that players are
endowed with a random selection of response modes.
These assumptions are natural in the current context. Congestion games,
such as the route-choice games studied by Selten et al. (2007), often involve a
large number of players, so that players may not account for the impact of their
own action. Secondly, the assumption that players are endowed with a random
selection of response modes is natural given that in the type of games studied
here, there are no response modes that are a priori better than others: whether a
response mode is successful (in the sense that it gives high payoﬀs) only depends
on whether there are other players using an antagonistic response mode. For
instance, Selten et al. (2007) identify two groups of players in their experiments
on route-choice behavior. One group switches roads when it was crowded last
period, while the other group then sticks with their choice, as they expect others
to switch. The interaction between these two groups make that traﬃc is divided
fairly evenly over the diﬀerent roads, thus giving rise to the magical coordination
Kahneman (1988) alluded to. It is thus the interaction between response modes
that determine the success of response modes, so that it may well be realistic that
players just use some simple heuristics or rules of thumb, rather than trying to
identify the optimal strategy.
In the current chapter, we relate the learning model proposed in the minority
game literature to the standard game-theoretic learning models, and compare
its predictions to experimental results on congestion games. The contribution of
this chapter is that it relates the literature on this learning model, which has
been largely developed in physics, to the literature on learning in game theory
and to the literature in experimental economics on congestion games. We have
no intention of giving a comprehensive survey of the extensive minority game
literature.Foracollectionofpapersontheminoritygame,seehttp://www.unifr.
ch/econophysics/minority, and see Challet et al. (2004) or Moro (2003) for an9 C   238
introduction to the ﬁeld.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. We discuss the learning model pro-
posed in the minority game literature in Section 9.2, and compare it to game-
theoretic learning models. In Section 9.3, we discuss its main predictions. These
predictions are compared to experimental results on congestion games in Sec-
tion 9.4. Section 9.5 concludes.
9.2 Learning to play the minority game
9.2.1 The minority game
We brieﬂy recall the deﬁnition of the minority game, and summarize the main
resultsoftheequilibriumcharacterization.Foranelaboratediscussionofthestage
game and a full account of those results, see the previous chapter.
There is a set N = {1,...,2k + 1} of players, where k ∈ N. Each player i ∈ N
has a set of pure strategies Ai = {−1,+1}. The payoﬀs only depend on the number
of opponents choosing that action: for b ∈ {−1,+1}, there is a function
fb : {1,...,2k + 1} → R
that for each ` ∈ {1,...,2k + 1} gives the payoﬀ fb(`) to a player choosing action
b when the total number of players choosing b equals `. If action b ∈ {−1,+1} is
chosen by k players or fewer under a strategy proﬁle a ∈ ×j∈NAj , we say that it is
the minority action under a, otherwise it is the majority action.




|{j ∈ N | aj = ai}|

, (9.1)
where a = (aj)j∈N ∈ ×j∈NAj. Payoﬀs are extended to mixed strategies in the usual
way.
The function fb, where b ∈ {−1,+1}, can have several forms. In the previous
chapter, we only assumed that the function is (i) symmetric, i.e., f−1 = f+1 = f, (ii)
monotonic, i.e., f is a strictly decreasing function. Here, to be in line with much of
the minority game literature (e.g. Challet et al., 2004; Moro, 2003), we assume
∀b ∈ {−1,+1} : fb(`) =
2(k − `) + 1
2k + 1
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Clearly, this function satisﬁes the symmetry and monotonicity conditions above.
To interpret this function, note that if the action proﬁle is a = (aj)j∈N ∈ ×j∈NAj,
with ` players choosing −1, and 2k + 1 − ` players choosing +1, where ` ∈ N, the
aggregate action
P
i∈N ai is equal to −` + (2k + 1 − `) = 2(k − `) + 1. When ` ≥ k + 1,
i.e., −1 is the majority action under the strategy proﬁle a, this term is negative, and
players who chose −1 (+1) receive a negative (positive) payoﬀ.
In the previous chapter, we characterized the set of equilibria of the minority
game. The game has a number of asymmetric pure Nash equilibria in which k
players choose one option (the minority option) and k + 1 players choose the
other one. In addition, there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which
each player chooses each alternative with probability 1/2. Also, there are mixed
Nash equilibria with k players choosing −1 with probability 1, k players choosing
+1 with probability 1, and a player randomizing between −1 and +1 with any
probability. Finally, there are a number of mixed Nash equilibria with more than
one mixer.
The large number of equilibria—there is in fact a continuum of equilibria—
makes it hard to predict which equilibrium will be played. As the equilibria in
pure strategies cannot be Pareto-ranked or ordered in terms of risk-dominance,
no particular pure Nash equilibrium can be singled out as being most salient
(Schelling, 1960). Hence, without pre-play communication, players do not have
enough information to implement a pure Nash equilibrium (cf. Menezes and
Pitchford, 2006). While players could use common knowledge of rationality and
symmetry to deduce and select the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium (cf. Ochs,
1990; Meyer et al., 1992), this may raise an incentive problem, as players can earn
a higher payoﬀ than in the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium if they manage
to outsmart other players. Hence, players may try to ﬁnd patterns in the play of
others when the game is played repeatedly (cf. Arthur, 1994; Meyer et al., 1992).
The learning model proposed in the minority game literature provides a way of
formalizing this notion. We introduce this model in the next section.
9.2.2 Learning model
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {0,1,...}. At each time t, the stage game is
played. After each round of play t of the stage game, the players are informed
of the aggregate action A(t) :=
P
i∈N ai(t), where ai(t) ∈ Ai = {−1,+1} is the action
taken by player i at time t. We assume that players have a limited memory:
they only retain the sequence of the minority actions in the previous m rounds,9 C   240
hm si,1 si,2 si,3 si,4
(−1,−1,−1) +1 −1 −1 +1
(−1,−1,+1) −1 −1 +1 −1
(−1,+1,−1) +1 −1 −1 +1
(−1,+1,+1) −1 +1 −1 +1
(+1,−1,−1) +1 +1 +1 +1
(+1,−1,+1) −1 −1 +1 +1
(+1,+1,−1) −1 −1 −1 +1
(+1,+1,+1) −1 +1 −1 +1
Table 9.1. An example of a subset of response modes with m = 3 and
nS = 4 for some player i ∈ N. For instance, if the history of outcomes
is (−1,−1,−1), then response mode si,1 prescribes action ai = +1, and
response mode si,2 prescribes action ai = −1.
where m ∈ N. More speciﬁcally, in round t, players observe a history hm(t) =
(−sign[A(τ)])τ∈{t−m,t−m+1,...,t−1},wherewenotethat−sign[A(t)]indicatestheminority
action at time t: if there are fewer players choosing −1 (+1) at time t than there are
players choosing +1 (−1), then −sign[A(t)] is equal to −1 (+1).1
A response mode s assigns to each history hm ∈ {−1,+1}m an action a ∈ {−1,+1}.
That is, a response mode s prescribes which action s(hm(t)) ∈ {−1,+1} to take, for
a given history of play hm(t) at time t. Note that a s(hm(t)) does not depend on t,
other than through hm(t): if hm(t) = hm(t0), then s(hm(t)) = s(hm(t0)). It is not hard
to see that there are 22m
diﬀerent response modes: there are 2m possible signals
hm of length m, and for each signal, there are two possible actions. For memory
length m, denote the set of all response modes by S(m). An important assumption
in the current learning model is that each player i ∈ N is endowed with a subset
Si of the set of all possible response modes S(m). All players are endowed with the
same number of response modes: there exists nS ∈ N such that |Si| = nS for all
i ∈ N. We assume that nS ≥ 2. For each player i ∈ N, the response modes in Si are
drawn uniformly at random from S(m), independently across players. An example
for nS = 4 and m = 3 is given in Table 9.1.
Whenfacedwithahistory,aplayerhastochoosewhichofhisresponsemodes
to use in the next period. Each player keeps a virtual score for each response
mode in his endowment that reﬂects that response mode’s past performance. The
1 The history hm(t) at t = 0 is drawn uniformly at random from {−1,+1}m.9.2 L      241
virtual score of each response mode is updated after each time period, regardless
ofwhethertheresponsemodehasbeenusedornot.Whenaresponsemodewould
have correctly predicted the minority action, its virtual score is increased with the
payoﬀs it would have earned, otherwise it is decreased with the same amount.
More speciﬁcally, the virtual score of player i ∈ N for response mode si ∈ Si at time
t > 0 is given by:





[2(k − `(si(hm(t)),t)) + 1]
where we recall that si(h) is the action prescribed by response mode si when the
history is h, and where `(a,t) is the number of players choosing action a in round
t. At t = 0, the virtual score of player i for si is pi,t(si) = 0.
An important thing to note is that players do not take the eﬀect of their
action on the aggregate outcome into account. In determining the virtual score of
a response mode, players only consider whether this response mode would have
predicted the actual outcome correctly, neglecting the question whether playing
this response mode would have aﬀected the outcome. To see this, suppose that at
time t, player i chooses ai = −1, and that the total number of players choosing this
action is k + 1, i.e., −1 is the majority action. Then, 2(k − (k + 1)) + 1 = −1 would
be added to all response modes prescribing action ai = −1 (given the current
history), and −(2(k − (k + 1)) + 1) = +1 would be added to all response modes
prescribing ai = +1. However, if player i would have chosen ai = +1, the number
of players choosing a = +1 would have been k + 1, and +1 would have been the
majority action. This is an important assumption of the model, and we discuss its
implications in Section 9.2.3.
The probability that a player chooses a response mode at a given time step is
determined by its virtual score at that time, with the choice probabilities following
the well-known logit choice rule. For i ∈ N, denote the response mode selected by
player i at time t by si(t). Then,










where β > 0 is the logit parameter. The parameter β can be interpreted as the sen-
sitivity of choice to marginal information. In the limiting case β → ∞, players mix
uniformly among the response modes with the highest virtual score. Otherwise,
players choose response modes with lower virtual scores with positive probabil-
ity, with a probability increasing in the virtual scores. Perhaps surprisingly, this9 C   242
additional noise may actually improve collective performance, as we discuss in
Section 9.3.1.
9.2.3 Discussion
In this section, we discuss two of the most important assumptions of the learning
modelintheminoritygamemodel:(i)theassumptionthatallplayersareendowed
with a random subset of response modes, (ii) the assumption that players update
thevirtualscoresofresponsemodesnotused,withouttakingintoaccounttheeﬀect
of that response mode on the game’s outcome. We discuss these assumptions in
turn.
Response modes and heterogeneity
In the learning model proposed in the minority game literature, players base their
action on the recent past, trying to discern patterns in their opponents’ behavior,
as in Arthur (1994). In the El Farol bar problem described by Arthur, players need
to decide whether to go to a bar or not. Going to the bar is only pleasant if it is
not too crowded. Arthur proposes that players condition their decision to go on
attendance levels in the previous weeks: if the bar has been crowded for the last
threeweeks,say,theyexpectittobecrowdednextweekalso.Thesementalmodels
are mapped into actions: if a player expects the bar to be crowded, he will not go.
The response modes in the learning model of the minority game literature
are a concise way of modeling this notion. An important question, however, is
which response modes need to be included in the model. There are two possible
approaches. Firstly, one could simply incorporate all possible response modes.
However, if all possible response modes are included in the learning model, the
strategy space becomes huge already for very simple games. Many diﬀerent re-
sponse modes are conceivable in a simple game such as the minority game, as
illustrated by the list of examples in Arthur (1994).
A second possibility is to include only a selection of possible response modes.
In that case, one could either make a selection based on behavioral assumptions,
or let the subset of response modes be determined at random. In the ﬁrst case, a
natural choiceis to includeresponse modes thatreﬂect beliefs aboutother players’
actions, based on recent outcomes. The ﬁrst approach is commonly taken in the
economics literature (e.g. Erev and Rapoport, 1998; Selten et al., 2007), while the9.2 L      243
current learning model chooses the second approach. In the latter case, there are
no restrictions on the types of response modes that players use.
This may seem to be a weak point of the model, as response modes need
not have a sensible interpretation in the learning model of the minority game
literature.However,ingamessuchastheminoritygame,whetheraresponsemode
is reasonable only depends on the response modes used by others. Conversely,
any response mode, whether it has a sensible interpretation or not, will work
if opponents use response modes that recommend them to take the opposite
action. For instance, in experiments on route-choice games, Selten et al. (2007)
report that some subjects use a “direct” response mode, while other subjects use
a “contrarian” response mode. Subject who use the former response mode will
switchroadsiftheyexperiencedcongestioninthelastperiod,whilesubjectsusing
the contrarian response mode stick with their choice, as they expect other subjects
to switch. The important point to note here is that the direct response mode is
only sensible if there are players who use the contrarian response mode and vice
versa. In such a case, agnosticism on the type of response modes that players use
may well provide a more realistic model of players’ reasoning processes than the
more restrictive assumptions employed in diﬀerent learning models. This oﬀers
an elegant solution to the dilemma signalled by Erev and Roth (1998, p. 873)
that it is virtually impossible to include all possible behavioral rules, but that
selection of speciﬁc rules bears the risk of “parameter ﬁtting in a model with an
enormousnumberofparameters”.Inthelearningmodelproposedintheminority
game literature, no response mode is ruled out on a priori grounds, while sensible
behavioral rules evolve naturally, as the only criterion for a behavioral rule to
be sensible in the minority game is that there are other players who follow a
“contrarian” behavioral rule. Indeed, in Section 9.3.3, we show that under the
current learning model, players will self-organize into groups that use diﬀerent
response modes in such a way that their actions cancel out to the extent possible.
However, this approach raises some questions. Firstly, one may ask why
players are heterogeneous in their endowment of response modes. Perhaps more
importantly, one could ask why players only consider a ﬁxed number of response
modes. Indeed, individual players have an incentive to increase the number of re-
sponse modes they use, as that gives them an advantage over other players (Mar-
sili et al., 2000). However, these assumptions are not uncommon in game-theoretic
models of learning and bounded rationality. Possible justiﬁcations for such as-
sumptions include that each player has diﬀerent experiences prior to playing the
minority game and therefore deems diﬀerent response modes more reasonable
than others (cf. Aumann, 1997; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998), and that boundedly9 C   244




The law of simulated eﬀect and boundedly rational players
Which response mode players choose from the set of response modes they are
endowed with, is determined by the virtual score of each response mode. The
learning process proposed in the minority game literature is closely related to
the reinforcement learning model of Roth and Erev (1995) and Erev and Roth
(1998). The main diﬀerence between the basic reinforcement learning model of
Roth and Erev and the learning model of the minority game literature lies in
the updating of the score of strategies or response modes not played. In the basic
reinforcementlearningmodel,thescoresofthesestrategiesarenotupdated,while
in the learning model proposed in the minority game literature, the scores of
all response modes are updated every period, as in hypothetical reinforcement
learningorstochasticﬁctitiousplay(FudenbergandLevine,1998).Theassumption
that players also consider the payoﬀs to strategies or response modes not played
seems to be reasonable. Camerer and Ho (1999) argue on the basis of theoretical
arguments as well as on the basis of experimental ﬁndings that players obey not
only the “law of actual eﬀect”, but also the “law of simulated eﬀect”, meaning that
in reinforcement, not only payoﬀs from strategies that are actually used count, but
also foregone payoﬀs from strategies not played.
However, for players to play according to the law of simulated eﬀect, they
need more information than for standard reinforcement learning. Under standard
reinforcement learning, players only need to know the payoﬀ to the action they
choose.Bycontrast,toplayaccordingtostochasticﬁctitiousplay,playersaddition-
ally need to know the payoﬀ rule as well as the actions chosen by their opponents.
Even in a game such as the minority game, where the players only need to know
the aggregate choice of other players (and not their individual choices), calculat-
ing foregone payoﬀs of strategies not used may be too hard for players that are
boundedly rational. In the learning model proposed in the minority game liter-
ature, players’ bounded rationality is reconciled with the law of simulated eﬀect
by assuming that players do not take the eﬀect of their own action on the global
outcome into account. In that way, players can account for foregone payoﬀs of
response modes not used, without having to do complicated calculations.
One may think that for a large number of players, it will not matter much9.3 P     245
whether players account for their own impact. However, due to the minority rule,
there remains a systematic bias in the rewarding of response modes, even if the
number of players is arbitrarily large. The reason is that the reward for a response
mode that is currently played is systematically lower than that for the response
modes that are not used. These latter response modes get a point if they prescribe
the current minority side, even if they would have tipped the minority to the other
side if they would have been played, so that they would have guessed wrong in
reality. As the response mode that is actually played does not have this advantage,
the response modes that are not played are systematically favored and hence
results depend on whether players take the eﬀect of their action on the aggregate
outcome into account. This makes that players keep switching between response
modes: over time, a response mode that is not played for some time will gather
suﬃciently many virtual points so as to be selected to be played, thus losing its
advantage, until another response mode takes over again.
Interestingly, if players correct for this bias by allocating a small additional
reward to response modes currently played, this does not happen, and in the long
run, players use the same response mode in every period (in the limit β → ∞).
When m is suﬃciently small, in each round, k players will choose one action, and
k + 1 the other, as in the pure Nash equilibria of the game (Marsili et al., 2000).
The learning model proposed in the minority game literature thus combines
features from several learning models in the literature on learning in games. How-
ever, it makes distinctly diﬀerent predictions than game-theoretical learning mod-
els. To these predictions we now turn.
9.3 Predictions of the learning model
In this section, we discuss the main predictions on the learning model proposed
in the minority game literature. Some results are obtained analytically, others by
simulations. In the simulations, a given number of agents is endowed with a
random subset of response modes, and results are obtained by averaging over
diﬀerent assignments. In the ﬁrst two sections, we characterize the behavior of
the model in terms of social eﬃciency and informational eﬃciency, and show that
the two are intimately linked in this learning model. In Section 9.3.3, we discuss
how the predictions of the model can be understood in terms of the formation of






















Figure 9.1. Time evolution of the aggregate action A(t), with 2k + 1 = 301
and nS = 2. Panels correspond to m = 2,7,15 from top to bottom. Figure
taken from Moro (2003).
9.3.1 Volatility
Simulations show that the aggregate action A(t) :=
P
i∈N ai(t) keeps ﬂuctuating
around 0, as can be seen in Figure 9.1. As the game is symmetric, the time average
of A(t) will be 0 in the long run (e.g. Challet and Zhang, 1997). More interesting
is the behavior of the volatility σ2 := hA2i, where h·i denotes the (time) average
of a quantity. The volatility is a measure of the degree of eﬃciency (measured in
terms of aggregate payoﬀs) achieved in a population. The higher the volatility,
the larger the loss in aggregate payoﬀs: large ﬂuctuations around 0 imply that
the size of the minority is only small, as aggregate payoﬀs are proportional to
−
P
i ai(t)A(t) = −(A(t))2.
By simulations, it has been found that σ2 is only a function of α := 2m/(2k+1)
and nS, where we recall that nS is the number of response modes of each player
(Savit et al., 1999). Figure 9.2 shows the volatility as a function of α. As can be seen
in the ﬁgure, the volatility converges to the volatility exhibited in the symmetric
mixed Nash equilibrium for α → ∞. With a large number of players (α small),
overall performance is much worse. In fact, the volatility is of order (2k + 1)2, so
that the size of the group of players choosing the minority action is much smaller
than k. At intermediate values of α, volatility is low, and it attains a minimum at
αc(nS)  nS/2−0.66(Marsilietal.,2000).Hence,atintermediatevaluesofα,players

















































Figure 9.2. Volatility as a function of the order parameter α for nS = 2 and
diﬀerent number of players N := 2k + 1 = 101,201,301,501,701 (, ♦, 4,
C, O, respectively). The critical value αc is the value of α for which the
volatilityisataminimum.Inset:players’averagesuccessrateasfunction
of α (not discussed here, see Moro, 2003). Figure taken from Moro (2003).
the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium. This means that players can somehow
exploit the available information to reduce σ2 relative to the symmetric mixed
Nash equilibrium. Note that this is not the result of some form of cooperative
behavior of the players: agents are selﬁshly maximizing their own payoﬀs, and
for intermediate values of α, this leads to higher aggregate payoﬀs. However,
coordination is not complete under the current learning model. The aggregate
payoﬀ is maximized if players play according to one of the pure Nash equilibria
of the game, with k players choosing the minority action. In that case, almost half
of the players are in the minority, and σ2/(2k + 1) = 1/(2k + 1). Players come close
to this optimum at α = αc, but they never reach it.
Strikingly, global eﬃciency is enhanced for certain values of α when players
do not always choose the response mode with the highest number of virtual
points, i.e., when β < ∞ in Equation (9.2). It can be shown that for α < αc, when
the volatility is much higher than under the benchmark of the symmetric Nash
equilibrium, volatility decreases when the noise level 1/β increases. For α > αc,
the value of β does not aﬀect the level of volatility (Cavagna et al., 1999). The
explanation is that under the current learning model, players form herds when
α < αc. The parameter α is a measure of the total number of response modes9 C   248
relative to the number of players. When α < αc, there are few response modes
relative to the number of players. In that case, players have to herd at a limited
number of response modes, leading to a large number of players choosing the
same alternative (see Section 9.3.3). Decreasing β is then equivalent to slowing
down the updating of virtual scores for response modes. A ﬁnite β therefore acts
as a brake against overreaction.2
9.3.2 Information and eﬃciency
As discussed in the previous section, players seem to be able to coordinate reason-
ably well for some parameter conﬁgurations. The only way players can interact
is through the history of play. This observation led some authors to study the in-
formation contained in the history of play. The information content of the history







hA(t + 1) | hm(t) = νi2,
where hA(t + 1)|hm(t) = νi is the time average of the aggregate action conditional
on a given history of play. Loosely speaking, H measures the information in the
time series of A(t). If A(t + 1) and hm(t) are independent, then H = 0. If H > 0,
then the signal A(t) contains information. It can be shown that players under the
current learning model minimize the degree of predictability (Marsili et al., 2000).
Depending on the value of α, players are more or less successful in doing that. At
αc, the system changes from an informationally eﬃcient phase with low aggregate
payoﬀs (H = 0, σ2 large) to an information-rich phase with high aggregate payoﬀs
(H > 0, σ2 small). In the informationally eﬃcient phase, aggregate payoﬀs are
lower than under the symmetric mixed Nash-equilibrium. By contrast, in the
information rich phase, players manage to coordinate and aggregate payoﬀs are
higher than under the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium.
This transition between the informationally eﬃcient and the information rich
phase, or equivalently between the phase with low aggregate payoﬀs and the
phase with high aggregate payoﬀs, is central to the current learning model. At this
transition, there is a qualitative change in collective behavior, while the principles
2 This result is reminiscent of the ﬁndings of Goeree et al. (2007) who show that in a social
learning model, payoﬀ-dependent noise in the decision process can break the cascades that













Figure 9.3. Information H (open symbols) and fraction of frozen play-
ers φ (full symbols; not discussed here, see Moro, 2003) as a function
of the control parameter α = 2m/(2k + 1) for nS = 2 and m = 5,6,7
(circles, squares and diamonds, respectively). Figure taken from Moro
(2003).
behind the behavior of individual players remain unchanged. For all values of α,
players try to outsmart each other, but for low values of α, they are on average less
successful. In the next section, we discuss the interpretation of α.
9.3.3 Response modes and their antagonists
We have seen that the qualitative behavior of the system depends mainly on
α = 2m/(2k+1). Moreover, for some values of α, players are much more successful
in coordinating behavior than for other values. What is the feature of the model
underlying this behavior? We address this question in the current section. The
answer to this question points to an intuitive interpretation of the model’s results
in terms of groups using counteracting response modes.
The minority rule forces players to diﬀerentiate: if all players choose the
same response mode, all players obtain negative payoﬀs. As there are 22m
possible
response modes for 2k + 1 players, one would expect that players succeed in
diﬀerentiating if 2k + 1 is much smaller than 22m
, and be unsuccessful when 2k + 1
exceeds 22m
. Hence, one would expect a qualitative change when 2k+1 is of order
22m
, rather than of order 2m, as observed. To explain why the transition occurs9 C   250










be the normalized distance between s and s0. If D(m)(s,s0) = 1, i.e., s and s0 prescribe
diﬀerent actions for each possible history of play, we say that s and s0 are anti-
correlated. When D(m)(s,s0) = 1/2, we say that they are uncorrelated. The reason that
thetransitionoccurswhen2k+1isoforder2m isthattworesponsemodesonlygive
rise to distinctively diﬀerent behavior if they are anti-correlated or uncorrelated. It
can be shown analytically that for every response mode, the number of response
modes that are anti-correlated or uncorrelated with that response mode is 2·2m/nS
(Challet and Zhang, 1998). Hence, the qualitative behavior depends on 2m, not 22m
.
This leads us to an intuitive interpretation of the model’s results in terms of
the interplay between groups using diﬀerent response modes. Let s be a response
mode, and let ¯ s be the response mode that is anti-correlated with s. Suppose Ns
players use the response mode s in a given time period, while N¯ s players use the
anti-correlated response mode ¯ s in that period. If Ns is approximately equal to N¯ s
for all anti-correlated pairs (s, ¯ s) of response modes, then the actions of players
using these response modes eﬀectively cancel and the volatility will be small.
Hence, it would be optimal if the group of players that use a certain response
mode is of about the same size as the group that uses the “antagonistic” response
mode. However, this is not always possible, as the dimension of the space of
response modes is ﬁxed by the parameter m. Hence, when the number of players
is large, the number of response modes they use will be larger than 2m, so that
players are forced to use response modes that are positively correlated. This gives
rise to herding eﬀects and large volatility when α is small. For somewhat larger
values of m (for a ﬁxed number of players), players use response modes that are
either uncorrelated or mutually anti-correlated. In that case, players spread more
or less evenly over both actions in each period. Finally, when m is very large
relative to the number of players, the number of players using a given response
mode will only be small, so that players act more or less independently (Moro,
2003). However, aggregate payoﬀs are still higher than under the benchmark of
the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium, as there always exist pairs of players that
follow anti-correlated response modes (Challet and Zhang, 1998).9.4 C    251
9.4 Comparison to experimental results
In this section, we discuss some experiments on the minority game and related
congestion games. In addition to the minority game, we focus on market entry
games and route-choice games. First, we brieﬂy introduce the latter two classes
of games. We then present some experimental results, and discuss whether the
learning model proposed in the minority game literature could explain these
results.
The market entry game (Selten and G¨ uth, 1982) has been studied extensively
in economics (see Ochs (1999) and references therein; see Duﬀy and Hopkins
(2005) for a recent contribution). In a market entry game, N players must decide
independently and simultaneously to enter a market with a ﬁxed capacity c < N
or to stay out. Players who enter the market receive a payoﬀ that decreases in the
number of entrants. The payoﬀ of players who stay out of the market is commonly
taken to be constant. The game generally has a large number of Nash equilibria,
both in pure and in mixed strategies. Depending on the exact form of the payoﬀ
function,theremayevenbeacontinuumofequilibria.PureNashequilibriamaybe
payoﬀ-symmetric or payoﬀ-asymmetric, and strict or non-strict, depending on the
choice of parameters. For the payoﬀ functions commonly studied, the (expected)
number of entrants is between c−1 and c in equilibrium. An important diﬀerence
between the market entry game and the minority game is that in the latter game,
the payoﬀs of both actions are subject to congestion, while in the market entry
game, players can choose between an action with constant payoﬀs (staying out)
and an action whose payoﬀs are subject to congestion.
Route-choice games are closer to the minority game in that the payoﬀs of all
actions are subject to congestion. In a route-choice game, players choose between
two or more roads. The payoﬀs of choosing one of these roads decrease in the
number of other players who choose that road. In equilibrium, players divide
themselves over the roads in such a way that travelling times and hence payoﬀs
are equalized. These games have been studied experimentally by a number of
authors (see Selten et al., 2007, and references therein). An important diﬀerence
with the minority game is that the pure Nash equilibria of the route-choice game
are payoﬀ-symmetric, and that they are strict.
Wenowturntosomeexperimentalworkonmarketentrygames,route-choice
games and the minority game, and discuss whether experimental ﬁndings can be
explained by the learning model proposed in the minority game literature. We
focus on two issues: aggregate behavior versus individual play and the eﬀect of9 C   252
information on players’ behavior. We discuss these issues in turn.
Aggregate behavior versus individual play
A robust ﬁnding in experiments on games in these classes is that subjects quickly
achievea“magical”degreeofcoordination(inthesensethataggregatepayoﬀsare
high). However, individual players generally do not play equilibrium strategies.
For instance, while Erev and Rapoport (1998) ﬁnd that the number of entrants
in a market entry game rapidly converges to the equilibrium value, they also
observe large between- and within-subject variability, which does not diminish
with experience. This is a common ﬁnding in experiments on market entry games
(Ochs, 1999, p. 169).3 Similarly, in their experiments on route-choice games, Selten
et al. (2007) observe that the mean number of drivers on the diﬀerent roads is very
close to the equilibrium number, while large ﬂuctuations in individual behavior
persist until the end of the experiment. Similar experimental results have been
reported for the minority game (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007; Chmura and Pitz,
2006).Inallcases,thehypothesisthatﬂuctuationscanbeexplainedbyasymmetric
mixed Nash strategy equilibrium of the game can be rejected. These results cannot
easily be explained with standard learning models, as these models typically
predictconvergencetothepureNashequilibriaofsuchgamesortoNashequilibria
with at most one mixer (see Duﬀy and Hopkins (2005) and the previous chapter
foradiscussionofthepredictionsofdiﬀerentlearningmodelsforthemarketentry
game and the minority game, respectively).
Some authors attempt to reconcile aggregate “equilibrium” behavior in ex-
perimentswithindividualnon-equilibriumplaybyconjecturingthatsubjectsmay
use counteracting behavioral rules (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007; Chmura and Pitz,
2006; Erev and Rapoport, 1998; Rapoport et al., 2000; Selten et al., 2007; Zwick
and Rapoport, 2002). For instance, Bottazzi and Devetag (2007) ﬁnd that there is
considerableheterogeneityinplayers’behaviorintheirexperimentsontheminor-
ity game. They show that it is not the heterogeneity per se which determines the
players’ success in coordinating, rather, it is the interaction between these diﬀer-
ent behavioral rules that players can successfully coordinate on choosing diﬀerent
actions. These ﬁndings are in line with the predictions of the learning model of
the minority game literature that players self-organize in groups that use coun-
3 An exception is Duﬀy and Hopkins (2005) who ﬁnd that subjects coordinate on one of the pure
Nash equilibria of the market entry game after a large number of rounds when they are given
feedback on others’ choices.9.4 C    253
teracting response modes, thus reconciling aggregate equilibrium behavior and
individual non-equilibrium play.
In most experiments, it is not fully clear which behavioral rules subjects em-
ploy. For example, Selten et al. (2007) are unable to classify 42% of the subjects
in terms of the behavioral rules they use in their route-choice experiments, while
Zwick and Rapoport (2002) cannot classify the behavior of some 60% of their
subjects in their experiments on the market entry game. This leaves open the
possibility that subjects use some response modes that may not have an intuitive
interpretation (and are thus not recognized by the experimenters) but that never-
theless perform well, since there are players using counteracting response modes,
as predicted by the current learning model (see Section 9.2.3 and 9.3.3). A system-
atic study of the diﬀerent response modes used by experimental subjects seems
needed. Indeed, Zwick and Rapoport (2002) conclude that there is a need “to re-
orient research on interactive decision making to individual diﬀerences, identify
patterns of behavior shared by subsets of players . . . , and then attempt to account




dimensions of information have been investigated in the experimental literature.
Aﬁrstdimensionthathasbeenstudiedishowbehaviordependsontheinfor-
mation subjects have on others’ choices. Players can be provided with information
only on the payoﬀ rule and aggregate behavior in the past rounds or may be in-
formed additionally of the individual choices of all other players. Although for a
wide range of learning models including the reinforcement learning model and
the learning model studied in the minority game literature, this should not aﬀect
results, in many experimental studies, behavior diﬀers qualitatively depending
on the information players have. For instance, in experiments on market entry
games, Duﬀy and Hopkins (2005) ﬁnd that behavior becomes less random when
players are informed of other players’ choices. In market entry games, this could
beexplainedbythefactthatprovidingplayerswithmoreinformationallowsthem
to use repeated game strategies, as the additional information allows players to
signal their commitment to entering the market. While for the market entry game,
such a signalling strategy pays oﬀ, this is not the case for the minority game and
route-choice games. For instance, suppose that k players in the minority game9 C   254
commit to action a = −1, and k players commit to action a = +1. The remaining
player will not be deterred from choosing either of those actions by the commit-
ment of other players, nor does the commitment of these players guarantee them a
positive payoﬀ.4 Nevertheless, also in the minority game and route-choice games,
players switch less often between diﬀerent actions when they are provided with
information on the choices of others (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007; Selten et al.,
2007). This could be explained under the learning model of the minority game
literature if the additional information induces players to account somehow for
their impact on the aggregate action (see Section 9.2.3), but it is not clear why this
would be the case.
A second dimension of information that has been studied in the literature
refers to the salience of information on the recent history of play. Bottazzi and
Devetag (2007) provide players with a string of past outcomes of varying length.
When players are provided with information on play in more rounds than just
the previous one, aggregate payoﬀs are signiﬁcantly higher. Bottazzi and Devetag
ﬁnd that a longer history allows players to correlate their behavior over a longer
time period. Notably, aggregate payoﬀs are highest in a treatment where players
are provided with information on several rounds, and play is characterized by a
substantial lack of short-range correlations between own current and past actions.
Hence,playersseemtoexploittheadditionalinformationtoimprovetheirpayoﬀs.
All together, these experimental studies lend some support to the learning
model proposed in the minority game literature. However, the question how in-
formation inﬂuences play in congestion games has still not been satisfactorily
answered. It would be interesting to compare players’ behavior under diﬀerent in-
formationaltreatmentsindiﬀerentcongestiongames.Whilemostlearningmodels
make similar predictions for the diﬀerent congestion games discussed here, intu-
itively, one would expect that information will play a diﬀerent role in these games,
as emotions like envy and regret will be more important in some games than in
others, and also the scope for repeated-game strategies diﬀers across games. Such
a systematic comparison would allow one to better separate the learning eﬀects
from possible repeated-game and behavioral eﬀects.
4 A repeated-game strategy that is eﬀective in the minority game is one in which players “take
turns”: players alternately choose each of the two actions in such a way that each player is in
the minority roughly half of the time. Indeed, Helbing et al. (2005) ﬁnd some evidence of such
behavior in their experiments on route-choice games with small groups, but it is unlikely that
players will be able to successfully play according to such a repeated-game equilibrium when
the number of players is large.9.5 C 255
9.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have given a critical account of the learning model proposed in
the minority game literature, and related it to standard learning and evolutionary
models in economics, showing that it shares quite a few features with these mod-
els. Still, the predictions of this learning model are markedly diﬀerent from the
predictions from other models. We have argued that these predictions are in line
with a number of experimental results on the minority game and related games
which cannot be explained by other learning models.
However, our understanding of learning in such games is still complete. For
instance, the eﬀect of information on play is unclear. An interesting direction for
further research would be to systematically vary players’ information in experi-
ments on diﬀerent congestion games such as the minority game and the market
entry game, and to compare play under the diﬀerent information treatments and
across games. While most learning models provide similar predictions for these
games,intuitively,onewouldexpectthatinformationmayhavediﬀerenteﬀectsin
these games, as in some games, repeated-game strategies or emotions may play a
larger role than in others. Such an experiment may help shed light on the question
which learning model is appropriate in such games.Bibliography
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Netwerken en leerprocessen binnen de speltheorie
Ditproefschrifthandeltovertweeonderwerpen,netwerkenenspeltheorie,enleer-
processen in spelen. Deel I van dit proefschrift kijkt naar netwerken. Netwerken
spelen een belangrijke rol binnen de economie. Ten eerste geven netwerken toe-
gang tot zaken als informatie en kapitaal. Empirische studies laten bijvoorbeeld
zien dat veel mensen een baan vinden via hun vrienden. Ten tweede wordt het
gedrag en welzijn van een individu vaak meer be¨ ınvloed door degenen met wie
hij een directe relatie heeft dan door het gedrag van de gehele bevolking. Wanneer
iemand bijvoorbeeld een communicatietechnologie kiest, kijkt hij vooral welke
communicatietechnologie zijn collega’s, familieleden of vrienden gebruiken.
In dit proefschrift nemen we aan dat economische agenten zoals individuen
en bedrijven gepositioneerd zijn op een netwerk. Elke agent, ook wel speler ge-
noemd, speelt een gegeven spel met zijn buren in het netwerk. In het voorbeeld
hierboven over de keuze van een communicatietechnologie speelt ieder individu
een co¨ ordinatiespel met zijn buren. In dit geval zijn de buren van een speler de
mensen met wie hij wil kunnen communiceren, bijvoorbeeld zijn collega’s. Iedere
speler moet een keuze maken voor een communicatietechnologie. Wanneer hij
dezelfde technologie kiest als een buurspeler, krijgt hij een positieve uitbetaling
die hetzelfde is voor alle technologie¨ en, anders ontvangt hij een uitbetaling gelijk
aan nul. Zijn totale uitbetaling is gelijk aan de som van de uitbetalingen over de
verschillende interacties met zijn buren. Een speler zal dan die technologie kiezen
die door het grootste aantal buren gekozen wordt; zie Figuur 1. Echter, welke
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Figuur 1. Spelers kunnen kiezen tussen twee technologie¨ en, X en Y. De
uitbetalingsmatrix links geeft de uitbetalingen van het co¨ ordinatiespel
tussen speler i en ´ e´ en van zijn buren, j. De tabel rechts geeft de to-
tale uitbetaling van speler i wanneer hij dezelfde technologie kiest als
ki van zijn ni buren, waar ki = 0,1,...,ni.
kiezen, enzovoort. Om te bepalen welke technologie hij moet kiezen, moet een
speler dus ook de mogelijke keuzes van de buren van zijn buren en de buren
van de buren van zijn buren etcetera beschouwen. Een complicatie hierbij is dat,
hoewel een speler vaak wel zijn directe omgeving in het netwerk kent, hij zelden
informatie heeft over de structuur van het gehele netwerk. Een speler zal dus
verwachtingen moeten vormen over de netwerkstructuur en de interacties tussen
de verschillende spelers.
Bovenstaand voorbeeld, hoe gestileerd ook, geeft een goed inzicht in de fac-
torendievanbelangzijnalswekijkennaardeinteractiesvaneconomischeagenten
in een netwerkcontext. Ten eerste handelen economische agenten vaak strategisch,
dat wil zeggen, ze kiezen de actie die optimaal is gegeven het gedrag van andere
agenten. In het voorbeeld hierboven kiezen agenten de communicatietechnologie
diehendehoogsteuitbetalinggeeft,gegevendekeuzesvanhunburen.Tentweede
zijn de economisch relevante netwerken over het algemeen groot en hebben ze
een complexe structuur. Bovendien veranderen ze voortdurend van structuur. Zo
zijn samenwerkingsverbanden in onderzoek en ontwikkelingen in sectoren als
de biotechnologie-sector erg ﬂexibel om te kunnen reageren op nieuwe (techno-
logische) ontwikkelingen. Om deze redenen zullen agenten over het algemeen
onvolledige informatie hebben over het netwerk waartoe ze behoren. In Deel I van
dit proefschrift kijken we daarom naar de interactie tussen onvolledige informatie
en strategische interactie in een netwerkcontext.
InHoofdstuk3en4kijkenwenaardegevoeligheidvanspeltheoretischevoor-
spellingen voor aannames over de verwachtingen van spelers over hun netwerk.
In het voorbeeld over de keuze van communicatiebeslissingen hierboven is hetS 270
belangrijkwatvoorverwachtingenspelershebbenoverhetgedragvanhunburen,
de buren van hun buren, enzovoort. Meer algemeen, wanneer spelers onvolledige
informatie hebben over de netwerkstructuur moeten ook de verwachtingen en
de informatie van spelers over hun netwerk gemodelleerd worden. We nemen
aan dat het netwerk waarop spelers gepositioneerd zijn getrokken wordt uit een
klassenetwerkenvolgenseenbepaaldekansmaat.Dezekansmaatvormtde(geza-
menlijke) prior van spelers. Daarnaast hebben spelers lokale informatie over hun
netwerk: ze kennen hun graad in hetnetwerk, dat wil zeggen, het aantal buren dat
ze hebben in het netwerk. Dit is private informatie, d.i., het type van een speler is
zijn graad in het netwerk.
Hoofdstuk 3 handelt over Bayesiaanse netwerkspelen. Bayesiaanse netwerk-
spelen zijn Bayesiaanse spelen waarin spelers gepositioneerd zijn op een netwerk
en onvolledige informatie hebben over het netwerk. De vraag die we in dit hoofd-
stuk proberen te beantwoorden is welke aspecten van een prior van belang zijn
voor speltheoretische voorspellingen. Meer speciﬁek, neem twee priors. We on-
derzoeken onder welke condities op deze priors het zo is dat voor elke uitbeta-
lingsfunctie, voor elk Bayesiaans-Nash-evenwicht in een spel met deze uitbeta-
lingsfunctie waarin de spelers ´ e´ en van deze priors hebben er een bijna-evenwicht
bestaat in het corresponderende spel waarin de spelers de andere prior hebben
zodanig dat de verwachte uitbetalingen ongeveer hetzelfde zijn (en vice versa). In
dat geval zeggen we dat de twee priors vergelijkbare strategische voorspellingen
doen: de verwachte uitbetalingen onder de (bijna-)evenwichten onder de twee
priors liggen dicht bij elkaar voor elke mogelijke uitbetalingsfunctie. We laten zien
dat een noodzakelijke en voldoende voorwaarde voor twee priors om vergelijk-
barestrategischevoorspellingentedoenisdatzeweinigverschillenintermenvan
de kansverdeling over lokale gebeurtenissen, dat wil zeggen, gebeurtenissen die
betrekking hebben op de typen van een speler en zijn buren.
Dit resultaat heeft twee belangrijke implicaties. Ten eerste betekent dit re-
sultaat dat het voldoende is om de distributie van spelerstypen en de correlatie
tussendetypenvanburentevari¨ erenomallemogelijkestrategischeuitkomstente
verkennen.Aandeenekantbetekentditdathetnietvoldoendeisomdedistributie
van spelerstypen te vari¨ eren, zoals tot nu toe vaak gebeurt in de literatuur. Aan de
andere kant beperkt het ook de verzameling priors die men hoeft te bekijken: pri-
ors hoeven slechts langs twee dimensies gevari¨ eerd te worden, namelijk in termen
van de typedistributie en de correlaties tussen de typen van buren. De tweede im-
plicatie van dit resultaat is dat Bayesiaanse netwerkspelen gezien kunnen worden
als een verzameling van overlappende lokale spelen, zodat we ons niet hoeven

















Figuur 2. De netwerken in (a) en (b) zijn identiek in termen van hun
lokale eigenschappen. In beide netwerken zijn er 6 knopen (spelers)
met graad 2 die alleen verbonden zijn met andere knopen met graad 2,
en 4 knopen met graad 1 die alleen verbonden zijn met andere knopen
met graad 1.
Meer concreet, beschouw de netwerken in in Figuur 2(a) en (b), en beschouw de
volgende twee priors. De eerste prior geeft kans 1 aan de netwerken die isomorf1
zijn aan het netwerk in Figuur 2(a), waarbij elk netwerk in de isomorﬁeklasse
gelijke kans heeft. De andere prior geeft kans 1 aan de netwerken die isomorf
zijn aan de netwerken in Figuur 2(b), waarbij weer elk netwerk in de betreﬀende
isomorﬁeklasse dezelfde kans heeft. Deze priors zijn duidelijk heel verschillend in
de kansen die ze toewijzen aan niet-lokale gebeurtenissen—bijvoorbeeld aan in-
dividuele netwerken—maar zijn identiek in de kansen die ze toewijzen aan lokale
gebeurtenissen,zoalsdekansdateenspelermeteengegevengraadeenbuurheeft
met graad 2. Onze resultaten laten zien dat deze priors identiek zijn in termen van
hun speltheoretische voorspellingen, ook al zijn de netwerken die een positieve
kans hebben onder beide priors erg verschillend.
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt netwerkspelen waarin er onzekerheid is over het aan-
tal spelers in het netwerk, naast onzekerheid over de structuur van het netwerk.
Het is redelijk om aan te nemen dat er onzekerheid bestaat over het aantal spelers
in een netwerk: wanneer spelers onvolledige informatie hebben over de netwerk-
structuur zullen ze vaak ook niet precies weten hoeveel spelers tot het netwerk
behoren. In dit geval is de spelersverzameling niet algemeen bekend, waardoor
deze klasse spelen geen onderklasse is van de verzameling Bayesiaanse spelen,
in tegenstelling tot de klasse netwerkspelen die in Hoofdstuk 3 bestudeerd wor-
den. We nemen nu aan dat het netwerk getrokken wordt uit de klasse van alle
1 Twee netwerken zijn isomorf wanneer ze gedeﬁnieerd zijn op dezelfde verzameling spelers en
wanneer de spelers op dezelfde manier verbonden zijn.S 272
netwerken met een eindig aantal spelers. Wanneer er onzekerheid is over het aan-
talspelersinhetnetwerk,isdevoorwaardedieweafgeleidhebbeninHoofdstuk3
voor twee priors om vergelijkbare voorspellingen te geven niet langer voldoende.
We laten zien dat twee priors vergelijkbare voorspellingen geven in deze klasse
spelen dan en slechts dan als (i) de priors vergelijkbare kans toekennen aan lokale
gebeurtenissen, (ii) een speler met grote kans een type heeft zodanig dat zijn con-
ditionele verwachtingen over de typen van zijn buren bijna hetzelfde zijn onder
de twee priors, en dat zijn buren met hoge kans (gegeven het type van de spe-
ler) een type hebben zodanig dat hun conditionele verwachtingen over de typen
van hun buren bijna hetzelfde zijn onder de twee priors, en dat met hoge kans
(gegeven hun type) de conditionele verwachtingen van hun buren bijna hetzelfde
zijn, enzovoort.
Conditie (i) komt overeen met de conditie die we afgeleid hebben in Hoofd-
stuk3.Conditie(ii)isnieuw.Deredendatwedezeconditienodighebbenwanneer
we onzekerheid over het aantal spelers in het netwerk toelaten is dat de hogere-
orde verwachtingen van spelers nu een rol kunnen spelen in de zin dat priors nu
ook gevoelig kunnen zijn voor gebeurtenissen die een lage (ex ante) kans hebben.
Dat is, gebeurtenissen die een lage kans hebben kunnen een groot eﬀect hebben
op speltheoretische uitkomsten via de conditionele verwachtingen van spelers.
Beschouw een verzameling typen waarvoor de conditionele verwachtingen sterk
verschillen onder twee priors. Een speler die ´ e´ en van die typen heeft, volgt dan
mogelijkeenanderestrategieonderdetweepriors.Indatgevalkunnendezetypen
andere typen “infecteren” via de conditionele verwachtingen: een speler kan het
waarschijnlijk achten (gegeven zijn type) dat zijn buren het waarschijnlijk achten
(gegeven hun type) dat . . . de conditionele verwachtingen van hun buren heel
verschillend zijn onder de twee priors. Zelfs wanneer de verzameling van typen
waarvoor de conditionele verwachtingen onder beide priors sterk verschillen een
lage kans heeft (ex ante), kan de verzameling ge¨ ınfecteerde typen een hoge kans
hebben, zodat de evenwichten onder beide priors sterk zullen verschillen in ter-
men van verwachte uitbetalingen. Dit geval wordt uitgesloten door conditie (ii).
Priors kunnen alleen gevoelig zijn voor gebeurtenissen die een lage (ex ante)
kans hebben wanneer er onzekerheid is over het aantal spelers in het netwerk.
Wanneer er onzekerheid is over het aantal spelers kan de verzameling typen die
positieve kans hebben aftelbaar oneindig zijn, terwijl de typeverzameling eindig
is wanneer het aantal spelers algemeen bekend is.2 We laten zien dat, wanneer het
2 Het type van een speler is zijn graad in het netwerk. Wanneer het aantal spelers n is, dan is de
kans 0 dat de graad van een speler in het netwerk groter is dan n−1, zodat de verzameling typen
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aantal spelers algemeen bekend is, conditie (i) conditie (ii) impliceert, maar dat in
andere gevallen conditie (i) en conditie (ii) beide noodzakelijk zijn.
Het resultaat in Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat hogere-orde verwachtingen een
belangrijke rol kunnen spelen in netwerkspelen. Bij de aﬂeiding van de resultaten
wordt gebruik gemaakt van een afbeelding van een stochastisch netwerk van
spelers op een vaste interactiestructuur van typen. Vervolgens gebruiken we de
equivalentie die in eerder werk is vastgesteld tussen spelen met lokale interacties
en spelen met onvolledige informatie om gebruik te kunnen maken van con-
cepten uit de literatuur van spelen met onvolledige informatie en hogere-orde
verwachtingen.
Gemotiveerd door het belang van correlatie tussen de graden van buurspe-
lers in netwerkspelen ontwikkelt Hoofdstuk 5 een model voor de verwachtingen
van spelers waarin correlatie mogelijk is tussen de graden van buren. De meeste
modellen die tot dusverre in de speltheoretische literatuur gebruikt worden ne-
men aan dat de graden van spelers (bijna) onafhankelijk zijn. Zoals aangetoond
in Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 kunnen de evenwichten die onder priors die voldoen aan die
aanname gevonden worden sterk verschillen van de evenwichten onder priors
met correlatie tussen spelerstypen, zelfs wanneer de distributie van typen gelijk
is onder beide klassen van priors. Bovendien zullen in veel economisch relevante
situaties de graden van buren gecorreleerd zijn door de manier waarop interacties
georganiseerd zijn. Beschouw bijvoorbeeld netwerken van bedrijven die samen-
werken in onderzoek en ontwikkeling. Deze netwerken bestaan uit overlappende
samenwerkingsverbanden, zoals ge¨ ıllustreerd in Figuur 3. Bedrijven zijn verbon-
deninhetnetwerkdanenslechtsdanalszetenminste ´ e´ ensamenwerkingsverband
gemeenschappelijk hebben.
Hoofdstuk 5 ontwikkelt een model waarin de correlatie tussen de graden
van spelers voortkomt uit een dergelijke groepstructuur. We karakteriseren de
typedistributie en de clustering in dit model. De clustering van een model is de
conditionele kans dat twee spelers buren zijn in het netwerk, gegeven dat ze
een gemeenschappelijke buur hebben. We laten zien dat we modellen voor de
verwachtingen van spelers kunnen construeren met elke gewenste distributie van
typenenmetelkegewensteclustering.Ditisbelangrijkomdatditeenmogelijkheid
biedt om de invloed van clustering op strategische interacties in netwerkspelen te
onderzoeken.
Deel II van dit proefschrift handelt over leerprocessen in spelen. Traditioneel









Figuur 3. Een voorbeeld van een onderzoeksnetwerk in de biotech-
nologiesector. De ﬁguur laat alle gemeenschappelijke samenwerkings-
verbanden in onderzoek en ontwikkeling van zeven bedrijven (Abbott
Laboratories (AL), Astra AB (AAB), Eli Lilly & Co (EL), Hoﬀmann-
La Roche Inc. (HLR), American Home Products Corp (AHP), Millen-
nium (M), en Pﬁzer (P)) in de periode 1994–2007 zien. Andere bedrij-
ven in het netwerk zijn Genetics Institute Inc. (G), en Roche Holding
AG (RH).
inspelen.Delaatstejarenisersteedsmeeraandachtvoorleerprocessendiekunnen
verklaren of en zo ja, hoe spelers leren volgens een evenwicht te spelen in een
bepaald spel. Een beter begrip hiervan is noodzakelijk omdat veel strategische
situaties dusdanig complex zijn dat het niet aannemelijk is dat spelers direct
volgens een evenwicht van het spel zullen spelen. Bovendien kan de theorie van
leerprocessen helpen om een beter inzicht te krijgen in de vraag of spelers over het
algemeen volgens een bepaalde klasse evenwichten zullen spelen in plaats van
volgens een andere klasse, en zo ja, waarom dat het geval is. Ook kan een studie
vanleerprocessenmeerinzichtgevenindevraagwaarominexperimentenspelers
soms wel, en soms niet volgens een evenwicht leren te spelen. Tenslotte kunnen
de inzichten verkregen uit de studie van leerprocessen helpen om bestaande e-
venwichtsconcepten te beoordelen. Zo convergeren sommige leerprocessen naar
bepaalde verﬁjningen van Nash-evenwichten, terwijl onder andere leerprocessen
de voorspellingen veel zwakker zijn dan Nash-evenwichten.
De hoofdstukken in Deel II van dit proefschrift dragen op verschillende
manieren bij aan een beter inzicht in leerprocessen. Hoofdstuk 6 introduceert een
leerproces waarin spelers altijd een beste antwoord spelen tegen de verwachtin-
gen die ze hebben van de acties van hun opponenten gebaseerd op het recente
verleden, maar daarbij een voorkeur hebben voor beste antwoorden die meer re-
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dat ze een beste antwoord kiezen, ze tegelijkertijd een voorkeur hebben voor meer
recente acties. Dit is een realistische aanname: recent gespeelde acties liggen per
deﬁnitie verser in het geheugen dan andere acties. Bovendien ontwikkelen spelers
vaak gewoontes, of gebruiken ze simpele vuistregels bij het kiezen van de juiste
actie, fenomenen die gemodelleerd kunnen worden door een dergelijke voorkeur
voor recent gespeelde acties.
Welatenziendatditleerprocesconvergeertnaarzogenoemdeminimaleprep-
verzamelingen.Minimaleprepverzamelingen—waarbij“prep”staatvoor“prepa-
ration”, oftewel voorbereiding—zijn een oplossingsconcept dat elke speler een
verzamelingactiesvoorschrijftzodanigdathijtenminste ´ e´ enbesteantwoordheeft
tegen elke mogelijke verwachting die consistent is met de acties die voorgeschre-
ven zijn aan zijn opponenten. Dit oplossingsconcept combineert dus de aanname
dat spelers rationeel zijn (in de zin dat de verzameling voorgeschreven acties van
een speler een beste antwoord moet bevatten tegen elke mogelijke verwachting
die consistent is met de aan zijn opponenten voorgeschreven acties) met de aan-
name dat spelers bij voorkeur geen overbodige ballast met zich meetorsen, in de
zin dat iedere speler een verzameling acties gebruikt die zo klein mogelijk is. Door
te laten zien dat het hierboven beschreven leerproces convergeert naar minimale
prepverzamelingen geven we een dynamische motivatie voor dit oplossingscon-
cept.
In Hoofdstuk 7 bekijken we het concept van minimale prepverzamelingen
en het gerelateerde oplossingsconcept van minimale curbverzamelingen nader.
Het verschil tussen minimale curbverzamelingen—curb staat voor “closed under
rational behavior”—en minimale prepverzamelingen is dat minimale curbverza-
melingeneisendatdevoorgeschrevenactieverzamelingvaniederespelerallebeste
antwoordenbevattegenverwachtingendieconsistentzijnmetdevoorgeschreven
acties van de andere spelers, in plaats van tenminste ´ e´ en. Merk op dat onder beide
oplossingsconcepten de oplossing van een spel niet bestaat uit een verzameling
punten in de strategieruimte, zoals bijvoorbeeld bij het Nash-evenwicht het geval
is, maar uit een verzameling actieproﬁelen. We geven een axiomatische karakteri-
satie van minimale prepverzamelingen en minimale curbverzamelingen. In het
bijzonder laten we zien dat beide oplossingsconcepten consistent zijn in de zin
dat voor beide oplossingsconcepten geldt dat, gegeven dat andere spelers volgens
een bepaalde oplossing spelen, het oplossingsconcept jou voorschrijft hetzelfde
te doen. Dit is een belangrijk resultaat, omdat behalve het Nash-evenwicht, geen
enkel oplossingsconcept dat als oplossing van een spel een verzameling punten in
de strategieruimte voorschrijft voldoet aan het axioma van consistentie (en twee
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curbverzamelingen ook voldoen). Daarentegen voldoen minimale prepverzame-
lingen en minimale curbverzamelingen wel aan deze natuurlijke eigenschappen.
InHoofdstuk8en9richtenweonzeaandachtopleerprocessenineenspeciale
klasse spelen, te weten de klasse van de minoriteitsspelen. In een minoriteitsspel
moet een oneven aantal spelers kiezen tussen twee alternatieven/acties. De be-
langrijkste aanname is dat het voor een speler die het alternatief heeft gekozen
dat door het grootste aantal spelers gekozen is loont om het andere alternatief te
kiezen.Dittypespeleniseeninteressantmodelvoorverschillendesituatieswaarin
congestie een rol speelt. Deze klasse spelen is ook vanuit een theoretisch oogpunt
interessant. In plaats van te co¨ ordineren op een gezamenlijke keuze, zoals in het
hierboven beschreven spel waarin spelers een communicatietechnologie moeten
kiezen, moeten spelers in minoriteitsspelen co¨ ordineren om te diﬀerenti¨ eren: spe-
lers moeten zich zo goed mogelijk “spreiden” over de twee acties. Dit lijkt, in
ieder geval op het eerste gezicht, moeilijker dan te co¨ ordineren op dezelfde actie.
Bovendien heeft het spel een groot aantal evenwichten. Het is dus niet direct
duidelijk of en hoe spelers in deze klasse spelen volgens ´ e´ en van de evenwichten
van het spel zullen leren te spelen.
In Hoofdstuk 8 karakteriseren we de evenwichten van deze klasse spelen, en
bekijken we de voorspellingen van verschillende bekende speltheoretische leer-
modellenvoordezeklassespelen.Welatenziendatdevoorspellingenvanveelge-
bruikte speltheoretische leermodellen niet altijd overeenkomen. Terwijl de repli-
cator dynamica bijvoorbeeld convergentie voorspelt naar een Nash-evenwicht
met maximaal ´ e´ en speler die een gemengde strategie speelt, valt de verzameling
stationaire punten onder de verstoorde beste-antwoord dynamica samen met de
verzameling van de logit quantal-response-evenwichten van het spel. Voor mi-
noriteitsspelen met drie spelers bestaat de verzameling Nash-evenwichten die de
limiet vormt van een reeks logit quantal-response-evenwichten met afnemende
ruis uit de zuivere Nash-evenwichten, de Nash-evenwichten waarin ´ e´ en speler
beide acties met gelijke kans kiest en het Nash-evenwicht waarin alle spelers
beide acties met gelijke kans kiezen.
Datdetheoretischeleermodellengeenuitsluitselkunnengevenoverdevraag
welk gedrag we kunnen verwachten in experimenten is in het bijzonder belang-
rijk omdat de uitkomsten van experimenten niet goed kunnen worden verklaard
met de standaard speltheoretische leermodellen. Aan de ene kant is het geag-
gregeerde gedrag van experimentele subjecten in overeenstemming met de Nash-
voorspelling dat spelers zich min of meer gelijk over de alternatieven verspreiden.
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te spelen. Dit kan niet goed worden verklaard met standaard speltheoretische
leermodellen.
We kijken daarom in Hoofdstuk 9 naar een alternatief leermodel. In dit
modelzijnspelersuitgerustmeteenstochastischeverzamelingvuistregelsdiehen
voorschrijven welke actie ze moeten kiezen gegeven een geschiedenis van recente
uitkomsten. Welke vuistregel spelers kiezen wordt bepaald door het succes van
de verschillende vuistregels in het verleden. Doordat de verzameling vuistregels
typisch zal verschillen van speler tot speler, introduceert dit heterogeneteit in het
leermodel. We laten zien dat dit model onder bepaalde omstandigheden de expe-
rimentele uitkomsten goed kan verklaren: onder bepaalde condities organiseren
spelers zich in verschillende groepen die steeds verschillende keuzes maken. Het
kan bijvoorbeeld zo zijn dat spelers zich organiseren in twee groepen: ´ e´ en groep
die de vuistregel gebruikt dat ze van actie wisselen wanneer de actie die zij kiezen
steeds gekozen wordt door de meerderheid, en ´ e´ en groep met de vuistregel dat
ze blijven vasthouden aan hun actie wanneer die actie steeds door de meerder-
heid gekozen wordt—bijvoorbeeld omdat ze verwachten dat anderen van actie
zullen veranderen. Onder bepaalde omstandigheden zullen de “antagonistische”
groepen ongeveer even groot zijn. Dit leidt niet tot Nash-spel op microniveau,
maar wel tot een ongeveer gelijke verdeling van spelers over de twee acties, in
overeenstemming met experimentele resultaten.